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Summary of Thesis 
Ideas and ideological attachments are a powerful motivating force over political 
activity. This thesis studies how a group of British Labour parliamentarians developed 
an ideological link to the Soviet Union and how this attachment acted as a prism 
through which they viewed the world. This led to an opposition to the Cold War to 
develop that was sympathetic to the objectives of the Soviet Union. This led pro-
Sovietism to become an established, but minority, tradition of British socialism. This 
is explored through a study of the ideals and activities associated with these beliefs by 
focussing on individual MPs. 
Using MPs as case studies, and studying them within the context of a period of the 
Cold War, we are able to understand how their activism became reactive to 
international relations and how their ideas filtered into developing traditions within 
the party's left-wing. The thesis rejects the notion that those who engaged in pro-
Soviet activism were agents of the Soviet Union and crypto-Communists and 
develops a framework within which these figures can be understood as principled 
socialists who shared the objectives of preventing an escalation of the Cold War and 
establishing a socialist future. 
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Introduction 
Pro-Sovietism and the British Labour Party 
The Party and the Left 
The British Parliamentary Labour party (PLP) is traditionally described as a coalition of 
left-wing traditions and ideologies. Wright described this coalition as fragile because the 
leadership was often tom between the policy outcomes imposed by the realities of 
governance and those prescribed by ideology. 1 The debate between approaches frequently 
divided the party. The leadership adopted a largely pragmatic and consensual approach to 
government, while the left argued that ideology should guide the party. The intra-party 
debate thus centred upon what was possible; the leadership maintained the stance that 
radical socialist policies were untenable for Britain and unpopular with the electorate. The 
left, in contrast, argued that socialist principles alone should determine policy and that, if 
the leadership showed determination in the pursuit of socialist goals, the electorate would 
respond favourably. Thorpe argued that similar divisions existed within the traditional 
constituency of the party, the working class. 2 Britain has traditionally lacked a 
revolutionary socialist tradition and, therefore, any socialist political grouping intent on 
securing electoral success has had to adopt a centre-Ieft3 or social democratic4 position. 
The democratic socialist left largely rejected this as a legitimate constraint. 
The internal divisions in the British Labour party are amplified by the fact that the party 
was founded upon an alliance of autonomous organisations. This factor led Shaw to 
conclude that Labour was "neither socialist nor... a party". ~ He described the party as a 
confederation of societies that had amalgamated only because they represented, to 
differing extents, working class interests. This has led political analysts to define Labour's 
ideology not as socialism but 'labourism'; a coalition of group interests some of which can 
be described as ideological but, in general, are nothing more than political objectives 
derived from the interests of a single class.6 We can therefore view Labour party policy as 
having emerged out of a loose collection of ideological traditions, restricted by a 
traditional non-radical tendency within the electorate and the party's structure and also by 
the existence of a largely right-wing parliamentary opposition. From this analysis we can 
recognise that socialist achievements, such as the nationalisation programme and 
foundation of the Welfare state, could only have been achieved in a consensual political 
atmosphere. 7 
2 
There is no easy way to characterise those parliamentarians who became known as the 
left-wing of the PLP. The left-wing traditions, which filtered into the ethos of the Labour 
party, included the influence of Marxism and Trotskyism, libertarianism, intellectual 
humanism, Christianity and internationalism. It would be misleading to discuss the 
existence of a left-wing ideology, or indeed one definite labourist ideology. Across the 
party there existed divisions over the objectives that should be pursued, which were often 
dependent upon the individual's socialist ideals. Furthermore, each of the ideological 
concepts held had blurred boundaries and lacked definite objectives relevant to everyday 
politicking. Thus the left of the Labour party can be defined as a loose collective united 
only around broad objectives, that lacked a definitive ideological core.s 
Historically high politics within the party has been viewed as a battle between left and 
centre-right factions, for example the Bevinite-Bevanite divide within the 1945-50 
government, or the Healey-Benn split of 1981. However, by no means were these factions 
organised or cohesive. In fact the ideological divisions within the party can be viewed as 
existing in minutiae within the left. The left-wing did have a broadly defined policy 
objective; to improve the conditions of the party's traditional constituency, the working 
class. The central tenets of the left-wing agenda were state ownership of the means of 
production and a non-aggressive foreign policy. The latter would determine what defence 
was necessary for Britain. However the proposed strategies for achieving this agenda 
differed vastly. There was no single philosophy that acted as a guide for left-wing activity 
and the broad objectives were not explicit and liable to flux. However, these two tenets 
were the broadly unifying ideological features of the left-wing agenda. 
The Left and pro-Sovietism 
The attitude towards the Soviet Union was one issue that separated the left. Most Labour 
left-wingers were at best antipathetic to Soviet Communism. Despite this, opposition to 
the Cold War did emerge out of Bevanism; the left-wing philosophy that enjoyed support 
of the majority of the left. The Bevanite mission was to unravel Britain's international ties 
that opposed the implementation of a socialist domestic policy.9 They particularly 
opposed Atlanticism; the support for the Anglo-American special relationship, and argued 
that Britain should establish a neutral Third Camp in alliance with socialist European 
powers. Trotskyists largely agreed with the Bevanite principles, but their arguments were 
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linked intrinsically to a more revolutionary tradition. ID While these traditions became 
shaped within a world polarised by the Cold War the majority of left-wingers retained a 
fundamentally anti-Soviet perspective. 
However there were a minority who did argue that a link existed between the Soviet model 
and the global socialist movement. These individuals were representative of the pro-Soviet 
tradition of left-wing politics. They held a sympathetic view of the Soviet Union, argued 
that it represented the only practical model of socialism and developed a theory for 
explaining any inconsistencies between the Soviet model and the Marxist template by 
highlighting that the regime had been beset by aggression since inception. This allowed 
these figures to develop a rationale for supporting and protecting the Soviet model from 
ideological and military attack. Pro-Sovietism became an ideological guide for action, 
those who possessed this sympathetic view of the Soviet model actively pursued strategies 
of opposition to the Cold War anti-Soviet rationale and attempted to build political, 
cultural and economic links between British society and the Soviet people and 
government. These activities were driven by events in the sphere of international relations 
and, in particular, the emergence of two camps; one socialist, represented by the 
Communist bloc. the other capitalist and led by the United States of America. 
This international ideological dichotomy had existed since October 1917, but was only 
ratified as a bipolar division in 1946 by the Truman Doctrine and Churchill's Fulton 
speech. This division led some left-wingers to feel forced into making a choice between 
western reformist socialism and Marxist-Leninist state socialism. While the former 
achieved hegemony, and the Labour leadership adopted a largely Atlanticist policy,11 there 
were those who opposed the anti-Communist rationale as defined by the Truman Doctrine. 
These figures pursued an active role in opposing the cross-party consensual foreign and 
defence policy. They argued that Britain'S post-war foreign policy was Churchillian in 
origin and should be re-oriented by a Labour government. These individuals were a 
minority who existed on the fringes of both Bevanism and Trotskyism and it remains 
difficult to categorise them within the traditional party political left-right spectrum. 
The Cold War narrative of pro-Sovietism 
When we are introduced to the pro-Soviet figures it is usually in pejorative terms. These 
definitions ignore the nuances in their political thought and fail to attempt to explain their 
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activities and arguments as a tradition within Labour's ethos. Histories of the party have 
largely, and perhaps rightly, defined them as a group with insignificant influence and so 
worthy of little academic attention. Those who have performed studies of the left-wing, or 
indeed left-wing thought, have offered them little more attention. In fact we find them 
lumped together and written off as antithetical to Labour's traditional ethos. Jenkins used 
the phrase "neo-Stalinist left",12 a view supported in Foote's work on the party's political 
thought. 13 Morgan, a little more charitably, defined the same group as "the far left 
fringe,,14 but also employed the pejorative terms "fellow-travelling left-wingers", IS 
"crypto-Communists,,16 and "left-wing gadflies.,,17 Thus they were consigned to history as 
the "loony left"; an image promulgated by the right during the 1980s. This perception was 
largely supported by the party leadership. Hattersley described them as members of the 
"illegitimate left".18 This, Hattersley explained, included Trotskyites, Maoists and 
Stalinists. He recalled that Neil Kinnock, as party leader, was: 
Determined to remove what he regarded as parasites, cuckooing in Labour's nest-
as much because of the electoral damage that they did as because of his undoubted 
opposition to their philosophy. 19 
Evidence suggests that the majority of the Labour party leadership shared this view of the 
pro-Soviet left. 
A powerful Cold War espionage narrative, which classifies all those who were 
sympathetic to the Soviet Union as spies and traitors, reinforces this negative 
historiography. It has been the raison d' etre of many writers to expose those who they 
allege were agents working on behalf of the Soviet Union. Blake Baker, Brian Crozier, 
Chapman Pincher and Nigel West have all devoted a significant amount of their writing 
and research to exposing the network of Communist agents active in Britain. This 
narrative is symptomatic of the fear of insurgent Communism that existed in Western 
societies. This was emphasised following the defection of Oleg Gordievsky and his 
subsequent collaboration with, Cambridge Professor and intelligence expert, Christopher 
Andrew. Revelations that Labour members were deeply involved in pro-Soviet activity are 
also extensive in Gordievsky's autobiography and in the work of Chapman Pincher.2o The 
watershed for such revelations emerged during the early 1980s and cemented the opinion 
that there was a profoundly dangerous aspect to the 'loony left' press caricature. These 
works epitomise the public expression of the opinion that the West was constantly under 
attack and that there were those within the British parliament who sympathised with, and 
indeed worked on behalf of, that Communist enemy power. 
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By the very nature, working as an agent for a foreign, enemy power is a clandestine 
activity. Therefore, it is difficult to prove or disprove complicity. The writers who alleged 
that those MPs who expressed pro-Soviet sympathies were Soviet agents depend upon this 
lack of clarity and rely on the willingness of their audience to believe their exposes. It 
should be noted, however, that this is an aspect of the Cold War mindset. On both sides of 
the global divide the attitude was zero-sum. Expressing pro-Soviet sympa~hies was 
equated to being an agent. The full gamut of agents from Alger Hiss, who passed 
information on the development of nuclear weaponry to the Soviet Union, to Will Owen,21 
proven to have taken money from the Czech StB for non-secret information, were all 
defined under the narrow definition of agent of the Soviet Union. 
The majority of literature on the subject is shrouded in sensationalism and relies upon a 
degree of innuendo. The best example of this authorship is Chapman Pincher. Developing 
the narrative following the conviction of Will Owen, Pincher, through several works, 
increased the atmosphere of suspicion claiming that there were more powerful, still 
undisclosed, Soviet agents within the Labour hierarchy. This notion has been reinforced 
by others including Blake Baker, Brian Crozier and to a lesser extent Nigel West. 22 
Pincher, as a journalist, sensationalised the story, hinting at individuals using allusion 
rather than concrete corroboration. An example of this is that throughout his works on the 
Labour party he stated that his contacts in the intelligence agencies had told him in private 
that there was a spy active in the Callaghan Cabinet. He also described Tony Benn as pro-
Soviet.23 Nowhere does he link the two statements, however, a connection can be made, 
and the reader can make whatever conclusion suits them. 24 
Agents: a question of perspectives 
The term agent needs some clarification. We need to understand what it meant exactly to 
be an agent of the Soviet Union, from the perspective of the KGB, and how an MP would 
be recruited. An important source of information is Oleg Gordievsky. As 'resident'2s in 
Britain 1980-83 he was party to many of the activities of the KGB and was able to define 
the terms used, and the type of work engaged in, by those MPs who were classified within 
the broad definition of agent. Gordievsky placed these MPs into three categories. An 
agent of the Soviet Union was an individual who did a variety of "little jobs" or "ran 
errands,,26 under the influence of their Russian contact. An agent, specifically of the KGB, 
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supplied information directly to a KGB officer as Gordievsky himself was. During the 
1970s a new term was introduced, the 'confidential contact'. These were very similar to 
the first category of agent of the Soviet Union. To be classified as such the individual had 
to have supplied information and followed KGB instructions on a significant number of 
occasions. Control, however, was limited and the relationship was often open and friendly. 
This is in stark contrast to the relationships described by Pincher. 
It is within the latter category that most of the individuals analysed in this study would 
fall. Gordievsky accepted that they were not spies, and that their usefulness was limited, 
but that they were viewed as KGB assets. This perception was held because they were 
sympathetic towards the objectives of the Soviet Union and, because of this, were 
prepared to divulge information that was unobtainable through official channels and would 
reiterate Soviet arguments as their own. Due to their position of influence, and 
prominence in the press, they were seen as important and KGB officers, Gordievsky 
recalled, were encouraged to recruit as many of this type of contact as possible. 
Evidence from other active Soviet agents reinforces Gordievsky's claim that penetration of 
the Western political structures was prioritised. Peter Gutzeit, the New York KGB station 
chief, when rationalising the requirement for extra expenses to aid the election campaigns 
of sympathetic would-be Congressmen and Senators, argued that this was necessary to 
"create a group of our people in the legislative bodies, define their political positions, and 
insert them there to actively influence events.,,27 This indicates that there was a strategy to 
install and then control a sub-group of politicians within the legislatures of non-
Communist governments. The purpose for this is clear. losef Frolik28 argued that MPs 
enjoy day to day contact with the governing forces of a country and so were placed in an 
ideal position; not only could they leak information on policy, they could also argue a 
certain line. 
Parliamentary agents were, therefore, viewed as being of the highest importance. Sir 
Martin Furnival lones, a former Director General of MI5, stated: 
of ail their British targets, Members of Parliament were the most vulnerable ... 
[Furthermore] if the Russian Intelligence Service can recruit a backbench MP and 
he climbs to a ministerial position, the spy is home and dry.29 
Gordievsky used the case of Norwegian politician Arne Treholt to emphasise the potential 
importance of sympathetic MPs. Treholt rose to the equivalent of Under-secretary in the 
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Norwegian Ministry for Defence, potentially he could have become Minister had his 
Soviet connections remained concealed.3o Similarly, Gordievsky listed Michael Foot as a 
favourable target for cultivation during his early career.31 Had Foot been recruited the 
KGB would have had a potential Prime Minister under their influence. Gordievsky 
claimed that by the time of his residency Foot was no longer approachable, but had run 
errands for his predecessors. However, no evidence exists to substantiate the allegation. 
Furthermore, this was strongly repudiated by Foot, forcing Gordievsky to retract his 
statement. 
Josef Frolik, Czech StB agent, also claimed to have handled three Labour party MPs. In 
Frolik's account of his defection he does not name them, though this was due to 
contemporaneous court cases against them. The individuals were, however, identified by 
codenames as Lee, Gustav and another unnamed man caught in a homosexual trap. Each, 
Frolik claimed, were paid for their services. Lee, identified as Will Owen, was solely 
interested in financial reward. According to Frolik he demanded free holidays and money 
and in return passed information of the "highest importance.,,32 This description of Owen 
seems somewhat dubious, Owen was not party to important information, and the fact that 
he was acquitted from a treason charge on the 9th May 1970 substantiates these doubts. 
Gustav was identified as the late Barnet Stross.33 Information supplied by Ann Swingler 
indicates that he did indeed have extensive contact with officials of the Czech Embassy 
and with the Czech government itself through his role as President of the 'Lidice Shall 
Live' campaign, organised by himself and fellow MP Stephen Swingler. Regardless of 
this, it is questionable whether Stross imparted information during his contact with the 
Czech officials, however the StB viewed Stross as a sympathetic contact within the British 
parliament. The third man was of the greatest significance. Not only was he paid, but was 
also blackmailed over his homosexuality and therefore had a dual motivation for working 
for the Czech Embassy. Pincher revealed that this was John Stonehouse who, throughout 
his career, appears to have been motivated by promise of financial gain. Frolik viewed all 
three as equally gUilty and described them as "parliamentary freeloaders,,34 and warned 
others "there are no such things as 'gifts', 'retainers' ... [or] 'consultancies' ... there are 
only bribes.,,35 
A further MP to be named as a contact and agent was Ray Fletcher, MP for llkeston 1964-
83. This allegation by Vasili Mitrokhin, who was accepted as being highly reliable, comes 
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directly from the files of the KGB. The allegation is that Fletcher published a critique of 
defence spending on the behest of the KGB and enjoyed extensive contact with the Czech 
Embassy and thus, it is implied, the StB.36 The latter Fletcher admitted, but claimed the 
contact to be innocent. His widow, in response to Mitrokhin's revelations, alleged that 
Fletcher was used as a conduit between MI6 and Czech dissidents.37 This appears an 
equally feasible role for Fletcher. He does not appear to have held a pro-Soviet perspective 
and £60 a Second on Defence, the pamphlet alleged to offer a pro-Soviet analysis, argued 
from a similar position to Cook and Smith's What Future in NATO? and reiterated the 
arguments of many critiques of defence spending produced by the anti-Soviet left. 
However, his writing shows evidence of a wealth of research into Soviet defence 
capabilities. This would have been carried out using the Soviet Embassy in London as a 
resource and, it is likely that, Soviet statistics were reproduced verbatim. Therefore some 
could argue that he had reiterated Soviet propaganda. 
There were obviously sections of the party whose ideas were, at times, better suited to 
membership of the CPGB. Similarly there was also a minority that appeared blind to the 
faults of the Soviet Union due to the claim to being 'actually existing socialism'. However, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the majoritarian desire of these individuals was to 
undermine or overthrow British democracy. The pro-Soviet strand desired radical changes, 
along socialist lines, that could lead to the creation of a more progressive society. The 
Soviet Union represented this ideal in part, but not in entirety. What was paramount to 
their perspective was the opinion that progress could not be made in an atmosphere of 
Cold War and thus the two sides had to be reconciled. 
Those who held pro-Soviet perceptions were identified and their ideals exploited by KGB 
officials. Gordievsky stated that this was particularly the case with the pacifistic strand. 
He related the method used by his one time superior Gennady Titov for gaining control 
over Norwegian politician Arne Treholt. Treholt had a bright future, until discovery,38 and 
Titov recognised this and flattered the young Norwegian by overstating the importance of 
his stance for achieving peace. One particular phrase Gordievsky recalled was Titov 
telling Treholt "[y]ou are preserving world peace and saving Europe from nuclear war.,,39 
Such encouragement could have had a significant effect on figures such as Konni Zilliacus 
or Frank Allaun, whose entire careers hinged upon fighting for peace. We can not say 
with any degree of certainty tactics like this were, or were not, used on British politicians. 
What is obvious is that the potential was present. Furthermore this was standard KGB 
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procedure and it is doubtless that KGB agents at least attempted to tap into the pacifist 
strand using this methodology. 
In some cases a sense of importance as a political actor could have been a deciding factor. 
An ambitious backbencher that believed that their talents were not recognised, a 
characteristic of many of the left-wing, may have sought rewards elsewhere. Active 
sympathisers were told that they were highly regarded in Moscow, given presents, 
holidays, and even medals for their service. If we consider William Wilson, a self-
confessed confidential contact during the second Cold War, he found that the PLP failed to 
recognise the common sense in his case for the recognition of the GDR or for developing a 
strategy of co-existence with Communism. However, to the Soviet officials he was an 
influential politician who, at crucial junctures, reinforced the Soviet line. Equally Konni 
Zilliacus was allowed to interview Khrushchev for research purposes. The impression is 
given that, to the Soviet leadership, Zilliacus particularly was a man of some importance. 
This is supported by the fact that Stalin felt it necessary to denounce Zilliacus when he 
switched his support to Tito. While Zilliacus maintained an independent perspective, 
refusing to adopt a purely pro-Soviet stance, his background and experience meant that 
KGB agents would have sought to cultivate him as an agent, may have sought to influence 
him with propaganda and did claim control over him when he reiterated their arguments. 
However, the reality of the relationship was vastly different from the Soviet perspective of 
Wilson or Zilliacus. This narrative provides some clues to why many MPs were 
categorised as agents without them entering into activities that they believed benefited the 
Soviet cause. In the zero-sum perspective of world affairs these individuals could not be 
seen as non-aligned but were either for or against. This explains why Zilliacus was classed 
as an agent and contact40 and why he was condemned as a traitor and fascist spy for 
supporting Tito's Yugoslavia in opposition to Stalinism. 
In stark contrast, Frolik in particular argued, that the desire for funds to supplement the 
arguably meagre wages of a backbencher led some MPs to become agents. These were 
seen as the most reliable by their handlers, as Frolik argued, "a friend can drop out of the 
business any day, a paid agent never, we ensured they received money from us and signed 
for it.,,41 The payment and receipt were very important, as this written proof of funds 
changing hands could be used as a lever to ensure the MP's future co-operation. On other 
occasions it was the MP's sexual proclivities which made them susceptible to blackmail 
and so be led to act on behalf of the Soviet Union. An example of how the KGB worked 
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is illustrated by the case of Sir Geoffrey Harrison, British Ambassador to Moscow during 
the late 1960s. Photographs were sent to him of a sexual encounter he had with a young 
woman employed as a maid in the British Embassy. The KGB claimed that she was an 
agent, and offered to overlook the incident should he do them certain favours. Harrison 
reported the situation to the Foreign Office and was duly transferred.42 Pincher inferred 
that the majority of others who found themselves in similar situations did not report such 
incidences. 
This may have been particularly the case with homosexuals. Due to the stigma and 
illegality attached to this sexual preference for a large part of this period it appears that it 
was easier for the KGB to extract aid from them. Mitrokhin stated that homosexual Labour 
MP Tom Driberg was recruited in this way.43 Pincher argued that Driberg had a dual role 
working for the KGB and MI5, a situation Driberg exploited in order to be open about his 
sexuality without fear of arrest.44 However, there were also ideological affinities between 
Driberg and Communism. This is evident in Driberg's portrait of his friend and former 
lover Guy Burgess who, Driberg argued, had attempted only to create a "better 
understanding between the Soviet Union and the West.,,45 This is an identical stance to 
that adopted by many of the pro-Soviet left-winger's. Therefore, though Driberg is argued 
to have exploited the interest in him, there may have been other, both ideological and 
personal, motivating factors. 
Therefore there is some substance to the allegations brought against pro-Soviet MPs. 
However there remains little evidence to suggest that any Labour MP acted as a slavish 
agent of the Soviet Union. Where there is a body of evidence, for example the cases of 
Driberg, Fletcher and Zilliacus, there is often a more complex picture than that offered by 
the majority of commentators. This study, therefore, removes the subject from the 
connotations associated with the Cold War narrative and offers alternative perspectives of 
pro-Soviet activities. However it remains important to examine the authenticity of many 
of the claims made against the pro-Soviet MPs. 
A rejection of the zero-sum perspective 
The whole question surrounding the activities of the pro-Soviet MPs, despite the 
traditional analysis of pro-Sovietism, is by no means zero-sum. The zero-sum, agent or 
enemy, perspective was the product of the climate that encouraged paranoiac anti-
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Communism, caused by the fear that the Communist ideology could become popular: and 
subvert western democracy. This was mirrored in Communist nations by an institutional 
narrow-mindedness, a feature of the societal control and all-encompassing totalitarianism, 
and a culture of fear. Therefore it is useful to explore the evidence that exists to 
undermine key aspects of the traditional Cold War narrative relating to pro-Soviet 
individuals in the West. 
Gordievsky, as acting head of the KGB station in London, was fully aware that officials 
did exaggerate the contacts they 'controlled' and their usefulness to Moscow. This 
justified both the official's existence, and the expenses they claimed.46 The fact that 
officials would and did exaggerate does mean that some of the information Gordievsky 
and Mitrokhin provided could be questionable. Although he is aware what contacts he 
himself had, Gordievsky could not be certain, for example, when naming lan Mikardo as 
an agent of the Soviet Union and Zilliacus as an agent of the KGB, specifically how great 
the contact, or element of control, was. There is evidence that many MPs would have 
contacted Eastern-bloc Embassies on several occasions for demonstrable reasons. For 
example, lan Mikardo needed permits and information to support his plans for trading with 
Eastern Europe. Konni Zilliacus, on the other hand, would have developed a rapport with 
Soviet Embassy officials when arranging fact-finding visits and contact with his friends in 
the Soviet Union. Gordievsky explained that safeguards did exist in the Soviet system, 
preventing over exaggeration. He argued that anyone who believes in the innocence of 
socialist politicians should "not underestimate the ability of a Westerner to lie.,,47 
Vladimir Shaposhnikov48 highlighted a further problem when gauging the culpability of a 
politician accused of acting as an agent. Most MPs enjoy legitimate contacts with the 
Embassies of foreign countries. Depending on their political persuasion, but more 
importantly on their reason for visiting, they were assigned a point of contact with the 
Soviet Union. This Embassy official, usually a KGB agent, would become their liaison. 
The Soviet representative would attempt to strike up a rapport, provided that the MP 
appeared sympathetic. If this relationship developed, the Soviet representative would 
draw them into conversation on mutually interesting issues, particularly party policy and 
member's attitudes to such issues as nuclear defence. The MP may have seen these 
discussions as informal, unimportant and possibly furthering East-West friendship. 
Equally much of what was discussed would have already been public knowledge. 
However, if the Soviet representative won an argument, putting forward a perspective 
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which the MP agreed with, and found this later used in a debate in the House, or in a 
publication, that Soviet official could legitimately claim the ability to influence an MP. 
Norman Atkinson,49 himself named by Oleg Gordievsky as "a frequent and friendly 
guest"SO of the Soviet Embassy, reinforced this argument. Atkinson argued that those who 
put forward allegations against left-wingers were only attempting to "make themselves a 
shilling or twO."SI He proposed that, as Prime Minister, Edward Heath often visited 
foreign Embassies, then in a speech in the House of Commons directly referred to that 
visit and conversations held with Embassy officials. These often included Eastern 
European Embassies, particularly the Yugoslav, and Heath's statements were on some 
occasions supportive to that nation. As Atkinson pertinently asked, did this make Heath 
the agent of any particular Embassy? 
Contacts between left-wing MPs and Soviet officials are also obscured by the perception 
of those officials who held, what Shaposhnikov referred to as, the mindset of homo 
sovieticus. S2 To the Soviet official there was no such thing as an open, frank discussion. 
Soviet society was built upon secrecy and the fact that the agent's task was to prove their 
capability at recruiting Western politicians to the Soviet cause meant that any contact had 
to be logged and reported to the Centre. To a British politician parliamentary debates are 
not secret. in fact most would have already appeared in the press. To the Soviet official 
any contact was an opportunity to gain kudos with the Centre and. for someone in 
Shaposhnikov's position. a chance to rise in the hierarchy. Furthermore, KGB agents 
believed that the MP, being willing to talk, may be willing to enter into some other form of 
collusive activity. 
The insignificance of the content of discussions is reinforced by the recollections of those 
who dealt with the Soviet Embassy. MPs had frank discussions and often heated debates. 
Sometimes the MP would even concede an argument to his Russian debating partner. S3 
State secrets were never involved and it should be noted that most of what was discussed 
had been in the press for days.s4 However all unofficial contact was viewed as potentially 
collusive. and all information classified as important. However the level of contact and 
degree of openness could wane. Gordievsky claimed that Ian Mikardo was, "in the fifties 
and sixties ... regarded as an agent, and a very good one. But then after Czechoslovakia he 
faded away."ss He and 10 Richardson. the latter named by Crozier as a confidential contact 
of the Soviet Union,56 had extensive contact with Soviet officials. The dossier on each 
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must have been extensive though solely, in all likelihood, referring to the trading net~ork 
they organised.57 It is definite that Mikardo would have been viewed as of extensive use, 
due to the number of British businesses he introduced to the Soviet Union. However, this 
does not necessarily make him an agent in the sense of acting traitorously, though he was 
arguably a willing volunteer of help. To him this was a reciprocal venture that benefited 
both economies, not one or the other side in the Cold War. Furthermore, his trading 
network was in operation until 1977, so presumably his use would not have been 
exhausted by 1968. However he may have been a little less willing to enter into frank 
discussions and more critical of Soviet policy. 
It must be remembered that the Soviet officials may have encouraged frank discussions 
from their British contacts, but this was not a luxury Soviet officials could enjoy. All they 
could do was reiterate the policy line set by the Politburo. Often the Soviet official tried to 
make MPs believe that they could talk frankly and independently about Soviet policy, and 
indeed this may have been possible beyond the confines of the Embassies and the myriad 
forms of surveillance. However, this was largely a ploy to increase informal contact 
between the official and the MP.58 The objective was to gain a group of influential 
individuals that would work on behalf of the Soviet Union. However the inconsistencies 
between the MPs behaviour and the Soviet perception of them are notable and too great to 
ignore. Therefore it appears doubtful that the spy network in parliament, implied by 
Pincher and Crozier, actually existed. If any co-operation occurred between pro-Soviet 
MPs and their Soviet points of contact it was likely to have been a discussion, between 
seemingly like-minded left-wing politicians, debating points that they were integral to the 
world view they shared. It should not be assumed that they were discussing how they 
could aid the Soviet Union in the ideological struggle against the West. 
Redefining the roles of the pro-Soviet MPs 
This study offers two alternative definitions of pro-Soviet activism; the 'change agent' and 
the 'conduit of understanding'. These definitions classify these figures as political actors 
with ideological motivations and clear objectives. These terms need some clarification. It 
should not be assumed that acting as a change agent entailed changing society or 
government on behalf of the Soviet Union. The aim was to change the climate of opinion. 
The anti-Communist Cold War perception was based upon the belief that nothing good 
came from the Communist bloc, this was characterised in myriad Cold War movies with 
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the rationale that 'the only good Commie is a dead one'. As one veteran pro-Soviet activist 
argued; "I didn't like that and wanted to change these ideas. ,,59 Changing the perception of 
the Soviet Union could lead to changing the societal perception of the British government 
and even changing the nature of that government, however this was not a necessary 
contingent of their activity. 
While avoiding the pejorative connotations associated with the term agent, change agent is 
a useful descriptive tool in outlining the role of those who promoted the policy of the 
Soviet Union. This was very much an agency driven activity. Their role was to highlight 
the progressive nature of the Soviet world view, the advanced nature of the socialist 
society and the desire for rapprochement and understanding among the Soviet leadership 
and people. In advancing these claims these individuals attempted to alter the anti-
Communist rationale which dominated the Western perception of the Eastern bloc. In 
putting themselves forward as a conduit for pro-Soviet ideas they acted as the agency 
through which these ideas could be disseminated, gain a broader audience and alter public 
perception and thus governmental policy. The ultimate aim was to end the Cold War and 
establish peace and global security, this would increase national prosperity for all nations 
following the end of the arms race and enable socialist ideas to spread across Western 
society. The hopes were that with rapprochement the Soviet Union would be able to 
discard the 'bunker' or 'fortress' mentality, repression would end and a reformed, more 
democratic form of socialism could emerge. Arguably those who acted as change agents 
were of great importance to the Soviet Union, particularly if they were figures with a 
degree of influence.60 Within society those perceived as most influential were University 
and College lecturers.61 In political circles however, the MP was the highest prize. This 
meant that the Soviet Union, through front organisations, propaganda campaigns and 
direct approach, actively pursued those with political influence attempting to convince the 
individual that the ideals of the Soviet Union and the individual were identical. 
There were various methods by which the official perceptions of the Soviet Union could 
be altered. Early examples are the attempts to convince Western socialists of the benefits 
of certain aspects of Soviet society, the planned economy being one key issue promoted 
throughout the 1930s. Later examples would be the attempts to convince pacifists that 
there was a real desire for peace within the Soviet Union and equally that the foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union espoused ethics that were absent from the policies of Britain 
and the United States. These notions were emphasised by many of those who form the 
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remit of this study. Arguably these figures were of significance to the Soviet Union in 
terms of gaining a foothold within the British socialist movement. Karl Radek emphasised 
their importance in 1934. 
Their actions are of enormous political significance, and not only as a symptom of 
the state of feeling among the intermediate strata in the capitalist countries ... they 
are hindering world imperialism in its effort to engineer a new and supreme crime, 
namely. an attack upon the USSR.62 
Acting as a conduit of understanding occurred simultaneously, but not universally 
alongside. acting as a change agent. This meant actively participating in developing an 
atmosphere of mutual understanding. While many MPs. of diverse political ideologies. 
attempted to work with their Soviet counterparts. developing a relationship based upon 
mutual understanding is significantly different. The West was arguably as enigmatic and 
incomprehensible to the Soviet Communist as Communism was to Western politicians. 
Therefore gaining a group of individuals who were willing to explain British politics, 
particularly the decision-making and policy formulation processes, was important to the 
Soviet Union: particularly when these individuals encouraged further contact between the 
Soviet representative and other Westerners. These people were particularly important as 
they acted as conduits of understanding between the conflicting ideological and political 
systems. Soviet leaders acknowledged that for them to comprehend British political 
culture and Britain's response to global events. a broader understanding of the British 
system was required. This meant gaining an in-depth knowledge of the policy formulation 
process, the constraints under which governments operated and the economic priorities of 
the capitalist system. To gain this knowledge meant encouraging those within government 
to explain why decisions had been taken. the underlying rationale for policy and what 
future policy determinants were likely to be. This information enabled Soviet leaders to 
understand Western policy and predict how NATO, and the individual member states, 
would respond to Soviet actions. 
It is difficult to determine how far this aided the Soviet Union. Nor can we ascertain the 
quality of information that they received, though both Gordievsky, as receiver, and 
William Wilson, one MP who discussed politics with a KGB agent, provide an indication 
that the information was unimportant and readily available from newspapers. What is 
important is that individuals were prepared to share information with the Soviet Union 
regarding Western domestic politics. Clearly. to the Soviet official, if an MP was willing 
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to discuss political events and future policies there was the potential that, had war br?ken 
out, they may have remained an important source of information within the British 
government. 
Equally links forged between British businesses and the Soviet economy, which had an 
underlying political agenda, were useful in ensuring that an element of public opinion was 
steered away from the anti-Communist perspective. Soviet leaders assumed that a greater 
understanding of Soviet policy aims would lead to a reduction in the effect of Western 
anti-Soviet propaganda. Therefore the combination of trade links, cultural exchanges and 
open contact between representatives of East and West was encouraged to ensure that a 
more inclusive pro-Soviet movement was created. These links were all founded upon 
mutual understanding. While the effects of this remain largely unquantified it is 
significant, in terms of Radek's view of this activity,63 that influential individuals were 
prepared to encourage the establishment of these links. Based upon an evaluation of those 
who entered into these activities, and their self-defined rationales, this categorisation of 
them as change agents and conduits of understanding can be put forward as a firm basis on 
which to found an analysis of the actions of the pro-Soviet MPs. Equally, when 
characterising pro-Soviet activity in these terms, this analysis also provides an alternative 
analysis of the Soviet Union's objectives when courting the British left-wing sympathiser. 
This study attempts to redress the pejorative connotations associated with pro-Sovietism 
by separating the activities from the Cold War zero-sum perspective. Implicitly this 
analysis rejects the description of these individuals as fellow travellers, however there is 
one useful aspect to this expression. That is the 'right to alight'. 64 The 'fellow traveller' 
metaphor argues that all socialists were travelling in the same car, and that the ultimate 
destination was the Soviet model. However all passengers had the right to alight at any 
point on the journey. When looking at those pro-Soviet individuals, usually earmarked as 
fellow travellers of the Communist party, it is clear that the right to alight was utilised 
frequently. This dispels the slippery slope theory that hypothesises that once an individual 
developed pro-Soviet sympathies, and acted against the Cold War rationale, then they 
would automatically drift into becoming a Soviet agent. The activities pursued by those 
studied here clearly show differing gradations of pro-Soviet activity and different 
categorisations of utility to the Soviet Union of these individuals. Understanding this is 
important to developing an explanation of the pro-Soviet political strand. These MPs did 
not constitute a coherent movement and did not follow one single form of political 
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activity. Pro-Sovietism was based upon an assortment of ideals, not all of which were 
subscribed to by every individual who displayed pro-Soviet sentiments, and had multi-
faceted activities associated with it. The level of support for, and contact with, the Soviet 
Union depended largely upon the individual. Similarly the perceived use to the Soviet 
Union of some pro-Soviet MPs was far greater than was the case with others. Therefore, 
the level of activity and utility can only truly be measured through a study of the 
individual's activities and their motivations for adopting a pro-Soviet perspective of global 
politics. 
Structure of the study 
Initially it is necessary to highlight the ways in which pro-Sovietism was encouraged by 
the Soviet Union and her representatives. The Soviet objective was to encourage 
influential members of western society to promote Soviet foreign policy, so acting as 
agents of influence. Chapter one provides a study of Soviet propaganda techniques, the 
tactics of inviting potentially sympathetic individuals to the Soviet Union and providing a 
guided tour, and the creation of a network of front organisations to promote Soviet policy 
aims. This enables us to understand how sympathetic individuals were drawn into the pro-
Soviet coterie. 
Chapter Two introduces the historical context for pro-Soviet sentiment during the Cold 
War. The Russian revolution of February 1917 enjoyed the support of individuals who 
believed in the notions of democracy and personal liberty and opposed the ancient regime 
represented by Tsardom. The Bolshevik revolution of October 1917, however, was 
received with a greater degree of ambivalence. The broad Labour movement viewed 
Bolshevism with suspicion, however a minority existed that wished to see the Soviet 
Union develop into the Marxist society that Leninist ideology promised. These socialists 
refused to separate Communism from the principles of British labourism. During the 
1930s the ideal of creating a socialist society, built upon economic and social equality, 
became particularly popular. Socialist intellectuals and theorists, not to mention a 
significant number of politicians, looked to the Soviet Union because it presented an 
alternative model of socialism. This alternative was presented against a backdrop of 
failing Western capitalism and insurgent National Socialism. The Second World War 
polarised these beliefs. Popular perception held that the war had an ideological character, 
socialism versus fascism. Thus, many socialists argued, should a successful conclusion be 
reached, and fascism defeated, the united socialist forces of the Northern Hemisphere 
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should determine the post-war world order.65 Even the historically anti-Communist 
Labour party recognised that the Soviet Union must be included in this 'Grand Alliance' .66 
The traditions that emerged within this period were represented in the mindsets of those 
who constituted the post-war parliament. 
Having developed an understanding of the historiography and the external influences that 
shaped the arguments of post-war MPs, the study will focus on four key periods of pro-
Soviet activity. These periods found the ideals of the pro-Soviet sympathisers of greatest 
relevance. Peaks and troughs punctuate pro-Soviet activity; these are linked to the party's 
fortunes and the international situation generally. Thus, the most pronounced activity is 
found when the party is either in office, with a large majority, 1945-50, marginalised from 
power, 1951-64 and 1979-87, or when the principles for which they fought were under 
threat; 1958-73 and 1979-87. 
Chapter three begins the chronological study focussing upon the individuals who became 
the founders of the anti-Cold War movement. The 1945-50 Labour government included a 
significant pocket of backbench dissent against the Atlanticist foreign policy. Only the 
scale of the parliamentary majority countered their influence. This ensured that the sixty or 
more67 dissidents did not make a large impression upon policy formulation. This 
amorphous group varied considerably in their level of extremism. The predominant force 
became known as the Bevanites.68 These were by no means pro-Soviet, though they were 
anti-American. Outside the Bevanite alliance stood a small minority whose only real allies 
were the non-Labour left consisting of the two Communist MPs and the Labour 
independent D N Pritt. These Labour MPs would be characterised by party General 
Secretary Morgan Phillips as the 'lost sheep'. The main protagonists, Hutchinson, Platts-
Mills, Solley and Zilliacus were expelled in an attempt to quieten the left-wing. From the 
attitudes and motivations of these four MPs, particularly Konni Zilliacus, we can study 
how the traditions of the pro-Soviet parliamentary strand developed.69 
The debate that the pro-Soviet tendency encouraged was whether or not to become 
involved in an United States-led, anti-Communist campaign. Those expelled believed that 
the Soviet Union was not an enemy, or at least that it held no enmity towards Britain. The 
most prolific writer among them, Konni Zilliacus, set the scene when he argued that Soviet 
antagonism was due to pre-war western antipathy and post-war United States 
imperialism.7o This debate was to gain much greater momentum when nuclear weapons 
19 
became the Cold War's bargaining chips. As the Soviet Union joined the United States as 
a nuclear power, and Britain openly discussed developing weapons of mass destruction,71 
the left recognised that the Cold War had become zero-sum. Every conflict was 
overshadowed by the nuclear threat and the fear emerged that should a no-win situation 
occur the nuclear 'last resort' could be used to ensure victory. This fear became the 
cornerstone of the opposition to governmental defence policy. The period 1957-1968, 
examined in chapter four, witnessed the ideas of Zilliacus revived and enjoy the support of 
an organised left-wing grouping. 
To campaign for unilateralism within the PLP the group Victory for Socialism was 
established72 with Stephen Swingler, a further potential 'lost sheep' expellee as Chairman. 
This group became the vehicle through which the proponents of anti-Cold War arguments 
were to attempt to gain a wider audience. Through the tireless organisation of intra-party 
conferences and meetings, both at the national and constituency level, Victory for 
Socialism fought the rationale promoted by governments of either political colour. 
Zilliacus was a prime mover in this group, as was Swingler. However younger MPs with 
similar ideals were also drawn to the group. Frank Allaun and Stan Newens, two long-
serving left-wing MPs, attribute their inspiration to Zilliacus. Their activities and 
arguments characterised the era that saw the United States and the Soviet Union increase 
bipolar tensions in Korea, Vietnam and Cuba. The arguments of Victory for Socialism, 
alongside concurrent international events, were to encourage others to become more active 
within both the left-wing of the party and extra-parliamentary anti-Cold War campaigns. 
The extra-parliamentary activity, and the intrinsic link to events in the international arena, 
is the focus of chapter five. This analyses the activities developed during the period of 
detente 1968-79. Many Labour MPs who circulated within the pacifistic wing of the party 
promoted the arguments that underpinned detente. To enforce the idea that the Communist 
bloc was changing, therefore encouraging governmental leaders to alter their perception of 
the Soviet bloc, MPs produced arguments framed by leaders of the Warsaw Pact nations. 
Stan Newens produced two volumes of writings by Nicolae Ceausescu, arguing that he 
was indicative of a more progressive style of Communist leader with whom the west could 
reach an understanding. Furthermore, as an undercurrent to detente cultural, economic 
and political links were developed between East and West. The encouragement of East-
West trade, within which Ian Mikardo was the most prominent figure, began as a by-
product of the cultural exchanges encouraged during the 1960s. Mikardo believed, through 
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establishing economic interdependence, he could be particularly instrumental in changing 
the global climate of opinion. This activity was supported in the House of Commons by 
several other individuals who can be identified as pro-Soviet, notably Will Owen and 
Renee Short. Short is indicative of the upsurge in front organisation participation. She 
actively pursued the abandonment of the controversial proscription policy of the Labour 
party, the success of which led to an increase in the membership of front organisations 
among the Labour left. These activities led to a more cohesive response to the anti-
Sovietism that was to be the feature of the 1980s. 
Chapter six describes the history of the final era of pro-Sovietism, 1979-87. This era 
witnessed heightened East-West tensions and thus an increase in pro-Soviet activity within 
the party. This period also saw British politics polarise as the Thatcherite politics of 
strong state and free economy gained ascendancy. The older campaigners such as Allaun 
had newer allies, but though they supported the ideals of peace some were cautious in 
using the Soviet Union as a focus for their dissent. Others did not have such reservations. 
During this period we see Labour MPs taking an active part, not only on the pro-Soviet 
side in debates, but also acting as executive members of 'front' organisations and 
developing relationships with agents of the Soviet Union. This appears to have been a 
much more devout variation of pro-Sovietism when compared to the activities of the pro-
peace Soviet sympathisers such as Allaun and Zilliacus. These activities, sponsored 
directly by the front organisations are explored by using the cases of James Lamond. Alex 
Kitson, William Wilson and Ron Brown. The latter two present an excellent opportunity 
for studying the motivation for developing relationships with representatives of the Soviet 
government. 
This study seeks to explain why a group of Labour MPs was drawn towards adopting a 
pro-Soviet perspective. In the final chapter we identify common denominators in the 
beliefs of these individuals, highlighting the central elements within pro-Sovietism. This 
allows us to establish a framework of understanding that avoids attaching normative 
values to the study of pro-Sovietism but develops an analysis that allows us to comprehend 
pro-Soviet activities within their context. This leads to the issue of perceptions to be 
introduced. Those who adopted the pro-Soviet oppositional stance were frequently 
criticised as anti-democratic, traitorous or bordering on the insane. A similar critique was 
developed of the Atlanticist, pro-nuclear grouping by their pro-Soviet opponents. While 
the reality of life under Communism became clear with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
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this should not purely be seen as an opportunity to prove the critics of pro-Sovietism 
correct. The end of the Cold War also allows us to understand why these minority 
positions were adopted without being constrained by the Cold War's zero-sum perspective. 
The key questions this study asks are how were these arguments developed, what 
underpinned them and how the Soviet Union was used as the focus for a significant part of 
this oppositional stance. Equally interesting, however, is what led social democratic 
politicians to use a regime, frequently regarded as despotic and corrupt, as the focus for 
their socialist belief. In the course of studying these individuals the nature of their 
activities will be explained and contextualised, showing how political actors promote 
causes and gain broader support for their ideals. Finally it will be asked what impact they 
actually had upon the Labour party, the Soviet Union and in relation to public opinion. 
This study will categorise these figures as change agents and conduits of understanding 
and assess the extent to which pro-Sovietism acted as guide on the activities they pursued 
in their quest to encourage a peaceful, socialist world order to evolve. 
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Chapter One 
Building a pro-Soviet fifth column: 
The Soviet campaign for support during the Cold War 
The Marxist-Leninist revolutionary socialist doctrine contained a clearly global 
objective. The revolution should not be limited within one nation, to paraphrase Marx 
and Engels "the proletarians ... have a world to win".l Lenin believed the creation of 
the Soviet Communist State could act as the catalyst for a European socialist 
revolution. He tried to give this rhetoric a practical dimension by ordering the Red 
Army deep into Poland in an attempt to provide military aid to the Spartacist 
movement in Germany.2 While the Western allies defeated the Red Army, this action 
substantiated the fears of Western governments that Bolshevism was an ideology of 
world domination. The fear that 'the Russians are Coming,3 remained a chief tool for 
gaining public support during the Cold War, and was the rationale behind the 
McCarthy-led hunt for communists within the United States legislature and upper 
echelon of US society.4 Similar 'witch-hunts' were carried out in other Western non-
Communist nations.s 
Lenin had predicted that inter-ideological war was inevitable and necessary. 
Capitalism and communism could not, and should not, co-exist. 
The free federation of nations is impossible without a more or less prolonged 
and stubborn struggle of the socialist republic against the backward [capitalist] 
states.6 
The workers, Lenin prescribed, supported by the Soviet government and its forces 
abroad, should plan to overthrow capitalism.' "Either the Soviet government triumphs 
in every country in the world, or the most reactionary imperialism triumphs. ,,8 The 
method for achieving this 'Soviet triumph' was not through military force but covert 
activity. Propaganda would be used to exacerbate hostilities within and between 
nations "tak[ing] advantage of this hostility ... to incite one against the other.,,9 
Within capitalist nations 
A Communist must. .. resort to all sorts of schemes and stratagems, employ 
illegitimate methods, conceal the truth, in order to get into the trade unions, 
stay there, and conduct the revolutionary work within. lo 
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Willi Munzenberg ll developed this policy within Western states. He argued that the 
Communist state required "transmission belts,,12 to disseminate revolutionary ideas. 
These conduits would promote Soviet policy "when [the Soviet Union] are lacking the 
necessary strength.,,13 Munzenberg brought the idea to life when he established the 
Communist Youth International. This was originally the Association of Social Youth 
Organisations, an organisation that united the youth organisations of the world under 
a socialist banner. Munzenberg set about converting it to Soviet control. Alongside 
his Finnish contemporary Otto Kuusinen he pioneered the creation of myriad 
organisations throughout those nations whose foreign policy was hostile to the Soviet 
Union. Munzenberg saw the membership disparagingly as a 'Club of Innocents', 
particularly those of the Friendship Societies. 
The operational activities of Munzenberg and Kuusinen, and proof that Soviet spies 
were active within Britain and the United States, fuelled the fires of anti-Communism. 
A situation evolved where any contact with Communists, or particularly 
representatives of the Soviet sphere of influence, could lead to an individual facing 
accusations th~t they were in some form of collusion with agents of the Soviet Union. 
Therefore official contact was minimal, at the highest level only and any form of 
entryism 14 was prevented. This underpinned the Labour party policy of proscription. IS 
The recognition that certain organisations were conduits of Soviet propaganda and 
tools of Soviet foreign policy increased the fear that Soviet subversion was indeed a 
threat to party cohesion, electability and, indeed, British democracy. 
This was only one aspect of the campaign designed to keep the Communists out of 
politics. Western propaganda promoted the perception that the Soviet Union was 
economically and politically corrupt and therefore contact with the regime, and its 
supporters, was perceived as unhealthy. This uniformity of message led to a rebuttal 
being transmitted by the Soviet Union and pro-Soviet organisations. In turn 
organisations were established to counter Soviet propaganda and infiltration. 16 An 
article in RIA Novosti's Daily Review outlined the Soviet campaign and its effects. 
A system was maintained that included an office of correspondents, the 
Novosti Press Agency [and] the Houses of Friendship. They functioned, 
turned out products, some delegations made visits. A paradox system 
27 
emerged. Despite an extreme hatred of Communism, the image of the USSR 
was much better than that of today's Russia. 17 
The Cold War was therefore fought mainly through propaganda campaigns and covert 
operations. 
This activity was a key aspect of both superpowers' prosecution of the Cold War and 
fear of enemy infiltration dominated international relations and domestic security. 
The Cold War became not a race for global military domination, though both sides 
did create monopsonic markets for their arms and established ideological hegemony 
over regional security, the frontline of the Cold War was ideological. As Yuri 
Andropov, fifth leader of the Soviet Union, stated in an address to the Central 
Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] of ISth June 1983; 
A struggle is going on for the hearts and minds of billions of people in the 
world. The future of mankind depends, in no small measure, on the outcome 
of this ideological struggle. IS 
While this was the Soviet perception of the Cold War it was equally recognised in the 
West that public opinion needed to be convinced that anti-Communism was the 
correct course of action. Fears existed that, while the majority of Western opinion 
was indeed convinced by the Cold War rationale, there existed an influential clique of 
pro-Communists, either in the payor under the influence of Soviet propagandists and 
agents, who were attempting to reverse this negative perception of the Soviet Union. 
The tactic utilised by the Soviet Union was the launch of an appeal to sympathisers to 
alter the perception of Soviet Communism. Propaganda was designed to attract those 
who argued for the adoption of a 'true' socialist agenda. It promulgated the twin 
beliefs that the Soviet Union adhered to true socialism and that it represented the 
progressive option in a zero-sum global dichotomy. The methods by which these 
messages were disseminated differed and are analysed separately below, however the 
paramount aim was to attract a variety of different influential individuals into the pro-
Soviet coterie. The more difficult step was to encourage those individuals to act on 
behalf of the Soviet Union. 
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Presenting the alternative: the Soviet propaganda campaign 
Initial reports of the political and social situation in post-revolutionary Russia were 
largely unfavourable. The correspondence of Malcolm Muggeridge to The 
Manchester Guardian reinforced the opinion that Communism was a new form of 
oppressive barbarism. This was perpetuated by official reports. It was thus necessary 
for the Soviet Union to encourage Westerners to visit the Soviet Union and offer an 
alternative, favourable, account of the regime: one it was hoped they would reiterate. 
The first visitors to the Communist State equally reflected the zero-sum nature of the 
global dichotomy. There were those, such as John Reed and George Bernard Shaw, 
who fell in love with the society and political system; others, like Muggeridge and 
WaIter Citrine, recognised a savage, barbaric and oppressive aspect to Bolshevik rule. 
It was the latter that became the received analysis. Muggeridge sent reports of 
cannibalism, state violence, enforced hardship, purges and growing inequality. These 
reports were to define the accepted perception of life under Communist rule. Those 
who dismissed this reality were individuals who desired the reality to be different. 
This led them to be criticised for their blinkeredness, or for allegations to be 
perpetuated that they were being paid by the Soviet Union to refute these stories. 
From these polarised perspectives the propaganda war began in earnest. 
Stalin, a far more pragmatic leader than Lenin, attempted to gain acceptance from the 
world. This initially involved attempts to show that his policy did not involve 
spreading the Bolshevik revolutionary doctrine, this was encapsulated in the theory of 
socialism in a single country. Alongside this was the campaign to show that 
Communism was an advanced method of government. The achievements of planning 
and state control were publicised, leading many to accept that the future lay more with 
the ideas of Communist society than those of the capitalist world. The Soviet Union 
became, to those who desired such an icon, a living embodiment of the socialist meta-
narrative. This was advertised in diverse ways, each aiming to convince the non-
Communist of the benefits of that society, that it was more advanced than capitalism 
and represented the future for mankind. The supporters and purveyors of this meta-
n.lfrative argued that the Soviet Union was the epitome of the modernist ideal, 
Communism had redesigned the relations between man and society and was in the 
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process of reshaping the future of politics. The objective of this was to gain support 
among idealistic but influential writers throughout the non-Communist world. The 
aim of this programme was simple: gaining acceptance, ending containment and 
encouraging others to adopt the ideas of socialism. 
It is useful to look at the methods by which the Soviet Union attempted to create 
converts. This was a three-fold approach. Soviet publications in the form of 
pamphlets, books and journal articles argued the benefits of Soviet society and the 
Communist system. These were circulated through pro-Soviet organisations within 
the non-Communist nations. Secondly, and more important in convincing a broader 
audience, was encouraging others to promote the Soviet argument. The intended 
process was; encouraging individuals to read and believe the propaganda, and then to 
visit the Soviet Union so the arguments of the propaganda could be reinforced. The 
final step was to encourage the individuals to reiterate these arguments as their own. 
Thus there are three aspects to the creation of the pro-Soviet meta-narrative discussed 
above: Soviet-produced propaganda, encouraging non-Communists to visit, then 
encouraging those people to write a favourable account of their visit. A further aspect 
to this process, detailed later, was not adopted by all those who held pro-Soviet 
sympathies and entailed entering into further activities in support of the aims of 
Soviet policy. 
Propaganda is the first line of attack when attempting to reach, and influence, a mass 
audience. In times of warfare it has been the primary tool for gaining support from 
the people for a cause, and attempting to undermine that of the enemy. It was the 
latter that Soviet propaganda was aimed towards. The ideology was disseminated in 
the name of the 'people' of the world, as distinct from those in government. The 
Soviet propagandists attempted to plant a seed, or in many cases nurture an already 
existent sympathy. The aim being to encourage influenced individuals to work on 
their behalf. According to Marx this was the role of the Communist party, who would 
act as the leader of the proletariat. 19 In Britain the Communist party [CPGB] became 
politically discredited and was unable to act as an agent of influence within the British 
socialist movement. Therefore, though it could still do Moscow's work, other 
independent advocates were required to substantiate Soviet arguments. 
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Early examples of these would be Beatrice and Sidney Webb, George Bernard Shaw 
and Denis Nowell Pritt. Depending upon the degree of Moscow's influence over those 
who produced the arguments, we see these secondary propagandist arguments staying 
true to, or varying somewhat with, the Moscow line. Pritt was completely slavish to 
the Moscow line; the Webbs privately faltered; later cases such as Konni Zilliacus or 
Frank Allaun allowed themselves to be critical showing clear differences in the degree 
of influence played by the Soviet Union. 
Qualter argued that the true reason for this propaganda campaign was much more than 
simply gaining pockets of sympathy across the globe. But that "in any given situation 
the reaction of those so influenced will be that desired by the propagandist. ,,20 This 
means that those individuals who became influenced would, at crucial points, argue 
and act on behalf of the Soviet Union. This is the accusation made against many of 
the pro-Soviet members of the Labour party. Attaining active support was the 
ultimate aim of the pro-Soviet propagandist, particularly when it was possible to 
influence those in, or with proximity to, political power. Public meetings on the 
advanced nature of Soviet society, usually substantiated by an eyewitness account did 
attract some support. Equally a mass readership for material like The Anglo-Soviet 
Journal enabled propagandists to set the agenda in favour of Soviet objectives. 
However five hundred ordinary members of western society21 do not have the 
influence of one in government. It must be remembered that the ultimate objective 
was to change governmental policy toward the Soviet Union. 
Lenin argued that there were two distinct methods for achieving this objective. 
Propaganda, the printed word, and agitation, the spoken word. Once in full power of 
what was to be the Soviet Union he created the Department of Agitation and 
Propaganda (Agitprop). Under the control of these departments fell the Soviet press, 
publishers, radio and later television. Thus, all media within the Soviet Union spoke 
with a single voice, that of the Politburo: essentially the leader. Through this 
unitarianist reportage the 'cult of personality' of Stalin was cultivated, fear was spread, 
and Russians and westerners alike could be drawn to believe the rhetoric.22 In 1929 
this Department was divided. The Department of Agitation and Mass Campaigns was 
given the task of controlling information reaching the Soviet people, creating the cult 
of Stalin. The second department rendered from Agitprop was the Department of 
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Culture and Propaganda, the work of which was aimed beyond Soviet borders. This 
division of labour lasted for five years; Agitprop was re-ratified in 1935. The aim of 
Agitprop was to mobilise and control the Russian people, while publications were 
aimed at the non-Communist world. Both aspects aimed at attaining slavish support 
for Stalinism and Soviet Communism. Internally this was a great success; externally 
it succeeded only among a minority with an existent ideological link to Marxist-
Leninism. Agitprop established a network of publishers and writers who would 
reproduce the words of the Politburo as their own. British Communists such as Robin 
Page Arnot, Rajani Palme Dutt and Tom Wintringham produced many publications, 
from voluminous books to short easily readable pamphlets,23 all argued the Soviet 
line. Alongside these were the Soviet Union's own publications of speeches and data, 
showing the success of Communism, and key theoretical works. 
The chief exporter of this propaganda was the Novosti Publishing Agency, created in 
the early 1960s to counter the anti-Soviet propaganda that had become the chief 
produce of departments of Western security organisations.24 The aim of Novosti was 
to centralise the production of Soviet propaganda. It ensured that every publication 
leaving the Soviet Union for the international audience was written with 'partiinost'; 
absolute loyalty to the party. It also sought, by this centralisation, to increase output, 
particularly to those audiences that the Soviet Union believed were most susceptible 
to their arguments. Novosti collected and disseminated data on the achievements of 
the Soviet Union and published myriad forms of literature to advertise and extol the 
cultural heritage of the Soviet Union to the foreign audience. As Hazan explained, the 
role of Novosti was to "sell the Soviet Union to the world.,,2s Alternatively, from the 
unique perspective of the Soviet Union, "spread the truth about the Soviet Union in all 
continents:,26 Novosti was, and to an extent remains, a highly organised propaganda 
machine though now it is a business providing travel brochures and Russian literature 
to the world market. Under the Soviet regime its staff consisted mainly of 
intelligence officers; for example IGm Philby worked for Novosti after his defection. 
The largest audience for Novosti publications were the English speakers of Britain 
and North America, at whom was aimed, between 1960 and 1970, a total of 58.8 
milIion magazines and newspapers. To concentrate on the statistics for Britain in 
1970 alone 161 titles on culture and education were released and a total of 10.5 
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million individual copies sold. Western Europe was also heavily targeted, particularly 
the FDR [West Germany], France, Spain and Italy. Though publications to the latter 
two were decreasing by 1970, there was a sharp rise in publications released in 
Spanish after 1975. These were mainly historical works on the Communist's role in 
the Spanish Civil War, information hitherto banned by the Francoist regime. A few 
figures on publications exported to Europe show where the Soviet Union believed the 
most sympathy lay. In 1970 out of a total of 50,587 titles released by Novosti 21,406 
were for the English market, 18,374 aimed at the FDR. This was the heritage of the 
Soviet Union's propaganda campaign aimed hitherto at these two nations. The Soviet 
propagandists had created an audience which, though an insignificant minority of the 
total population, was increasing steadily. Unfortunately what cannot be ascertained is 
what positions in society this minority held. We do see that many West Germans held 
prominent positions on front organisation's international committees.27 This does 
indicate a degree of sympathy for the Soviet Union among an influential minority. 
A similar targeting pattern is apparent in radio broadcasts, though in this case most 
broadcasting hours are aimed at the USA. Targeting was all important, the cost 
precluded saturation, therefore Agitprop had to aim its service at existing customers in 
the hope that these people would encourage others to join the audience. Pamphlets 
could be passed on to others, newspapers sold to work colleagues and so the message 
could be disseminated. This is the practice of any movement wishing to draw public 
attention to their cause. This, however, was essentially the work of an enemy power 
and anyone who entered into this type of activity was technically guilty of a 
treasonous act. However, prosecution was reserved only for those who passed secrets 
to the East, not for those who imported propaganda to the West. 
The targeting process did not just aim at nations, but at individuals within a nation. 
Organisations held lists of the sympathetic, as many advertising companies hold the 
names of those who may potentially purchase their produce. Any individual who had 
subscribed to a newspaper or journal, sent off for a pamphlet, visited the Soviet 
Union, or more significantly became a member of a pro-Soviet organisation would be 
targeted with further materia1. 28 Agitprop, and its network, also targeted independent 
organisations. Propaganda attempted to link Soviet policy with the aims of non-
aligned organisations. Equally pro-Soviet activists pursued entryism to gain influence 
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over the policies of various organisations. An example of which would be the way 
that the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament [CND] was courted. Ostensibly a 
pacifist organisation which united many strands of thought, CND was infiltrated by 
Communists. By the 1980s members of the CPGB or the British Peace Association 
[BPA]29 filled many key organisational positions. For example Gary Lefley, BPA 
National Organiser became General Secretary of CND in 1981. He was joined on the 
National Executive by five others named as CPGB members: Philip Bolsover, Duncan 
Rees, Stanley Bonnett, Chris Horrie and John Cox. Though none of these were 
prominent British Communists, they had been slowly promoted within the pro-Soviet 
network until they could gain a degree of control over the policy of an influential 
movement with a mass membership. Bolsover was, during the 1970s, a Morning Star 
editorial writer; here he gained respect within the British Communist movement. His 
elevation was then to a place of greater influence. The role of these Communists was 
to transmit the message that the Soviet Union supported the anti-nuclear, pro-peace 
campaign to the membership of CND.3o Stalin argued that war was inevitable 
between imperialist, and therefore capitalist, countries; thus, he argued, the peace 
movement should actively fight the governments of the capitalist nations.3l 
Using myriad publications the Soviet Union disseminated this message to the broader 
audience. In the July 1950 issue of the World Federation of Democratic Youth 
[WFDY] magazine the Soviet Union was proclaimed the bulwark for peace, despite 
the fact that it had just become a nuclear power and was arming the North Koreans 
against the United States. Speeches that reinforced this notion, and argued the justice 
of Soviet actions, were propagated by Soviet propaganda agencies. The front 
organisations disseminated a similar message to its membership. Thus the image of 
the Soviet Union as being a nation based upon a socialist ideology desirous of 
peaceful co-operation was disseminated among idealists and intellectuals alike, 
encouraging the creation of a pro-Soviet strand. 
The initial propaganda of the Lenin regime was aimed at nurturing support and 
recognition from the world's governments. There was a degree of sympathy during 
the interventionism of the Allies during the civil war. Lenin sought to exploit this 
among those Union leaders who had threatened strike action and so ended the 
intervention policy. Initially representatives of the working class leaders were invited 
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to Soviet Russia to view the new society. It received the mixed reviews characteristic 
of later visits to the Soviet Union. George Lansbury filled Albert Hail to speak of the 
virtues of the 'First Socialist Republic', overwhelmingly though Labour politicians 
and Union leaders condemned it, Waiter Citrine32 was particularly critical. Following 
virtual failure with the working class leaders it was the intellectuals who were invited 
to visit and encouraged to dispel the rumours that the Bolsheviks were nothing more 
than anarchistic iconoclasts, hell bent on shaping the world in their image. This 
equally had varying degrees of success. Early publications had a very small audience, 
so the only tenable strategy was to induce others into publishing. All that was required 
was to get prominent individuals who commanded respect to visit the Soviet Union, 
praise it in the highest terms, and publish their work. George Bernard Shaw was one 
such selected and he in turn introduced the Webbs who produced the greatest eulogy 
possible.33 
Shaw, the Webbs and many contemporary intellectuals and writers from the 
democratic west, found the invitation to visit, subsequent guided tour, and the honour 
of being able to produce an exclusive report on the phenomenon of the Twentieth 
Century, too great an opportunity to miss. They left for the Soviet Union with great 
alacrity, ignorant of what was being laid on for them. The Soviet Union that they saw 
was a pageant from the time they set foot on Russian soil. They were treated like 
demi-gods, given the party line and sent home with money, in the form of a 
publisher's advance. All that was required of them was the production of a favourable 
account. This was not unique to the 1930s, or to the writers and intellectuals, the 
invitation was to remain a powerful tool of Agitprop. It appears that many visited the 
Soviet Union wishing to find their ideal and therefore blinded themselves to the faults. 
A pertinent example, in relation to this study, would be the Webbs. However, there 
were many others who made the pilgrimage to the Socialist Mecca. 34 
Theodore Drieser, a lawyer who has suffered an expensive divorce, extolled the 
simplicity of divorce in the Soviet Union. Equally, Alexander Wicksteed, a 
campaigner for equality for women, lauded the fact that under Communism women 
had equal rights to work, and childcare provision was provided by the state to enable 
them to do so. The perceived achievements under Communism could be attributable 
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to the conversion to pro-Sovietism of Renee Short, who held similar ideals to 
Wicks teed and combined them with her perception of Soviet society. Others did not 
go to the Soviet Union in search of an advanced society. They wished to return to 
basics and view politics and society developing from a tabula rasa. Indeed for the 
Fabians like Shaw and the Webbs it was an experiment, possibly one to which they 
believed they could provide stimulus. For others the Soviet Union could provide a 
sense of atonement, they were hardened capitalists, fully imbibed with the fetish for 
commodities, in Soviet Russia they could view a new simpler world knowing that 
they would return to their comforts.35 A process existed by which any guest could be 
convinced that the Soviet Union represented their personal ideal. 
From arrival in the Soviet Union. the 'guest' would be pumped with a stream of data 
showing Soviet successes. They were booked into suites in the Metropole Hotel and 
dined on the finest foods. This experience led Shaw to believe that there could not be 
a famine in the Soviet Union. 36 During their stay the guests underwent an endless tour 
of factories, collectives or whatever their particular interest may be. Renee Short 
described her tour of the schools of Leningrad,37 Platts-Mills the justice system.38 This 
would provide the ultimate proof that the successes were real and worthy of published 
praise. Furthermore, implicit to these tours was the implication that these 
achievements should be actively protected from a hostile world. 
Intourist was created in 1929 to co-ordinate the visitors programme in line with party 
policy. If one particular achievement required advertisement, then Intourist would 
take the guests there. Initially this was handled through Soviet businesses which 
would appoint an interpreter, often a KGB official. Intourist was used to centralise 
the organisation. it would be told who was arriving and when, and so be able to plan a 
programme around the visitor well in advance. During the peak period of visits, the 
1960s and 70s, a London based company Progressive Tours, virtually subsiduarised 
by the British-Soviet Friendship Society. became the main tour operator. This worked 
closely with British front organisations and the Soviet embassy, and according to 
certain sources made a very good profit from this venture. Worker's exchange trips 
became a particular tool for gaining support.39 Once a trading partnership was 
established British workers were invited to visit their Eastern European counterpart. 
During these visits attempts were made to indoctrinate their visitors with Marxist-
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Leninist ideas, a campaign which can be attributed as contributing to the emergence 
of revolutionary ideas during the 1970s and 80s.40 The tour guides, often young 
women, were also employed to steer their guests away from what they really wanted 
to see and to what the party wanted them to see. Pamphlets were also left in hotels~ 
these reinforced Soviet propaganda and no exposure to non-partiinost material was 
allowed. 
There were those who came back after this experience unimpressed. Andre Gide, a 
French writer, disliked the fact that he was allowed privileges by the so-called ultra 
egalitarian society. 41 Others could not ignore the conflicting reports. They, like 
Stephen Spender British poet and playwright, could not compromise what they were 
shown with the conflicting reports of their respected contemporaries. This was 
particularly the case among 1930s Communists who renounced the Soviet Union in 
1939 because of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Others failed to make this transition because 
they saw the Soviet Union as representing a higher ideal, whether it was socialism, 
simplicity, or an advanced society is particular to the individual. 
The alternative perspective of life and politics within the Soviet Union, as portrayed 
by propaganda and reinforced during guided tours, was presented by organisations 
and respected individuals. This was to be continued by many of the Labour MPs who 
constitute this study. There were three key ways in which this met a-narrative of the 
Soviet Union was presented to the West. Firstly the presentation of a purely 
alternative perception, this combated the image of the Communist as evil and sub-
human as depicted in Western propaganda. Secondly, and importantly, the Soviet 
Union was extolled as an 'actually existing' socialist society, the embodiment of an 
ideal. This encouraged others to support and protect the regime, many hoping for the 
long awaited thaw in the leadership style. Finally, the Soviet Union was presented as 
a proponent for peaceful coexistence, the alternative to the United States which was 
argued to be an imperialist power. Those who presented this alternative picture of the 
Soviet Union facilitated Communist entryism into groups such as CND and 
campaigned for acceptance of the World Peace Council as a credible organisation. 
The latter created a situation which meant that many of those who adopted an anti-
AtIanticist or what is often described as a 'progressive' stance on world affairs, but 
were not ostensibly sympathisers of the Soviet Union, were drawn naturally into the 
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pro-Soviet orbit as the perception was popularised that only the Soviet Union 
supported progressive political movements.42 
The progressive ally: The Soviet front organisation network 
One of the central tenets of the Labour left-wing was, and remains, the promotion of 
social and political reform and the adoption of a liberal democratic framework across 
the world. This was promoted through extra-parliamentary organisations established 
to oppose regimes which operated through oppression, segregation and suppression of 
all, or sections of, the populace. While to many the Soviet Union epitomised the 
antithesis of these 'progressive' ideals a strategy existed to counter this perception. 
The Soviet Union actively supported many organised movements, regional, national 
and international, which opposed non-progressive regimes. Examples of those 
organisations which directly received Soviet support, in the form of money and arms, 
were the African National Congress [ANC], the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
[PLO] and the Provisional Irish Republican Army [IRA]. This process was aimed at 
drawing the members of supportive organisations, such as anti-Apartheid and the 
Troops Out Movement, to also support these causes' benefactor. These ideologically 
non-aligned organisations were often funded indirectly through Soviet controlled 
umbrella organisations such as the International Association of Democratic Lawyers 
[IADL]. This support led to the progressive ideals of the organisation and its 
membership being allied to Soviet foreign policy aims, thus encouraging supporters of 
the ideals to join the pro-Soviet coterie. 
John Platts-Mills, President of the Haldane Society and Executive Member of the 
IADL, acted as the link between Cominform and myriad British organisations, 
organising funding for offices, providing secretaries and linking them to non-British 
organisations with a similar remit. He accepted that the Soviet link was real, arguing 
it to be necessary and unavoidable: 
America, and Britain, supported all these monstrous leaders and disgusting 
regimes, only the Soviet Union stood for freedom and democracy they 
supported justice and so helped one who fought these regimes.43 
Platts-Mills rationalises this as part of a struggle of good versus evil, the Soviet Union 
representing the good, a perception he developed during the Spanish Civil War. He 
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refused to see that the ulterior motive for the Soviet Union's support for these 
organisations was to encourage the members to act on the behalf of, not only the 
particular organisation but also, the Soviet Union. 
These organisations, often referred to as front organisations44 independent of their 
proximity to Soviet policy aims and Soviet control, allied a broad section of the left-
wing. Communists, Labour party members, non-aligned socialists, pacifists and 
humanists supported the ideals these organisations represented. The Soviet 
leadership's underlying hope was that this broad alliance would draw the majority of 
socialists and progressive individuals into adopting a pro-Soviet perspective. This 
could only be achieved by linking the aims of the organisation with those of the 
Soviet Union and by fostering a recognition that it was the Soviet Union alone whose 
policy was supportive of progressive movements across the globe. Thus there was an 
active policy within many organisations designed to encourage support for the Soviet 
Union as being the progressive bulwark as an alternative to the 'imperialist' United 
States. 
This was perhaps the most effective way of creating a stratum of support. Whether 
they were single-issue societies; such as the League for Democracy in Greece, 
organisations working at the international level; the World Peace Council for 
example, or friendship and cultural societies like the British-Soviet Friendship 
Society, they attracted a wider spectrum of membership than the Communist Parties. 
This was the purpose in the mind of the man who can be credited for developing this 
network, Willi Munzenberg. Munzenberg's 'Innocents', particularly within the 
Friendship Societies, had the appearance of independence, but the societies' leaders 
were tireless workers on behalf of the Soviet Union. 
In Britain one man stamped his mark on several such organisations, D N Pritt. It 
appears clear that he was an agent of the Soviet Union.4s For his devotion to duty, 
Pritt was awarded both the Lenin Peace Prize and the Stalin Prize. Pritt's main task, it 
would seem, was initially the creation of support within British intellectualism. Later 
he was a pro-Soviet lawyer, Labour Mp46 and independent pro-Soviet voice in 
parliament. The first organisation he became involved with was the Society for 
Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union [SCR]. Though he does not appear on the 
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list of founders, he was a prime mover in its establishment. At this time he was not 
well known and therefore his name did not carry much weight. However, those who 
were influenced sufficiently into forming the SCR were, or would become, extremely 
prominent. The list of founders read as a who's who of the pro-Soviet or fellow 
travelling intellectual movement, it included G D H Cole, G B Shaw, Beatrice Webb, 
Leonard and Virginia Woolf and J B S Haldane. There are also individuals like 
Bertrand Russell and H G Wells who criticised the regime, but still wished to retain a 
link with the Soviet Union or at least an interest in its progression. The founding 
members of such an organisation are unimportant. What is important is control. Pritt 
was the first President, no records exist of how he was elected, however his role was 
to ensure that the society would adhere to the Soviet policy line. This society was to 
be joined by the British-Soviet Friendship Society [BSFS], formed in 1927. 
Following the Second World War various friendly societies were created to promote 
friendship with the Warsaw Pact nations. All had a similar raison d'etre, advancing 
the Soviet cause. The broader membership may not have been entirely aware of this. 
The SCR, for example, provided language classes, film shows, exchange visits for 
entertainment or education and travel arrangements. However, the main purpose was 
introduction. From the time an individual crossed the step of the SCR office, and 
showed an interest, that person was regarded as a potential sympathiser. This was the 
route taken by many students of Slavic languages, or exiled Russian refugees, who 
wished to retain a cultural link. Jane Rosen, currently the librarian for the SCR 
recalled that three MPs, lan Mikardo, Sydney Silverman and Julius Silverman were 
frequent visitors; all three were, as children, Jewish refugees from Tsarist Russia. The 
SCR was particularly unobtrusive with regards to its control, this was what can be 
characterised as a 'first base' organisation. Individuals who progressed further into the 
network would become more interesting to the Soviet propaganda machine. 
However, in joining the SCR their names were entered onto the mailing list. They 
would then be sent offers to buy Soviet literature, or sent gratis copies, their response 
was measured and the contacts increased or decreased reciprocally. The Soviet 
Cultural Attaches, who monitored these societies, did not want to enlist these people 
as spies; all that was needed was a sympathetic ear. It would be ascertained later as to 
how far they would travel on the metaphorical Moscow-bound car.47 
40 
Organisations such as the BSFS present the best example of a front organisation. 
While there are scant records of the inner workings of the national body, viewing the 
archived material of some of the regional branches it is possible to gain an insight into 
how the organisation operated. The raison d'etre of the BSFS was to promote 
friendship and understanding between the peoples, but not the governments, of the 
two nations. They encouraged the twinning of towns, exchange visits and held 
meetings and seminars; all these aimed at educating people on politics and life in 
Soviet society. They approached art galleries to hold exhibitions, colleges to allow 
Russian visitors to give a presentation and encouraged the establishment of local East-
West trading links. The best available example is the Birmingham Branch, whose 
minutes from 1975-90 present a picture of the activities of the society. These show 
there was a clear political agenda. 
The organisation's meetings reiterated the message of the Soviet Union, particularly 
enforcing the image of the Soviet Union as being pro-peace and anti-nuclear. The 
secretaries frequently invited MPs to speak at these events, asking them to promote 
certain issues,48 particularly easing the way for expanding existent trade and it is 
notable who accepted and who declined. Philip Crees, Chair of the Birmingham 
branch, denies involvement in approaching MPs, but recalled it did occur and that he 
thought that the political side of the organisation was promoted too heavily. Crees 
campaigned for rapprochement but believed that it was achievable using cultural links 
alone. However, the organisations national apparatchiks, for much of the period 
Andrew Rothstein and Gordon Schaffer, ensured that promoting political connections 
remained high on the agenda. 
Arguably this was due to these societies close ties to the Soviet Union. While 
members claim these societies were self-funding, evidence suggests that a degree of 
control was exercised from the Soviet Embassy and that the Centre encouraged 
political ties being forged. MPs were encouraged to join, one, William Wilson,49 
being Chairman from 1977 to its demise. He recalled that when concerts were put on, 
the Soviet Ambassador would only attend if an MP were speaking. so This indicates 
that the Soviet Union saw the BSFS purely as a conduit for information and support 
and so enforced a certain type of activity upon its members. The faithful, who 
occupied the top posts, filtered these directives down to the membership at the branch 
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level. Crees recalled that it was the secretary who dealt with "head office". This 
secretary was not named, and has since died but, was a Communist party member and 
dealt with preparing articles for publication and organising events. The secretary was 
the mechanism by which the Centre maintained control over the branch. Crees 
appears a little naive in not recognising the control exerted by the Soviet Union, but 
remained a semi-respectable figurehead of the branch, living on ideals that were 
largely false. 
Following the Second World War altering the global perception of the Soviet Union 
became the goal for many such organisations. Linking the Soviet Union with the 
ideals of peace and democracy, in opposition to the recognised perception in the 
West, encouraged influential and idealistic individuals to lend their support. In this 
period the front organisations took on a new facet; from aiming to gain a mainly 
passive membership, they now needed an active pro-Soviet fifth column. Radek and 
Kuusinen's role for them came to life as the bulwark of Soviet agitation. The network 
expanded exponentially throughout the world, the centre of which was the World 
Peace Council [WPC].51 This became a very powerful asset to the Soviet Union, 
gaining many unwitting agents to the cause, particularly through its subsidiary 
organisations. The raison d'etre was defined in a 1949 Cominform directive 
Particular attention should be devoted to drawing into this movement trade 
unions, women's, youth, co-operative, sports, cultural, educational, religious 
and other organisations, and also scientists, writers, journalists, cultural 
workers, parliamentary and other political and public leaders.52 
This was the fulfilment of the ideals espoused by Lenin and put into practice by 
Munzenberg and Kuusinen, the desire to gain a mass movement just below the 
governmental level. All that had to be achieved was, as Munzenberg stated, 
"spread[ing] abroad the doctrine that Russia is prepared to sacrifice everything to 
keep the world at peace. ,,53 
It is doubtful that the mass movement, which the peace movement became, believed 
Soviet rhetoric. However the perception, which became popularised, was that the 
Soviet Union was at least more inclined towards peace and disarmament than the 
West, particularly the United States which was characterised as a capitalist imperial 
power.54 Many Labour MPs shared this view, however this was seldom the result of 
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exposure to Soviet propaganda. Some who held an anti-Atlanticist world view found 
their ideas shared by Soviet propaganda, others viewed the propaganda as a cynical 
ploy and rejected these arguments. ss The individuals who became attracted by the 
image of the Soviet Union as the force for 'peaceful co-existence' were those who held 
existent beliefs in the Soviet Union. These beliefs were gathered through their 
perceptions of the historical relations between East and West and their perceptions of 
the nature of Soviet socialism. Many of the ideals of the pro-peace movement became 
reinforced by Soviet propaganda, this led many organisations to be tainted by 
association because of the proximity of the arguments. 
Using the WPC as an example it is possible to show how a front organisation was 
utilised to promote the idea of the Soviet Union as a bulwark of peace and ascertain 
what led individuals to join. The image of this organisation was one of non-alignment 
and impartiality. WPC activities aimed at promoting an end to the arms race and in 
particular ending nuclear escalation. This was of course completely in line with 
Soviet desires as they were well aware that they were losing the arms race. S6 The 
initiative emerged following the first World Congress of Defenders of Peace held 
simultaneously in Paris and Prague in April 1949. This attracted delegates from 
seventy-two countries. We know that at least two British MPs attended the Parisian 
conference: Konni Zilliacus and lan Mikardo. Goodman argued that this was an 
attempt to unite the worldwide communist movement following a period when control 
had slipped away from Moscow and at a time when communication was hindered due 
to keen defences and inadequate finances. ~7 The WPC was established as the 
executive body of the Partisans for Peace Congress, which claimed to unite the anti-
fascist and anti-imperialist movements across the globe. The invitation placed in 
World Government News, the journal of the US based World government movement, 
claimed modest objectives. 
to continue discussions with the world government movement in different 
countries, to seek for points of agreement and joint activity, and to encourage 
participation by both movements in their respective conferences and 
congresses. S8 
Frederic Ioliot-Curie defined the organisation's role in explaining"[n]o one man, no 
one country by itself, but all united together can defend peace and prevent war."S9 
This was to become the central tenet of the WPC. 
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Ioliot-Curie, scientist and Nobellaureate was the first WPC President and the French 
representative; however, he was not a member of the French government. Equally the 
United States representative 1949-53 was Paul Robeson, a man banned from public 
speaking in his own country. This is mirrored by many of the representatives. What it 
became, therefore, was an organisation with an international membership of 
intellectuals and artisans, all putting forward a pro-Soviet argument for peace while 
having little real influence. Essentially it was an agent of influence as were its 
members. The WPC did have input at, perhaps, the highest level, though was still 
unable to change policy. It was recognised by the United Nations and was often 
consulted during the formulation of policies around relevant issues. Therefore, as an 
agent of influence, it had achieved its greatest aim. Nevertheless it found itself unable 
to change the dominant rationale. 
Communists historically dominated the leadership of the WPC. The greatest example 
is that of Romesh Chandra, who became President in May 1977 following the death 
of Ioliot-Curie. His path to the heights of pro-Sovietism was through the Communist 
party of India. Indian Communists became the most fervent supporters of the Soviet 
Union during the fight against Britain for independence. Chandra ensured that all 
WPC propaganda had a pro-Soviet, anti-Western slant attached to it. The central 
tenet of all WPC propaganda was world peace: Chandra argued "[t]he Soviet Union's 
military policy fully corresponds to these goals. It is of a purely defensive 
character".6o Equally representatives of Soviet controlled governments dominated it. 
Poland, the Soviet Union itself, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, and other 
Warsaw Pact nations held exponentially more seats than their size or influence should 
have dictated. Latin American regimes also feature highly, but usually for limited 
periods, then an ex-president, recently ousted by a coup is found acting as the 
country's representative. Usually the coup had been exacted by a United States 
backed military leader and this reinforced the anti-United States rhetoric of WPC 
propaganda. Any circumstance that indicated that the United States was an aggressor 
suited the WPC perfectly. The WPC did take harsher lines than would be expected on 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as did semi-independent peripheral Communist states, 
such as Yugoslavia and Romania. This could indicate that the Soviet Union did not 
have total ideological control. However, this was not how the WPC was perceived in 
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the west. William Whitelaw, in his role as British Home Secretary denied access to 
Chandra in 1980 on the grounds that he was "a senior official of an organisation 
which is a disguised instrument of Soviet foreign policy ... his exclusion is conducive 
to the public goOd.,,61 
The irony of the WPC is that its members ratified the 'rules and regulations' which 
stated that members should promote eight set objectives. These included respect for 
the right of people to sovereignty and independence, respect for the territorial 
integrity of states and, non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. These, 
together with the objectives concerning nuclear proliferation were broken 
continuously by the Soviet Union, and not only in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 
Afghanistan. In every Warsaw Pact nation and within the Baltic States there were 
desires for independence from Soviet military rule. This must have been obvious to 
those who represented the GDR and Poland and for many native Russians, however, 
this organisation constantly promoted the Soviet Union as the conciliatory and 
progressive superpower, an argument that gained strength as it became widespread. 
MPs are recorded as members, and one, James Lamond,62 stood by this in Parliament. 
He recognised its pro-Soviet nature, but saw it as the only organisation which co-
ordinated the peace movement on an international scale.63 He was convinced that the 
pro-Soviet argument was correct, as were many others. Viewing the organisation 
impartially we can see the attraction it held for people of a certain mindset. Members 
met anywhere in the world, represented many societies and ethnic origins and the 
agenda was centred around establishing a peaceful, co-operative future. Colour, race, 
religion, gender or politics was irrelevant, what was importance was a desire to work 
towards world peace. This was the attraction of the organisation. 
Control cannot be reasonably disputed, even though members such as James Lamond 
claim they were completely unaware of it. The list of Joliot-Curie Gold Medal for 
Peace winners read as a 'who's who' of the Communist leaders and supporters of the 
world. Fidel Castro of Cuba, Salvador Allende of Chile, Brezhnev himself and 
Yasser Arafat chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO], a regular 
receiver of Russian arms. This type of organisation attracted those who desired world 
peace. They were then drawn into believing that the Soviet Union was the only nation 
that stood for peace. The Soviet Union did desire peace, but on their terms, not those 
45 
of the western leaders, thus they encouraged an army of supporters to argue this cause 
on their behalf. The objective was to encourage these supporters to use their positions 
of influence to change the governmental and public perception of Soviet policy aims. 
The WPC also forged links with Soviet backed paramilitary and liberation 
movements, particularly the PLO, Provisional IRA and the ANC and encouraged 
leading members of these onto the Presidential Committee. This led supporters of 
these movements; pro-Palestinians, Irish Nationalists and Black Rights activists, into 
the pro-Soviet orbit. Subsidiary organisations, established independently, were 
supported by front organisations. The Anti-Apartheid movement in Britain was 
funded by the Haldane Society, which indicates they enjoyed the sponsorship of 
Moscow, as was any organisation that opposed British involvement with Northern 
Ireland.64 Equally Libya, Cuba and Vietnam had their own friendship and support 
organisations which were backed by the Soviet Union. Possibly all but the top 
echelon of these organisations could have avoided being fully appraised of the extent 
of Soviet support. In Britain these societies received funding, probably originating 
from Moscow, through the Haldane Society of Progressive Lawyers, British affiliate 
of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers the headquarters of which 
were in East Germany. 
When looking at those front organisations which survived beyond the Soviet Union it 
is telling that they were poorly funded in their latter years. In 1994 Paul Mercer6s 
recorded them as being mainly run from one address; 27 Old Gloucester Street, 
London. This was no more than one office that controlled around twenty post office 
box numbers.66 Here mail for diverse organisations such as the British Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Campaign, The Friends of Afghanistan, No Intervention in Libya, Hands 
Off Ireland and Hands off Iraq were received and disseminated to the officials. Many 
of these are anonymous; however most openly advertised MPs as being patrons. 
The overarching supporter for these organisations was the IADL. This provides a 
good example of how non-aligned progressive movements were drawn into the pro-
Soviet orbit. The IADL was created and directly controlled by Moscow. The Haldane 
Society, the British subsidiary, was run firstly by Pritt, then by John Platts-Mills, both 
devoutly pro-Soviet.67 This organisation aided the establishment of smaller, single-
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issue organisations that attracted a different calibre of member. Many Labour -MPs 
supported the Anti-Apartheid cause; prominent members were Stan Newens and 
Bernie Grant. Grant, veteran fonner MP for Tower Hamlets, supported many black 
rights and anti racist causes, Newens, as a prominent figure within Liberation 
promoted many campaigns against US supported regimes in Latin America; 
particularly Pinochet's Chile. Equally many MPs, some of whom were Jewish, 
supported pro-Palestinian societies; these included Sydney Silverman, lan Mikardo 
and in recent years Jeremy Corbyn and George Galloway. These MPs were more than 
likely to have been unaware of the extent of Soviet control the organisations had, or 
did not care provided the civil rights issue was publicised internationally and 
addressed within the respective nations. This was the case with most members, 
however, if the Soviet Union could have made explicit, and popularised, the 
perception of itself as an ally of this progressive cause, it was hoped that the dominant 
perception of the Soviet Union would change. This was the true reason for the Soviet 
Union supporting these organisations. 
Alongside these organisations were the truly independent peace movements who were 
constantly targeted by the WPC. This was largely successful. For example, 
Communists became prominent in CND during the 1980s. The CPGB had been a co-
supporter of the Aldermaston marches since the 1950s, the Communists appeared as 
fellow pacifists, however, their interests were not solely pro-peace. Labour Action for 
Peace [LAP], retained a non-communist leadership, but also appeared to subscribe to 
the notion that the Soviet Union was pro-peace, reiterating this argument in many 
publications.68 Members of the LAP, particularly Frank Allaun, were often found 
supporting the Soviet argument. They did not go as far as the WPC, however. appear 
to have been influenced by Soviet arguments. 
These ideas were clearly recognised as a threat to British political stability by all 
parties in government. The Labour party proscribed membership to the WPC in 1951, 
almost immediately after its inception. It also investigated anyone who had links to 
the WPC.69 However, it was not necessary to be a member to be under the influence 
of such an organisation. Through subsidiaries, such as the British Peace Committee, 
myriad publications entered the country. They were sold in many left-wing 
bookshops, on peace rallies and marches, and were sent as trial copies to those who 
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had previously shown an interest. Left-wing MPs were sent review copies, in the 
hope that their content would int1uence the arguments. The question is did this 
propaganda campaign influence them or simply reinforce their existent world views? 
Those MPs interviewed do not recall any influence being drawn from pro-Soviet 
publications. They see their arguments as being a product of their own beliefs and 
experience. However the arguments of those who take up a greater part of this study, 
Konni Zilliacus, Frank Allaun and Stan Newens particularly, follow the tenet ofWPC 
material to the letter. They did not openly support the Soviet Union, only world 
peace. But each argued that the Soviet Union had the greater propensity for 
negotiating peace while the United States was characterised as a dangerous and 
antagonistic force. This is a conundrum that can only be answered by the individuals 
themselves. It appears that they were influenced, in some way, by Soviet propaganda 
because they arrived at the conclusion that the Soviet Union was fervently pro-peace 
and the United States opposed these ideals. Moreover some were so keen to believe 
that they risked their careers, and political credibility, to defend Soviet policy. 
Perhaps the most important type of front organisations were those which opposed 
United States backed, anti-democratic regimes. These specifically targeted members 
who had previously espoused sympathy with their particular cause. This can be best 
exemplified through the work of the League for Democracy in Greece. This had been 
established during the Second World War as an aid organisation under the Presidency 
of Compton Mackenzie, writer and humanist (1883-1972) with Pritt as Organising 
Secretary. Following the war activism increased as the British government supported 
the anti-Communist monarchist forces in the civil war and the League became a 
fervent opponent of this policy. Initially the League enjoyed substantial support from 
the parliamentary left-wing70 this was largely lost, however, when the Labour party 
proscribed the league in 1950. The League did retain a cell of support however and 
were constantly kept up to date on who was sympathetic. 
New life was breathed into the organisation in 1968. From the conclusion of the Civil 
War, and establishment of King Paul II as de jure leader, there had existed a conflict 
between the civilian government and the military. Papandreou, the nominal Social 
Democrat Prime Minister, attempted to gain control of his defence ministry. This 
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prompted a coup led by Colonel Papadopoulos. In response to these developments 
John Fraser71 formed the parliamentary Greek Democratic Committee to exert 
pressure on the government to support Papandreous. Fraser forged links with the 
League, using it as an adjunct. In a letter to the League's Secretary, Diana Pym, 
Fraser72 listed all the MPs who had supported motions calling for an investigation into 
the human rights record of the right wing Greek government.73 In 1973, following the 
abandonment of proscription by the Labour party, the 98 MPs Fraser listed were 
systematically approached by Pym and Marion Sarafis, fellow administrator of the 
League. Each MP was invited to join, and offered Vice Presidencies or other 
Executive positions. 74 From this they gained 21 new members and a further 42 
agreed to promote the Greek political situation as a special interest. They were then 
prompted by letter when an issue of importance should be raised. 75 
It is important to note who did join, and who put their names forward as willing to 
argue the League's case. Most who joined had supported other 'front' causes. 
Though this organisation did not specifically draw MPs to the Communist cause the 
links with the Soviet Union were fairly explicit. In 1946 the League incorporated 
Maritpress, a propagandist press agency run by the Greek Communist party. Pym 
shared an office with Maritpress and therefore could brief members and sympathisers 
on the Communist arguments. Pym also forged links to the Soviet Women's Anti-
Fascist Committee [SW AFCf6 and the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Greek 
Democrats [SCSGD]. In an undated letter to Lydia Petrova of the SW AFC it is 
evident that Pym visited the Soviet Union on several occasions and participated on a 
'joint action planning committee' with the SCSGD. Pym also encouraged left-wing 
figures to visit and meet Soviet officials of these organisations. On 20 February 1973 
she wrote to Sergei Smirnov of the SCSGD to inform him that Alan Sapper, an 
influential Communist Union leader,77 was due to visit the Soviet Union and had an 
interest in Greek issues. She told Smirnov that he should "meet him to discuss the 
international action which you have been over-seeing." Pym also wanted Sapper to 
be taken to the Greek exiles' community in Tashkent that the SCSGD had established. 
Sapper was to become Chairman of the League in 1977 but had been involved in the 
organisation's activity since 1968. During the filming of Doctor Zhivago reports 
from Union members had indicated that the political situation was worsening, 
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summary executions were taking place and non-Greek film workers felt unsafe: He 
spearheaded a Union-led blockade of Greece, established links with Greek dissidents 
and began a file listing those who were committing crimes against the Greek people. 
Sapper recalled that the only international support for the anti-fascist movement in 
Greece came from the Soviet Union. This led to much information being passed 
through Greek refugees in the Soviet Union to their supporters in Britain. He testified 
that this necessitated that clear links between the League and the Soviet Union were 
established and a joint programme of activity pursued.78 The Soviet Union had 
established clear links with the Greek socialists thus were in a better position to co-
ordinate the support campaign, this led the League's policy to be placed under Soviet 
control. 
Pym did act as a conduit for Soviet instructions, particularly in the 1967-73 period. 
There are many letters that show links being established between the League and 
organisations such as the World Federation of Democratic Youth. The Vice President 
S Chakraborty, told Pym that "we should like solidarity to be expressed in the most 
diverse forms.,,79 Pym sent literature to British youth organisations, Trade Unions, 
left-wing publications and sympathetic individuals. Much of this was produced in the 
Soviet Union and disseminated through the Bureau of Liaison with Organisations by 
Ivan Bachev.8o There are no specific details of meetings with Soviet officials, 
however the tone of the letters, which shows a familiarity, indicates that Pym had met 
them on several occasions. This is also indicated by references to meetings in 
Moscow, London and across Europe in letters between Pym and several of the 
officials. It can also be inferred that these meetings were at the expense of the Soviet 
government. The League at no time had a mass membership and though no full 
accounts exist after Leslie Solley's departure as Honorary Treasurer, some time after 
the 1956 AGM, we can see it was not an affluent organisation. It was of course in the 
Soviet interest to encourage a good relationship between their domestic organisations 
and international counterparts. This allowed the Soviet Union greater policy control 
and afforded them a direct link to membership. The fact that this included several 
MPs, who also harboured sympathies in other areas of Soviet foreign policy, made the 
advantage greater. 
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These examples allow us to gain a snapshot of how some of the front organisations 
operated.81 Particularly in the case of the League for Democracy in Greece we see an 
organisation, founded on humanitarian concerns, become pro-Soviet due to a series of 
well placed individuals within its hierarchy and a Soviet campaign to establish itself 
at the head of the Greek anti-fascist movement. Evidence indicates that similar 
campaigns were undertaken with regard to the Anti-Apartheid and pro-Palestinian 
campaigns. Pritt was instrumental in ensuring the League adopted a pro-Soviet 
perspective when he became Vice President. Diana Pym, as secretary, acted as the 
main conduit of communication with the Soviet Union. This is similar to the role of 
the anonymous secretary of the Birmingham BSFS. We can assume that similar 
methods were used in other organisations.82 
The front organisations were highly organised and effective, promoting a popular 
cause, while being backed covertly by the Soviet Union. We can observe how the 
process of courtship by the Soviet Union worked and how the organisation was able. 
to encourage a number of individuals, in positions of influence, to support the 
organisations' cause. This could mean, at key times, also supporting the policy of the 
Soviet Union. The mechanisms for achieving this appear as simplicity itself, but are 
the product of a well organised propaganda machine. This was part of the process of 
drawing individuals towards the Soviet side in the ideological war. 
The pro-Soviet strand within the British Labour party were not a product of this 
campaign. They did enjoy contact with Soviet officials, reiterated Soviet arguments, 
visited the Soviet Union and were prominent members of front organisations. 
However they pursued these activities on the strength of personal beliefs. These were 
reinforced by the Soviet campaign, and efforts were made to maintain support at times 
when support was liable to weaken. The Birmingham BSFS engaged in frenetic 
activity in January 1969 to explain Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia. This included 
mailing the two local MPs sympathetic to the Soviet Union, Renee Short and William 
Wilson. These individuals were important to the Soviet Union and the campaign 
aimed to increase their number. This was largely a failure. However, the study of 
Soviet methods of gaining support allows us to understand how an alternative 
perception of the Soviet Union became popularised among a minority of individuals 
who held existing sympathies towards the Soviet model of peaceful socialism. 
51 
I K Marx & F Engels. The Communist Manifesto. London. Phoenix. p 55. 
~ This was the last battle of the Russian Civil War 1918-20 and took place on Polish soil. Lenin's 
objective was to establish a bridge between Soviet Russia and Germany to provide aid to the 
Spartacists. though he was unaware that the leaders Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg had already 
been killed. See A B Ulam. Lenin and the Bolsheviks, London. Secker & Warburg. 1966. pp 584-7 . 
• 1 The title of the book by Vie Alien: V Alien. The Russians are Coming. Shipley. The Moor Press, 
1987 which refuted anti-Communism as based upon prejudice and assumption. 
~ In particular the 'testing' of actors and film-makers and others in the entertainment industry for 
Communist sympathies. 
S A very unsympathetic appraisal is provided in D N Pritt. The Labour Government 1945-51, London. 
Lawrence & Wishart. 1963. pp 390-402; for a more academic but equally critical appraisal of the 
investigations into the affiliations and activities of the Labour left see S Dorril & R Ramsay. Smear: 
Wilson and the Secret State, London. Harper Collins, 1991. pp 36-43. 
6 V I Lenin & G Zinoviev. Against the Stream, Moscow, Progress. 1925, p 156. 
7 D Shub, Lenin. Harmondsworth. Penguin. 1948, pp 444-5. 
8 Lenin's speech to the Supreme Soviet. September 1920. reproduced in V I Lenin. Collected Works, 
Vol. XXIII. Moscow, Novosti. 1946, p 292. 
9 V I Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. XVII. Moscow. Novosti. 1946, pp 386-7, 
IOV I Lenin. Collected Works, Vol. XVII, Moscow. Novosti, 1946, p 142. 
11 German Communist and friend of Lenin from pre-Revolutionary times. He was employed by Lenin 
to direct propaganda operations in Europe. See S Koch. Stalin. Willi Munzenburg and the Seduction of 
the Intellectuals,_London, Harper Collins. 
12 I Phelps-Fetherston, Soviet International Front Organisations: A Concise Handbook, London, 
Frederick A Praeger 1965, p 1. 
13 Karl Radek quoted in The Report of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, p 53. 
Communist party Archive. 
14 The practice by which members of political groupings, such as the CPGB, entered the Labour party 
in an attempt to facilitate contact between the parties and increase sympathies for the party and its 
objectives within the Labour party. 
IS The process of enforcing that Labour party members could not become members of other political 
organisation, the membership of which was seen as inimical to the political philosophy of the party. 
This was the brainchild of William Gillies. Head of the International Department 1918-1939, who 
argued that a threat was posed by organisations which claimed to support the aims of the party. His 
initial fears were that the members of the CPGB and affiliate goups would be accepted as candidates 
for the Labour party, this was expanded in reaction to the formation of the Popular Front. See C 
Collette, Internationalism and officialdom in the British labour movement: Labour's attitude to 
European socialism 1918 to 1939. with special reference to the role of the International Secretary of the 
Labour Party, unpublished M.Litt thesis. University of Oxford, 1992. 
16 See S Dorril. MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operation, London, Fourth Estate. 2000; S Dorril & R 
Ramsay, Smear: Wilson and the Secret State, 1991; P Lashmar & J Oliver, Britain's Secret Propaganda 
War: 1948-1977, Stroud, Sutton, 1998. 
17 V Segodnya, 'Russia's image in the West - two views', Daily Review, 23 January 2001. 
IH Quoted in C Rose, The Soviet Propaganda Network: A Directory of Organisations serving Soviet 
Foreign Policy, London. Pinter.1988. p 9. Andropov was not the first to make such a statement. 
however this is indicative of Soviet policy towards the democratic West at an important juncture in 
East-West relations. 
I') This internationlll organisation. controlled by Comintern [the Communist International] and after 
1949 Cominform. did carry out this task as far as possible. The CPGB was hindered by its slavishness 
to Stalin which caused divisions. particularly following the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939. 
52 
20 T H Qualter, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, 1962, p 27. 
21 This is an the average membership of the SCRSS 1927-40, see archive papers 1935-1968. 
22 For an account of the level of societal control in the Soviet Union sce V Kravchenko, I Chose 
Freedom, London, Robert Hale, 1946. Particularly pertinent would be the account of his investigation 
during the purge trials; pp 112-146. 
23 There are many examples of published works produced by British Communists which reiterate 
Soviet policy aims. Some, for example R P Dutt, World Politics 1918-36, London, GoIlancz, 1937 
were lengthy texts aimed at an intellectual audience. H Pollitt, How to Win the Peace, London, The 
Communist party, 1945 is a small pamphlet aimed at a broader audience. It seems clear that these 
volumes were often produced with an audience in mind, the phrasing, length and level of difficulty 
varies between writers and indeed works. 
24 For a recent discussion of the British equivalent, the Information Research Department, is P Lashmar 
& J Oliver, Britain's Secret Propaganda War: 1948-1977, 1998. 
25 B A Hazan. Soviet Propaganda: a case study of the Middle East Conflict, New Brunswick, 
Transaction Books, undated, p 49. 
26 Zhurnalist. No. 1, 1972, P 5. 
27 The majority offront organisation officials represented Warsaw Pact nations, though Britian, France 
and Gennany also had seats on various councils. Aside from these other Communist nations were 
represented, particularly Cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam, and countries undergoing struggles of 
independence in which Moscow had an interest; South Africa, India and Palestine. The Palestine 
Liberation Organisation has had a seat on the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council since 
1954, though this was not always filled. 
28 Interview with Jane Rosen, 8 July 1998. 
29 The British affiliate of the World Peace Council. 
30 P Johnston, Daily Telegraph, 25/9/99, electronic version. 
31 J Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Simon & Shuster, New York, 1952, p 30. 
32 General Secretary of the TUC. He supported Lansbury in 1918, however following his visit in 1922 
saw nothing worthy of emulation or support. Sce W P Coates, & Z K Coates, A History of Anglo-
Soviet Relations, London, Lawrence & Wishart.1945, pp 289, pp 476-7. 
33 See S Webb & B Webb, Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?, spcciallimited edition printed by 
the authors for the subscribing members of the Transport and General Workers Union, 1935. 
34 Pilgrimage was Beatrice Webb's tenninology, see M Cole, Beatrice Webb's Diaries 1924-32, 
London, Longmans, Green & Co, 1956, p 305. David Caute used the phrase 'Socialist Mecca' when 
discussing the desire among intellectuals to visit the Soviet Union; D Caute, The Fellow Travellers, 
London, Quartet, 1973, p 117. 
35 For a review of the motivations of intellectuals who visited the Soviet Union, and the arguments they 
produced on their return, see D Caute, The Fellow Travellers, pp 60-131; B Dent, 'Moscow 
Travellers', New Statesma!!, 6 July 1984, pp 10-11; P Hollander, Political Pilgrims: Travel of the 
Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union. China and Cuba. 1928-1978, New York, Harper & Row, 
1981. 
36 For details of Shaw's visit, and an analysis, see M Holroyd, Bernard Shaw: Volume 3: 1918-1950: 
The Lure of Fantasy, Middlesex, Penguin. 1991, pp 233-248. 
37 The Guardia!!, 10/10/72. 
38 J F F Platts-Mills, 'Law in the Soviet Union', Anglo Soviet Journal, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Summer 
1963, pp. 8-11. 
39 Interview with Philip Crees, fonnerly Chairman of Birmingham Branch ofBSFS, 12 May 1999, 
40 Interviews carried out with several fonner employees ofWebster's Tools, Wakeficld indicate that the 
cultural exchanges were designed to motivate British workers into revolutionary behaviour. Fred 
53 
Parson, who visited in 1977 and 1979. recalled one whole day of the visit being devoted to the Soviet 
analysis of the worker's struggle in Britain. This included action strategies and revolutionary dogma. 
He was also even given pamphlets by Lenin and Trotsky as guides for action. He remembered that 
many of the Union members who were there were much impressed, especially when aid was offered to 
strikers. While this does not indicate that Soviet exchange trips and industrial action were linked, it 
does show that attempts were made to increase both anti-government activity and pro-Soviet activism 
in Britain. 
41 Andre Gide's 1936 argument was reproduced in A Koestler et ai, The God That Failed, London, 
Andre Deutsch, 1960, and more recently in MacArthur, Brian, (Editor), The Penguin book of 
Twentieth Century Protest. Middlesex, Penguin, pp 123-5. 
42 Interview with Alan Sapper, 25 July 2000. 
43 Interview with John Platts-Mills, 4 July 1998. 
44 This definition refers to the fact that these organisations' nominated cause was perceived as a front 
that disguised the fact that they were dedicated to supporting Soviet foreign policy. 
4S It is documented that Pritt was seen as a GRU asset and Nigel West, to reifnorce this claim, 
chronicled Pritt's defence of Major Wilfred Vernon in May 1932. Vernon was arrested for the 
unauthorised possession of government documents. It is alleged that Pritt did not disclose the fact that 
his client was an agent working for the Soviet Union despite the fact that Vernon's Soviet connections 
had been revealed by Vernon's accomplice Frederick Meredith. Meredith admitted his role in 
espionage and implicated both Vernon and Pritt when he was arrested for a different offence in 1970. 
See N West, The l11egals: the Double Lives of the Cold War's Most Secret Agents, London, Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1993, p 35; p 109. 
46 Pritt was expelled from the party in 1939 for his support of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and subsequent 
Soviet invasion of Finland. 
47 An analogy developed first by Trotsky to characterise the position of the Soviet Union and America 
on the world stage, this has been famously used to characterise the behaviour of pseudo-Communists. 
48 Three local Labour MPs Robin Corbett, Birmingham Erdington 1983-present day, Jeffrey Rooker, 
Birmingham Perry Barr, Feb 1974-2001 and Brian Walden, Birmingham All Saints 1964-74 and 
Birmingham Ladywood 1974-77 were approached but refused to have any contact with Birmingham 
BSFS. Julius Silverman Birmingham Erdington 1945-83 was a friend to the society, and a lifelong 
member of the SCR. No letters exist in the archive, however the contacts are recorded in the minutes 
of meeting. 
49 Labour MP for Coventry South 1964-74 and Coventry South East 1974-83. 
so Letter from William Wilson, 19 May 1999. 
SI The name has gone through many variations i.e. World Peace Congress, World Peace Council and 
World Council for Peace. This is due in some part to translation, but mainly to the banning of the 
World Peace Congress in 1953 following which the name and headquarters were changed to disguise 
the fact that it was the same organisation. 
S2 Cominform directive of 29/11149, quoted in I Phelps-Fetherston, Soviet International Front 
Organisations: A Concise Handbook, 1965, pp 17-18. 
53 R H Shultz and R Godson, pezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy, Washington, 
Pergamon Brassey's. 1984, p 112. 
54 Cuba. Vietnam. Cambodia and various United States military operations in Latin America reinforced 
this view. An anti-American stance underpinned the world view of organisations such as the Movement 
for Colonial Freedom, established by Fenner Brockway in 1949, and was shared by many on the left of 
the Labour party and though anti-Americanism did not equate to pro-Sovietism some were drawn to 
support the Soviet Union as the alternative to American capitalism. See for example the case of Stan 
Newens. 
H Articles in Tribune denounce both United States and Soviet actions, Reynolds News, in contrast, 
developed 1\ pro-Soviet perspective and was able to explain Soviet actions while condemning the 
United States. 
54 
56 This particularly argued by Russian historian Volkogonov. See D Volkgonov, The Rise and Fall of 
the Soviet Empire: Political Leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev, London, HarperCollins, 1998, p 217; pp 
276-7. 
51 ER Goodman, 'The Soviet Union and World Government', The Journal of Politics, Vol. IS, No. 2, 
May 1953, pp 231-253, p 250. 
58 Advertisement, World Government News, May 1951, p 9. 
59 World Peace Council, What it is and what it does, 1978, p 6. 
60 R Chandra. 'The Soviet Union and the arms race', World Marxist Review, January 1981, p 35. 
61 Hansard. Vol. 978, Written Answers, Col. 219. 
62 James Lamond MP for Old ham East and Oldham Central and Royton 1970-1992 will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter Six. 
63 Interview with James Lamond, 17/2/99. 
64 John Platts-Mills, President of the Haldane Society, organised annual grants to be transferred from 
the society's funds to more than twenty different organisations that opposed Anglo-American policy 
and supported various global liberation movements. The fund was titled the "international liberation 
fund" established jointly by the IADL and the WPC, but the money came from the Soviet Union. No 
accounts for the Haldane Society are available, however Platts-Mills argued excused his role arguing 
that "someone had to support these causes, no so-called democratic government would". Interview with 
John Platts-Mills, 4 July 1998. 
6S P Mercer, Directory of British Political Organisations: 1994, Essex, Longman, 1994. 
66 There were nineteen organisations listed at this address. This address is now the office of the 
National Union of Insurance Workers. and the secretary says that she has no knowledge of the previous 
occupant. The office overlooks the October Gallery. and is situated in a back street of the Holbom 
District. The October Gallery was established to celebrate the revolutionary spirit of Bolshevism. it 
now displays West African art. 
61 Originally the Haldane Society had been a group of socialist, 'progressive', lawyers, established by 
Sir Stafford Cri pps and Frank Soskice, both Labour MPs. Cripps stepped down as Chairman in 1949 
and was replaced by Pritt. After Pritl's death the mantle fell to Platts-Mills. 
68 See M Ormerod, What About the USSR: Labour and East-West Detente, London, LAP, 1987, 
69 For example, Ian Mikardo was investigated after a pamphlet listed him as a signatory to a BPC 
petition. see Morgan Phillips papers. National Museum of Labour History. 
10 The League claims to have had the support of 80 MPs in an unpublished history produced by Diana 
for King's College London Archive. It is clear from the letters in the Archive that Pym attempted to 
maintain this and gain further support from left-wingers in parliament. 
11 Labour MP for Norwood 1966-97. He was PPS to Barbara Castle 1968-70, and spokesman for 
several departments including employment, trade and housing. 
12 Letter J Fraser MP to Diana Pym, 30'h November 1967. 
13 Fraser was not a member of the League and refused to join in 1974, but he did acknowledge Greek 
democracy as a special interest. He argued that this was due to it being an issue of democracy versus 
oppression. He recognised that the League had a pro-Soviet agenda and, though he used it as an ally, 
would not have allowed it to dominate his parliamentary organisation. Interview with John Fraser, 
23n/99. 
14 See Letters in Archive, for example Pym to ludith Hart, 30'" June 1973. 
15 There are numerous letters to the MPs who either joined or agreed to name the situation in Greece as 
an area of special interest in the King's College Archive, League for Democracy in Greece, letters, 
MPs. tiles A-L and M-Z. 
16 These organisations are referred to by Rose as Soviet Matrix Organisations used to exert Soviet 
control over the front organisations. C Rose, The Soviet Propaganda Network: A Direct0D' of 
55 
Organisations serving Soviet Foreign Policy, 1988, pp 255-276. Many of the Women's organisations 
were controlled by Valentina Tereshkova, first woman in space, due to her acceptability and heroine 
st:ltus among women worldwide. However, they were run mainly by established party figures, E 
Primakov and Sergei Smirnov for example appear often as officials. 
77 Sapper was at the time President of the Confederation of Entertainment Unions, Secretary of the 
Federation of Film Unions, Treasurer of the Federation of Broadcasting Unions and a member of the 
British Copyright Council. 
78 Interview with Alan Sapper, 25 July 2000. 
79 Letter S Chakraborty to Diana Pym, 3rd November 1967. 
80 Letters from Bachev. in both English and Russian, exist in the League for Democracy in Greece 
Archive, King's College London. These were translated by the League, converted into pamphlets and 
sent out to other organisations. Copies of letters to other organisations, such as local peace groups, 
Youth Federations, and Student Unions, exist requesting that these essentially Soviet produced 
pamphlets be disseminated among their members. The pamphlets encouraged the reader to take action 
to support Greece. Pym did not inform any of the organisations who had originally produced this 
material. 
81 It is impossible to categorically state that the Soviet Union did completely control many of the 
organisations that have been classified as fronts for Soviet policy. There are few organisations that 
have their papers archived and there is little secondary material available. The League for Democracy 
in Greece, therefore, can be presented as the ideal example of an organisation founded on humanitarian 
ideals and concerned with supporting a liberation movement that became a Soviet front following a 
courtship procedure undertaken by Soviet officials and the installation of pro-Soviet individuals within 
the organisation's hierarchy. 
82 There is a lack of records for many of the organisations funded by the Haldane Society and for the 
Haldane Society itself, therefore this study relies on the evidence presented by the papers of those 
organisations which have been archived. 
56 
Chapter Two 
From Emancipatory Revolution to Grand Alliance: 
The Traditions of pro-Sovietism 
The ideological division of the world, synonymous with the Cold War, served to focus the 
activities of individuals who possessed a sentimental attachment to the ideals of Soviet 
Communism. However the arguments that were developed in defence of the model of 
'actually existing socialism' were not developed purely as a counter balance to Western 
produced anti-Soviet propaganda. The pro-Soviet position was the public expression of 
the belief that ideological links existed between the Soviet 'socialist experiment' and the 
future of socialism as a political programme. This belief led British socialists to develop 
means to defend the Soviet Union on the basis that a common objective existed and that 
this could only be reached in a stable and interdependent world order. The traditions of 
pro-Sovietism emerged as a result of the Russian revolutions in 1917 and a symbiotic 
relationship developed between British pro-Sovietism, and the pro-Soviet milieu's analysis 
of British socialism, and the Soviet Union which was to remain a permanent feature within 
this political strand. Evidence for this relationship can be found in the fact that pro-
Sovietism became pronounced and then submerged in response to developments within 
the Soviet system and Soviet actions in foreign policy and as a reaction to failures with the 
British gradualist tradition of socialism. Clear breaks with the Soviet model were made in 
reaction to Stalin's purges and show trials, the Nazi-Soviet pact and the invasion of 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, however some individuals were unable to make this break 
and were forced to excuse these actions. The individuals who maintained a pro-Soviet 
position held the viewpoint that elements of the Soviet system were built upon socialist 
principles that should be adopted by the British Labour party. Thus the Soviet Union was 
employed as a hook on which to hang these individual's opposition to Labour's economic 
and foreign policies. 
In order to understand the opposition to the post-1945 Cold War rationale it is necessary to 
place these pro-Soviet sentiments within a historical perspective. The traditions 
underpinning them mainly date back to the period immediately preceding the Second 
World War, specifically 1931-39. There was little lasting attachment to the revolutionary 
spirit of 1917 in Russia within the British Labour party, nor was there any ideological 
sympathy for Soviet Communism during the 1920s. There were, however, contrasting 
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views of the Soviet Union and the Communist International, therefore it is necessary to 
explain how British socialists greeted the societal changes in Russia and their perception 
of how this would effect the world order. This chapter covers the period 1917-1945, and 
charts the currents of support as they moved towards and away from the ideas emanating 
from the Soviet Union. During this period fervent opponents became ardent admirers, and 
erstwhile supporters turned their back upon the Communist ideal. A minority of those who 
inherited the pro-Soviet perspective of world politics were elected to the Labour benches 
of the 1945-50 parliament. Their election would mark the beginning of active 
parliamentary support for the Soviet Union within the Labour party. 
There are several existent studies of the relationship between the British Labour party and 
the broader socialist movement and post-revolutionary Russia, subsequently referred to as 
the Soviet Union. 1 These characterise the period under focus here as one that set the scene 
for the anti-Sovietism of the Cold War. The Labour party saw the Soviet Union as the 
antithesis of its socialist beliefs and recognised that contact was electorally damaging. 
This led to a division occurring in the British Socialist movement between the British 
Socialist party, which evolved into the CPGB, the Independent Labour party [ILP] who 
were more tolerant of Soviet ideas,2 and the anti-Soviet Labour party.3 The Labour party's 
mistrust of the Soviet Union emerged almost immediately after political power passed to 
the Russian Communists.4 The ideological dichotomy is highlighted by the fact that the 
October 1917 revolution was perceived, with a zero-sum perspective, as either a triumph 
of the people over tyranny or as an act of violent repression. The PLP leadership 
universally subscribed to the latter. What is clear is that the two perspectives shared little 
ideological middle ground and thus no alliance between the PLP and the Communist 
International [Comintern] was ever seen as viable or attractive. This means that support 
for the Soviet Union was pursued at the dissident individual level. 
The fact that, after 1922, there was an organised pro-Soviet political organisation within 
Britain, the CPGB, does not indicate the presence of a coherent pro-Soviet movement. 
Pro-Soviet sympathisers could not be so easily compartmentalised. While the CPGB 
attracted those who believed in key revolutionary ideals and became proactive within the 
politics of class struggle, the party was perceived by the working class as operating from a 
very narrow political perspective. As Laybourn and Murphy observe "the CPGB was an 
immensely sectarian organisation [that] attempted to impose what many would now see as 
inappropriate policies on the British political tradition of compromise and radicalism."s 
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Thus. for those who supported the ideals of Soviet Communism but opposed Moscow's 
dominance over Communist party policy, there was not always a clear choice of which 
political party to ally with. Therefore, although the CPGB is an integral element of this 
story, the level of support for the party only acts as a definer of the political mood of the 
period. Membership of the party and the proximity between pro-Soviet MPs arguments 
and the simultaneous position of the CPGB on an issue can, however, be indicative of an 
individual's beliefs.6 We do not find many individuals drifting between Communism and 
Labourism, due mainly to the opposition to Communist ideas within the Labour party. 
Individuals did leave the CPGB to join the Labour party however, in studying these cases, 
it is possible to find individuals who made a break not only with the party but also the 
politics of the communism.7 The lack of electoral credibility experienced by the CPGB 
forced many who developed a pro-Soviet perspective to choose to remain independent 
from the party, prior to 1945 many centred upon the ILP, but there were also influential 
Labour members who exhibited pro-Soviet sympathies. 
The CPGB did promote the argument that there was significant middle ground between 
Labourism and Communism. J T Murphy argued that a 'united front' programme calling 
for the creation of a socialist society, radical welfare reforms, recognition of the rights of 
Trade Unions and a lasting peace in Europe, should be adopted by all the left-wing 
political groups.8 Murphy argued that this would attract the "proletarian masses" to the 
party "eventually liquidating the Labour party. ,,9 Thus while shared objectives did exist the 
Labour leadership maintained a permanent distance from the CPGB and, after 1924, 
Labour actively obstructed Communist entryism. This is clearly evident from the creation 
of the proscription list in 1925,10 which defined the organisations that promoted pro-
Communist causes as inimical to the rules of Labour party membership. However, this 
did not detract Labour members and theorists from supporting pro-Communist and pro-
Soviet causes and discussing a shared socialist destiny. The Soviet Union provided proof, 
as Dell observes, that "socialism could be successful, because it was believed that at least 
economically it was successful."tt This was the product of a certain series of historical 
developments, ones which would have ramifications on the perception of World War IT 
and the post war world order. 
What can be observed in the 1917-45 era is a short honeymoon, in which the February 
1917 revolution was welcomed as a triumph of proletarian power, while the October 1917 
revolution was viewed with uncertainty. This was followed by a protracted period when 
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there was little pro-Soviet activity outside the CPGB. However after 1930 a distinct shift 
of ideas towards the Soviet economic model can be detected and support grew for the 
Soviet Union in opposition to the growth of fascism. The reasons for these shifts, as 
throughout the history of pro-Sovietism, were developments in domestic politics and the 
international arena. The only reason that pro-Sovietism can be described in terms of being 
a movement during certain periods, albeit a minority movement, particularly 1945-1987, is 
due to the relative constancy of the bi-polar antagonism. Prior to 1945 it was not strictly 
necessary to choose an ideological side, though the ideas surrounding the Popular Front, 
which gained support after Hitler rose to power in Germany, did argue that an ideological 
dichotomy was being developed. Thus the history of the relationship between the British 
Labour movement and the Soviet Union tells us a great deal about the roots of the pro-
Soviet movement, and can indicate why certain MPs chose the Soviet side. 
The questions this chapter seeks to answer are what factors led to the development of pro-
Soviet analyses, how were these arguments expressed and what traditions were bequeathed 
to post-war socialist politics. This will be achieved by focusing upon key figures within 
the British Labour movement who produced pro-Soviet analyses in response to 
international events. In focussing upon the arguments developed we see how at times, and 
around certain issues, pro-Sovietism became pronounced, only to wane in response to the 
events in the international arena. Therefore we will see that there was an initially 
favourable response to the Russian revolutionary movement which cooled almost as 
rapidly as it grew. This led to a period of estrangement beyond the CpaB circles. 
However as parliamentary socialism failed in Britain and socialism came under attack in 
continental Europe, new models were sought and focus shifted, once again, toward the 
Soviet Union. This led to a group to actively protect the Soviet model of existent 
socialism. The activities of these individuals reached their climax during the Second 
World War as fascism and communism were perceived to be fighting over the future of 
Europe. The arguments developed during this period were to shape thinking for the next 
fifty years, and beyond, and ensure that pro-Sovietism was to remain a feature on the 
fringes of British labourism. 
Brief Honeymoon, Quick Divorce: Feb 1917-Aug 1931 
The limited organisational strength and cohesion of the pro-Soviet political strand is 
indicated by the fact that in periods of international stability pro-Soviet support was 
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usually marginalised if not pacified entirely. This is what can be clearly seen in this 
period. Massive initial support for the revolution within the anti-war movement, members 
of which would later enter parliament, was followed by a degree of reservation, then 
complete rejection. This defined the relationship until the repercussions of the Wall Street 
Crash forced a Labour Prime Minister to cut benefits and reject socialism, be subsequently 
be abandoned by the majority of the Labour party and head an all-party National 
government. The myth that MacDonald's "perfidy had caused the only reverse in Labour's 
otherwise relentless forward march 11 12 became popularised, British socialism, underpinned 
by traditions of gradualism and reformism, had failed, only the revolutionary model was 
able to withstand the disaster that had beset capitalism. This led socialist intellectuals to 
view the Soviet economic and political model in a similar way to which the February 1917 
revolution was greeted by many of the leaders of the British Socialist Movement. It is 
with this favourable reaction that this narrative must begin. In 1917 the peace movement 
and the Russian revolutionary movement forged ties that would reappear much later in 
their history. As Tsarism fell, socialists within Britain talked of worker's control and of 
forcing the governments of Europe to end the war and dissolve the 'ancient regime', 
arguments inspired directly by events in Russia. 
The highpoint for this movement emerged during the summer of 1917 when an unofficial 
convention was held in Leeds. This 'Peace Convention' drew together the radical strands 
of British socialism with a view to determining the future. The Conference agenda, and 
the objectives and rhetoric of the delegates, was influenced by the example set by the 
events of February 1917 in Russia. British socialists argued that Russia was a role model 
for action and delegates proposed that they establish a vanguard to lead the workers and 
soldiers in some form of rebellion against government policy; particularly the continued 
prosecution of the war and the forced labour schemes in operation on the Clyde. The 
influence of events in the Soviet Union would be apparent among British socialists forty 
years later. 
Those present in Leeds who became Labour MPs did not retain their radicalism much 
beyond the end of 1918. The prime examples were future Prime Minister James Ramsay 
MacDonald and future Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. It could be argued that these two 
made a deep genuflection when adopting an anti-Soviet perspective. However, the 
rejection of the Russian model for political action was due to the development of the 
Soviet political form and the contact MacDonald and Bevin had with representatives of the 
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Soviet government. What is indicative is the zeitgeist of this meeting and how the ideals 
filtered into British socialism. 
Though the ideas of the Marxist-Leninism gained prominence in the speeches at this 
Convention, these socialists were not supporting Bolshevism per se. Their model for 
action was the revolutionary spirit of the Russian proletariat, a spirit that was embodied to 
a far greater extent by Kerensky than Lenin. Russian workers and peasants had fought for 
their rights in opposition to autocracy, as MacDonald stated in his message to the Russian 
people: 
with gratitude and admiration [The Convention] congratulates the Russian people 
upon a Revolution which has overthrown a tyranny that resisted the intellectual and 
social development of Russia. 13 
The gratitude and admiration is here awarded to the Russian people, the agency behind the 
February uprising~ many socialists and historians would view the Bolshevik revolution as 
an opportunistic coup d'etat rather than the result of a mass-inspired revolt. 
However activists at Leeds were to borrow their modus operandi directly from Leninism. 
Rather than just sending messages of admiration the Council created a quasi-revolutionary 
vanguard for Britain and agreed upon a strategy of direct action. The Russian proletariat 
was placed on a pedestal as the epitome of the European worker. 14 Sylvia Pankhurst, 
leading Suffragette, argued that the Provisional Committee of the United Socialist 
Council, the Convention's organising body, should follow the example set by the Russian 
workers, take action and assume political control. While the chief objective was ending 
the first World War, the 'great imperialist war', there were also hints that these socialists 
had a clear view of the society they aimed to establish. C Ammon1s argued that the future 
government should: 
place itself in accord with the democracy in Russia by proclaiming its adherence 
to, and determination to carry into immediate effect, a charter of liberties 
establishing complete political rights for all men and women, unrestricted freedom 
of the press, freedom of speech, a general amnesty for political and religious 
prisoners, full rights of industrial and political association, and the release of labour 
from all forms of compulsion and restraint. 16 
This revolutionary rhetoric was a direct result of the Russian revolution; it offered to 
Western socialists a romanticised ideal of proletarian action. Importantly it also led to the 
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identification of an iconic correlation between the oppressed proletariat and peasantry of 
Russia and their British counterparts. British socialists had equally suffered for their 
pacifist stance while Union leaders faced troops for demanding shorter working hours and 
wage increases. This led the proletarian leaders to equate their struggle directly with that 
of their Russian counterpart and wish to follow their lead. As Bevin stated, "I believe 
even in our country there will have to be the shedding of blood to attain the freedom we 
require.,,17 Bevin had faced troops when opposing compulsory overtime; ILP leaders 
James Maxton and Fenner Brockway were imprisoned for conscientious objection; James 
Connolly had been executed for leading the Easter Rising in Dublin. These actions were 
equated with the executions of peasant farmers and striking dock workers in the Luna 
shipyards; examples of oppression that had laid the foundations of Russian revolutionary 
tendencies. As Ammon intimated, perhaps Maxton, Brockway, Connolly and the other 
martyrs of the working class had planted the seed of revolution in Britain. 
William Anderson 18 proposed the creation of a vanguard to infiltrate worker's and soldiers' 
organisations, undermine the government's authority and bring to bear the power of 
organised labour. This vanguard should "work strenuously for a peace made by the 
peoples of the various countries, and for the complete emancipation of international 
labour,'.19 The vanguard was not designed with a purely parochial outlook, but should 
plant the seeds for an international socialist revolution. Reading the speeches delivered at 
this convention as exemplary of the spirit of 1917 it is little wonder that Trotsky and Lenin 
led the Bolsheviks to power with the belief that much of Europe was about to follow in 
their path. 
This said, it should be noted that insurrection and subversion were not the aims of every 
delegate to the Convention; nor did the Convention have a mass support among political 
groupings or Trade Unions, though it did attract 1,150 delegates representing the British 
Socialist party, the Independent Labour party, the Labour party as well as the Fabian 
Society and the Socialist Women's Guild. The Convention did publicise the fact that there 
was a revolutionary undercurrent present in Britain, however. Equally it stimulated 
sympathisers of revolutionary socialist ideas to make their voices heard in support of 
Russia. Future Communist MP Willie GalIacher led Red Clydeside20 in support of both 
the Provisional government and later the Bolsheviks. Equally the embryonically 
communist British Socialist party campaigned for support and recognition for the new 
Russian government. Such strands would filter into the ILP and Trade Union sponsored 
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Hands Off Russia Movement, within which Ernest Bevin would be a key activist. Hands 
Off Russia was created specifically in opposition to intervention into the Russian Civil 
War, an action that was later described as the establishment ofbi-polarity.21 However, this 
was the true extent of any British revolutionary spirit. The Leeds Convention cannot be 
viewed as the birth of pro-Sovietism but the refocusing of the radical traditions of British 
socialism. As Bullock argues convincingly the arguments put forward at Leeds can be 
presented as "a preview of the British left between the wars, anarchical, utopian, already 
fascinated by and profoundly ignorant of the Russian experience. ,,22 This is reinforced by 
Miliband's appraisal of the event. 
The Leeds Convention had fortuitously brought together the revolutionaries and 
the constitutionalists. But the gulf between them remained as profound as it ever 
had been and the installation of the Bolshevik regime in November 1917 only 
served to widen that gulf.23 
There were similar murmurs on the Labour benches in parliament, but here the real 
concern was for the progression of the war, not for the success or failure of the post-
revolutionary regime in Russia.24 The fact that Kerensky followed his predecessor Prince 
Lvov and maintained Russia's presence in the war meant that he was respected by his 
western parliamentary counterparts. When Lenin deposed him, and sued for peace, he 
became anathema to the Allies. This was compounded by the perception that Lenin's 
government was founded on a 'dangerous' ideology?S The Labour leadership were 
indecisive over how they should react to Lenin. Sections within the Unions appeared well 
disposed towards Bolshevism, however the broader movement became concerned by 
reports of oppression and tyranny and began to distance themselves from the Soviet 
Union. Equally Bolshevism was used increasingly to undermine the Labour party through 
association with the socialist doctrine therefore, despite the existence of some latent 
sympathies, party conference decisions between 1918-22 ensured that any links with 
Bolshevism could not easily be inferred. 
The anti-Bolshevik stance was reinforced by Kerensky's testimony to the 18th Annual 
Conference in 1918. He visited Britain to call upon the Labour Movement to help in the 
struggle against Leninism. In emotive phraseology he requested the support of his British 
comrades, arguing that: 
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the most ruthless oppression is applied against the Democratic and Socialist Parties 
in Russia ... comrades it is up to you ... to settle the question whether it is, or not, 
possible to remain a calm spectator of that unheard of tragedy.26 
Kerensky expected that MacDonald, his correspondent, would lead the British democratic 
socialists in support of the White forces backed by the Entente powers. In this matter he 
was mistaken. The broader socialist movement had no sympathy for interventionism and 
thus the power of the British worker was to undermine the international anti-Communist 
fight from its inception. 
In 1947 Ernest Bevin's greatest regret must have been his role in securing Bolshevik 
victory in the Russian Civil War. In 1918 Bevin stood as a better ally for future luminaries 
of the CPGB than Churchill as he threatened to call a general strike.27 He established a 
Council of Action against intervention and argued eloquently, in his role as Union leader 
and Labour party delegate, the case for protecting the Soviet Union: 
Czars have murdered thousands and we have not interfered. But if a people's 
revolution takes place we are called upon ... to stamp out a terrible menace. That is 
a policy that Labour cannot idly stand by and see develop.28 
This was a stance that pro-Soviet MPs would also adopt during the Cold War. Labour 
members argued that the 'people's revolution' should be protected from a hostile world 
and reinforced the statements made by the delegation sent to Russia in 1920. The 
delegation's report had claimed that the oppression detailed in the 'capitalist' press was a 
"perversion of the facts ... 29 They would perceive, as did the ll...P in 1922, that 
Organised capitalism, lacking the bowels of compassion, sees in the natural horror 
that has overtaken Russia a means to bring about the defeat of a theory it hates and 
fears. 3o 
While those who exhibited pro-Soviet sympathies, in the period immediately following the 
October revolution, would mainly alter their perceptions others would adopt their 
perspective of the Soviet Union. Therefore the historical context is crucial to 
understanding the activities and perspectives of those MPs who expressed pro-Soviet 
sympathies during the Cold War. In this initial period we see a growing perception that 
the Bolshevik regime was attempting to enact socialism while under threat from the 
reactionary forces of capitalism associated with the old order. Socialists opposed the 
aggression to the Leninist regime on principle, even those who doubted that Russia could 
progress to true socialism.31 These principles of non-aggression and non-intervention 
would be revived, particularly by Zilliacus, as a basis on which to attack Bevin himself. 
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Labour established a policy of neutrality towards the Lenin government. The MacDonald 
government did offer formal recognition, despite the dangers of association, and opened 
negotiations on the Tsarist debt.32 Official recognition encouraged the formation of a 
group of pro-Soviet activists within parliament. The Anglo-Russian Parliamentary 
Committee [ARPC] was established as a pro-Soviet pressure group by MPs and Trade 
Union leaders; this argued for the "the establishment of the friendliest diplomatic relations 
and the greatest possible development of trade between the Soviet Union and Great 
Britain.,,33 Despite worsening relations members of this committee continued to argue the 
Soviet case in parliament. This activity waned as many members of the ARPC lost their 
seats after 1931 and subsequent Labour governments, regardless of existent sympathies 
within the party, found maintaining relations with the Soviet Union an untenable policy. 
The Soviet propaganda campaign, allegedly exploited by Conservative central office when 
producing the Zinoviev letter,34 damaged Labour's electoral credibility, though it is open to 
debate whether the incident was instrumental in the party losing the 1924 General 
Election. Following this experience the official party organisation would keep contact to 
the minimum. It became the task of individual members to forge links if they felt inclined. 
This happened increasingly after 1945 however the model for this type of relationship 
would be forged during the 1930s, the period that would become known as the 'Red 
Decade'. 
Collapse of faith: The failure of democratic socialism and the rise of fascism 
The economic depression following the Wall Street Crash of 1929, and the manner in 
which lames Ramsay MacDonald, the Labour Prime Minister, addressed it, led many to 
doubt the parliamentary road to socialism. More importantly the failure of gradualist 
socialism, and the perceived betrayal of the party and the British proletariat by 
MacDonald,3s led some to view the Soviet Union and 'actually existing socialism,36 as a 
viable alternative. Amid western economic collapse stood the Soviet Union, prospering 
with a planned economy. Despite recognition of the failures in the political system many 
could not deny the comparative societal benefits of Soviet communism. Leading party 
members, trade union leaders and influential socialist intellectuals embarked upon visits, 
produced studies of the Soviet political and economic system and reached conclusions that 
favoured the adoption of Soviet not British socialist principles. MacDonald had stated that 
Communist methods could not be adopted because Soviet socialism was fundamentally 
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opposed to British democracy. However, by introducing emergency measures that 
included cuts in unemployment benefit, the perception that MacDonald had chosen the 
interests of capital, particularly the bankers, over the working class became popularised.37 
Thus MacDonald himself provided the impetus for many to adopt a pro-Soviet stance. 
Thus, during the 1930s, many looked to the Soviet Union for inspiration in developing an 
alternative socialist theory of the role of the state. 
It was not a new phenomenon for Westerners to visit the Soviet Union and produce 
favourable reports.38 Throughout the 1920s intellectuals and writers were given guided 
tours, encouraged to publish their observations and were often paid generous advances for 
publication costS.39 While the Soviet Union encouraged these pro-Soviet propagandists to 
produce favourable accounts of Soviet society, during the 1930s a new scientific analysis 
was employed by British socialist theorists, particularly G D H Cole and Sydney Webb, 
that was not influenced by Agitprop. The Soviet Union was described as the epitome of 
how a socialist society could, and indeed should, work. The reason was not because of the 
perfection evident to visitors to the Soviet Union, but because British socialism had failed. 
The old struggle between Britain and the Soviet Union as the leaders of world socialism 
was over and it appeared, from the arguments promoted by many former Labour 
supporters, that Stalin had emerged as the victor. Jennie Lee,40 when recalling her 
experiences in the 1930s, asked "what sort of socialist movement had we in Britain?,.41 
John Strachey42 described the MacDonald group as "the deadliest enemy of the British 
workers. ,,43 More telling however, was Sidney Webb's conversion to Soviet Communism. 
Despite being architect of the Labour party constitution, Webb became disillusioned with 
the leadership. This led him to become perhaps the greatest exponent of the argument that 
the Soviet Union was socialist. This was highly influential due to his standing in the 
British Socialist movement. It was of the Fabian Society, of which Webb was a founder, 
that Hugh Gaitskell stated "They are the people British socialists most respect. ,,44 
Therefore Webb was ideally placed to be an agent of influence for the Soviet Union. 
Reading the Webbs work led some young socialists to join the Communist party. Eric 
Heffer recalled: 
I read it [Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?] from cover to cover. It 
convinced me that Russia was socialist and that Stalin'S constitution was genuinely 
democratic. The Webbs have a lot to answer for. 45 
67 
Praise for their publication came from the highest echelons of the British communist 
movement. When reviewing the book for Labour Monthly, Dutt, then Vice Chairman of 
the CPGB, wrote that "[t]heir concrete picture will win conviction in many quarters where 
the current generalisations fail to reach. ,,46 
We cannot quantify the numbers influenced by their work, Heffer's condemnation of the 
Webbs indicates that their writings did have an effect on British socialists, particularly 
those who wished to believe in the Soviet ideal. Therefore, while it is impossible to state 
categorically that the Webbs directly influenced any pro-Soviet MP, they represent one 
aspect of a range of pro-Soviet influences prevalent during the 1930s. This is important 
because it was during this period that many of the post-war pro-Soviet MPs became active 
within the socialist movement and developed their perspective on the world. 
The Webbs painted a view of the Soviet Union as the ideal of socialist life. This was an 
unprecedented genuflection for a couple whose previous work was founded upon the 
'inevitability of gradualness'. Socialism, the gradualists' argued, was the inescapable 
conclusion of history. This necessitated a parliamentary socialist party that would erode 
the basis of capitalism through public ownership schemes and welfare reforms. Beatrice 
Webb wrote in her diary that "My husband and I have always been against the Soviet 
system, and have regarded it as a repetition of Russian autocracy.,,47 It was the reversal of 
socialist reforms by a Labour government that made Sydney Webb doubt his own theory. 
His letters to Beatrice portray him as a defeated man, however he was also searching for a 
new belief. It was George Bemard Shaw who provided the impetus for Webb to search for 
his new belief in Soviet Communism. Shaw had already joined the fellow travelling 
coterie. making several visits to the Soviet Union. He was able to draw the Webbs into 
accepting Soviet Communism as the reality of their socialist ideals. 
In rejecting the parliamentary road to socialism Webb intimated that attaining socialism 
might only be possible through "a terrific struggle on clearly thought out lines.,,48 This 
could be argued to indicate that Webb had accepted the Leninist revolutionary doctrine, 
Shaw encouraged him to accept Stalinism also. Shaw achieved this by convincing Sydney 
Webb that Stalin had adopted the Webbs gradualist theory. This allowed Webb to view 
the Soviet Union from a fresh perspective. Beatrice recorded the conclusion of Shaw's 
Summer School speech thus: 
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It must be right! The paradox of the speech: the Russian Revolution was pure 
Fabianism, Lenin and Stalin had recognised the "inevitability of gradualness"! 
Also they had given up "workers' control" for the Webbs' conception of the three-
fold state, citizens, consumers and producers organisations.49 
Beatrice Webb had already shown an interest in the Soviet Union, being one of the 
founders of the SCR, by 1932 Sydney Webb appeared to have developed the belief that the 
Soviet Union was an experiment that he could influence. Thus he was to visit the Soviet 
Union, be given a guided tour by Griseli Barishnic,5o and become a propagandist on behalf 
of Stalin. 
The ideas put forward by the Webbs, mainly in 'Soviet Communism: A New 
Civilisation?' ,SI were ones which must have played a role in encouraging support for the 
Soviet Union and were to become a part of the British socialist tradition. While many did 
not apologise for the excesses of Stalin as Webb did, Webbs' description of Soviet society 
was one of a range of influences that convinced many that socialism was possible and that 
it existed in the Soviet Union. In constructing their positive analysis of the Soviet Union 
the Webbs countered criticism of the system directly, particularly the views of those who 
described the regime as undemocratic. They accepted the fact that there was no legal 
opposition, but argued this was not necessary. The soviets allowed much greater 
democracy than any system of public ballot. They described the Soviet policy formulation 
process as being: 
an upward stream of continuously generated power, through multi-form mass 
organisation, (through soviets, committees, etc) to be transferred at the apex into a 
downward stream of authoritative laws and decrees and directives.52 
Thus. according to the Webb's analysis, the lower orders of society decided what they 
wanted and passed the power to implement legislation to the Politburo. The Webbs 
described Stalin, as did their contemporary Anna Louise Strong, as "the supreme combiner 
of wills".53 As a leader Stalin arbitrated between opposing forces, but was unable to make 
a decision that opposed the will of the people. Their conclusion read: 
if by autocracy or dictatorship is meant government without prior discussion and 
debate, either by public opinion or in private session, the government of the [Soviet 
Union] is, in that sense, actually less of an autocracy or a dictatorship than many a 
parliamentary cabinet. 54 
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Thus the Webbs characterised the Soviet Union as being founded upon the will of the 
people displayed through a Periclean system of government. They admitted, though, that 
they did not see this system in action and that they had been unable to communicate with 
the ordinary Russian people to check the authenticity of the leadership's claims.ss 
Therefore the eloquence of their guides, coupled with a desire to believe, led the Webbs to 
accept Soviet propaganda as reality. They concluded that the world was set on an 
ideological collision course; capitalism versus communism. The Webbs saw the United 
States as the capitalist bastion, the enemy of socialism, a conclusion that would be reached 
by many socialists during the Cold War. In choosing an ideological side the Webbs' 
argued that Communism offered the better life for its citizens, and therefore should be 
adopted as the model for a socialist state:S6 
We hope to give a vision of the Communist alternative to decadent capitalism, 
planned production for community consumption with as much liberty and equality 
as is compatible with the continued progress of the human race in body and mind 
and social life. 57 
The Webbs harboured personal doubts as to the authenticity of their own claims regarding 
Soviet democracy and egalitarianism however. These are evident in Beatrice's diary, 
particularly regarding the purges and show trials. However these doubts were never 
intended for publication. To advertise the contradictions between the ideal of Soviet 
society and the reality would dispel the myth of true socialism. However these doubts do 
lead us to question the conclusion that the Webbs had found "an alternative, 'new', 
morality,,58 in the Soviet Union. Seymour-Jones puts the blame for the Webbs' conversion 
to pro-Sovietism upon Sidney Webb, arguing that "it was a tragedy that she [Beatrice] 
ultimately allowed Sidney's insidious influence to corrupt her integrity and compromise 
her life's struggle.,,59 While Sidney Webbs role as publicist and active change agent was 
described "of great value,,60 by Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky, he was not alone in his 
pro-Soviet writing. As Kidd argues both Sidney and Beatrice argued separately that their 
own collectivist socialist ideals, the basis for a moral community, were reflected in the 
Soviet Constitution.61 Doubts between the Soviet system, as described by the Soviet 
Constitution, and the reality of purges and show trials were voiced privately only. This 
private. almost moral, conflict is pervasive within the arguments of many that were 
sympathetic to the Soviet political model. 
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The Webbs furthered their propagandist activities by holding seminars at their 
Bloomsbury home. Regular guests were Communists such as Lytton Strachey and JBS 
Haldane, sympathisers such as Charles Trevelyan, President of the SCR, and other 
interested parties such as the economist John Maynard Keynes,62 who likewise saw statism 
as appealing. These meetings were frequented by Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky. 
possibly talent spotting sympathisers for a more active role within the pro-Soviet 
movement. In this context the allegation that the next generation of spies were 
"Bloomsbury's children,,63 is possibly not too excessive. However a much greater force 
was to encourage the socialist to adopt a pro-Soviet perspective. 
In Britain socialism appeared to be defeated. The Labour party's parliamentary 
representation had been reduced substantially, the leadership "smashed ... the gradualist 
ideology ... seemed to be in ruins ... [and] the party's policy was confused.,,64 George 
Lansbury attempted to create a credible opposition to MacDonald's National Labour 
party6S but lack of unity and his own ill health caused Lansbury to fail. Thus in the 1931 
Election non-National government Labour party candidates were returned in only fifty-two 
constituencies66 with Lansbury, Clement Attlee, then a virtual unknown. and Stafford 
Cripps as the most senior parliamentarians. The worker's parliamentary voice became 
impotent for the best part of a decade. Within some Trade Unions and many industrial 
communities Communism gained favour. 67 Not only did the Communist party agents 
supply funds to strikers and their families. but also the Communist leaders spoke of issues 
that the Labour party refused to raise. In tandem with other young socialists around the 
ILP, the CPGB were seen to be active in the worker's struggle. importantly the Labour 
party was not seen in this light. Due to this extra-parliamentary activism support could be 
found for the formation of a Popular Front of socialists. This even found support among 
Labour's ranks as Europe saw the rise of, what Communists and many socialists argued to 
be. the most virulent form of capitalism; fascism. 
Fascism rose out of the settlement following the First World War. The so-called mutilated 
peace allowed Mussolini to manoeuvre his way to power in Italy during the early 1920s.68 
while Nazism flourished as the economic and political humiliation of Germany under the 
terms of the Treaty of Versailles led inevitably to socio-economic and political collapse.69 
Threats to stability. trends such as nationalism and the growth of the popularity of 
Bolshevism among the proletariat, became magnified with economic depression. This 
situation led those who sought security and strength to turn to "the most radical form of 
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counter revolution.,,7o Fascism took hold in countries that had been weakened following 
WWI, and where liberal social democracy was failing in the face of a Communist threat. 
This led the Stalinist analysis of the phenomenon to be widely supported among socialists. 
Fascism, he argued, stood as "the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most 
chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital.,,71 Fear that this 
phenomenon would spread, and that conservative governments such as the British 
National government would support these regimes, led socialists to support the formation 
of a left-wing, extra parliamentary coalition to organise opposition. 
This was the ideal behind the formation of a popular or people's front72 backed by G D H 
Cole, who· published his supporting thesis in 1937. The Labour party opposed the idea 
because it would be under "international control".73 The National Executive (NEC) 
understood this to mean Soviet control, however, the party leadership faced strong dissent 
to their directive from an influential minority. This dissent came particularly from two 
young MPs sponsored by the National Union of Mineworkers S 0 Davies and Aneurin 
Bevin, but also the more urbane Stafford Cripps.74 These should not be dismissed as 
fellow travellers but, like Cole, they recognised the importance of forming a bulwark 
against fascism. Thus the movement found support among all sections of the British 
socialist movement. 
The argument put forward was grounded squarely within socialist ideology. These 
individuals recognised that if fascism became the dominant ideology then socialism would 
become not only excluded from politics but also crushed. If a war were to take place in 
Europe, figures on the left as diverse as Emanuel Shinwell and Denis Pritt agreed that this 
would adopt the character of socialism versus fascism. Proof of this was provided when 
the Communist supported Spanish republican government forces fought a civil war against 
an army that was reinforced by Italian troops and the German Luftwaffe. Socialists who 
supported the creation of a popular front against war and fascism adopted the view that the 
force that would defend socialism was the Soviet Union. Cripps argued that Britain 
"should make it clear to the world that it will do everything possible to support the [Soviet 
Union] ... [and] ... any other socialist states.,,7S In a speech at the 1935 Labour Conference 
he criticised the appeasement policy of the government for being based upon imperialistic 
self-interest and argued that this perspective would determine policy in any future war.76 
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Cole synthesised the mood most eloquently, stating his case for dissent and the purposes 
of the proposed front. He stated that the People's Front was not designed as an electoral 
rival to Labour, particularly as no General Election was imminent, but as a force of 
opposition to the Conservative dominated National government. He saw it as an 
international pressure group acting both domestically and within the League of Nations. 
While the term pressure group was not in common usage in the 1930s, it would probably 
have not held sufficient emotive strength for Cole. He used the term crusade, the raison 
d'etre of which would be: 
to arouse and to unite democratic opinion upon issues which have to be faced at 
once ... which, in international affairs, will insist on Great Britain taking the lead in 
a democratic movement to check fascist aggression and to prevent war, while here 
at home it will insist that the nation wage relentless warfare upon unnecessary 
poverty, upon unemployment in the depressed areas, and upon all monopolists who 
make men cheap and goods dear in the interests of higher profits.77 
Such far-reaching ideals were to be dashed at the first hurdle. Though the Popular Front 
was established without Labour party support, without Labour's participation it could not 
be described as a mass movement and was politically ineffectual. Furthermore, no 
international cohesion was attained; thus Cole's ideals were unrealised. However, they 
were not forgotten. The notion that socialists of the world should unite for international 
and domestic benefits was exhumed in 1945. At this point the international order was 
based upon United States, British and Soviet co-operation. The ideals expressed by Cole in 
1937 appeared, in 1945, more tenable. 
Labour's stance on international affairs damaged the party's credibility within the British 
socialist movement, a credibility that would not return until the final years of the Second 
World War. This was particularly clear following the response to the Spanish Civil War. 
Neutrality, the official policy, was described by one maverick backbencher as being akin 
to a "Christian declaring himself neutral in the struggle between God and the Devil.,,78 
Even Emanuel Shinwe1l79 recalled in his autobiography that: 
The disaster came because the Great Powers of the West preferred to see in Spain a 
dictatorial government of the right, rather than a legally elected body chosen by the 
people.8o 
Therefore, it was the Soviet Union that was accepted as the pro-socialist, anti-fascist 
bastion. This led to the wartime support invested by the British people in 'good old Uncle 
10e' .81 More importantly, these arguments vested in the Soviet Union a crucial role in 
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Europe's future. The twin notions that socialism was going to be victorious in war and 
that, allowed to develop unhindered, the Soviet Union could attain true socialism led to the 
development of theories for peace and stability in the post-war world. In 1939 pro-Soviet 
enthusiasm collapsed as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. However the notion of Stalin's 
betrayal was forgotten as Hitler's forces invaded the Soviet Union under the auspices of 
Operation Barbarossa, and to an even greater extent when the German army was routed at 
Stalingrad. After 1942 it seems that a majority looked squarely at the Soviet Union as the 
force that would, to a much greater extent than the United States, determine victory and 
defeat and would determine the character of the post-war European political system. 
The Socialist Champion: Who won the war anyway? 
As Hitler's forces turned against Soviet Russia Cripps, from his position in the British 
Embassy in Moscow, wrote to British Prime Minister Churchill that: "Russia is one of our 
fronts and must be regarded and treated as such.,,82 Cripps encouraged British socialists to 
campaign for an alliance with the Soviet Union and, in agreement with Churchill, a 
propaganda unit was created to encourage the British people to support their new 
communist allies. The leader of this unit was John Platts-Mills, associate of D N Pritt, and 
Labour party worker. 83 Public opinion indeed focussed on the Eastern front; this is 
recalled by many of the pro-Soviet MPs who spent their formative years as young men in 
the forces. 84 Mass observation reports85 describe rallies and demonstrations, enjoying 
substantial support from the public, being held calling for greater military aid to be 
awarded to the Soviet Union.86 Bevan, Davies and Willie Gallacher, Communist MP for 
West Fife, brought this debate directly to parliament. Their fears were that the British 
government was happy for the Soviet Union to be crushed by Germany. 
The most notable result of the propaganda campaign was the level of public support for 
the Soviet war effort. Aid Committees were created at the local level and fuel, medical 
supplies, blankets and clothes were collected for the beleaguered Russian people. The 
membership of the British Soviet Friendship Society [BSFS], Russia Today and the SCR 
increased; funds swelled, as did donations to the Joint Committee for Soviet Aid. Pro-
Soviet sympathies became not only legitimised but fashionable. Thus it appears as no 
exaggeration when Philip Noel-Baker87 told the House that: 
They [the British people] have been profoundly moved by events in Russia. Hour 
by hour, day by day, they can never forget the millions of men, women and 
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children who are resisting, with self immolating heroism, the most powerful and 
cruel onslaught in the history of mankind. They want to share that ghastly Calvary. 
They are ready to take risks, grave risks for Russia.ss 
Those who called for a Second Front to be opened argued that the leadership was 
abnegating their responsibilities despite Prime Minister Churchill constant protestations 
that a pre-emptive strike, intended to draw the war away from the Eastern Front, was 
untenable and potentially suicidal. The failure of the British government to act led to 
increased pro-Soviet activity that appeared to enjoy the support of a significant number of 
the British population. 
It can be argued that the mass support was an indicator of the fervency of anti-fascism 
rather than fanatical pro-Sovietism. Largely this is an accurate conclusion evidenced by 
the fact that much of this enthusiasm was to wane before the Red Army reached Berlin. 
However a degree of latent support, established as a result of the Soviet contribution to the 
war effort, remained a feature of the post-war pro-Soviet tradition and became exacerbated 
as a reaction to the pursuit of the anti-Soviet policies of containment and rollback. For 
example figures like William Wilson and J ames Lamond both recall the war years as 
influential to their political development. These MPs revived the themes of these 
arguments, and the underlying reasons for offering support to the Soviet Union, in 
parliament during the late 1970s and 1980s. Thus it was within the period prior to 1945 
that the strong attachments exhibited during the Cold War were developed between 
members of the British left and the Soviet Communist system. 
Part of this was a direct result of Popular Front activity. However following the front's 
collapse the organisation was superceded by the People's Convention. This was created in 
1941 with the objective of creating a coalition in opposition to the war. Following the 
Soviet entry into the war the Convention shifted to opposing totalitarianism as represented 
by fascism and the National government in Britain.S9 The Convention established links 
with various aid committees which had been created to support strikers and their families 
and refocused their activities to collect aid for the Soviet Union. It also launched a 
campaign to unite the aid organisation with so-called ultra democratic political societies to 
establish a political agenda. This organisation, created by CPGB luminary Rajani Palme 
Dutt and organised by D N Pritt, promoted the overthrow of the Churchill-led National 
government and its replacement with a 'People's' government.90 While this movement 
was a failure in political terms it did promote the pro-Soviet war effort among the British 
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Trade Union members and established the 'Help for Russia' fund. The pamphlet The 
People's Convention Says argued that the munitions workers would increase production if 
the supplies were to be sent to the Soviet Union.91 Thus evidence exists that the mood 
within Britain, to definite but unquantifiable degrees, was sympathetic to the Soviet 
Union. 
The support for the Soviet war effort is indicated by the level of funds raised by Help for 
Russia. This fund, administrated by the Trade Union Congress [TUC], raised £816,099 
between August 1943 and October 1946. The Unions raised £121,082 of this figure but 
the joint committees, consisting of various locally organised societies, raised a total of 
£273,058 while the Co-operatives accrued £312,064. The amounts collected, at a time of 
national hardship, indicates that an empathic relationship existed between the British 
worker and their families and their Russian counterpart. This is reinforced by the fact that 
the British United Aid to China Fund, also administrated by the TUC, raised only 
£127,590, one sixth of the funds raised for Russia.92 There are also indications that an 
alliance with the Soviet Union was seen as desirable, according to a 1944 Gallup Poll 76% 
of those asked wanted the co-operation between Britain and the Soviet Union to 
continue.93 As Callaghan argued, the Soviet Union had emerged from the war as "a 
decisive force in the world.,,94 
These public and political associations, created between the British people and the Soviet 
Union, developed a vision for the future. They argued, to varying extents, that the future 
of Britain and the Soviet Union were intrinsically interlinked. Rapprochement seemed 
likely, even between Labourites and Communists in domestic politics. Harry Pollitt, 
General Secretary of the CPGB, wrote to J S Middleton, LabO~y Secretary, asking 
for affiliation. He swore to "accept all the obligations of being affiliated to the Labour 
party, and loyally ... carry out all decisions reached at its annual conference.,,9s Arguably 
these overtures were genuine. . With the Comintern disbanded in 1943 the CPGB was 
nominally independent and therefore could no longer be perceived as a puppet of Moscow, 
though the degree of independence of the CPGB is a subject of debate.96 Furthermore, it 
appeared that such an alliance would be quite normal given the international situation 
1941-4.97 As the conclusion of the war appeared inevitable, Stalin was perceived as the 
emerging victor and Soviet-style socialism was, albeit momentarily, the only way forward 
for Europe. As the editor of the Anglo-Soviet Journal argued in 1944, a time when the 
SCR's magazine was closest to boasting a mass readership: "we in Great Britain who sleep 
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peacefully in our beds, who have almost forgotten we are at war, should, like the Soviet 
people, be grateful to Stalin.,,98 
It was with this mood as a backdrop that socialist theorist G D H Cole produced his 
personal thesis on how the future of Britain and Europe should be organised. Cole cannot 
be described as being traditionally pro-Soviet, nor a Communist sympathiser. His roots 
lay in Guild Socialism, and though his thought and that of the Communists converged in 
the mid-1930s, his sights were set on domestic improvements not world revolution. But, 
like the Webbs, Cole had grown to despair of parliamentary socialism. Though he 
opposed centralism and statism he argued in 1942 that "A National Plan is [possible] when 
the government of a country holds in its hands the reins of economic power in every part 
of national life.,,99 This led him to promote nationalisation as a necessary step towards 
socialism. He analysed aspects of Soviet political life and developed an argument for the 
transfer of those aspects that were appropriate to the circumstances in Britain. He 
recognised, as others failed to, that the Soviet Union was a totalitarian regime built upon 
fear, cruelty and persecution. 100 However he extolled the virtues of centralised economic 
planning while supplying his own caveat: "social control of the State and the means of 
production ... is not by itself enough to ensure freedom in all its desirable forms."IOI He 
believed, like the Webbs, that Communism was fashioning a new civilisation and that the 
success of this project would enhance the perception of socialism as a social theory. 
However, despite inconsistencies in his arguments, Cole did not argue for Communist 
rule, or even the transplantation of Soviet society onto British democracy. He was a 
reformist and a gradualist, and wished to see reforms implemented that would guide 
Britain towards socialism in a form desirable to the nation's citizens. It is surprising, 
therefore, that it was he who was to publish a work which argued that Stalin should rule 
post-war Europe. 
Cole's publication, Euro e Russia and th f ure was a classic in terms of Soviet 
propagandist material. It was also influential, the circulation of Left Book Club editions 
means that it would have reached an audience with a less informed perspective on the 
world than Cole. None of the pro-Soviet MPs interviewed cite Cole's work as the source 
of their inspiration however, his arguments, like those of the Webbs, are indicative of the 
zeitgeist of the age in which they were published. This was an age when many of the pro-
Soviet MPs of the 1970s and 80s were young students, factory workers or soldiers, thus it 
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can be utilised as an example of how the period 1942-5 shaped the thought of future 
generations of socialists. 
While contemporary writers looked specifically at a new future, Cole used his present 
circumstances to develop a critique of the past. He argued for a Europe based upon co-
operation and collectivisation, one that had a socialist basis rather than one in which 
nations competed for power, wealth and empire. It was with this end in mind that he 
wrote the following: 
I would much sooner see the Soviet Union, even with its policy unchanged, 
dominant over all Europe, including Great Britain, than see an attempt to restore 
the pre-war states to their futile and uncreative independence and their petty 
economic nationalism under capitalist domination. Better be ruled by Stalin than 
by the restrictive and monopolistic cliques who dominate Western capitalism. Nay 
more: much better be ruled by Stalin than by a pack of half-hearted and half-witted 
Social Democrats who do not believe in Socialism, but do still believe in the 
'independence' of their separate, obsolete national states. 102 
Cole therefore argued that Europe would benefit more under Stalinism, and state 
economics governed from the centre. than under the socialism of MacDonald or Weimar's 
Chancellor Bruning. 
The fact that Europe was to become~ unified regi n should have made Cole's critique 
obsolete. However, it was because Europe, or at east Western Europe, was perceived to 
have unified only because of the Cold War that this critique gained followers. Cole 
wanted the creation of an amalgam of the Soviet command economy and parliamentary 
social democracy. In his words the appropriate elements of Soviet society would: 
become the instruments of a new and invigorated parliamentarism, of a 'liberal' 
socialism, and of a policy of tolerant democracy, they need not involve the creation 
of a totalitarian regime. 103 
Cole argued for a half way stance between gradualism and Communism. A socialist 
government should implement Stalin's economic model, but within the framework of the 
British democratic tradition. He did, however, have reservations regarding British 
democracy. He had seen the National Gvernment, like many on the left, as an 
undemocratic institution because it had not been elected by true mandate. That a 
government could be formed without the mandate of the people indicated, to Cole, that 
British democracy was flawed. This led him to support a more Periclean democratic ideal, 
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one whose only exemplar existed in the Soviet constitution. When replying to a critic of 
his 1941 thesis, he adopted the following stance: 
I regard the Soviet system as much more democratic than parliamentarianism and I 
advocate it for a large part of Europe as the most appropriate way of bringing real 
democracy to power. 104 
Here Cole seems to raise a contradiction in his own work. He identified the Soviet Union, 
in separate tracts, as both totalitarian and democratic. This appears to be an attempt to 
reconcile the view that socialism must be democratic to be successful los and his personal 
view that the Soviet Union had achieved elements of both while retaining a one-party 
authoritarian style of leadership. 
This analysis of Cole's position gives the impression that he subscribed to the same 
slavishly pro-Soviet perspective as the Webbs did in publications. He did not clarify 
whether his analysis was based upon the paper constitution or the practice in the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, once again it can be argued that he supplied some of the impetus to the 
pro-Soviet movement. Co le offered his support to the Soviet system on the grounds that 
key aspects of it were comparatively better, more democratic and more advanced than the 
British social democratic model, a perspective that would draw many to support the Soviet 
Union. 
The inconsistencies were clarified a little in a later publication. In Great Britain in the 
Post-War World Co le argued that a United Socialist Europe should counteract United 
States capitalist influence. Here the Soviet Union is given the role of ideological guide, 
rather than that of dominant political force. Britain, he argued, must follow an individual 
course. However, this would be dependent upon "close economic and cultural relations 
with the United States.,,106 This was seen as being particularly advantageous in light of 
Roosevelt's launch of the 'New Deal'. Cole had few fears of United States influence under 
Roosevelt, though this mild Atlanticism was short lived, arguing that if British industry 
became dominated by United States capitalism: 
It would not. .. be such a disaster for the British people as the retention of control 
by the heavily damaged monopoly capitalism of Great Britain ... the continuance of 
this type of capitalism... would mean poverty and mass unemployment and the 
continued loss of markets and of productive power. 107 
The foreign policy of a post-war government prescribed by Cole must also ensure close 
working relations with "British Dominions and at the same time... build up relations 
79 
equally with the Soviet Union and with the coming Socialist system of continental 
E ,,108 P . h' h 'D .. 'C I d Id . urope. eace WIt In t e OmInlOnS, 0 e argue ,cou only be guaranteed through: 
unification under socialist control, and with an influential participation by the 
Soviet Union, which will be able to bring its own highly successful experience in 
the democratic handling of national problems to bear on the situation on the 
African continent. 109 
In this work Cole argued both the middle way, Bevanite, stance, while also promoting the 
Soviet Union as a progressive infl\lence, an argument that would find popularity among 
the members of the post-war pro-Soviet strand. 
It is important to note that the pro-Soviet sympathies, exhibited in Cole's wartime 
publications were also a feature of his Cold War tract The Meaning of Marxism. Here 
Cole argued that the Soviet Union had "solved the dilemma which capitalism had found 
insoluble [how to] ensure ... that ... every advance in technical efficiency shall be passed 
on to the consumers in the form of a rising standard of life." Cole argued that the Soviet 
system of "planned socialisation" provided a model for those nations that were "far ahead 
of Russia in their mastery of productive technique." I \0 Like others he argued that the strict 
authoritarian nature of the Soviet political system was the result of external aggression 
which had prevented the Soviet Union from cleansing itself of its Tsarist political heritage, 
though he recognised that the lack of a liberal tradition had also restricted the development 
of democracy. I I I Cole did extol the virtues of the Soviet socialist construction and argued 
that such a project would have been: 
impracticable except under the auspices of the Communist party. The same was 
true in 1945 over most of Eastern Europe; and anyone who denies this is merely 
kicking against the pricks of social necessity.112 
This appears to be a direct condemnation of the policy of containment and the campaign 
against Communist parties in Western European elections. He predicted that the 
"offensive-defensive" strategy of United States capitalism would be met by a reciprocal 
"defensive-offensive" strategy from Soviet Communism, a situation that would lead to 
"repeated deadlocks." 113 While Cole's conclusion is accurate, it is interesting that he saw 
the Western side of the ideological dichotomy as leading an offensive while the Soviet 
Union was essentially pursuing a defensive strategy, a conts-km-that many on the left 
would return to throughout the Cold War. Cole stressed t~sition, that a 
socialist system should be installed across Europe while capitalism was weak due to the 
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devastation of industry incurred during the Second World War and he argued that British 
Labour should establish a union with: 
like-minded collaborators in other countries to make possible the creation of a 
group of Socialistic countries able to stand out against engulfment by either 
American capitalism or Soviet Communism, and so ... preserve ... what is valuable 
in the 'liberal' tradition. 114 
Cole's pro-Soviet arguments were supported and magnified by other writers. Pollitt called 
for unity between socialist groups, both locally and internationally. The Second World 
War had become a people's war, and therefore must be followed by a 'socialist' people's 
peace. llS While this did not win Pollitt a seat in the House, it did win a degree of support 
for the CPGB, particularly as it appeared increasingly that the post-war Labour 
government was in the process of losing that very peace. Perhaps more telling is the call 
for continued friendship by Mrs Clementine Churchill; the liberal wife of the Prime 
Minister. She became personally involved in the Aid to Russia campaign, and established 
a Red Cross service dedicated to the victims of German occupation. Not only did the 
pamphlet on her visit to the Soviet Union paint a picture worthy of any fellow traveller; 
she also expressed hope for the continued alliance. As she witnessed her husband stand 
alongside Truman and Stalin she felt that she was "standing on the edge of a vast, new and 
unexplored world." 116 That world was not only one of co-operation with the Soviet Union, 
but, moreover a world at peace living in harmony. She saw the grand alliance, as some 
called it, as the backbone for this brave new world and, therefore, the major foreign policy 
aim had to be to retain it at all costs. Though the costs were deemed too high for western 
governments, some Labour politicians did not lose their grasp of this dream. 
Those individuals who retained these ideals would establish a minority bulwark against the 
Cold War, a small but vituperative group who became drawn towards the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet leadership and its agents exploited sympathisers, but despite this they retained 
a link to the Soviet political ideal, an attachment that led them to become disillusioned 
with domestic politics and the loose ideological basis of British labourism. Mazowar 
argues that this loss of faith in ideology happened immediately on witnessing the post 
Second World War settlement. This is true of the vast majority of those, like Bevan and 
Cripps, who were prominent before 1945. However, the next generation appeared to 
embrace the struggle with alacrity, without regard for their personal credibility or the 
electoral image of the party. It was only after 1989 that the minority studied here, and 
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their comrades in the Unions, front organisations, Communist Parties and the broad pro-
Soviet milieu became. in Mazowar's words, "apathetic, resigned and domesticated". 1 17 
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Chapter Three 
Konni ZilIiacus and Labour's Adversarial Voices from the Left 
The traditions of the 1930s popular front against war and fascism, the public support for 
the Soviet war effort during the Second World War and the ideal of continuing co-
operation between the 'Big Three' after victory in Europe, were to shape the dissidents 
arguments during the 1945-50 Labour government. The majority of the studies of this 
period focus upon the leadership of the party and ignore the left-wing opposition to the 
developing Cold War. I This is due to the minimal effect that those MPs, who developed a 
pro-Soviet critique of the Cold War anti-Communist ethos, had upon party policy. There 
was no attempt at making a trade-off between the imperatives of international security and, 
what Koelble described as, the "rationalities for action,,2 of the ideologically motivated 
members. The Labour leadership developed a zero-sum perception of relations with the 
Soviet Union and therefore those who opposed party policy were believed, by some, to 
support the enemy. The leadership's anti-Soviet position was in direct opposition to the 
decisions of the 1944 party conference and the ideals expressed by Labour's 1945 General 
Election Manifesto. Furthermore the Cold War conflicted with the vision of the future 
asseverated in the campaign addresses of many of the newly elected left-wing Labour 
parliamentarians. 
The 1945 Labour party manifesto borrowed largely from the Beveridge report, despite a 
decision by the War Cabinet to make no commitment to implementing Beveridge's 
recommendations.3 The manifesto also, against the judgement of the party's National 
Executive [NEC], pledged a future Labour government to a broad nationalisation 
programme. This programme was supported by a massive majority at the 1944 Annual 
Conference and had been campaigned for within parliament by ninety-seven Labour 
backbenchers. As Morgan has argued the 1945 Manifesto presented to the electorate a 
practical expression of the ideals and aspirations associated with the party constitution.4 It 
also represented the practical ideals of many of those who entered parliament for the first 
time after the landslide victory. Particular stress was placed upon the necessity to retain 
the alliance between the three major powers. The Manifesto, personal election addresses 
and many influential theoretical analyses argued that "the consolidat[ion] in peace [of] the 
great war-time association of the British Commonwealth with the U.S.A. and the 
U.S.S.R"~ was the only stable foundation for future peace.6 
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While war was averted between the Soviet Union and the NATO alliance, stability' was 
dependent upon the dangerous premise of mutually assured destruction.7 This was to 
become the socialist anathema after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To the campaigners who 
had plotted a course through the pre-war peace movement, organisations such as the Union 
for Democratic Control or the People's Front, co-existence became an imperative. This 
led to some individuals adopting an oppositional position to the consensual Atlanticist, 
anti-Soviet policy. The position developed by a broad left backbench movement involved 
the argument that any alliance built on opposition to another nation or collective of nations 
was certain to lead to war. However, this current of thought involved much more than 
pacifism. Within this strand of thought a pro-Soviet analysis developed. This was fuelled 
firstly by pro-Soviet propaganda but secondly, and more importantly, by events taking 
place on the world stage. This pro-Soviet campaign was launched as a reaction to the 
development of an Anglo-American anti-Communist ethos that was based upon fear of 
Communist incursion, a fear many left-wingers argued was unfounded. The most vocal 
opponent of anti-Communism was Konni Zilliacus. He and a small group of Labour 
backbenchers persistently undermined Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's anti-Soviet stance 
by arguing for a policy of co-operation and co-existence with the Soviet Union. This ideal 
had been supported by Conference therefore, Zilliacus and his allies argued, it was the 
Labour Cabinet's duty to carry this policy forward. 
The history of the inter-war Labour movement shaped the party that would enter 
government in 1945. This Labour government should not betray its principles, as was the 
perception of the MacDonald government. The Attlee government, armed with a 
significant electoral mandate, should create a socialist settlement for Britain. Evidence 
suggests that there was a belief on Labour's backbenches that socialism was finally 
victorious. One newly elected Labour MP, and ex-miner, rose to sing the Red Flag at the 
close of the first day of parliament. One observer recalled that this was met with delight 
by some Labour members and the Communist and ILP members but caused consternation 
among the Conservative opposition.8 
The 1945 election campaign had focus sed upon the values of socialism. Churchill argued 
that this would mean "totalitarianism and the abject worship of state" and societal control 
by some form of "Gestapo".9 With the benefit of hindsight we can argue that Labour only 
had to treat such derision with contempt, capture the moral high ground, and run a 
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responsible campaign built upon promises that the British people wanted keeping. This 
was achieved and Labour won a resounding victory. IQ As Thorpe argued, it is unlikely the 
British people wanted the creation of an idealistic or ideological state, I I but societal 
change and welfare reform. These were key reforms that Labour were trusted to deliver. 
Thus a section of the left appear to have held expectations that went far beyond the 
aspirations of Labour's leadership and the electorate. 
A minority on the left, such as E P Thompson, believed that Britain was on the cusp of a 
democratic revoluti~n. 12 By the 1950s this minority argued that they had once again been 
betrayed. This betrayal myth resulted from the degree of high expectations. Labour had 
the majority to achieve socialism, but had accepted a consensus foreign and domestic 
programme. 13 The idealism waned almost immediately among the majority of Labour 
MPs, and it is debatable whether it ever enjoyed majoritarian support among Labour 
backbenchers, party members or the electorate. The largest block vote against the 
government's extension of conscription by Labour MPs could only muster seventy-two 
supporters. 14 The most organised oppositional force, the Bevanites, argued from a 
position consistent with Labour policy and traditions; radical idealism was the preserve of 
a minority whose most influential orator was the Gateshead MP Konni Zilliacus. 
Konni ZiIliacus: the rebel who knew best? 
Zilliacus' idealism was founded upon the notion that the world should co-exist without 
conflict. IS Throughout his writings on international relations during the 1930s and early 
1940s there runs the theme of a socialist peace being the only desirable future. He places 
the blame for the First World War squarely on the shoulders of capitalists and imperialists, 
while the Second World War, he asserted, was created by intransigence on both sides of 
the political spectrum. He argued that the National Government of Britain had been driven 
by imperialist desires rather than any sense of, what is referred to by Michael Foot in his 
introduction to The Mirror of the Past as: "[t]he law of nations, respect for their 
neighbours, the moral conscience of mankind." 16 These factors were irrelevant in a world 
system based upon power politics. As Morgenthau argued in his analysis of international 
relations from the realist perspective; state interests ruled diplomatic relations. 17 Zilliacus 
wanted Europe to break from this tradition; firstly through the League of Nations and then 
later through new alliances built during the Second World War. The Treaty of Versailles, 
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with its basis in the notion of crippling the losing nations, had led to a flawed peace. The 
settlement of 1945 would have to be different if a lasting peace were to be secured. 
Zilliacus entered parliament as an expert in international affairs and hoped for a role in 
steering Britain and Europe towards a new future. However, he allied with a minority in 
the party which remained under constant attack from the leadership. Due to the party's 
large majority following the 1945 General Election it could afford to expel radical voices. 
This was to be the fate of Zilliacus and three colleagues. By 1950 he was disillusioned by 
the failure of the Labour government to oppose the Cold War, but not totally thwarted. 
However, his radicalism was sufficiently subdued and he was allowed to return to the 
Labour party in 1952 and to stand for election in 1955. This minority, of whom Zilliacus 
was the most prolific and vocal representative, consisted of individuals who looked to a 
whole range of influences and external interests, all seeking an elusive and arguably 
illusory socialist peace. Jan Zilliacus remembered him as a man whose "knowledge was 
ahead of most people ... [But who was] often damned for acting with the best intentions.,,[8 
This was probably how he perceived himself. 
His writings exhibit a belief that he knew best. This belief was based upon his experience 
as a member of the League of Nations Secretariat General's Information Section for 
twenty years 1919-1939. What he did not realise was how far his ideas were out of step 
with the mainstream beliefs of his party. He stated the following in his introduction to I 
Choose Peace: 
The MP's loyalty to his party should not and normally does not conflict with his 
loyalty to his constituents and his conscience ... But he must also be ready, when 
the issue is grave enough, to stand and deliver on his conscience and judgement, 
even though that make him a rebel and an anarchist. 19 
Zilliacus decided that the government's foreign policy affected the future so gravely that 
he was willing to be a rebel, seemingly on the strength of his conscience, beliefs and 
experience. I Choose Peace, published just prior to his expulsion, stands as his major 
work on post-war foreign affairs. This represents a historical analysis of Anglo-Soviet 
relations from a pro-Soviet perspective and offered a template for the policy changes he 
saw necessary for the Labour party to enact to secure a peaceful future. To assess his true 
beliefs it is necessary to analyse the central tenets of his arguments and critically assess the 
pejorative labels attached to him during his years on Labour's benches. 
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He has been accused of being a fellow traveller of the Communists in very vehement 
terms. GaitskeU' s diaries describe him as being part of the, "lunatic fringe [of] pse"udo-
Communists. ,,20 This has led some to draw the conclusion that he was some form of agent 
of the Soviet Union. This chapter outlines his arguments and activities to assess the level 
of independence Zilliacus maintained from the Communist line. As comparative studies 
there will also be a study of his three co-expellees, Leslie Solley, John Platts-Mills and 
Lester Hutchinson. This will provide a picture of this period of government, the 
arguments and issues that became central to the pro-Soviet position and how their 
arguments were shaped by exogenous events. This chapter will characterise what led 
these four individuals to face expulsion rather than accept government policy and how 
they developed a tradition that evolved within the Labour party as an undercurrent of the 
left-wing agenda. This five-year period witnessed cogent opposition from the 
backbenches over foreign policy and, within that opposition, the emergence of 
parliamentary pro-Sovietism. 
I Choose Peace: the Zilliacus perspective of international affairs 
Zilliacus' perspective of European affairs since the Russian Revolution characterised the 
world as enveloped in a struggle between capitalism and socialism or communism. He 
made no distinction between the latter two ideological paths. He argued that from the 
outset the capitalist world was frightened of communism, a fear that led firstly to 
intervention in the Russian Civil War and secondly to a policy of exclusion against the 
Soviet Union. Using the Memoirs of Sir Bruce Lockhart21 as evidence, Zilliacus argued 
that these policies led to the harshness and perpetually violent element present in the 
Soviet regime. A paranoid fear of external forces infiltrating Soviet Russia had developed 
and therefore all non-Bolshevik elements had to be prevented from being able to damage 
the system. Thus he constructed an apology for the excesses of Stalinism. Notably, unlike 
Pritt and many propagandists within the CPGB, he recognised that the ideal and the reality 
of Soviet Communism did not equate to one another, but he was able to develop an excuse 
for the inconsistencies between fact and rhetoric. Zilliacus portrayed Russia as a 
struggling nation, permanently beset by hostility for effecting a transition from 
authoritarianism to a socialist or workers' democracy. This mirrored the argument put 
forward by Labour MPs and Trade Unionists in opposition to intervention in the Russian 
Civil War. 22 
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In more damning terms Zilliacus argued that the intervention in Europe against Socialist 
and Communist groups, such as the German Spartacists, paved the way for Fascism: He 
quoted LIoyd George who had expressed fears that a Spartacist-Ied Germany could ally 
with Bolshevik Russia against the capitalist West. Zilliacus argued that this policy of 
intervention had aided the more reactionary groups to come to power. Had this not 
happened, a "social revolution, mostly under Social Democratic leadership,,23 would have 
occurred in Germany. He argues that had this policy been reversed then the Second World 
War may have been unnecessary as Hitler, and the National Socialist party,24 may never 
have gained power. Furthermore, had the intervention in Russia been successful, and 
Tsardom restored, then the alliances in the Second World War may have been 
substantially different. The authoritarian regimes of Hitler's Germany, Tsarist Russia, 
Hirohito's Japan, Mussolini's Italy and Francoist Spain would possibly have been too 
strong an enemy for Britain and the United States to handle. This analysis can be linked 
with the, then emerging, tradition of thought that viewed the Soviet Union as the decisive 
combatant in the Second World War.25 
Equally, he argued that when fascism did emerge the leaders of the capitalist group in 
parliament initially welcomed it. Zilliacus quoted Winston Churchill, who stated that 
Mussolini had: "provided the necessary antidote to the Russian poison,,,26 to provide the 
necessary evidence. Zilliacus argued that the belief that the fascists were people that could 
be dealt with, and that Communists were inherently untrustworthy, had led to the National 
Government's policy of appeasement. Baldwin and Chamberlain, in Zilliacus' opinion, 
understood the imperial aspirations of the fascists but not the socialist statism of the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, it was the Soviet Union that became isolated from European politics. 
ZilIiacus argued, using evidence based on Conservative members' arguments, that this 
attitude remained unchanged. 
Even after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Zilliacus tells the reader, many still 
held the view that the Soviet Union was the true enemy, while the fascist opponent only 
needed their power and aspirations restricting. Zilliacus argued that Churchill believed that 
Hitler and Mussolini were "friends of yesterday that might have to be salvaged 
tomorrow.,,27 ZiIIiacus' claim was that the Conservatives were naturally anti-Communist 
and thus pro-fascist; they declared war on Nazi Germany to reassert Britain's traditional 
superpower status, not to defeat an ideology. This analysis continued a trend developed 
within G 0 H eole's arguments regarding the nature of future conflicts between capitalist 
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states.28 Cole believed that World War 11 was to be the definitive ideological battle,29 and 
arguably Co le also recognised that this was not a perspective held by the Conservative 
party. With this analysis as a foundation, the Soviet victory over fascism in war and the 
Labour defeat of the Conservatives were linked, by some radical socialists, to the ideal of 
a post-war socialist settlement. 
Zilliacus argued that it was Soviet Russia that defeated Nazi Germany and therefore, had 
every right to ensure that Germany could never rise again to attack Russia. Thus he 
excused the Soviet Union for creating itself a 'sphere of influence' or 'buffer zone' in 
Eastern Europe.3D The Soviet Union, as the bulwark of democratic socialism, had defeated 
imperialism and should now be the leader, or at least a significant partner, in the New 
World order. This was the conclusion that Cole had reached in 1942, but rejected by 
1945. 
Zilliacus accepted that the Soviet Union had tried to remain neutral, explaining that Stalin 
had not been certain in 1939 who would ally with whom in the forthcoming conflict. 
Therefore the non-aggression pact with Germany, Zilliacus argued, was totally rational. 
Stalin recognised Britain as an enemy, not an ally, even after the German invasion, a 
perception reinforced by Britain's reluctance to aid the Soviet Union. The suspicion of the 
West adopted by the Stalinist regime, Zilliacus argued, was proven correct in the post-war 
world. Once again Zilliacus saw intervention attempting to prevent the election of 
socialist or communist parties to government in Europe. Throughout the United States' 
sphere of influence the policy of containment, as outlined in the Truman Doctrine, 
dominated foreign policy. Zilliacus saw this as a zero-sum game that was certain to lead 
to a third World War.31 
While Zilliacus rejected the Cold War rationale, and heavily criticised Atlanticism, he did 
not, however, slavishly support Stalin or Soviet Communism. Not only did he support Tito 
and the independence of communism from the CPSU and Cominform, but he was also 
able to criticise aspects of the Soviet system. These were not the actions of a Soviet agent 
or confirmed fellow traveller. However, it appears that he was able to excuse much of the 
harshness of the Soviet system. While accepting that the post-war Communist states were 
essentially police states, Zilliacus excused this by arguing that it was that same aggressive 
policy which had been pursued by the western capitalist world that, as he put it, 
"aggravate[d] the evil and choke[d] back the good.,,32 He saw all the failings in the 
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establishment of socialism in the Soviet Union as being the fault of, primarily, the 
suspicion and antagonism that was displayed towards the state by the capitalist world, the 
epitome of which was displayed by the emergence of Fascism. This point was stressed in 
an unpublished draft of a Fabian pamphlet written in 1939: 
the Soviet Union is still remote from realising the civil liberties side of this 
[socialist] programme, and it is not likely to make much progress in this direction 
so long as we have not defeated the menace of fascism and war.33 
Zilliacus refuted the argument that Communism was no more than 'Red Fascism' arguing 
that equality was the greatest acquisition of the Russian people. Denouncing reports of 
oppression he argued that all forms of discrimination, such as racism, sexism or class-ism, 
had been eradicated. He compared the melting pot of United States to the 'electric mixer' 
of Russia's one hundred and eighty nine races, ignoring the reality of anti-Semitic policies. 
While he believed that he was producing a balanced argument, in the end the sum of his 
argument is to blame, prior to the Second World War, Britain, and in the post war world, 
the United States. At no time does Zilliacus apportion any blame for the outbreak of Cold 
War upon the Soviet leadership. 
His analysis of the events in Greece, Germany and Italy, all potential Cold War 
flashpoints, confirmed his opinion that there existed a new western imperialism. In all 
these nations United States forces had tried to prevent or contain the spread of 
Communism. Zilliacus criticised this heavily: 
Uncle Sam comes across thousands of miles of sea and land to squat on Uncle 
Joe's doorstep and calamity-howl about Soviet expansion. The whole thing would 
be comic if it were not so tragic.34 
Here Zilliacus displays the hypocritical position that devalued the arguments of those who 
exhibited pro-Soviet sympathies and used the Soviet Union as a focus for their dissent to 
the Cold War rationale. The Soviet Union was allowed almost complete latitude of action 
in the name of protection and self-preservation while the West, particularly the United 
States, was not. In hindsight we can argue that the Cold War rationale was flawed, and 
that a more co-operative, peaceful future was ultimately more desirable. However, in 
hinging his opposition upon an apology for Soviet foreign policy Zilliacus devalued the 
main tenets of his argument and thus his alternative foreign policy programme. 
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Konni Zilliacus perceived that the world had two choices. The Cold War offered the 
maintenance of a balance of power through a protracted arms race. That would lead to 
reductions in domestic spending and inevitably to war. His alternative was to abandon 
containment and accommodate Russia in a socialist European union. Zilliacus stated that 
the creation of a United Socialist Europe would be impossible without the inclusion and 
co-operation of the Soviet Union, 35 an argument that had few supporters within Labour 
circles. 
R W G Mackay,36 his fellow Labour MP, predicted that a stable post war settlement 
necessitated the establishment of a socialist European Union. However, countering the 
arguments of Cole and Zilliacus, Mackay stated that the inclusion of Russia would be fatal 
to harmonious relations,37 arguing: "war with Russia [may be] inevitable.,,38 Bevanites 
similarly focused on Europe as being pivotal. The Europe Group, a broad left-wing 
coalition, argued that a non-aligned European Union should be created to counter the 
influence of both superpower blocs.39 Zilliacus countered this argument stating that peace 
should be maintained through the United Nations. Rather than creating a neutral barrier, 
negotiation and conciliation should "lock the door on the third World War.,,40 The UN 
should stand, not as a tool of the United States against the Communist states, but as a 
proper consultative body operating through the governance of treaties to ensure pacific 
settlements to all disputes.41 This he argued would lead to world government. The drive 
towards co-existence should start with an end to hostilities both real and via propaganda, 
particularly between the various leaders of the socialist parties and nations, indicating the 
domestic feuds between Communists and the Labour party and the stand-off between 
Britain and the Soviet Union. He argued that if the British Labour party led the way in 
foreign affairs then detractors would naturally dwindle away. There would be opponents 
but compromise both nationally and internationally would create the right environment for 
change. 
The 1945 manifesto of the Labour party, Let us Face the Future, stated that: 
We must consolidate in peace the great wartime association of the British 
Commonwealth with the [United States] and the [Soviet Union]. Let it not be 
forgotten that in the years leading up to the war the Tories were so scared of Russia 
that they missed the chance to establish a partnership which might well have 
prevented war... an International Organisation capable of keeping the peace in 
years to come. If peace is to be protected we must plan and act. ,,42 
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This was the notion that Zilliacus supported and actively campaigned for. He recognised 
that the Soviet Union must withdraw from Eastern Europe to an extent, but that Stalin 
needed certain assurances before that could happen. This could only be achieved through 
open, friendly negotiation, not by threat of force. It was the latter that had created the 
post-war situation. 
Zilliacus accused Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, of losing Britain all the goodwill that 
was present in Europe in 1945. Therefore, the first task he argued for was the replacement 
of Bevin, but not of the government. As he concluded: 
"It can only be done under Labour rule because the making of peace has become 
inseparable from the building of a Socialist Commonwealth.,,43 
The question is why did Zilliacus, unlike Mackay or the Bevanites, call for Soviet 
inclusion. It appears that Zilliacus held either a genuine hope for a lasting peace or a 
greater fear of impending war. However he is often accused of more cynical motives for 
his writings. In answering this critique of Zilliacus it is important to remember that 
nowhere in his writings, up to 1949, can be found a criticism of Stalin or Lenin, only the 
argument that they had reacted in a defensive manner towards aggression. This has led 
opponents to question exactly what the role of Konni Zilliacus was, and by whom was he 
influenced? 
Independent Socialist or Agent of Influence 
It is unsurprising that opponents accused Zilliacus of acting under Soviet influence. It is 
not difficult to locate circumstantial evidence to indicate that he was a Soviet-controlled 
agent of influence. This, more often than not, was presented not by his opponents but by 
Zilliacus himself. Zilliacus argued that the smear campaign against him was part of a 
strategy developed by a Labour right wing and Conservative coalition: 
they do not believe in the possibility or desirability of living at peace with the 
Socialist third of humanity, and denounce as a crypto-Communist and practically a 
traitor anyone who believes we can and should try to discover common ground 
between our purpose and interests and those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union and revolutionary China.44 
Zilliacus recognised that he was a prime target for such accusations but readily provided 
his opponents with ammunition. It seems that he was daring his opponents to prove these 
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allegations. Within his background. however, are clear links to Soviet society and 
indications that the sympathies evident in I Choose Peace were developed early in his life. 
In the introduction to A New Birth of Freedom he provided a short biographical note.45 
He recalled that his father was a Finnish Bolshevik who fled Finland to escape Tsardom. 
Konni Zilliacus senior wrote on the Russian Revolutionary Movement, and was founder 
and leader of the Finnish 'Activist' party.46 Therefore the young Konni, born Kobe Japan 
in 1894, lived through this period of revolution influenced by his father. His father's 
influence, to support the progressive, anti-imperialist forces, lived on in the writings of 
Zilliacus.47 The young Konni was taught, as he later recalled that: 
some day there was going to be a revolution in Russia, and this would be 
something great and good to which all liberal and civilised people looked 
forward. 48 
However, during his education at Yale, he was encouraged to adopt a more conservative 
approach towards impending revolution. 
Prior to the start of the First World War Zilliacus joined the US Air Force and then 
became attached to British Intelligence. Here he made his first direct contact with 
revolutionary Russia. For around a year, during 1918 and 1919, Zilliacus worked on the 
British Intelligence mission in Siberia. His role in the mission was to keep data and 
transfer messages between the British government and the forces on the ground. This role 
meant that he was party to the secrets of the British Government and their attitudes to 
revolutionary Russia, the movement he had been brought up to support. In the House in 
1948, during a heated debate with Churchill, Zilliacus revealed this fact and used it to 
show that Churchill's attitude to the Soviet Union had never changed. There are no 
records of this intelligence mission however we can probably assume that as he was 
willing to mention it in the House of Commons the details were accurate. 
Perhaps more indicative of his sympathies is the fact that, while in Siberia, he married a 
Polish Revolutionary, Eugenia Nowicka. Archie Potts49 indicated that there is evidence to 
suggest that Nowicka was an exile in Siberia and that her parents were reasonably middle 
class and privileged. Whether the Nowicka family were exiles of Tsarism or Bolshevism 
is unknown though given the period under discussion the former is a more reasonable 
assumption. Regardless of this any links with the Leninist regime, or its ideological 
traditions, that she brought to the marriage remain unknown. Unfortunately, due to the 
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failure of this marriage, he does not mention her in his publications or his unpublished 
autobiography. His widow knew little of her and their children, Stella and John, have both 
died, so this part of Konni's life remains a mystery. 50 
Britain's role in the Russian Civil War was short lived, mainly due to the opposition of the 
Labour party and the Trade Union Movement, a factor that led Zilliacus to join the party in 
1919. In 1921 he began an eighteen year post working in the Information Section of the 
League of Nations in Geneva. His role for the League was, due to his linguistic abilities, to 
review Russian affairs, assessing the content in Russian papers and journals and receiving 
Soviet delegates. In this capacity he must have met most of the leading Bolsheviks. It is 
impossible to assess whether they were aware of his background or his sympathies with 
their movement. They would probably have researched his background and would have 
been aware who his father was. Whether he was ever approached and asked to work on 
their behalf at this time is unknown, but when researching how the Soviet network of this 
period worked, it would be hard to imagine that he was not. The son of a revolutionary, in 
a place of responsibility and influence, must have been viewed as a golden opportunity for 
Soviet agents. This raises the question of what led him to start publishing. 
During the 1930s, using the pseudonym Vigilantes, Zilliacus began writing on foreign 
affairs. He concentrated on why the League of Nations was failing, why Europe was 
drifting into war and what should be done to end this situation. His major work of the 
period, Inquest on Peace, published in time for the 1935 British General Election, is 
specifically aimed at demanding an anti-Fascist policy emerge within the British socialist 
movement. At this time he also argued for Soviet inclusion into the League of Nations. 
His motives for this are open to speculation because it was at this time that he began to 
develop his pro-Soviet arguments. While Stalin was portraying himself as a peaceful man 
wishing to become part of the world order, Zilliacus wrote of inclusion of, and co-
operation with, the Soviet Union. The question remains whether this was produced due to 
Zilliacus' personal feelings and beliefs, or whether he was influenced by Soviet 
propaganda and contact with representatives from the Soviet Union. Later writings are 
based on evidence collected from discussions with Soviet leaders. Therefore it is likely 
that it was during this period that he established links with leading Soviet officials and 
later explored these relationships to gain information about Soviet foreign policy aims. 
There is no evidence that he was ever encouraged to write on behalf of the Soviet Union 
and it remains doubtful that Zilliacus would have done so. Despite this, Moscow would 
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have perceived him as a pro-Soviet change agent and arguably this was correct. Zilliacus 
was perfectly placed to attempt to alter the climate of opinion by producing favourable 
analyses of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy objectives. His profile would have 
been raised further when he became an unofficial advisor to the Labour party. 
During the 1930s Zilliacus was approached by Hugh Dalton to act as an advisor to the 
Labour party on foreign affairs. This role allowed him to develop his interest in British 
politics and the Labour party. During this period the CPGB were arguing for the creation 
of a popular front and many were arguing that the Soviet Union should be seen as an ally. 
Here he appears perfectly placed to act as a lever on those who doubted the motives of the 
Soviet Union in Europe, such as Arthur Henderson and Clement Attlee, with whom he 
worked closely. Hugh Dalton recalled that Zilliacus was under suspicion in 1932. In his 
diary he noted HendersonS1 had told him "a strange tale of allegations that ZillyS2 is a 
Bolshevik agent and may have been having his correspondence tampered with."s3 He 
resolved to look into these allegations. In January 1932 Dalton stayed with Zilliacus in 
Geneva. Here he became aware that Zilliacus had Communist connections. Dalton 
accompanied Zilliacus to a meeting promoting the boycott of the 1936 Berlin Olympics. 
This was attended by Ernst ToIler and Claud Cockburn, both journalists for the Daily 
Worker, and Edgar Mowrer, an expelled German Communist. Dalton recalled that the 
meeting agenda followed "very much the Soviet line."S4 No records of an investigation, if 
one took place, exist. Dalton himself makes no further reference to the allegations. We 
should suppose that, given the positions Zilliacus was to be elevated to, they remained 
unsubstantiated. However it is open to debate whether there was any truth in such 
allegations, or whether he was simply an easy target due to the open way in which he 
moved within Communist and pro-Soviet circles. 
In 1939 Zilliacus resigned from his post at the League of Nations in disgust over the 
Munich Agreement, a move that was to bring him to Britain and the Labour party. During 
the war Zilliacus held a Civil Service post in the Ministry of Information [MOl], working 
alongside many who supported the Soviet Union. Many of the celebrated Cambridge spies 
held posts within the Civil Service or the Intelligence agencies during the war and 
immediately after.S5 Whether any links were made between the veteran of diplomacy and 
the young communist idealists remains undocumented. However Zilliacus was again in a 
position where he was able to maintain links with the Communist world as a legitimate 
gatherer of governmental intelligence. 
100 
Whether there was an unofficial contact between Zilliacus and Soviet Russia during the 
period up to 1945 is unknown. Certainly he was sympathetic to the regime. Thus we can 
argue that following Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, and the development of 
a tripartite alliance, Zilliacus had confidence in the future. Due to Hitler's military 
miscalculation the mistrusted Stalin became 'good old Uncle Joe' and the Soviet Union 
became an ally. Moreover, the Labour party had become a progressive movement 
advocating sweeping reforms, albeit on the back of a national consensus. 
The only evidence that has been put forward implicating Zilliacus as an agent of the Soviet 
Union referred to his wartime post in the MOl. Nikolai Tolstoy quoted the letters of 
Viktor Kravchenko, one time Soviet diplomat who defected in 1944.56 Kravchenko placed 
Zilliacus in Beirut as an Allied Officer with access to sensitive information on manoeuvres 
in the Caucasus. Tolstoy claimed that links already existed between Zilliacus and an agent 
called Rado, who was, according to information in the US National Archives of the FBI in 
Washington, a high level spy handler code-named Dora.57 Tolstoy argued that this link 
was strengthened and that Zilliacus was part of a group in the East which other sources 
testify included Kim Philby and Jack Klugman.58 Archie Potts refuted this completely 
stating the only military role Zilliacus had was as a member of the Home Guard and that 
he did not leave the country during the war years. This information has been corroborated 
by his widow.59 
It could be argued that such clandestine activities would be concealed, particularly by his 
widow. However, this alleged role appears contrary to his earlier and later behaviour. 
Furthermore with figures like Philby and Klugman active in this area, what would be the 
need for Zilliacus to expose himself to suspicion if he was an agent. Equally, as a 
translator, it is highly unlikely that Zilliacus would have had access to "staff maps". 
Kravchenko claimed Zilliacus sent a grossly over-estimated figure of the troops to Stalin, a 
tactic which could have been a ruse organised by the Ministry of Information, for whom 
Zilliacus worked. 
The only factor that gives the allegation weight is that Kravchenko named Zilliacus. Of all 
the possible targets, if there was no truth in the accusation, why name him? It may have 
been a trick of the memory, a name or face being confused, by a man writing ten years 
later with no documentary evidence to hand. Alternatively it may have been written for 
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anti-Soviet propaganda purposes. However evidence suggests that this, along with many 
allegations against Zilliacus, is largely false. This refutation is reinforced by Oleg 
Gordievsky who believed that Kravchenko's allegation was based upon a misheard code 
name and that the person passing information to Moscow from Cairo was the CPGB 
member James Klugman. Gordievsky recalled that Kravchenko was not party to high 
level information and therefore was working from hearsay. Kravchenko may well have 
been a contact of Zilliacus legitimately in relation to the League of Nations work and so 
knew of him. As Gordievsky highlighted, everyone is given a code name to confuse 
listeners and "muddy the waters of understanding.,,6o 
It appears that Zilliacus acted in too obvious a way to have been any sort of reliable agent, 
particularly as a member of parliament, which is the period that is under scrutiny here. 
Whether he was under Soviet influence or not he did fulfil the role of a propagandist. 
Soviet articles published in Britain argued that the Soviet Union was acting defensively 
and that it was the Western Alliance that was the aggressive force. These arguments were 
constantly reinforced by the arguments of Zilliacus both in I Choose Peace and subsequent 
publications and in speeches to the Commons. It can even be argued that although his pro-
Soviet sympathies were not slavish, this could also have been part of his role. He had to 
be someone that the British politicians and people would listen to. Cominform did not 
need another Dutt, or Harry Pollitt, who produced similar arguments, but were perceived 
as under the control of the Kremlin. Misguided Soviet officials may have assumed 
Zilliacus was influential and thus destined for higher positions in government. 
The myth of the crypto-Communists 
For Soviet ideas to percolate into British politics what was necessary was a body of 
independent support within parliament. These semi-independent but Soviet influenced 
MPs would be able to explain that aspects of Soviet society had strayed from the socialist 
ideal, while not being too critical of Stalin, and blaming Western capitalist aggression 
where possible. These MPs could produce reasoned, well argued analyses that would 
attract those who sought an understanding of foreign affairs but who did not possess many 
preconceived ideas. This would have been the perfect role for someone like Zilliacus. 
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Chapman Pincher argued that the KGB did control certain members of parliament. 
employing them to embarrass the Government by asking questions "calculated to damage 
the interests of Britain or her allies.,,61 He also claims. albeit without substantiation that: 
Some of the MPs are even named, by their code-name, in KGB radio traffic. The 
late Konni Zilliacus was one of them, and Driberg was another. [To excuse his 
lack of evidence he stated] I greatly regret that at this stage, I am unable to name 
others who are still alive and shelter behind the libel laws, as it is difficult to 
induce any intelligence source to appear as a witness, as MI5 itself knows only too 
wel1.62 
Henry PelIing reinforces this thesis arguing that several crypto-Communists were elected 
to parliament in 1945,63 suggesting that many of the left-wingers were at least acting 
covertly on behalf of the CPGB. While Pelling avoids naming any MP in particular he 
does allude to the fact that they had "all but disappeared by 1951" suggesting those who 
were expelled were part of the CPGB's Cadre Department.64 This argument is based on 
Douglas Hyde's recollection of receiving a call at the Morning Star office from a 
Communist who "announced himself as the new Labour member for his constituency ... 
with a loud guffaw.,,6s Hyde recalls that the "eight or nine cryptos"66 were soon to leave 
either the Communist party or parliament: 
[s]ome ... [came] to feel that the parliamentary way to socialism was the best ... 
others became attracted by a political and parliamentary career ... [o]thers ... were 
subsequently ... purged by the Labour party itself and who, in the 1950 election, all 
lost their seats. ,,67 
While much of this is circumstantial evidence, Zilliacus did appear as a witness for the 
defence of the Soviet Union at the Kravchenko libel trial in 1949 arguing that slave labour. 
as described in Kravchenko's I Chose Freedom, was not practised in the Soviet Union.68 
This role indicates that Zilliacus was acting on behalf of the Soviet Government, and 
Gordievsky claimed that he was seen in Moscow as an asset of the KGB. However, 
evidence suggests that he was not the 'Soviet stooge' Pincher would seem to suggest. Many 
of his, more moderate, left-wing colleagues doubted the leadership's view of him. J P W 
Mallalieu69 wrote: "[t]o be a secret agent, Zilly is too clumsy and much too honest.,,7o 
It is equally indicative that Zilliacus rejected the Soviet model of socialism, unlike figures 
like Pritt with whom he was categorised. In 1952 Zilliacus abandoned his support for the 
Soviet Union and focused upon Tito's Yugoslavia as the new hope for the future of 
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Communism and world peace. This was not a shift in thought that was particular to 
Zilliacus. Within the British-Yugoslav Association71 a split developed between the 
advocates of the Stalinist line, a group led by D N Pritt, and the more internationalist and 
democratic socialists such as Zilliacus and Stanley Tiffany.72 It appears doubtful that 
those who found themselves able to break from the Cominform line were at any time 
under the influence of Stalin's agents. 
The only source of information on the private life and thoughts of Konni Zilliacus was his 
widow Jan. When she met Zilliacus actress J anet Harris was a Communist party member 
though, due to her Hollywood upbringing, this was arguably a faddish attachment. Jan 
recalled that when she and Konni began their relationship Harry Pollitt, a close personal 
friend, told her she must leave the Communist party; "give up on this and join the Labour 
party, if not it will look bad on Zilly you knoW.,,73 Pollitt was fully aware of the stigma 
attached to having CP links. Jan retained her strong socialist beliefs, seeing the ideas of 
Pollitt and Zilliacus as those to which she would personally subscribe, and admitted that 
their perspectives were not dissimilar. This gives the impression that Zilliacus was well 
disposed towards the CPGB and its leadership, particularly Pollitt. 
However evidence appears to contradict the perspective that a benign relationship existed 
between Zilliacus and the CPGB. It appears that during the Second World War Zilliacus 
was indeed approached and invited to be, in Laski's words, "a member of the CP in the LP 
concealing his name." 74 Laski stated that Zilliacus refused. This does indicate that 
overtures were made and that MPs were encouraged to conceal their affiliation, thus acting 
secretly on behalf of the CPGB. The objective was to gain influence within government, 
however a further implication was that membership could be employed as a lever of 
control if the Soviet Union did not get the expected benefits from the relationship with the 
MP. There is no evidence to indicate that Zilliacus did, or would have considered, taking 
up such an opportunity. The fact that he openly discussed the incident with Laski 
reinforces the open, almost carefree, image that Zilliacus assumed. Equally he seems to 
have lacked the ideological commitment to belong to the CP, his objective was world 
peace not the predominance of one or the other side in an ideological war. 
Jan accompanied her husband on nearly all of his visits to the Soviet Union. She told me 
that they were usually invited, particularly after Zilliacus presented a strong pro-Soviet 
argument in the House. This indicates that Soviet agents kept an eye on their verbose ally. 
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She described these visits as very informal, possibly geared to impress the couple, but that 
the Zilliacuses were not impressionable people. Konni had no need for an interprete'r, he 
discussed politics with the Soviet leaders, and she recalled that "he would argue and 
explain the Western point of view.,,75 When asked if they ever tried to steer his literature 
she replied that they "wouldn't dare,,,76 Zilliacus was too independent. He had real hope 
for the Communist bloc in the post war world, but became disillusioned with the foreign 
policy motives of the Soviet Union. This and no other reason led him to lend his support 
towards Tito. Following the death of Stalin, Zilliacus became a close friend of both 
Khrushchev and Tito and visited their dachas often. Jan recalls that Zill, as she called him, 
was never fully supportive of Stalinism. He recognised the truth behind the socialist 
fa~ade77 but saw this as a poor excuse to start a third World War. 
Zilliacus argued that Stalin had no intentions for further expansion and felt that the fear of 
Communism, that existed to extremes in the United States, and to a lesser extent in Britain, 
was "ludicrous and unfounded.,,78 He argued: "the Soviet Union d[id] not want war and 
Communism [wa]s a social challenge, not a military threat.,,79 He saw the dominant 
rationale leading to the situation of permanent paranoia later synonymous with 
McCarthyism. Many of left opposed the investigations launched by the leadership into 
their activities. Jan recalled that Zilliacus was the subject of an MI5 investigation and had 
secretaries thrust upon him who would search through his papers when he was out of the 
office. Ambitious members of the party had to be careful in their associations and 
arguably Zilliacus was a particular victim of the anti-Communist ethos. In party circles he 
was suspected of being a 'Red' ,80 therefore, younger members who supported his stance, 
individuals such as Frank Allaun, found themselves tarred with a similar image. This 
attitude disgusted Zilliacus. He saw himself as being victimised due to his beliefs in peace 
and socialism. 
To Zilliacus these two ideals were inseparable. Socialism, he argued, represented the only 
way of achieving peace, co-operation and social equality. A stance that leads us to 
question why he supported the Soviet Union as it was clearly not socialist. Zilliacus 
argued that it was. The egalitarian society, state ownership and a non-aggressive foreign 
policy in the face of provocation, he eloquently argued, were fundamental to Soviet 
society. External pressure from the West and Stalin's response to this aggression had 
deformed the original blueprint, but the ethos remained and could still be rescued. This 
was the central argument of A New Birth of Freedom. The achievements of the society, 
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which had had western Socialists and intellectuals gazing in awe since 1931, would act as 
the ideological glue of the system. Meanwhile, ideological dedication from the' new 
leadership would cleanse it of the excesses of Stalinism and produce a more democratic 
political system. a socialist society rather than just a socialist economy. He recognised 
faults on both sides of the ideological spectrum and argued that the people could and 
would redress this eventually: 
The longing for freedom and equality can never be wholly extinguished in human 
hearts, nor can men indefinitely be deceived into believing they already possess 
freedom when in fact they do not. That is as true of the absence of economic and 
social democracy under capitalism as it is of the lack of political democracy under 
Communism.81 
Zilliacus preferred the economic and social freedom that he saw represented under 
communism. That is obvious, though never openly stated. He wanted the Soviet Union to 
have a chance to develop, for the state bureaucracy to wither away, but argued that this 
was dependent upon the actions of external forces. He believed that the Soviet system 
represented the ideal for mankind's future relations; these should be founded on peaceful 
co-operation not the competitiveness of capitalism. This belief, amalgamated with his 
experience in foreign affairs, shaped Zilliacus' theories on international relations. His 
experiences indicated that one system emerged as the progressive alternative to capitalism. 
It is likely that contact with Soviet delegates, coupled with theories emerging from Britain 
and Western Europe, nurtured and reinforced his perception of the Soviet Union. This 
belief in Soviet society, and his deep fear of war, can be argued to have underpinned his 
attachment to pro-Sovietism and his motivations for acting as a propagandist of pro-Soviet 
and pro-Communist82 arguments. 
The Totalitarian Element 
During Labour's 1945-1950 term of office Zilliacus was not the sole proponent of the pro-
Soviet analysis on international relations. His allies were among the amorphous group that 
Raymond Blackburn83 referred to, in a debate on the infamous 'Nenni telegram', as the 
"Totalitarian element of the Labour party.,,84 Blackburn called for their complete 
expUlsion. a goal that was never fully achieved. However between April 1948 and July 
1949 four MPs were expelled. and it is interesting to view the sources of opinion that they, 
particularly. should be expelled. while others such as Geoffrey Bing or Tom Driberg were 
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to remain within the fold. Geoffrey Bing stated that the reason that he had not been 
earmarked for expulsion was that he had been "more adroit than they have been in not 
being put into a position where I had to declare myse1f.,,8S 
Though this is probably true for many of the potential expellees, to expel every opponent 
of Bevin's foreign policy would have been impossible, or at least extremely detrimental to 
party cohesion, Labour's parliamentary majority and future electability. Examples had to 
be made in order to kerb the left, particularly the Keep Left group who maintained a 
moderate anti-Atlanticist position. Though Aneurin Bevan and Richard Crossman were 
staunch opponents of Bevin, arguably it would have been political suicide for the party to 
expel them because of their ability and popularity. Those who would become examples to 
other left-wing dissidents were members who the press had highlighted as being 
troublesome and for whom the public, particularly Labour voters, had little support. This 
was largely achieved, though the electorate moved substantially away from Labour at the 
1950 Election anyway.86 So how and why did these four dissidents make themselves the 
targets of the Labour Whip? 
The Labour leadership was aware that a problem existed. It was the task of Morgan 
Phillips, General Secretary, to find who were the main proponents of the pro-Soviet 
perspective. D N Pritt criticised the process as resembling the "McCarthyite witch-hunt" 
experienced by anti-Cold War activists in the United States.87 The file that was created on 
the individuals, known collectively as the 'Lost Sheep', was carefully compiled. Party 
members, in parliament and the constituencies, were employed to gather evidence and 
send it to Transport House. This evidence combined hearsay records of speeches, press 
cuttings and even opinions of party members.88 
Hugh Dalton provided the damning piece of evidence against Zilliacus. This was an 
article in The New Statesman and Nation called 'The Labour Party's Dilemma', in which 
Zilliacus argued that the policy of intervention, pursued by Britain and the United States, 
within other nations domestic politics was "indefensible in terms of democracy.,,89 Dalton 
footnotes this article with the sarcastic comment "tell this to the Kremlin.,,9o In an 
accompanying letter, Dalton suggested a solution: "I feel we cannot, much longer, avoid 
dealing with the author, as we did with Platts-Mills.,,91 
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A seventeen-page document was drawn up which contained evidence of Zilliacus' pro-
Communist support. This was used to prove that Zilliacus was unfit to be a Labour party 
member. In defence of the party's decision, Phillips wrote to one critic: 
they ... used their positions and their prestige, as members of the British House of 
Commons, in a manner inimical to the work of the party and in support of policies 
which, time and time again, had been rejected by the Annual Party Conference.92 
There are entries for all of the individuals expelled, and eighteen93 other possible 
candidates for expulsion. This shows there was a degree of support for pro-Soviet ideas 
and that the party was keen to act against the major proponents. 
John Faithful Fortescue Platts-Mills, the first to be expelled, plotted an unusual political 
course before standing as a Labour candidate in 1945. He was a New Zealander by birth, 
had spent time in the British Air Force, worked as a propagandist under Churchill during 
the war and had worked in the Yorkshire mines as a 'Bevin boy', The latter had led him to 
have a close affinity with the British people, a quality that he recalled encouraged him to 
pursue a career in the Labour party. In his opinion the higher echelons of the party were 
against him from the outset. He recalled that his election expenses were restricted to 
hinder his campaign, though this did not stop him selling himself, using billboard posters, 
as the 'People's John',94 His maiden speech 20 August 1945 should have been a warning 
to the front bench. 
Despite his rough and candid style, Platts-Mills would endeavour to be as contentious and 
controversial as possible. His subject was Greece, cleverly quoting Churchill's speech of 
16 August when he stated that "we must remould the relationships of all men, wherever 
they may dwell, in all nations.,,9s Platts-Mills asked, therefore, why was Britain 
reinforcing a corrupt, fascistic regime in Greece and preventing free elections from taking 
place. Furthermore, he enquired, if the Government was so keen on ensuring the freedom 
and self-determination of a nation's peoples, why was India still under British rule. These 
were issues on which the Labour Government could guarantee support from the Tory 
opposition. The only voices to break the parliamentary consensus on foreign affairs were 
the intra-party left-wing and their independent allies, D N Pritt, Independent member for 
Hammersmith and Phi I Piratin and Willie Gallacher, the Communist party members for 
Mile End and West Fife respectively.96 Alongside the so-called 'Lost Sheep', these MPs 
used these and similar issues, highlighted as anti-socialist policies, as a stick to beat the 
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front bench, particularly the hapless Ernest Bevin. This was a small, but formidable, 
group, eloquent and extremely critical of the Government's handling of foreign affairs'. 
In the House Platts-Mills, alongside Hugh Lester Hutchinson, Leslie J Solley and Konni 
Zilliacus, continually adopted an oppositional stance to the cross-bench consensus and 
took great pleasure in asking the most difficult questions of Ernest Bevin. It was not that 
the questions were unanswerable, but these were questions designed to cause the electorate 
and party members to doubt the socialist credentials of the Labour party. SoIley, 
supported by others on the Labour Left and the elected Communists, asked George Brown, 
speaking on the Greek situation, if "he was suggesting that we have supported democracy 
in Greece when we compelled the holding of elections without any working class party 
participation.,,97 Equally, Hutchinson, in his maiden speech on 21 February 1946, stated 
that the Government, and particularly Bevin, was: 
the unfortunate heir to the traditional policy of bolstering up reactionary monarchs 
and decaying regimes wherever we can find them. In that policy I believe we can 
find the explanation for the antagonism between ourselves and Soviet Russia.98 
The most notable factor that links these four individuals is that in speeches on foreign 
policy, the Soviet Union's policy was referred to as the positive alternative to the negative 
anti-Communist Cold War rationale. Equally if there was a debate on the Soviet Union, or 
one of its client states, at least one of their voices was heard opposing Bevin and 
promoting a pro-Soviet line. It is not difficult to see why these individuals were singled 
out. Others, highlighted by Schneer99 as government opponents, were never so vocal in 
the House, the medium receiving most attention in the press. This reportage embarrassed 
the Labour Government greatly. The Times of the period, throughout its political pages, 
highlights incidents where these individuals publicly exposed the inconsistencies and 
failures in Labour's foreign policy, 
John Plans-Mills, culprit or victim of the 'Nenni Telegram' incident,loo was the first to be 
expelled for his opposition despite the fact that Zilliacus was the most active in opposing 
government policy in the House and in his independent writings. Perhaps the party 
believed it could control ZiIliacus with the threat of expulsion. Due to his wealth of 
experience in foreign affairs many did argue that he was a "loaded gun that required 
careful handling" 101 indicating a desire to control Zilliacus, if possible, through the party 
whip procedure. Equally the expulsion of Platts-Mills may have been an attempt to break 
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the group's apparent cohesion. This was arguably a pointless exercise. Platts-Mills recalled 
no true cohesion; he admitted that they met for dinner from time to time and Jan Zilliacus 
recalled that Platts-Mills and Hutchinson were regular houseguests. However their 
alliance was due to their beliefs; they were friends due to their political stance, but did not 
act in an organised manner. He provided the image of these four dissident MPs as 
pragmatic opponents of the government motivated by their principles alone. Jan argued 
that Zilliacus, despite being the most knowledgeable of the group, would never have 
wanted to be a leader: "he had no ego whatsoever.,,102 What is evident is the ideological 
cohesion of the group; they spoke as a party within a party, supported by the external pro-
Soviet faction, the two Communist MPs and D N Pritt. Thus the only course of action 
open for the party leadership was to ensure that their pro-Soviet arguments could not be 
interpreted as representing party policy. 
Their unity on the international situation is evident from parliamentary debates recorded in 
Hansard. Zilliacus stated that the Conservatives' desire to make an issue of the Russian 
war crime trials of eleven Poles, all suspected of 'Fifth Column' activities, was "not 
unconnected with their desire to stir up trouble between us an the Soviet Union.,,103 Platts-
Mills described Conservative foreign policy, and by implication that of Bevin, as being 
along: 
familiar lines, a complete absence of any clear policy that will make toward world 
peace and break down the existing difficulties; the same veiled abuse of the Soviet 
Union running through it. 104 
Arguing that the policy of interventionism in the political arrangements of other nations 
was flawed, Platts-Mills asked pertinently "[if] the French people were to decide to have a 
left-wing Government... should [we] then invade France to prevent it."IQS Leslie Solley, in 
sealing his fate, stated on 14 May 1948, five days before his expulsion, that 
we are not faced with the line up of the so-called anti-democracies on the one hand 
and the so-called democracies on the other. It is a line up of, on the one hand the 
warmongers who are substantially the capitalists, and on the other hand the non-
warmongers who are substantially the anti-capitalists. [He argued] Let us join the 
anti-capitalists and we shall win peace for the peoples of the world. 106 
These arguments could have come straight from the writings of Zilliacus, whether in the 
1930s or the post war period. The style of delivery shows Zilliacus as the most eloquent 
member of the group. Not surprisingly, all members of this elite minority showed a greater 
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vituperativeness towards the Government following their 'expulsion, none more so than 
Platts-Mills. In his unpublished autobiography he recalled: 
This one man [himself] hurled himself at Ernie Bevin like a clenched fist whenever 
he appeared ... to be acting ... more abjectly servile than usual to United States 
foreign policy. This was only about once a day. 107 
The reasons for this appear two-fold, Platts-Mills opposition to the Cold War ethos and his 
open, deep dislike of Bevin. Platts-Mills described Bevin as bigoted, anti Semitic, and 
horrible. l08 However, Platts-Mills major concern was that an anti-Communist propaganda 
campaign had been initiated in order to prepare the British people for a war against the 
Soviet Union. 
The pro-Soviet propagandist 
If Hyde's recollection is correct, and there were crypto-Communists within the 1945-50 
Labour government, John Platts-Mills appears one of the most likely candidates for such a 
role. However he himself tells a different story. His first official connection with the 
Soviet Union was when working for Churchill during the Second World War. He was 
singled out to lead a nondescript team of propagandists, whose task was to change public 
opinion. 
Churchill said he had been teaching the British since 1918 that the Russians were 
un-Christian, they ate their babies ... If the British people went on thinking that 
there would be no war effort, because the only war effort could be in favour of 
Russia. 109 
Stafford Cripps, then British Ambassador to Moscow suggested Platts-Mills for this task 
in 1941. The question is why? Platts Mills was an apprentice barrister and part-time 
worker for the Labour party, in the role of secretary of St Philips Ward. However, he was 
also a member of the Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR110 (SCR), a Labour 
party proscribed organisation. He also had close links with members of the International 
Brigade, the People's Convention and the Popular Front movement. It is possible that, 
during their association in the latter campaign, Cripps learned of his sympathies. Platts-
Mills had also enlisted to fight in Spain, but was refused because he was married with a 
child. I11 Equally he had been prominent during the 1930s in prosecuting cases against 
fascists and defending their Communist opponents following street fights, 112 activities that 
had brought him to the attention of the League of Socialist Lawyers. 113 
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Platts-Mills recalled that he was very successful in his work as a propagandist, this led 
Churchill to dismiss him and encourage him to take work in the South Yorkshire· coal 
mines as a Bevin boy. However, Platts-Mills role as a change agent was to be revitalised 
when he became a Member of Parliament. This role was not founded upon a desire to 
support the Soviet union per se; his opposition to Bevin was founded on the belief that the 
government's scheme of rearming Germany was part of a Churchillian plan to start a new 
war: 
Churchill conceived the idea, and this is not made up on my part, this is direct 
information from the horse's mouth as it were. He made up the idea that the 
Labour Government being in power and he being in opposition, but Bevin and 
Attlee so worshipping him, Churchill, that they would do what he suggested, and 
he should get the Labour party leaders to get Germany rearmed, set her again on 
Russia. This time not having to fight us as well, but with us as a neutral with 
America and France providing the arms and money, then Germany would beat 
Russia at last... It was the most monstrous thing really. 114 
This was his rationale for opposing the party. He and his colleagues shared the view that 
Labour foreign policy was tied to Churchill and a scheme that would lead to an unjust war. 
Platts-Mills did not share Zilliacus' total opposition to war, but opposed the anti-
Communist and anti-Russian ethos of the Cold War. 
Platts-Mills equally opposed the hypocrisy that underlined Churchill's plan. Under 
Churchill's instruction Platts-Mills had spent two years turning the British people towards 
the Soviet Union. British workers had been producing 'Tanks for Joe', tanks in support of 
the Soviet war effort. To Platts-Mills it appeared that these same workers were now being 
called upon to produce 'Tanks for Germany', 'Tanks against Joe'. This he argued was 
wrong: 
I thought the best thing was to go on making the same propaganda as I had been 
making during the war under Churchill's instruction, making people think what 
good chaps the Russians were. I IS 
He recalls this as the true reason for his expulsion. 
He visited Russia several times, leading exchange visits of war heroes. He describes the 
individuals he met there as wonderful people, not the barbarians that pre-war propaganda 
had led him to expect. This led him to the conclusion that "Joe Stalin can't have been so 
horrible as they fought for him, made sacrifices for him, as they did.,,116 James 
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Callaghan 117 accompanied Platts-Mills on one visit designed for young people who had 
been active during the Second World War. Callaghan was then Vice-Chairman of the 
Parliamentary Defence and Services Committee. These recollections tell us of the British 
delegation drinking heavily with their Russian counterparts. Callaghan recalled that "we 
were heavily indoctrinated with propaganda during our visit and I daresay it had more 
effect on some than on others." 11 8 We can assume that the aim was to turn individuals like 
Callaghan, in a position of relative influence and power, into Soviet sympathisers. One 
fellow visitor, Captain Harry Ree, who represented the Army, was regarded by the Soviets 
as a spy after his visit, though Lord Callaghan cast doubt on the authenticity of the claim. 
Platts-Mills was possibly already seen as an asset, particularly given his role in organising 
visits to the Soviet Union. 
Upon his return to post war London, John Platts Mills found himself a new post, as junior 
partner in the law firm run by D N Pritt. It is more than likely that they had already 
enjoyed some contact through the SCR and other wartime pro-Soviet organisations. Platts 
Mills became a member of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers 
[IADL],119 of which Pritt was President. This, as well as his link with the SCR, a 
Communist front organisation that Pritt also chaired, makes the two appear intrinsically 
linked in their pro-Soviet activities. It is unknown whether Platts-Mills' association with 
Pritt shaped his political perspective or whether he was drawn to Pritt because of existent 
pro-Soviet sympathies. Pritt was seen as an active OGPU agent during the 1930s, it is 
possible that he also recruited sympathetic young intellectuals to front organisations and 
then encouraged them to participate in further activities at a later date, depending on their 
position in British society. It is equally possible that Platts-Mills was influenced by both 
peers and alumni of Balliol College, Oxford University. These included past pupils R P 
Dutt, Theodore Rothstein and Tom Wintringham, and current pro-Communist students 
like Marxist historian Christopher Hill. Pritt was also an Oxford fellow though not at 
BaIliol College. Koch indicated that pro-Soviet agents operated in the Universities during 
the 1920s recruiting sympathisers for more active roles, it is possible that Platts-Mills was 
referred to Pritt for 'further political education'. 120 
Platts Mills's contemporaries included fellow Labour MP Denis Healey. Healeyadmitted 
joining the Communist party due to the influence of contemporaries, 121 but resigned due to 
the CPGB's analysis of the Second World War. Many others refused to break their links 
with the Soviet ideal they had supported during their youth. Platts-Mills, however, refuted 
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the notion that he was ever a Communist party member, however his activities indicate 
that he was, arguably, a Communist in all but name. Platts-Mills stressed that his 
sympathies were with the Russian people but not the Soviet leadership. As for being a 
fellow traveller and a follower of the Communists in parliament, he admitted that they 
were friends, going as far as on one occasion to become involved in a fist fight in the 
Commons Tea Rooms. This was with the Conservative MP for Brighton "a real 
Fascist" 122 in defence of Phil Piratin, m but "as far as me following the Communist line, 
they followed our line rather than our following their line.,,124 
Free from the shackles of Labour party membership Platts-Mills continued his support of 
the Soviet Union through his membership of the IADL and the SCR. Since 1989 he has 
been the President of the SCR, and spent many years on the Executive Committee, 
particularly as Vice President alongside the Presidents D N Pritt and Hugh Jenkins. 
During the 1960s he was involved in IADL work, investigating former Nazi judges, US 
intervention in Vietnam and in Iraq and was prominent in the establishment of a bureau to 
investigate US war crimes which was based in Postdam. After Pritt's death Platts-Mills 
became the figurehead of many of the pro-Soviet organisations formally controlled by 
Pritt. Equally letters between him and Ivor Montague, the pro-Communist journalist and 
filmmaker, show that Platts-Mills was instrumental in Montague being awarded the Lenin 
Prize for Peace in 1959. He must therefore have had some degree of influence in 
Moscow.1 2S The very innocent letters show that the two men were obviously old friends 
rather than fellow conspirators. However, they were in a position by the late 1950s to be 
open about their sympathies. 
Platts-Mills also wrote for the SCR's publication, the Anglo Soviet Journal, which was a 
medium for pro-Soviet propaganda. These articles give some indications of his true 
beliefs: "the Soviet people work because they have confidence both in what is happening 
today and in the future ... there is no mistaking their enthusiasm for the regime.,,126 Platts-
Mills believed that the Russian people controlled their own political destiny. They had 
chosen to live under Communism because of the benefits experienced in a 'true socialist 
society'. He argued that they had changed the political regime previously by revolution 
therefore, if Stalin was so unpopular, why had they not operated once more as the vehicle 
for societal change. He appeared to refute evidence that indicated that the Soviet system 
was unsocialist, supporting a Journal which, on Stalin's death, printed a eulogy, written by 
Pritt, for the late dictator: 
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Thank you, Joseph Stalin, for the cultural human development, for the conscious 
purposeful humanism that you have brought to the lives of all who have eyes to 
see, minds to understand, and hearts to rejoice. 127 
Though Platts-Mills does not display the same devout Stalinism of this eulogy, he argued 
that there was nothing wrong with Stalin on the basis of the love the Russian people had 
for him. He argues that the death of Stalin led to the 1989 collapse: "it all went wrong 
after that." 128 
Platts-Mills heavily criticised the changes in the beliefs of his erstwhile colleague, going 
as far as to allude that Zilliacus' change of beliefs was a cynical ploy to gain re-election; a 
sin none of the others in the group committed. It is obvious that the Communist MPs had a 
greater respect for Platts-Mills than his Labour colleagues did. This is shown not only by 
their support for him in the House. In Willie Ga1lacher's memoirs of the period he 
described Platts-Mills as "the most indomitable and courageous Member of the House of 
Commons." 129 
Whether Platts-Mills' pro-Soviet beliefs came from contact with the Russians or their 
agents, or the impact of his experiences, is hard to establish with any degree of exactitude. 
He insisted that he believed in what he was doing, firstly for Churchill, then for the Soviet 
Union. He opposed a policy that he saw would lead to an unjust war, and a process 
through which an entire nation's people had become demonised. He had little care for the 
concerns of governments only the interests of the people, albeit the people of Soviet 
Russia. He identified his time in the coal mines, and the people he met there, with the 
Russian people; "good people who wanted peace and prosperity,,130 his objective was to 
ensure that the British government would not stand in their way. 
The 1930s, as several historians have argued, was the "golden age for Communism in 
Britain.,,131 Labour was seen to be impotent in creating social inequality. The alternative 
was revolutionary socialism. These ideas appealed to many middle-class intellectuals. 
Some saw themselves as Lenin-like figures, leading the way by producing revolutionary 
material, a role consistent with Roberts' characterisation of R P Dutt. 132 Those who stood 
on the fringes such as Platts-Mills were more independent, but maintained clear support 
for the Soviet ideal. These figures operated within parameters determined by a pro-Soviet 
campaign centrally controlled by Cominform agents. They produced the same arguments, 
kept an appearance of independence. but were careful not to denounce the model of 
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'actually existing socialism'. Not all were as prominent as Platts Mills, some kept their 
alliances with the front organisations reasonably secret, Julius Silverman for example. 
Beatrice Webb coined the phrase "Mild mannered desperadoes .. 133 because of their 
backgrounds. These were middle-class intellectuals who would become influential in later 
life however Webb observed that in their youth they would yearn to overthrow the system 
in which they were destined to prosper. What Webb did not foresee was that this also 
made them ideal subjects for Soviet recruitment. 
There was no reason for figures like Platts Mills to be CPGB members. Their role as non-
aligned progressive and influential socialists was important to Cominform's objectives. 
Their promotion of the Soviet Union as a socialist state, the progressive alternative to 
United States capitalism, and their condemnation of the United States as the 'aggressive 
superpower' reached a wider audience than openly Communist pamphleteers. Locating 
supporters for these arguments within parliament and using their positions to further the 
goals of the Soviet Union were the roles ascribed to them. Platts-Mills assumed this role 
with enthusiasm and, in later life his only regret was that his ideals crumbled before his 
eyes. He argued, almost tearfully, that "socialism has no chance anymore, they destroyed 
it" .134 The British affiliate of the IADL, the Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers, carries 
on its work with Platts Mills as President. Through this organisation pro-Soviet policy 
lines are maintained despite the collapse of the focus for these activities. The Haldane 
Society acted as an umbrella for organisations that offered support to Cuba against the 
United States, and exposed the injustices prevalent in the dictatorships supported by the 
United States to contain Communism. Recently the society has supported campaigns in 
support of Libya, Argentina during the Falklands Conflict and currently Iraq. The fight 
seems to be continuing long after the ideological struggle is lost. Platts-Mills' pro-Soviet 
network is now a poorly funded source of permanent dissent. 135 
The advocate of totalitarianism and the campaigner for democracy 
Hugh Lester Hutchinson equally had a history of Communist connections. His mother, 
Mary Knight, was a founder of the CPGB. Hutchinson himself was arrested by the British 
Government in India in 1932 while investigating the arrest of prominent CPGB members 
on the charge of "conspiracy to deprive the King-Emperor of sovereignty over British 
India. ,,136 This episode, the Meerut Conspiracy Trial, was an attempt by the Colonial 
Office to quell the rising tide of Indian Communism. The conspiracy involved British 
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Communists actively supporting the Indian Communist party by providing funding and 
tactical advice. Key activists were British Indians Shapurji Saklatvala, Rajani Palme"Dutt 
and M N Roy, all of whom were members of the CPGB. Callaghan argued that the Indian 
Communist movement was mainly controlled from Britain and orchestrated by Rajani 
Palme Dutt,137 despite claiming Indian independence as its chief objective and enjoying 
some support from Mahatma Gandhi. Non-Indian British Communists were also 
prominent agitators and this was the accusation levelled against the thirty-one militants 
arrested in March 1929. 
His experiences in Meerut encouraged Hutchinson to place the question of colonial rule 
and the issue of imperialism high on his agenda as a Labour MP. However there exists no 
evidence that Hutchinson took an active part in the conspiracy or that he had any contact 
with the chief conspirators in Meerut, Ben Bradley and Philip Spratt, or with the CPGB. 
It is also unclear if he acted under Communist party control. Branson maintained that he 
was acting on behalf of a Trade Union, members of which were among those 
imprisoned. 138 It should also be noted that, following the division of the Labour party 
after the MacDonald-Lansbury split, the Lansbury-Ied Labour party argued in favour of 
the release of the Meerut conspirators. An official 1933 publication argued that the arrests, 
which had been approved by Ramsay MacDonald in his role as Prime Minister in 1929, 
and subsequent sentences of up to twelve years were "indefensible.'oI39 This indicates that 
Hutchinson was not acting in opposition to the Labour party or that his pre-war activities 
can be used as evidence that he was a Communist plant as Pelling argued was the case 
with many of the pro-Soviet radicals. 140 Equally he does not appear to have sought a career 
within politics and, unlike Platts-Mills, did not continue his work within the extra-
parliamentary pro-Soviet network. Following his expUlsion from the Labour party 
Hutchinson returned to teaching, and drifted into obscurity, retaining no links with his 
previous colleagues. However, Morgan PhilIips was certainly satisfied with the conclusion 
that "he is undoubtedly a Communist in everything but name.,,141 
Phillips was probably correct. In his one published article on post-war political ideology 
Hutchinson defines himself as a revolutionary socialist in the communist tradition. This 
short article for Left, April 1946, is written as a rebuttal of previous articles calling for the 
creation of a Third Force. This stance, Hutchinson argued, was motivated by a hatred of 
Stalinism and as such ignored the realities of post-war Europe. This reality, that the Soviet 
Union was the decisive political force in post-war Europe, Hutchinson argued, should not 
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be rejected simply because of opposition to Communism. The Bolshevik revolution was 
successful, Hutchinson argued, because it had created a socialist state. The Bolshevik 
example, set in Russia in 1917, had been seized by many Eastern European nations 
therefore, he argued, Soviet Communism represented the political future for Europe. 
Hutchinson accepted the brutality of the regime stating that "there is a profound 
difference ... between Utopian and Marxian Socialism.,,142 Marxism, to Hutchinson, was 
the highest form of socialism, the ideology destined to replace capitalism, but its success 
depended upon resolute action from the socialist movement. Parliamentary democracy, 
Hutchinson argued, was a sham that defended the self-serving capitalist class only. 
However, it did provide the opportunity for a socialist group to seize the power of the 
state. On achieving this, as Labour had in 1945, the state must be "smashed" and replaced 
by a state organ "created of Socialists by Socialists... the rights of man can only be 
obtained in a classless society, which can only be introduced by stem and dictatorial 
methods.,,143 The spread of this type of socialism Hutchinson saw was inevitable and 
ultimately desirable. As radical socialism was established across the world an alliance of 
these regimes would be established to protect them from the twin horrors of United States 
imperialism and war. 
Hutchinson never argued that Britain, or indeed Europe, should ally with the Soviet Union, 
though this is implicit in such terms as "socialist unity" and his argument for establishing 
an anti-United States socialist alliance. Marxism and the Post-War World was, however, a 
clear message to the socialist movement in Britain, particularly the Labour party, to fulfil 
its historical destiny and accept that the world was heading towards a socialist revolution. 
To Hutchinson, Labour should have been the catalyst not the opponent: 
It is high time that we re-instated Marxism as the political theory of British 
Socialism, and thus do our part in speedily completing the Revolution, before 
worse horrors than we have already undergone are upon US. l44 
This was not a tenable role for the Labour party. Hutchinson appears to have entered 
parliament in the belief that this government would tear away the structures of the old 
society and create a new socialist state. His methodology for this was the creation of a 
proletarian dictatorship. This was neither labourism nor gradualism; these were 
Communist ideals and were inimical to the principles which guided Labour's political 
thought. 
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Hutchinson sealed his fate while on an extensive lecture tour of the United States. The 
Soviet Monitor, 29 April 1949, quoted his denunciation of the Marshall Plan and the North 
Atlantic Treaty as "instruments of war." 145 He is quoted as arguing that the true purpose 
of Marshall Aid was to tie the economies of Western Europe inexorably to the United 
States. With the economy under American control, so domestic and foreign policy would 
be subordinated too. British capitulation to United States foreign policy, he argued, was 
"turning this country into an aircraft carrier for the designs of American imperialism.,,146 
Hutchinson was arguably from a similar school of thought as Zilliacus, but a more radical 
variant. He was clearly the most ideologically radical of those expelled and it is 
unsurprising that he never returned to the party. 
Leslie Iudah SoUey appears as the enigma of this group. His career in oppositional politics 
centred upon one issue in foreign affairs, Greece, and his publications, either alone or with 
fellow Labour MPs Norman Dodds 147 and Stanley Tiffany, opposed British Governmental 
intervention in the Greek political situation. Solley's analysis argued that a semi-fascist 
monarchist group was being allowed to take control of the Greek Government rather than 
the Social Democrats. This policy, Solley argued, had begun under Churchill's War 
Cabinet and had been opposed by many in the Labour party. A Labour government had 
been expected to change policy toward Greece but had refused to consider the alternatives. 
Solley argued that a Labour government should break from the Conservative traditional 
foreign policy. 
Solley stands out in comparison to his fellow expellees due to the lack of consistent, direct 
support of the Soviet Union. In Greece: The Facts he argued that there were very few 
Communists in Greece, only several groups of progressive Socialists who have the support 
of the people, but who, due to British intervention, were being persecuted by the forces of 
authoritarian reaction. Though he supported the views of Zilliacus in parliament, he 
cannot be described as a fellow traveller, more a staunch democrat wanting his party to 
practise what many of the front bench had preached prior to taking office. He does argue 
against capitalism. which does tie him to the Communist line but he did not argue for an 
alliance with the Soviet Union, though he had no fear of Soviet influence in international 
affairs. 
The main tenet of his publications on Greece is the futility of the British Government's 
policies which entailed an interventionist stance based on a fear of phobic proportions. 
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The anti-Communist foreign policy, underpinned by a fear of Soviet expansionism, was 
being practised, he claimed, to the detriment of the socialist principles on which he had 
been elected. Like Platts-MiUs and Hutchinson, Solley also left politics following his 
expulsion. Equally SoUey did not believe he was doing anything either disloyal or 
immoral. In his own defence. following the Nenni telegram incident. he wrote to Morgan 
Phillips stating that he was unaware that the Nennists had been proscribed by the NEC. 
He did not agree with this decision, but assured Phillips that "I shall certainly confine such 
disagreements to what is permitted by the party constitution." 148 
After Hutchinson. Platts-Mills and Solley joined with Pritt in forming the Labour 
Independent Group [LIG], and standing as independent 'true socialists' in the 1950 General 
Election. all three lost their seats. They were never to return to parliament. Their objective 
was to influence their colleagues, and the British public, and change the perception of the 
Soviet Union and consequently government policy towards the Communist bloc. Their 
tactics. and the effect of these upon the party, can be seen in reports of the Foreign Affairs 
Group of which Zilliacus. Platts-Mills and SoIley were members. Zilliacus was selected 
because of his experience, Platts-MiIIs and SoIley chose to join in order to influence the 
Labour government's foreign policy. Solley used the group to propagate the opinions, 
based on his role as Honorary Treasurer and chief parliamentary voice, of the League for 
Democracy in Greece. The aim of the Foreign Affairs Group, headed by Bevin, was to act 
as a think-tank aiding policy formulation. but, due to the inclusion of these individuals, as 
junior Civil Servant Kenneth Younger recalled, "[it] was reduced to a very angry and 
virtually impotent body.,,149 This represents a snapshot of the effect of this element's 
presence within the Labour party. It was this effect, and the embarrassment they caused 
the party and its leadership. that led to a campaign being spearheaded against them. They 
. represented a strand of the British socialist tradition that was inimical to the tradition of 
the Labour party and incompatible given the developments in international relations. Only 
Zilliacus was welcomed back, though some argued that this was due to a significant shift 
in his thinking. 
From Gateshead to Gorton: a genuflective journey 
It can be argued that the Labour party had little choice in expelling the man who was 
described by his Conservative opponent in the 1950 Election as "[t]he Communist 
member for Gateshead.,,150 Zilliacus and his fellow expellees were fighting for an Election 
120 
pledge that Ernest Bevin could no longer deliver due to the realities of the post-war 
international order. Denis Healey, Labour's International Secretary 1945-51, explained in 
his autobiography that the governmental perception of the Soviet Union was based upon 
fear. He recalled that: 
I believed that Stalin's behaviour showed he was bent on the military conquest of 
Western Europe. I now think we were all mistaken. We took too seriously the 
Leninist rhetoric pouring out of Moscow. lsl 
With hindsight it appears that Healey agreed with Zilliacus' analysis that the Labour 
government was suffering from 'Forrestalitis'. Zilliacus argued that their anti-communism 
was akin to that of James Forrestal, the US Secretary of State who had a mental 
breakdown after convincing himself that "the Russians were coming."IS2 Zilliacus' 
obsession was the reverse: he was convinced that it was the United States who were 
dragging Britain into a crippling arms race and subsequent Third World War. He argued 
that the result of this policy would be the reversal of Labour's social reform programme 
and could lead to a Third World War. As both sides had armed themselves with nuclear 
weaponry Zilliacus, and many of his allies within the peace movement, feared that this 
would lead to the destruction of civilisation. These arguments would remain central to 
Zilliacus' analysis of international relations. However, during his absence from parliament 
and the party, he did appear to reject his attachment to the Soviet Union as the focus of his 
dissent. John Platts-Mills described this as "a deep genuflection"IS3 though this represents 
his reiteration of the Stalinist critique of Zilliacus following his condemnation in the 
Slansky trial. 
However, Zilliacus' position did shift over the three-year period 1949-52, and it is useful to 
consider why this shift occurred. Zilliacus did not expect to be expelled. ls4 He may, 
therefore, have reappraised and adjusted his arguments to match broader trends in the 
party. Whatever the motivating force during the early 1950s, the focus of his criticism 
fundamentally altered. This adjustment allowed Zilliacus to see that both the United States 
and the Soviet Union were guilty of causing and exacerbating the East-West tensions. On 
the strength of this conclusion Zilliacus chose to champion a new cause, that of 
Yugoslavia, the first independent Communist state. 
The reorientation of Zilliacus' analysis was first introduced in a pamphlet written around 
1950. 155 In Tito v Stalin: Yugoslavia and the Cold War he supported Tito's refusal to 
suborn his state to Moscow. Zilliacus criticised as unwarranted the verbal attacks made 
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against the Tito regIme, quoting Khrushchev's speech on the occasion of Stalin's 
seventieth Birthday, which referred to the Yugoslav leadership as a: 
gang of murderers and spies which has completed the transition from nationalism 
to Fascism, which has turned into a direct agent of imperialism and become its tool 
in the fight against socialism and democracy. 156 
Zilliacus treated this condemnation with contempt. From this point of departure he puts 
forward a dual argument. The first point is that if the West can come to terms with Tito, 
accept him as a both Communist arid as a co-operative, peaceful leader of an equally co-
operative and peaceful nation, then this could represent the first step towards the 
rapprochement of capitalism and communism. His second point for debate was that, as the 
Soviet Union had categorised Yugoslavia as an enemy and the West had offered no 
assurances for the security of the Titoist regime, why had the Soviet Union not annexed 
Yugoslavia. Any subsequent threat of reprisals would not be an issue as Stalin would have 
recognised the unwillingness of the West to start a war in defence of a Communist state. 
Annexation, Zilliacus argued, was the action to be expected of an imperialist, expansionist 
power but Stalin had not taken this route. Thus Zilliacus was attempting to demonstrate 
that not all Communists were as uncooperative as Stalin while maintaining his criticism of 
the Anglo-American containment policy. 
This revised argument was probably designed to redefine Zilliacus as an analyst of 
international relations independent from Soviet influence. It is true that the Soviet Union 
was not criticised in this pamphlet but, importantly, neither was it supported. This gave 
clear signals to the Labour leadership that Zilliacus was in a process of ideological 
reformation. The pamphlet also shows a degree of support for Titoist politics a theme that 
would continue in later works by Zilliacus. 157 What this pamphlet achieved, however, was 
it placed a clear gulf between Zilliacus and the Stalinist regime, one that would be 
pronounced until after the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's denunciation. 
This revision did leave Zilliacus politically isolated. In the introduction to A New Birth of 
Freedom, he described his shock at being openly criticised in the Soviet Press, and 
described as an "attorney of Fascism."IS8 This stemmed from his support of the Titoist 
regime, which equally led to Zilliacus to become ideologically separated from his allies in 
the LIG. His condemnation by Cominform, in November 1952, as an agent of 
imperialism, who had worked with Titoist agents in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, 159 
propelled him back toward the Labour party but did not guarantee him immediate re-
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selection as a parliamentary candidate. Gallacher highlighted the rift between Zilliacus and 
the nominal leader of the LIG Pritt. He recalled that: 
However hard Pritt and others ... Platts-Mills, Solley and Lester Hutchinson ... 
tried, they found it more and more difficult to work with Zilliacus. His case, in his 
opinion, was a very special case. He was the man who was fighting Bevin's 
foreign policy. [Though they] had given a good account of themselves in foreign 
affairs debates, ... only his own speeches counted with Zilliacus. 160 
This seems to indicate that Zilliacus also distanced himself from Platts-Mills and Pritt 
because he believed that they were too slavishly pro-Soviet. 
The situation in which Zilliacus found himself, alienated within domestic politics and 
denounced by his erstwhile left-wing colleagues in parliament and the Soviet Union, 
appears to have allowed him to be more openly critical of Stalinism. His most telling 
criticism of Stalinism is in his analysis of Tito's policy of neutrality. In his biography of 
Tito he argued that, in splitting away from Cominform, Tito was: 
defending the all-important principle that the relations between Socialist states 
should be based on equality, mutual respect for each other's national independence 
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. 161 
However, he was unable to reconcile himself to the fact that there was anything inherently 
wrong with the political and economic framework of the Soviet State. On viewing the 
state in the post-Stalinist era he noted the presence of the "evils of tyranny, oppression and 
the Police State,,162 but explained that these were a direct result of the western attitude to 
the Soviet Union. He did accept that there were unsocialist aspects and that both sides 
were "using ideologies to mask their national interests.,,163 Zilliacus hoped that with the 
death of the two major Cold War Warriors, Truman and Stalin, a new era of co-operation 
could begin. His hopes were constantly dashed. His ultimate dreams were lodged with 
the British Labour party who he believed "with ... courage ... could lead mankind out of 
the valley of the shadow of death in which we are wandering.,,164 However, for the 
majority of his time as MP for Manchester Gorton, the Labour party was confined to 
opposition so unable to effect the changes he called for. 
Whether the motive for his reformation was disillusionment with Soviet policy or a desire 
to return to the ranks and spread his ideas from within, the result was his return to the 
Labour party fold. He was readmitted as a member in February 1952, stood for the seat of 
Manchester Gorton at the 1955 Election, and took his seat as Labour candidate there until 
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his death on 6 July 1967. The Labour Whip was withdrawn once again between May 1961 
and March 1963 due to his persistent dissent over the party's support of United States 
foreign policy in Vietnam. Zilliacus continued to criticise the bullying tactics of the United 
States which, pitted against the weak countries of the Caribbean, South East Asia and 
Latin America, were distasteful and provoked war with the Soviet Union. 16s When 
criticising the actions and beliefs of US President John F Kennedy he quoted Ruskin, 
English social critic of the Nineteenth Century, who stated that there was "no more 
dangerous a snare ... set by the fiends of human frailty than the belief that our enemies are 
also the enemies of God.,,166 This would have been his analysis of all the conflicts the 
United States waged under the aegis of containment and roIlback. The mindset of the 
Cold War, in his eyes, had taken the shape of a religious crusade. Zilliacus' concern was 
to keep Britain from being infected by the all-consuming passion to destroy Communism. 
His alternative was to pursue a policy of accommodation. 
The theme of his final work was Labour's Crisis: Its Nature. Causes and Cure. 167 Here 
Zilliacus linked his interpretation of world politics with a more traditional Bevanite 
perspective. The policy of containing Communism. he argued, involved spending plans 
that threatened the domestic social reform programme conceived by the Attlee 
government. This position was largely consensual across Labour's left-wing. 168 The 
Conservatives. he argued, had little care for social welfare and had no ideological reasons 
for breaking with the traditional anti-Soviet policy. Labour did and should. This did not 
represent a 'deep genuflection' of Zilliacus' previous analysis however, this less radical 
stance does indicate that he instituted a reformation of his patterns of thought. It is 
difficult to determine how or why this gradual process of reformation took place. It is 
possible that this was a reaction to the investigations that were taking place and an 
indication that he was attempting to disassociate himself from pro-Sovietism. However it 
seems unlike Zilliacus to bend in the face of adversity. A more plausible interpretation is 
that this was Zilliacus making an attempt to reach a reasoned conclusion, one that 
appeared tenable as East-West relations improved. 169 He maintained that accommodation 
with the Soviet Union should be pursued, though he used George Kennan's arguments as 
evidence rather than the arguments of the Soviet leadership. 170 This gave him the 
appearance of being non-aligned and led Watson to the conclusion that this 'alternative 
centrality' was the real Zilliacus. 171 
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We can conclude that this alternative analysis of the Cold War was the result of Zilliacus's 
acceptance of Tito over Stalin and his initial acceptance of Khrushchev, coupled with his 
continual maintenance of distance between himself and Soviet Communism after 1950. 
Zilliacus was never an ideological communist; his arguments hinged upon developing an 
alternative to Cold War. His last published work highlights this perhaps better than any 
other. The party did not contain any figure as profoundly anti-Soviet as Bevin thus 
Zilliacus believed that. as Wilson attempted to develop channels of communication 
between London and Moscow.l72 rapprochement had become a distinct possibility. 
Zilliacus was equally developing a tradition of analysis that would later be espoused by his 
supporters Frank Allaun and Stan Newens. He argued that the Wilson Government had 
betrayed the electorate by enforcing wage freezes to pay for a foreign policy that was tied 
to the 10hnson administration in the United States. He argued that this was the result of a 
policy tradition set by Churchill and enacted by Bevin, which had subsequently enslaved 
the Labour administration. He talked of the "disgraceful policytl173 whereby a Labour 
government was supporting the war in Vietnam, an issue that caused uncompromising 
dissent on the Labour backbenches. His conclusion was that Labour must make a stand 
for socialist principles, purge the party of the policies of earlier governments and start 
afresh with socialism. The United Nations should stand as the arbiter of international 
disputes and the sole agent of protection against aggression, ending Western reliance upon 
NATO. Those nations who could not afford to support the foreign policy of the 10hnson 
administration and maintain troops overseas, he argued, should remove them and plough 
the released capital back into domestic public services. 
This is Zilliacus as a principled democratic socialist. In this reasonably short pamphlet he 
tied together many of the loose ends of his life's works. The Soviet Union is referred to as 
a "fellow member" of the United Nations. Neither a shining example of society nor an 
excuse to incur the cost of an arms race. Here, with the benefit of hindsight, his arguments 
make a great deal of sense. The revelations of the state of the Soviet economy that came 
to light following the collapse in 1989 showed that. given the opportunity, the Soviet 
Union may have willingly curbed escalation. 174 However, with the United States and her 
supporters opposing it, constantly improving and innovating their destructive capability, 
there was no chance of this. The result was the collapse, not only of the Soviet state, but 
also of the free provision of certain forms of health care, an issue that had led Wilson to 
resign from the Cabinet in 1948. Heavy defence spending equally led to cut backs in 
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welfare spending, wage freezes and civil unrest which marked British history during the 
1970s, all of which were predicted by Zilliacus. Whether this pamphlet represents his 
ultimate beliefs is a moot point. What it does represent is his last words on the 
inconsistencies between the party's policy and its declared objectives. 175 Whether he flirted 
with Communism or not is unknown. His proclamations of innocence are arguably 
expected, but he did oppose the Communist party,176 or at least appeared to. Whether this 
was to gain acceptance as an independent, and to convince the Labour party of his right to 
membership, is uncertain. However, he never had the appearance of a man whose beliefs 
had been bought. 
Old traditions with a new imperative 
Zilliacus' arguments encapsulated the collision of traditions of thought that occurred as 
world war drifted towards Cold War. His analysis of the Soviet Union was a more 
realistic, though not unsympathetic, analysis than that of the Webbs. Clearly he did not 
argue for a Europe dominated by Stalinist politics but claimed that the ideal of Soviet 
Communism, rather than the disfigured reality, was an experiment that needed to develop 
without aggressive intervention. While Platts-Mills and Hutchinson argued that there was 
something inherently superior in the Soviet political model, Zilliacus can be seen to 
hesitate on this point. He could see the potential for a more socialist system within the 
Soviet Union but at no time did he argue that this system had been established. The fact 
that he focused upon Yugoslavia as an alternative indicates he was seeking a model, not 
however to attempt to prove that socialist theory could be transformed into a tenable 
political programme. The ultimate objective for Zilliacus was to prevent war. He and 
Leslie Solley argued that the Soviet Union was not expansionist but that Stalin was only 
pursuing a protectionist policy due to the aggressive stance that had been adopted by the 
non-Communist nations towards the Bolshevik regime since October 1917. In recognising 
that the West's leaders would never trust Stalin, Zilliacus attempted to utilise Tito as a 
Communist leader that did not pose a threat. If Tito could be perceived as a leader with 
whom the West could co-operate then future leaders of the Soviet Union could be 
perceived in a similar way and a policy of co-existence pursued. This ideal was 
fundamental to Zilliacus' arguments and underpinned his attempt to draft an alternative 
foreign policy for the British Labour party. Zilliacus' alternative programme set the agenda 
for the pro-Soviet milieu and featured prominently in the publications of members of the 
pro-Soviet left. Not only those produced by Frank Allaun and Stan Newens, who recalled 
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being influenced by Zilliacus, but also in arguments produced by figures like James 
Lamond and Renee Short who took a more radical and pro-active course of opposition to 
the Cold War ethos. 
The debate on the role of Zilliacus has featured in many studies of left-wing activism 
during the 1945-50 period. Many group the four expellees together under the label of 
crypto-Communist. Others, however, do recognise the importance of Zilliacus in his own 
right. Meehan recognised him as an experienced analyst of foreign policy but concluded 
that he was "very influential and definitely harmful to Labour's interests. l77 An extensive 
study of Zilliacus by Sharon Ferguson argued that he was committed to Britain, and to the 
Labour party especially. Ferguson's analysis appears correct when focussing upon 
Zilliacus' analysis of the Labour party as the agent capable of implementing a policy of co-
existence, however, this conclusion appears precarious when we consider his statements 
that express commitment to the success of the Soviet Union. Evidence for this can be 
particularly found in quotes in the press from his trips to the Soviet Union, or from 
speeches given at Soviet sponsored events, 178 where he wished the Soviet Union success in 
both domestic and foreign policy. There is also Potts' perspective, that Zilliacus was an 
internationalist and so lacked any nationalist tendencies. Evidence to reinforce this claim 
can be found in his advocating world peace through the United Nations. While this 
perspective is equally plausible he did argue that Britain was a key player. This however 
can be understood within the context of the era in which he was a practitioner in 
international affairs. Britain's pre-war role as leader of an Empire and sole superpower 
gave it immense power and influence within international relations. Zilliacus opposed 
Britain allowing itself to be eclipsed by the United States, arguing instead that the Attlee 
government should have pursued a new 'Pax Britannia'. Britain, he argued, should have 
been re-established as the guarantor of stability and peace, the role adopted in the 
Nineteenth Century. This may have been unrealistic, however a trend can be observed 
within left-wing thought that placed Britain as a moral guide within the international 
community. This trend is clearly shown within the arguments for unilateral nuclear 
disarmament. 179 The fact that Labour pursued a policy advocated by Churchill, who 
Zilliacus described as "that senile WaIter Mitty of anti-Communist carnage",180 was to 
enrage many sections of the left of the party. Few were to make as definitive a stand as 
Zilliacus or would develop the prolonged programme of opposition as pursued by Platts-
Mills. Nevertheless Zilliacus defined a tradition for opposition within the Labour party. 
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Dan Watson placed Zilliacus as the precursor of a current that would be popularised within 
the left-wing groups across Europe when he characterised him as a "premature 
Eurocommunist." 181 This is a conclusion that deserves some consideration. 
Eurocommunism was an adaptation of Marxist-Leninism that rejected the revolutionary 
model of societal change because of the conclusion that this would inevitably lead to a 
bureaucratic dictatorship.182 It was recognised that "to achieve socialism in the 
industrialised countries [required] the consensus of a large majority of the population.,,183 
This meant that the only viable route for socialists was the parliamentary route, effecting a 
"democratic transition to socialism engineered through the political institutions of 
advanced capitalism." 184 Boggs argued that this redefinition of the aims of European 
Communists, particularly within the Partito Communista Italiano [PCI], was instrumental 
in gaining popularity for these ideas, a trend that gained impetus when subscribed to by the 
Spanish Communist party after the death of Franco. 18S Togliatti, the leader of the PCI, 
argued that the movement should act while the opportunity presented itself. During the 
period of detente, at a time when the United States was seen as impotent after the defeat in 
Vietnam, he argued that, in the late 1970s: "there [wa]s a chance of escaping an immediate 
military intervention on the part of [Communism's] international enemies.,,186 Carrillo, the 
key theorist of Spanish Eurocommunism, stressed there was an ideological link between 
Eurocommunism and the Soviet model. He argued that, should the movement have 
widespread success, the Soviet Union, finding a more co-operative political system 
emerging in Western Europe, would "make progress in transforming [Soviet society] into 
a real working people's democracy." 187 This supports the claim that there was a link 
between the ideals of Eurocommunism and the thought of Zilliacus. 
Zilliacus did believe in working class unity, and could foresee circumstances under which 
the CPGB would be admitted to the Labour party, though he agreed that this would have 
to be under terms set by the Labour party.188 This gives some credence to Watson's 
hypothesis. The point of contention remains, was he premature in these beliefs or was he 
influenced by a theory that emerged during his lifetime. The roots of Eurocommunism, 
Watson argued, were the late 1960s and 1970s, placing it in the context of the radical 
movements of 1968. However Carrillo argued that his influences were the independent 
socialist regimes of Tito and Dubcek.189 Boggs, on the other hand, agreed that Tito was a 
practical example but cites Pietro Nenni as the first exponent of Eurocommunism as a 
political theory.190 Zilliacus built up a firm friendship with both these figures, sharing 
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several platforms with Nenni while campaigning for the Partisans for Peace'. Thus 
Zilliacus may well have absorbed these influences into his political philosophy. 
Zilliacus' obvious belief in democratic socialism would have meant that there was much to 
attract him to a strategy that, in Togliatti's reworking of Nenni's theory, argued for plotting 
a gradualist route towards a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat. 191 Furthermore the 
agency prescribed as the organisation that must drive forward this programme was one 
built upon working-class unity. Togliatti argued that the only body capable of this were 
the Trade Unions, while Mandel, using vaguer language, discussed a "union of progressive 
forces.,,192 This reinforced the faith Zilliacus placed in the Labour party, the one 
organisation built upon working class unity and the British Trade Union movement, while 
reviving the ideal of the 'people's front'. As friend and fellow Labour MP Mervyn lones 
recalled, Zilliacus believed in the practicability of an "alliance with communists against 
capitalists", lones stated that: "No enemies to the Left was always his watchword.,,193 
Zilliacus' belief in left-wing unity was seldom reciprocated. Communist MP, Willie 
Gallacher described Zilliacus' faith in the Labour party and the democratic route to 
socialism as his 'Achilles heel' . Gallacher argued that, in rejecting revolutionary 
tendencies and accepting the parliamentary route to power, Zilliacus allowed his 
opponents in the Labour party to ignore him as he "constituted no danger to their power 
and privileges.,,194 Despite this critique, this combination of theoretical and practical 
models that collide within the work of Zilliacus places him in a unique position. His 
analysis not only reflected the political culture of Britain and the trends of pre-war 
socialism, but he also embraced radical trends emerging from post-fascist Europe. 
Eurocbmmunist ideas were by no means a central theme of all his analyses and, within 
some publications and speeches, he did appear to be a greater exponent of traditional pro-
Soviet and pro-Communist ideals. However, it is important to note that Eurocommunists 
did not reject the Soviet ideal. Within the Eurocommunist literature runs a debate of 
whether it was, as Zilliacus argued, the hostile capitalist world that had disfigured the 
Marxist-Leninist society, or whether Stalinism had emerged, as Trotsky argued, as an anti-
revolutionary despot. It was in reaction to the histories of Italy, and later Spain, that the 
notion of dictatorship of the proletariat was rejected 19S a shift that allowed 
Eurocommunism to be compatible with the traditions of British labourism. 
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Zilliacus' attachment to the ideas of Tito and Nenni, and thus the analysis which he 
developed, can also be perceived as an aspect of the Anglo-Marxist tradition. 196 The 
parliamentary path was the only route available within the British political system. While 
this frustrated many left-wingers who, like Hutchinson, were keen to alter the societal 
structure, it was also a reality which had to be accepted and accommodated. Zilliacus 
argued that national traditions did matter. He observed that to defend itself the Soviet 
leadership had reverted to the authoritarian traditions of Tsarist rule in order to maintain 
order. This had caused the sharp contrast between authoritarian leadership and a socialist 
economic system. Zilliacus equally maintained that Bolshevism was particular to Tsarist 
Russia and could not be exported. He wrote: "to me the Russian Revolution has always 
seemed too Russian to spread except to countries that missed the French Revolution.',197 
Zilliacus arguably saw the Soviet Union, in the same way as Churchill, "a riddle wrapped 
in a mystery inside an enigma.,,198 It was a vast and barbaric nation, and the Russian 
revolutionary spirit mirrored this. He attempted to encourage the capitalist world to come 
to terms with this new civilisation, put an end to unfounded fears, and establish a peace 
based on co-operation between capitalism and communism. This would, he argued, benefit 
all the peoples of the world. These beliefs are the constant theme of his work. Admittedly 
his work evidences a perception of Britain as a pivotal power, and a belief in the Labour 
party, but his perspective was one of an internationalist. While he is often accused of 
acting as an agent of influence, it appears that this was strictly on his own terms. He 
argued that he had never been a Communist; that would have been "a disgraceful 
thing.,,199 Jan described him as finding the description of him as a fellow traveller of the 
Communist party as humorous. She said he would laugh and shout "Nonsense, they are 
my fellow travellers.,,2oo Zilliacus was a free agent with clear beliefs by which he stood 
despite the consequences. Neither expUlsion from the Labour party or to be branded as a 
fascist by Pravda deterred him: 
If I am a rebel on these matters, I am not the first, and I shall not be the last, to 
stand on his own conscience for what he believes to be right, in spite of what 
everybody has said against him.201 
Zilliacus was the chief exponent of the pro-Soviet alternative during the 1945-50 
government and, to a greater extent than his co-expellees, developed the framework of 
analysis that would be used by those who were to inherit this tradition. Within his 
arguments we tind the traditions of the 1920s and 30s encapsulated within the anti-Cold 
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War framework of analysis. This tradition would become embedded within the arguments 
of left-wing organisations within the party. The first of these was Victory for Soci3Jism 
which would extend the ideas of Zilliacus through to a new generation of left-wingers. 
These individuals would develop new ways, within parliament and at the extra-
parliamentary level, of furthering the campaign designed to change the climate of opinion. 
His ideas would bridge the gulf between parliamentary left-wing traditions and the pro-
Soviet front organisation network co-ordinated by Pritt and Platts-Mills. Therefore within 
this period, which witnessed the drawing of sharp, ideological battle lines, divisions 
between right and left would develop within the Labour party. Though the division can be 
simplistically defined within a spectrum running from the pragmatic realism of the 
leadership to the ideological idealism of those who would constitute the left, there are 
many different perspectives that are apparent on both sides of this dichotomy. Some of 
those who can be placed into the category of 'ideological idealist' would adopt the pro-
Soviet position and attempt to act as change agents in the Zilliacus mould. 
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Chapter Four 
Victory for Socialism: 
Developing a pro-Soviet alternative to the Cold War rationale 
The Attlee government was hailed as "perhaps amongst the most effective of any British 
government"l and whose achievements are almost universally regarded as formidable. 2 
Despite having made Ita significant contribution towards the lives of the people who 
supported it, and indeed of many others,,3 Labour was, in 1951, consigned to thirteen years 
on the opposition benches. The legacy of the 1945-51 government for the party became a 
double-edged sword;4 the welfare state became both an emblem and a millstone for each 
Labour government after 1951.~ Spending plans in the domestic sphere became untenable, 
particularly alongside a high spending defence policy. Equally as the post-war boom 
began to slow, the battle between left-wing idealism and the leaderships' pragmatic 
approach was exacerbated as revisionists reconsidered the objectives of state ownership 
and full employment and abandoned key elements of the Keynesian project. The gulf 
between the left and the leadership, emerging with the Ministerial resignations in 1947 and 
the backbench rebellions over foreign policy, was crystallised in the parliament of 1945-
51. However the battle for control over party policy became increased as the leadership 
pursued an anti-left campaign while the left developed a coherent organisational strategy 
with the reformation, in 1958, of Victory for Socialism. 
The Attlee Cabinet, many of whose members had been anti-MacDonald rebels during the 
1930s, were physically and mentally exhausted by the General Election of 1951. The 
Conservatives inherited the benefits of Labour's domestic reforms and the post-war 
economic boom. It was only an out of touch Conservative Prime Minister, standing 
impotent as the economy drifted toward recession, that allowed Labour, in 1964, to stand 
as the force of modernisation, the party 'in touch' with British society and the changing 
nature of economic imperatives.6 Clear internal battle lines had, by this point, been drawn 
within the party, though the left-wing were more reticent in attacking the Wilson 
government's revisionist socialism than Gaitskell, Wilson's predecessor or Home's 
Conservative government.' However, a minority led a sustained campaign against the 
Labour party's support for the Cold War rationale. The international bipolar dichotomy 
had developed a zero-sum nature, dividing the world into two ideological power blocs that 
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were perceived to be preparing for war. This led to an increasingly organised programme 
of attack to be launched by those who opposed the Cold War rationale. 
The centrist and Atlanticist8 section of the party controlled policy formulation, and until 
the end of the 1960s they enjoyed a clear majority on the National Executive but an 
increasingly narrowing majority within Conference. Control was maintained through 
continued attempts to undermine and suppress the left. Hugh Gaitskell, party leader from 
December 1955 until his death in 1963, became a hate figure for the left9 coming under 
attack at Conference and through the left-wing press. To counter the left's moral stance on 
defence policy and the party's proposed spending plans, Gaitskell, along with George 
Brown, Roy Jenkins and William Rodgers, sponsored the formation of the Campaign for 
Democratic Socialism [CDS]. The rationale of the group was to argue that the left-wing 
agenda was opposed to democracy, supported Stalinism and was the antithesis of the 
ideals and ethos of the Labour party.lO The group's magazine Campaign, edited by 
Rodgers, launched a smear campaign against the left, particularly highlighting weaknesses 
on defence policy, and constantly criticised the left's nominal leader Aneurin Bevan. I I 
Left-wing activists were, however, successful at gaining support within the constituencies, 
dominated the agenda of Tribune and Reynolds News, and used the Morning Star as a 
platform. The period 1957-62 witnessed bitter disputes at Conference, with the leadership 
finding widespread opposition from the party. The fact that opinion within Conference 
had begun to shift leftwards was of greatest concern for Gaitskell. The strength of support 
for unilateral nuclear disarmament was a particular embarrassment to a leader who had 
publicly pledged himself to the nuclear defence policy launched by Bevin.12 Gaitskell's 
left-wing opponents attacked him on the basis that he was anti-Socialist, a campaign some 
argued to be designed to undermine support for him as party leader.13 In reality this was 
nothing more than a reaction to Gaitskell's perceived right-wing stance on foreign and 
security policy. As Keohane argues, Gaitskell, like Attlee previously, held the belief that 
socialist values and principles should be adhered to but "contended that power and force 
were inescapable realities of international politics which could not be wished away by 
fidelity to socialist norms.,,14 It was this pragmatic approach to politics that caused a rift 
between the leadership and the left. Under ideal circumstances Gaitskell and his left 
opponents would arguably have enjoyed significant common ground, however the 
circumstances were not ideal for the development of a socialist foreign policy. Gaitskell 
recognised this while the left refused to do so. The factor that allowed Gaitskell to retain 
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control over policy was the incoherence of the left's campaign. There remained deep 
divisions over policy objectives, the opposition was incoherently stage-managed and, 
because of this, the left was impotent in changing party policy. Indicative of this was 
Bevan's debacle over unilateralism'S ,at the 1957 party conference. Foot argued that 
Bevan's ambitions for office, particularly the position of Foreign Secretary in a Gaitskell-
led government, had led him to support multilateralism. 16 The strongest criticism came 
from Bevan's colleagues at the Tribune newspaper and his rejection of unilateralism led 
the left to seek a new focus. 
The Bevanites, as they later became known, had developed a broad left-wing manifesto 
espoused by Bevan and voiced through the Tribune newspaper. Domestically they 
demanded the completion of the nationalisation programme and espoused the 
establishment of a workers' democracy. In foreign policy they opposed German re-
armament, adopted an anti-Atlanticist stance and opposed the rhetorical anti-Communism 
of the post-war British governments.'7 A degree of cohesion and organisation existed, as 
Peggy Duff has recalled. IS Within the Bevanite movement existed a strategy to increase 
left-wing representation in the house. Duff, Tribune circulation manager, organised a 
group of prospective parliamentary candidates whom she referred to as the 'Second XI'.19 
These included Hugh Jenkins, Stan Newens and Renee Short. Trade Unions were 
encouraged to adopt them and pay election expenses. Equally constituencies were 
encouraged to short list 'Second XI' members in preference to centre-right candidates. This 
was combated by the NEC's candidate approval procedure, which placed approved 
candidates on the 'B list', a procedure which excluded Jo Richardson, secretary of Victory 
for Socialism, from being adopted because she refused to sign an undertaking not to 
criticise Gaitskell.2o The hostilities over prospective candidates are indicative of the battle 
between left and right for control over party policy. There were several attempts by the 
Elections Sub-Committee of the NEC to block the left-wing's choice from being adopted. 
In each case that came under scrutiny a dossier was produced, compiled by the party's 
National Agent Sara Barker, detailing the 'misdeeds' of the left-wingers. Heated 
discussions took place regarding the acceptance of Frank Allaun "as doubt had been 
expressed about his full acceptance of Labour party policy".21 Other cases to attract 
attention were Tom Braddock, Bernard Floud, and Sam Goldberg, all of whom had 
Communist connections and during the late 1950s failed the approval procedure, and Ernie 
Roberts and Zilliacus who would eventually be approved. Left-wingers within the NEC 
constantly opposed this practice; Mikardo, a campaigner for intra-party democracy who 
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accused the party leadership of adopting 'authoritarian' practices, informed CLPs that they 
could not and would not be bound by the selection committee's decisions. The eventual 
success of the left's campaign can be measured by the steady left-wing trajectory 
experienced by the party from the late 1950s which culminated during the 1980s. 
The intense anti-left activity by the party leadership caused the left to become increasingly 
organised. However the collapse of Bevanism, or at least Bevan's move away from the 
Bevanite tradition, meant a new organisation was required to step into the breach. As 
Anne Swingler recalled: "the left followed Bevan, but when he abandoned them they 
needed someone else to get things done. ,,22 Stephen Swingler, using Tribune as a platform 
for his arguments, filled this void and reformed Victory for Socialism. This organisation 
allowed the left to regroup, establish an alternative manifesto and promote left-wing ideas 
through the constituencies. This alternative Labour programme would be spearheaded by 
a group of Labour left-wingers with existent pro-Soviet sympathies. Moreover as the 
international situation worsened defence issues became of paramount significance to the 
left. The fear expressed through the pages of Tribune was that the anti-Soviet foreign 
policy, and reliance on nuclear defence, would result in the mutual annihilation of 
mankind. Victory for Socialism's defence policy formulators attached a pro-Soviet critique 
to their analysis of these international developments. 
The launching of a campaign to alter the governmental world view became a strategic 
imperative as, during the 1950s, the Cold War dynamic adopted a zero-sum character. As 
Scott argued, "the idea that communism was a monolithic political entity controlled from 
Moscow became an enduring American fixation.,,23 The policy of containment developed 
a new impetus, rolIback; promoted as a moral response to Stalinism by US Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles. He described containment as "negative, futile and immoral" 
arguing that the East should not be sacrificed to Communism "to gain time for the 
West.,,24 The adoption of roIlback meant that there would be a determined response to the 
spread of Communism, not only restricting advancement but also taking active measures 
to reverse the tide. In practice this new trajectory led United States forces to face Soviet 
weaponry in Korea, Vietnam and Cambodia. Proxy wars were fought between many Third 
World nations and the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. 
The left united in opposition to the anti-Communist foreign policy and the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Soviet incursion and demanded that negotiations 
replace military aggression. Though not all the proponents of these arguments solely 
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criticised the United States and defended the Soviet Union, Victory for Socialism 
arguments promoted the idea that the United States was the aggressor despite the realities 
of Soviet foreign policy. 
It is clear that the Soviet leadership were not purely pursuing co-existence in the face of 
hostility. Khrushchev pursued a foreign policy of arming the enemies of the United States, 
undermining US hegemony and openly provoking the United States leadership. However 
the fact that Khrushchev backed down when faced with the threat of a nuclear exchange 
allowed him to adopt the image of having saved mankind, so nurturing support among 
left-wing groups. Soviet support for third world nations or rebel movements, during 
conflicts with the United States or United States backed forces, Soviet propaganda argued, 
was offered in order to defend democracy in the struggle against US imperialism. The 
explanation provided by Soviet propaganda filtered into the arguments of the pro-Soviet 
strand within the Labour party. It should not be assumed, however, that purely 
progressive ideals and protectionism underpinned Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev 
clearly recognised the threat which Cuba's proximity posed to the United States mainland 
and saw an opportunity to reduce United States' superiority in the arms race. Soviet 
defence minister Malinovsky argued that Cuba gave the Politburo the opportunity to 
"place one of our hedgehogs down the Americans' trousers.,,2S Presidium minutes 
indicate Cuba was a strategic rather than an ideological ally; used, rather than protected, to 
improve the Soviet bargaining position.26 This was, however, disguised heavily by Soviet 
propaganda. What is indicative is that those who were members of Victory for Socialism 
appear readier to accept the Soviet arguments than those put forward by Britain or the 
United States. 
As the international dichotomy became zero-sum, the left-wing found themselves isolated, 
rudderless and impotent within the Labour party. Equally fresh perspectives had 
developed within the 'New Left' intellectual strand that focused upon Third World 
influences of non-aligned socialism. 27 This revitalised internationalism, the inter-war 
socialist aspirations and the concerns voiced by the anti-nuclear socialist movement all 
filtered into Victory for Socialism's alternative programme. The alternatives put forward 
by Victory for Socialism indicate both a collision of differing left-wing positions and a 
sympathy for the pro-Soviet analysis in opposition to Atlanticism. They were to create a 
self-perpetuating met a-narrative. These Labour MPs had a clear vision of how the nations 
of the world should interact and how the people of the world should live and argued that 
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this could only be achieved under socialism. This became synonymous with the ideal of 
'actually existing socialism', as embodied by the Soviet Union. Thus an argument 
developed in which the Soviet Union was placed upon a pedestal as the model for the 
future. This was not specifically Soviet socialism in the form in which it existed at that 
time. Many, like Frank Allaun, did hope for political democratisation to complement the 
existent socialist economy. However, this could only be achieved within an atmosphere of 
co-operation and co-existence. Thus within the alternative socialist manifesto, which was 
promoted in various forms between 1960 and 1983,28 a pro-Soviet slant to foreign and 
defence policy developed. This was the legacy of the Victory for Socialism tradition. 
Victory for Socialism as a pro-Soviet agent for change 
Victory for Socialism was originally formed in 1951 with Hugh Jenkins29 as the chairman. 
It had little effect on party policy, and was to peter out as other similar groups had before. 
However, in 1958, the name and the idea were to be resurrected by Stephen Swingler and 
other like-minded individuals on the left of the Labour party. The new group was open to 
Labour party members only and would amalgamate the broad left-wing ideals of pacifism 
and humanism, revitalising many of the ideals of the Union for Democratic Control. The 
members were influenced heavily by the Bevanite tradition; they were Third Way-ers, 
internationalists and confirmed socialists. Victory for Socialism did not stand as a pro-
Soviet group, however the group was steered by individuals who expressed their criticism 
of party policy using a pro-Soviet analysis. These individuals argued against the Cold 
War, NATO and nuclear weapons and for rapprochement and co-existence with the 
Communist bloc. The individuals who dominated the policy of the group were the most 
prominent advocates of these arguments. For example Konni Zilliacus, who became 
Victory for Socialism's Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary by unanimous mandate,30 
was to develop the defence policy programme advocated by Victory for Socialism.31 His 
appointment ensured that Victory for Socialism'S alternative defence strategy was broadly 
sympathetic to the Soviet Union, describing the Soviet nuclear arsenal as necessary on 
protectionist grounds due to the aggressively anti-Soviet stance maintained by the NATO 
alliance. 
Zilliacus' biographer Archie Potts argued that following his expUlsion Zilliacus was a 
spent force. However, Jan Zilliacus recalled that when he returned to the party he did have 
supporters, a group she referred to as the 'Zill boys,.32 This consisted of the Foreign and 
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Commonwealth Group within Victory for Socialism which included Frank Allaun and 
Stan Newens. Frank Allaun, fellow entrant into parliament in 1955 in the neighbouring 
seat of Salford East, had been integral to the campaign to reinstall Zilliacus as an MP. 
Through Victory for Socialism, and later through Labour Action for Peace, the analysis of 
Zilliacus was to live on. 
The rejuvenated Victory for Socialism group was formally established in February 1958. 
Stephen Swingler, Chairman of the group set out the agenda in an article in Tribune stating 
that members should encourage "fresh discussion about the application of Socialist 
principles, and above all, inspire 'renewed faith in the power of democratic action.,,33 As 
with those accused of being fellow travellers in the 1945-50 government, this organisation 
was received with a similar mixture of fear and distaste. It included many of those MPs 
who had orbited the Zilliacus group of the earlier period, including Swingler himself, 
Geoffrey Bing, Tom Braddock,34 Emrys Hughes, Ian Mikardo, Julius Silverman, Sidney 
Silverman and William Warbey. Bing himself was a self-confessed "fellow traveller of 
Zilliacus.,,35 However, younger, soon to be highly prominent, faces were recruited also. 
They included Frank Allaun, Judith Hart,36 Stan Newens and Renee Short: some of whom 
would be prominent advocates of the pro-Soviet perspective. 
Victory for Socialism promoted a pro-Soviet perspective of the Cold War among the 
Trade Unions, constituency Labour parties [CLPs] and the ordinary membership. It is 
impossible to calculate the effect of this, however, given that certain key left-wing ideals, 
particularly unilateralism, were to gain prominence during the 1970s and 80s, it can be 
argued that this was, in no small part, a result of the activity of Victory for Socialism. 
Furthermore Victory for Socialism also provided the left with a network of supporters on 
which activists could call. Stan Newens recalled that through Victory for Socialism and 
Tribune, MPs knew who they could rely upon to support them over certain issues.37 Thus 
when statements were made to the press, questions submitted to Ministers or meetings 
arranged to debate policy issues, invitations were made to like-minded MPs to join the 
campaign. Examples of this can be seen on the letters pages of The Times. One example 
was a letter, written by William Wilson calling for full relations to be established with 
Communist Albania?8 The signatories included Wilson, James Lamond, Ernie Roberts, 
and Stan Newens. Thus from connections made through left-wing groupings Wilson was 
able to add weight to his argument by inviting like-minded MPs to sign the letter. 
----------~-~~----~-
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Therefore we can assume that, as a result of Victory for Socialism, after the 1960s the ,pro-
Soviet left-wingers were acting as a much more cohesive unit. 
This chapter focuses on two individuals; the man who resurrected Victory for Socialism, 
Stephen Swingler, and the key activist within the anti-nuclear and pacifist element within 
the Labour party, Frank Allaun. These two politicians represent the strands that converged 
into the alternative manifesto put forward by Victory for Socialism. Swingler's 
perspective was rooted within the Communist traditions of the 1930s. His analysis of the 
Cold War was largely drawn from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. Allaun, despite gaining 
a political education during the 1930s, and having campaigned alongside Communists, 
brought the UDC tradition of pacifist socialism to Victory for Socialism. His arguments 
achieved greater longevity despite being built upon the Zilliacus perspective of 
international relations. Prior to analysing the roles and ideals of these two individuals it is 
useful to outline the Victory for Socialism position on defence policy and provide some 
detail of its origins. 
The socialist defence policy: designed by Moscow? 
For the broad Labour left the greatest anathema was the initiative to develop an 
'independent British nuclear deterrent'. Their opposition was based upon two premises. 
Firstly failures on the part of the British nuclear weapons programme had forced Britain to 
purchase a defence system from the United States, the left argued that this would mean 
that British defence would be ultimately under United States control. This countered 
Gaitskell's position that Britain's nuclear capability would secure "influence and prestige 
and a measure of independence vis-a.-vis the United States.,,39 Figures including Harold 
Davies argued that the existence of nuclear weapons in Britain would make the nation a 
target that lacked independent means for activating its' defences, thus it was argued that 
the weaponry was a pointless acquisition. The second premise, put forward by the pacifist 
left who dominated Victory for Socialism, rejected the nuclear deterrent completely. The 
nuclear deterrent was described as anti-socialist. Allaun argued that no socialist could 
envisage using weapons of mass destruction. There were equally arguments that described 
nuclear weapons as too expensive, thus detrimental to domestic socialist policies. 40 
These debates had been a feature within the Labour party since 1945. Ernest Bevin had 
argued that nuclear weapon were highly desirable on nationalist grounds. Bevin stated 
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"We have got to have this thing whatever it costs. We've got to have the bloody Union 
jack on top of it.,,41 Due to the divisive nature of the nuclear deterrent initial plans were 
made in secret and without recourse to any level of the party. When the plans were made 
public they did appeal to the 'little Englander' section of parliament and country, but not 
to the internationalist element of Labour. The left argued that nuclear weapons were 
undesirable and the antithesis of the ideals of socialism. After the failure of the Blue 
Streak project42 the plan to develop a independent deterrent were shelved. This allowed the 
left to argue that Britain, as a non-nuclear power, should act as a model for European 
nations. However plans by the Conservatives, firstly under Macmillan then Home, to buy 
Skybolt from the United States brought the issue of Britain as a nuclear power back into 
the limelight. The left feared that, should this transaction be ratified, Britain would become 
a dependent satellite of the United States, therefore backbench activism increased. 
The proposal for a British nuclear deterrent was put forward in Defence White Papers 
firstly in 1957, and then in 1964. These argued that the keystone of British defence was 
the prevention of war. The Conservatives expressed the fear that "there is at present no 
means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the 
consequences of nuclear attack.,,43 The solution offered by the then Foreign Secretary, 
Alee Douglas-Home, was to develop, or buy, a nuclear weapons system. Allaun, when 
criticising the appointment of Home, described him as "so anti-Soviet as to be unsuitable 
for the pOSt.,,44 Zilliacus ridiculed the logic of Home's argument: 
The Americans and Russians may be deterred by the deterrent, ... but not John 
Bull, we may have only a tiny nuclear force, no modem means of delivery, and an 
impossibly vulnerable territory compared to the giant [Soviet Union], but we shan't 
yield to Soviet nuclear blackmail. It is for them to yield to ours.45 
Zilliacus was not alone in raising his voice in opposition. 
Benn Levy and Harold Davies, both left-wing Labour MPs, though by no means pro-
Soviet, were equally vocal in their opposition. In his undated pamphlet, Bull's Eye Island, 
Davies argued that one or two strikes would be enough to devastate Britain. The resulting 
nuclear fall-out would be sufficient to wipe out the entire population. Davies called the 
Conservative defence policy "spineless [and] servile [to] American brinkmanship.,,46 Levy 
reiterated much of Davies' and Zilliacus' arguments, as did many on the left. Harry 
Pollitt, General Secretary of the CPGB, wrote extensively on the subject, Tribune 
brimmed with anti-nuclear articles, and the Independent Labour party joined in the 
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castigation of the policy. Still it went ahead. The socialist movement found this one issue, 
opposition to the presence of nuclear weapons on British soil, became a policy around 
which it could unite47• The main argument was based on a combination of socialist ideals, 
pacifism and fear of war. Foot put it most succinctly in Tribune, writing in criticism of 
Aneurin Bevan proselytising his position to supporting the H-bomb: 
I remain unconvinced that the possession of a few bombs which can never be used 
except as an act of national suicide and which as long as we produce them will 
impose enormous burdens on our economy, will assist in making Britain's voice 
more powerful in the world ... [On the other hand] Britain's readiness to renounce 
the weapon ... could capture the imagination of millions of people in many lands.48 
This was a core belief among many left-wing socialists. The advocates of this position 
would continually make their voice heard and eventually stamp their mark on official 
party policy. 
The conflict between right and left in the party was deepened by the issue of nuclear 
weapons. Hugh Gaitskell supported the nuclear deterrent and was largely Bevinite in his 
approach to foreign and defence policy. Until 1957 Nye Bevan was seen as the champion 
of the left-wing cause, but, at the Brighton Conference Bevan recanted his erstwhile 
beliefs in favour of nuclear weapons. Bevan motives are the subject of much debate. Foot 
argued that he had been persuaded during discussions with Gaitskell and Sam Watson.49 
Bevan, Foot assumed, was led to recognise that the issue was not a vote winner, and to 
gain election the party leadership had to be seen to be united and responsible.so With 
hindsight it appears unrealistic to believe that the party would alter its policy once in 
power, Bevan may have believed that this could happen. It does appear that his opposition 
to unilateralism was a sharp U-turn in his thinking. Indicatively, none of his colleagues 
believed he was sincere. They argued that he had been influenced either by the party 
hierarchy, his recent visit to the Soviet Union and meeting with Khrushchev or, as the 
New Statesman wrote, that he was simply hungry for power in a forthcoming Labour 
government.SI For Bevan the act was a sad epitaph; he was to die prior to the next General 
Election. David Coates writes of this genuflection: "the perennial dilemma of the Labour 
Left MP. of needing a Labour government and a position within it if he was not to be 
totally impotent, but having to pay a high price."sz This was not a dilemma for individuals 
like Zilliacus, Mikardo or AlIaun. These radical MPs maintained their resolve in remaining 
independent voices of opposition to the party line. 
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Despite Bevan's change of heart, the 1960 Conference accepted unilateralism as the policy 
of the Labour party. The factor that changed party policy was the Union vote. Frank 
Cousins, speaking for the Transport and General Workers [TGWU], put forward the 
common sense argument against non-proliferation: 
If we have the right to possess the nuclear weapons, then every other country in the 
world has that same right. And if they have the right, how do we ever get into that 
atmosphere of avoiding the accidental drift into war?S3 
This was also the position of the Communist party and it was argued that the emergence of 
unilateralism was due to Communist party influence within the Unions. CND and the 
broader peace and unilateralist movement. The Soviet Union did not want every nation 
who supported the United States to have missiles directed at the Communist bloc. and 
encouraged its supporters abroad to support the anti-nuclear campaign. a line which the 
CPGB followed loyally. The Communist's support for unilateralism led many on the left. 
including Frank Cousins. to be accused of being a member of the CPGB. In Cousin's case. 
as with the case of many of the leadership's opponents. these allegations were usually 
pursued by those he opposed the most vituperatively, Arthur Deakin, his predecessor at the 
TGWU, and Gaitskell himself. Dorril and Ramsay claim that these allegations were 
unfounded. S4 Determining the origins of the unilateralist position are problematic. the 
policy was promoted and supported by a broad section of the British left. Arguing that 
unilateralism benefited the Soviet Union was a convenient method for undermining the 
chief proponents. as was linking together "pacifists, unilateralists and fellow travellers."ss 
However. it is difficult to sustain the argument that unilateralism was a position developed 
by individuals with pro-Soviet sympathies. The arguments presented by the left were 
logical and in keeping with the traditions of the peace movement that emerged during the 
First World War, there is scant evidence to suggest that these MPs were loyally 
reproducing arguments originating in Moscow. However, it suited Gaitskell to label the 
unilateralist defence policy as inspired by Soviet propaganda. 
The proximity of the left's position and the official line of the CPGB adds weight to the 
view that the unilateralist position, adopted in 1980. was 'tailor made for Moscow'. 56 A 
critique of the party that gained prominence within the popular press. In reality however it 
was a policy that had the support of a broad range of individuals emerging from disparate 
socialist traditions. The supporters of the 'socialist foreign policy' included Marxists. 
Trotskyists and the pro-Soviet left, many of whom became prominent members of the 
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NEC as the party was drawn to a more left-wing political stance. However, their influence 
was negligible when the party was in power. As Taylor observed, "CND and the Labour 
left failed to hold the Labour party to the unilateralist policy of the 1960 Conference."s7 
This failure led many to adopt extra-parliamentary methods to attempt to achieve their 
goals. Victory for Socialism members carried out a dual role that would survive into the 
1970s during the period of detente. While pursuing extra-parliamentary activity they 
campaigned for a change to Labour's foreign and defence policy. They offered an 
alternative view of East-West relations and promoted the ideas emanating from Moscow. 
This group represented the only true organisation that espoused the pro-Soviet perspective. 
This was due, in no small part, to the individuals who drafted the policies that the group 
advocated. 
The Last Lost Sheep 
Stephen Swingler was lucky, it appears, not to have been expelled with Zilliacus and 
Solley in 1948. On Morgan Phillips' list of possible expellees there are five ticks,s8 one by 
the name of each of those expelled plus two others Herschel Austins9 and Swingler. Next 
to the latter is a question mark. Why was it that he had been earmarked for expulsion? 
Phillips selected MPs who were prominent dissidents, but who did not have any significant 
popularity within the party. Not all on this list could be expelled; the most vocal were 
chosen because of the attention they generated for their arguments. Swingler was not one 
of the most high profile advocates of the pro-Soviet position during the 1945-50 period, 
though he was suspected of being a Communist party member. In many ways the high 
point of his leftist activity was from 1958 to 1964. However, the radical socialist 
perspective he brought to parliament originated in the traditions of the Communism of the 
1930s. 
Within the pages of his 1939 publication, Political Thought since the French Revolution, 
Swingler's support for Soviet ideology was made transparent. Swingler argued that the 
Communist State was the ultimate form of emancipation of political thought and practice. 
Covertly referring to the British Labour government of 1929-31 he discussed the failure to 
"translate real political desires into social activity and to achieve success.,,60 He argued 
that democratic politicians sublimate themselves and their country to dogmatic 
controversies, which are used as a shield for their inability, or indeed lack of enthusiasm, 
to implement revolutionary change. This, he argued, was not the case in the Soviet Union. 
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The achievements of the Russian revolution, Swingler argued, were real, emancipatory, 
and had to be safeguarded, firstly from outside, but importantly also from dissent within. 
The Stalin-Trotsky dichotomy over the creation of socialism in one country he saw as 
being thoroughly debated and resolved. Thus he excused the treason trials as necessary to 
combat attempts to subvert the principles of the revolution: 
[T]o demand freedom for Trotskyism in the [Soviet Union] or further discussion of 
the issue is merely stupid... The controversy over theory has been settled in 
practice and further discussion can in no way aid action; therefore to demand the 
right to free discussion of the issues, as people have done over the Moscow trials, 
is to demand the right to obstruct and constrain, the right to negate freedom.61 
He explained the lack of understanding of the purges and trials in Britain as being the 
result of the political commentators and analysts: "find[ing] it difficult to understand that 
political discussion should be directed towards practical change, having made in 
parliament a positive virtue of obstruction62. This shows that his sympathies, at this time, 
lay entirely with revolutionary socialism and the Marxist theory of the inevitable collapse 
and supercession of capitalism. It is unclear what he envisaged for Britain as this work is 
historical not prescriptive. However, in his work we see the tradition of the Leeds 
Convention of June 1917. A belief in the concept of change as emanating from the Soviet 
Union: this belief was translated, to an extent, into the arguments Swingler put forward 
during his parliamentary career. 
Swingler, while at New College, Oxford, had joined the Young Communist League, and 
later the CPGB itself. Oxford was a significant breeding ground for Communist 
sympathies. However, by no means should this be seen as a life-long association. Many 
young politicised people joined the radical left, only to 'grow out of it', or more equally 
grow disillusioned with the slavish support for Soviet policy and the prescribed role of the 
Communist International.63 The Swingler family were all left-wingers, his father was a 
friend of the 'Red Dean' Hewlett Johnson,64 who would attend dinner parties and deliver a 
pro-Soviet sermon to the avid audience. Stephen's brother, Randall, was a lifelong 
Communist party member and celebrated poet. Therefore, that influence constantly 
surrounded him.6s However in 1938 Swingler and his wife Anne decided to join the 
Labour party. Anne recalled that: 
we went to live in North Staffordshire. There, I joined the Labour party and he 
joined the Labour party. The reason was that it was just so obvious, in that area 
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there was a very small, tiny Communist party but we wanted to be effective, we 
wanted to make change and so we joined the Labour party.66 
Anne Swingler had also been politically educated within Communist circles. During the 
1930s she worked for the Labour Research Department [LRD], which was dominated by 
members of the CPGB like Noreen Branson and was proscribed by the PLP. Therefore, 
Anne's political education was imbibed with a clear pro-Soviet slant. Anne admitted that 
she did not realise the implications of this until much later. Anne recalled that Stephen 
was initially reluctant to stand as an MP. He already had a career as a teacher. It was only 
when he realised that no one else would stand for Labour in the constituency of Stafford in 
1938, and that it was unlikely the Labour party could unseat the Conservatives, that he 
allowed his name to be put forward as the prospective candidate. War intervened, public 
opinion changed and Swingler was to come to office in 1945 with a massive majority, all 
of which was lost by 1950. It is possible that he retained his Communist party 
membership during this period: Anne Swingler hinted that this was the case.67 
It is significant that he returned to Oxford in 1939 to lecture, rather than being drafted. In 
1939 the Communist party analysis, as propagated by Stalin, was that the war was a 
further imperialist excursion by Great Britain and Germany and therefore Swingler chose 
not to join the army. More significantly, and consistent with the Communist line, he 
enlisted into the army in 1941, being posted to the Royal Armoured Corps in 1942. Bill 
Alexander,68 International Brigade stalwart and CPGB member was at Sandhurst with 
Swingler. Alexander recalled that Swingler indeed saw the British motives for declaring 
war as protectionist and imperialist. However, he did not recall if Swingler's attitude 
changed, Swingler was posted to Europe while Alexander went to North Africa.69 
It is unknown when Stephen Swingler's membership of the CPGB expired. It is possible 
that due to the disorganisation of the CPGB membership files in the immediate post-war 
period, his membership was never formally cancelled. This was certainly the case in some 
areas.70 Whether Swingler was, or was not, a Communist member while a Labour 
politician is immaterial. What is important is that in his younger days he forged 
associations with Communists, and was therefore influenced by them. These associations 
were retained. Anne still dines with the former leadership of the London Communist party, 
friends she has retained since her time at the Labour Research Department. Stephen 
Swingler's private life was spent within the far-left milieu and this influence arguably 
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spilled over into his political arguments. Once in parliament he followed the anti-
Atlanticist line, though, to a much lesser extent than many of his left-wing coUeagues. At 
this time Swingler's pro-Soviet activism was strictly extra-parliamentary. 
Stephen Swingler bore no hostility towards the Soviet Union. Like Platts-Mills he enjoyed 
friendly and informal visits to the Eastern bloc in the early post-war period.71 However, it 
is not unusual for a Member of Parliament to be the guest of a foreign country. What is 
important is the mindset of individuals such as Swingler; they did not, and in many ways 
could not, accept the Russian, Czech or any of the peoples of Eastern Europe, as their 
enemy. 
Vladimir Shaposhnikov,. a one-time official in the Ukraine region of the Soviet Union, 
recalled that this was common among socialist politicians. As a Soviet official he found it 
easier to deal with 'right-wing' governmental representatives, as with them the agenda was 
strictly business. Socialists would want to discuss political theory and offered their own 
opinions on the Soviet system. They treated their Russian counterparts as slightly 
disenfranchised siblings;72 people recognised as having similar beliefs, but ones that had 
been led astray.73 Conversely, Stan Newens found that such discussions were almost 
impossible to enter.74 
However, this attitude towards the Soviet socialist model goes some way to explain the 
great hope that existed within the work of individuals such as Swingler and many within 
the vanguard of Victory for Socialism. Their objective was the establishment of socialism 
and success relied heavily upon the Soviet Union. The basic premise of the Swinglers' 
beliefs was firstly, that the Soviet Union had a socialist economic framework and secondly 
that the Soviet Union would be able to evolve and become democratic, allowing political 
freedom to complement public ownership. This belief was central to the pro-Soviet 
mindset. It led many individuals within the pro-Soviet milieu to ignore the flaws in the 
Soviet socialist model, this would cause them to question their faith. Anne's faith was, by 
1968, eroded completely. She recalled that "I and millions like me, were led astray into 
believing Russian Communism could change itself into a reasonable democracy.,,7s 
Alongside their beliefs in the Soviet Union there was also one tie to the Communist world 
that the Swinglers were unable to break. This was the link with Czechoslovakia. The 
Swinglers and Bamett Stross,76 who was condemned posthumously as a spy by Josef 
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FroIik, took in Czech refugees from the Nazi invasion in 1937. This led the Swinglers and 
Stross to have a lifelong association with the mining town of Lidice. Stephen Swingler 
and Stross jointly formed the Anglo-Czech Parliamentary Committee, sat on the Executive 
of the Anglo-Czech Friendship Society and raised money for the rebuilding of Lidice 
under the auspices of the Lidice Shall Live Campaign. Barnett Stross was the prime 
organiser of both the societies and of the handing over of money collected. This left him 
open to suspicion and accusation. It was only when Swingler was made Minister of 
Transport by Harold Wilson that he was forced to break his most obvious links. At the 
time he was investigated, and felt compelled to deny his membership of the CPGB. His 
cabinet position meant that Swingler was unable to attend the celebrations marking the 
anniversary of the freeing of Czechoslovakia held in 1968. Anne was the sole 
representative due to the death of Stross in 1966. She cut the ribbon to the garden of 
remembrance flanked by sombre, austere Communists who, she recalled, were aware that 
they had become very unpopUlar. It is unknown what Swingler's reaction was to the 
Czechoslovakian invasion by the Soviet Union in 1968. He died months later. Anne 
recalled that this was the point of no return for her. Following that incident she rejected the 
ideals of the Soviet Union completely.77 
The heritage of Swingler was that he and his left-wing comrades of the immediate post-
war period created a movement that would maintain opposition to the Cold War. Though 
Stephen died due to a combination of overwork and heavy drinking in 1969, Zilliacus's 
beliefs, matched with Swingler's less narrow-minded style, were adopted as the way 
forward. Victory for Socialism was the first vehicle to be used to establish a cohesive left-
wing programme. The Tribune Group would supercede this though it became fraught with 
divisions over perceptions of the Soviet Union, policy towards the European Community 
and the position on Palestine.78 The individuals who pursued the pro-Soviet perspective on 
international relations found that they were constantly the subjects of accusations and 
investigations. The suspicion surrounding them, as with Swingler and Zilliacus, was that 
they were really Moscow's agents attempting to influence and indoctrinate the party and 
the public. It is a fact that this was their role, but it is doubtful that it was at Moscow's 
behest. Their desire to act as agents for change appears to have developed out of their 
personal beliefs rather than under the influence of persuasive envoys for the Communist 
powers. 
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Nuclear weapons became the first issue around which Swingler, Victory for Socialism and 
the pro-Soviet strand became united. The notion of mutually assured destruction, or MAD, 
which constituted the assurance that neither side of the bi-polar stand off would attack the 
other, was in direct opposition to the beliefs of certain sections of British Socialism. Their 
intention, as put forward in the party's 1983 Election Manifesto, nineteen years after the 
dissolution of Victory for Socialism, was to "draw back from the nuclear abyss. ,,79 The 
left, which would dominate the party by 1983, opposed the Cold War rationale on the 
grounds that it offered no prospect for co-operation. The left argued that efforts should be 
made to accommodate the Soviet Union's needs; the Cold War rationale, which relied 
upon a military stand-off, they argued, was a dangerous policy. The occurrence of crises, 
such as the Berlin blockade in 1948 and Cuba in 1962, only exacerbated the fears of the 
pacifist wing of the party. This led the left to develop a coherent oppositional strategy. 
Equally they were encouraged to believe that the greater threat came from the West not the 
East. Khrushchev spoke of weapons control, co-operation and disarmament. The United 
States offered no sign of supporting any form of rapprochement. Eisenhower's 1955 
Christmas message to the peoples of Eastern Europe was clearly provocative, stating that 
he recognised the trials suffered under Soviet rule and offered hope that right would win in 
the end.8o Though these sentiments were probably sincerely appreciated by those under 
Soviet military rule, it made any form of co-operation seem very distant. 
This led many to view the Soviet Union as the only potential peacemaker; the Soviet 
leadership wrote of peaceful co-existence, while the NATO leaders spoke of containment 
and rollback. This perspective was constantly promoted by Victory for Socialism and 
many pacifists were then drawn into supporting the Soviet Union in opposition to the 
United States and to opposing the British government's support for the Cold War. Those 
who adopted this strand of thought believed that the Soviet Union was pro-peace but was 
hindered by the antagonistic capitalist world. The pro-Soviet MPs steadfastly promoted 
this position in parliament and within the Labour party. The common language shared by 
peace movement literature and pro-Soviet propaganda led many who supported the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, opposed US foreign policy and defended the Soviet 
Union to be accused of spying, particularly between 1950 and 197081 when Britain was 
suffering a mild form of McCarthyism. This, however, did not dampen the activists' 
spirits. The chief points of contention between the left and the party were the support for 
the United States, acceptance of the nuclear deterrent and subscription to the anti-
Communist rationale. The alternative programme and independent foreign policy, 
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established by Victory for Socialism, was based upon the principles of co-operation, co-
existence and unilateral nuclear disarmament. This would become official party policy, 
facilitated by a leftwards shift by the leadership of the National Executive, as the young 
left-wingers prominent in Victory for Socialism during the 1950s found themselves 
promoted to areas of greater influence. One of the major forces behind establishing this 
programme as party policy was Frank Allaun, whose single dedication made him the 
leader, by default, of a movement. That movement, Labour Action for Peace,82 
incorporated the ideals of pacifism with the pro-Soviet perspective. It was Allaun's 
adherence to this perspective that led him to be considered an asset by the Soviet Union.83 
ZilIiacus'Successor 
Frank Allaun, Labour MP for Salford East 1955-83, appears to have been greatly 
influenced by Konni Zilliacus. Allaun recalled that he "knew and liked him well.,,84 
Equally he had the highest respect for Zilliacus' ability and knowledge. He stated that 
Zilliacus "knew more about foreign policy than any other MP in Parliament.,,8S This belief 
must have added a great deal of weight to the arguments of Zilliacus. Allaun fought to get 
Zilliacus nominated as Labour candidate for the Manchester Gorton constituency86 where 
Allaun was active within the local Labour party and where he worked as a journalist. They 
worked alongside one another to develop Victory for Socialism's alternative foreign policy 
and Allaun was to inherit the tradition of seeking peace and co-operation in the 
international political arena. A deep fear of nuclear war was integral to Allaun's analysis, 
as war was, he argued, the logical outcome of the Cold War bipolar stand-off. 
Allaun's perspective on Soviet foreign policy led him to stand on the far left-wing of the 
Labour party, leading some to describe him as a fellow traveller. and for The Sun 
newspaper to denounce him, on one occasion, as a traitor.87 It is extremely questionable as 
to how far such accusations were deserved. In his writings he was not slavish to the Soviet 
leadership and he followed a broadly independent course, remaining critical of the 
oppressive nature of the Soviet regime. However, Allaun showed that he retained a belief 
that there was an inherently socialist element to the Soviet Union, and this belief led him 
to argue that the Soviet Union posed little threat to the world. According to Allaun's 
analysis, the Soviet Union emerged as the best and only hope for a peaceful conclusion to 
the Cold War,88 an argument founded on the premise: "I was convinced - as I am today-
that the [Soviet] people and their government did not want war. ,,89 
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Allaun argued that this perception was proven conclusively: "First and most important of 
[Gorbachev's] achievements, in my view, is his unilateral action in ending the Cold War, 
which nearly became the nuclear and final battle.9o He described Gorbachev as leading 
"the struggle for peace,,91 a description he attached to no other Soviet leader, despite the 
propaganda they produced to prove their worth92. He stated that Gorbachev: 
has given me hope in a cruel age ... It was he who ended the East-West Cold War, 
fought with weapons of mass destruction on both sides, when he announced ... that 
he would withdraw 800 planes, 8,000 tanks and 500,000 troops from the Russian 
frontier ... Gorbachev forced the other nations to follow suit.93 
In an article for the Morning Star, reviewing Gorbachev's Memoirs, Allaun recognised the 
need in the Soviet Union for free elections and the formation of a parliamentary 
democracy. However, he criticised Gorbachev's economic reforms because they were 
founded on the premise that the Bolsheviks' model of planning was a failure.94 Allaun 
argued that the 'new,9S market economy established in Russia created greater economic 
hardship for the people. He maintained that Gorbachev should have introduced a system 
that retained a command economy combined with the reformist programme of glasnost96 
of the political system. He remained highly critical of the system put in place to supplant 
Communism: 
I accept that glasnost, or freedom of speech, media and political parties, is 
welcomed by the Russian people. But it has been perestroika, or reconstruction, 
which has ruined the country ... the truth is that the Russian people were far, far 
better off then than they are today.97 
Allaun, therefore, welcomed the democratisation of Russian politics and the opportunity 
this presented for rapprochement between East and West, but he unequivocally opposed 
the policy of economic privatisation pursued by Gorbachev. Allaun's fight for peace was 
ultimately successful but at the expense of socialism. Peace was achieved between East 
and West, but the price for this was that the Soviet Union, and all it had stood for, had 
collapsed. The contradictions within the Soviet experiment were laid bare. Gorbachev 
exposed the faults in a manner that Khrushchev could not have envisaged when 
denouncing Stalin. Socialists like Allaun attached their hopes of a global socialist 
revolution to the success of the Soviet Union, in some democratised form, therefore he and 
his allies had to face a very difficult conclusion in the light of the events of 1989. As he 
stated ""I do believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union has set back hopes of a socialist 
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world, at least for a time ... 98 This shows that Allaun saw an ideological link between 
democratic socialism and the Soviet model and that he believed that they shared a 
common destiny. It is necessary, therefore to investigate fully the intellectual development 
Frank Allaun underwent in pursuit of a socialist future based on peaceful co-existence, and 
how his pro-Soviet sympathies shaped his perceptions of the world. 
Allaun had visited the Soviet Union during the 1930s.99 This was obviously the fulfilment 
of a burning desire. He saved for some years, from the age of 22, so he could see 
"socialism in practice". His visit was sufficient to convince him that there was a great deal 
of potential for socialism in Stalinism, though his desire to visit indicates that he was 
already sympathetic to the ideals of the Soviet Union. This belief was based upon a 
conviction that it stood as a viable socialist alternative to capitalism. Allaun accepted the 
faults with the Soviet system but saw that the underlying ideology was worthy of 
protection and emulation. However, he did not argue that Communism should be 
transplanted into British political society. Allaun argued that a socialist system must be 
established by "a democratically elected government."IOO Like many commentators he 
accepted that the political circumstances in Russia in 1917 and those that existed 
concurrently and subsequently across Europe were significantly different. Britain could, 
and indeed should, become socialist through the democratic process without resorting to 
violent means. 
The second belief he held is that both the people, and more importantly the government, of 
the Soviet Union did not want war. Moreover, Allaun argued. the Soviet leadership were 
prepared to act to prevent a war. He believed that in the Russian psyche was a deep fear of 
war and, had it not been for Hitler's invasion, the Soviet Union would have remained 
neutral during the Second World War. Allaun employed this argument to explain the Nazi-
Soviet Pact and Soviet actions during the post-war settlement. In all references to the 
Soviet Union he omits to mention the coercive actions of the Soviet leadership to their 
own people and the nations annexed after 1945. As with many of the pro-Soviet left-wing 
he is able to ignore these inconsistencies on the grounds that there was, within in the 
Communist system, a socialist ideal which would emerge given the correct circumstances. 
Therefore, Frank Allaun appears to have subscribed to the same world view as his 
erstwhile friend and colleague Konni Zilliacus. These views are apparent from Allaun's 
early published writings and are consistent with the principles of the groups Allaun was 
active in. 
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Aside from the peace movement Allaun's other concern was to improve the housing of the 
poorest in Britain, a mission on which he was joined periodically by the CPGB. The 
'bathrooms not bombs' campaign became a key policy to gain membership for the CPGB 
amongst the disaffected and disadvantaged and was to be utilised as a focus for anti-Cold 
War activity particularly in the Greater Manchester area. Allaun saw that public service 
issues and arms reduction were policies that could be promoted simultaneously: "for the 
less spent on the military the more money there would be for housing."lol He argued that a 
socialist government should allocate a greater proportion of the budget to domestic 
spending and stated that defence was "the only sphere in which the government can cut 
[spending] without hurting ordinary working people"lo2. He argued, as a constituency MP, 
for raising the standards of housing in Salford, calling for the provision of baths, hot water 
and inside toilets, all of which were considered luxuries to many Mancunians in the 1960s. 
To AlIaun these policies seem to be argued from the heart, not for cynical reasons. This 
focus also made him a more rounded constituency representative than Zilliacus could ever 
be. Allaun, however, was also a member of the party at the right time, a time when he 
could progress into the Labour hierarchy gaining some, albeit limited, influence. 
As with many of his left-wing colleagues on the NEC, he was seen as too out of step with 
the leadership to be given a Cabinet post, particularly as a spokesperson on foreign affairs. 
However his popularity, and the support for his ideas, within the party is evidenced by the 
fact that he was elected to the NEC annually from 1967-1983, and became Deputy 
Chairman and Chairman of the party 1977-9. His highest Cabinet position, however, was 
as Parliamentary Private Secretary to Anthony Greenwood, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies for six months from October 1964; a position from which he resigned as a protest 
against Wilson's support of the US bombing campaign in Vietnam. This was the end of 
any ambitions he may have had for greater influence. Like radicals before him he was to 
be a voice from the sidelines, marginalised but never silenced. This did not bother Allaun, 
who stated in his memoirs that he "prefer[ed] the freedom of the Back Benches.,,)03 
The main vehicle for his criticism, apart from parliamentary speeches, was the press, 
particularly the organ of the Communist party, The Morning Star. Though he had other 
links to Communist inspired organisations, this was his strongest association with the 
revolutionary left during his parliamentary career. Within his formative years, however, 
he was educated into radical socialism. He frequented the Left Book Club Library in 
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Manchester which was run during the 1930s by Marjorie Pollitt, the mother of CPGB 
General Secretary Harry Pollitt. He recalled the "enjoyable political debates" when he 
joined Communists and Socialists alike in sending condolences to Pollitt on his mother's 
death. 104 Allaun appears to have shared many ideals with Harry Pollitt. Both saw 
themselves as fighters for the working class and, during the 1930s, put forward very 
similar arguments. Allaun had little sympathy for the CPGB organisation, but he did not 
see Communists as enemies. Allaun also worked closely with Eva Reckitt, who formed 
the radical socialist book chain Collets, organising an exhibition in Manchester which 
Reckitt was to move to London under the title 'An Exhibition of Books, Posters and 
Cartoons showing the Struggle of Six Generations of Workers for Peace, Freedom and 
Democracy'. This advertised the role of the Soviet Union in the international workers' 
struggle, promoting aspects of Soviet society and policy that Soviet propaganda 
highlighted to gain the support of individuals like Allaun; those with a keen socialist 
perspective who were dissatisfied with Western policy. 
It was the peace movement that became Allaun's raison d'etre. He was made honorary 
secretary of the Manchester Anti-War Council at the age of nineteen, an organisation he 
described as tiny compared with what he would become part of in later life. 10S The radical 
writers of his youth. Upton Sinclair, Jack London and Robert Tressall heavily influenced 
him and he developed his grasp of economic theory through reading Das Kapital. His 
initial career was as a journalist, firstly as a Town Hall correspondent in Manchester, then 
as foreign affairs correspondent for the Daily Herald, before becoming the Editor of 
Labour's Northern Voice in 1951. From here the transition to active politics was 
reasonably painless though, as he recalled, filled with foreboding. Though he admitted he 
became quite at home on the backbenches. 
Allaun enjoyed longstanding links with left-wing socialist organisations. He joined the 
Union for Democratic Control [UDC] in 1922 and was prominent in the Movement for 
Colonial Freedom. On joining the Labour party he became part firstly of Victory for 
Socialism, then Labour Action for Peace and began a career of dedicated activism within 
the party. He also joined the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, [CND] and helped form 
a parliamentary branch among Labour backbenchers. His dissent, like Zilliacus', was based 
on the fact that Britain was tied to the United States and dominated by an anti-Communist 
rationale. He saw this as being both dangerous, and ultimately false, and was seldom 
reluctant to put forward this view. ''The whole of my object was really to influence the 
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Labour party, to make the party the 'peace party' .,,106 Zilliacus, Allaun and the wider 
disarmament movement maintained the view that the Labour party was "the natural 
vehicle for bringing CND policy into effect."I07 
The organisations that he allied himself to, during his pre-parliamentary career, reflect his 
fundamental political stance. Strong continuity can be found between the ideas of the 
UDC and the stance adopted by LAP and CND. The UDC was a liberal, pacifist 
organisation established by Charles Trevelyan,I08 on 5th August 1915, as a reaction to the 
failure of negotiations aimed at ending the First World War. 109 The central tenets of the 
organisation were that territory should not be annexed without the consent of the populace, 
foreign policy should be governed by democratic mandate, international conflicts must be 
settled through arbitration and armaments should be limited to the level of absolute 
necessity. It also believed that state compliance should be monitored and enforced by an 
international organisation with the power to settle disputes through negotiation. The 
intellectuals drawn to this organisation were to include those who later circulated around 
both the Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union [SCR] and CND. These 
figures held an internationalist outlook and put forward alternatives to bipolarity and war. 
These traditions of anti-war, anti-bloc and pro-UN ideas are prominent throughout the 
arguments of AlIaun and. although he followed a pro-Soviet perspective, evidence 
suggests that his perspective was developed independently through influences acquired 
early in his life. 
Allaun was attracted to Victory for Socialism because the group advocated a programme 
to "lay the foundations of socialism and lasting peace". I 10 His membership meant that he 
was working alongside like-minded individuals among whom he could attain a position of 
influence. He was immediately posted to the Executive Council and was elected to the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Policy Group chaired by Zilliacus. His first publication as an 
MP was for the Salford Reporter, in which he wrote that only the Labour party had the 
ideological foundations that could avert war. I11 Like his leftist predecessors in the 1945-
50 government he opposed the fervent anti-Communist propaganda. In a speech to a 
formative group of individuals. who later became Labour Action for Peace, he argued that: 
there seems to be developing the idea that the only good Russian was a dead one. I 
have not come here to defend the Russian government, but I warn you to be on 
your guard against this day-to-day propaganda against the Russians. I 12 
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This speech is important in the fact that it displays a central theme of AIlaun's perspective. 
He argued that the Cold War ethos drove the world towards the edge of a nuclear 
volcano. I 13 One provocative move by either side could plunge the world into an inferno. 
He accepted that there were faults on both sides but, to AIlaun, the evidence indicated that 
it was the hawkishness of the West that was leading the world closer and closer to being 
engulfed in the metaphorical lava. 
This fear, for Allaun and many of those of the same mind, was at its height in the 1960s. 
Firstly in Cuba, then in Vietnam, the United States leadership was pursuing an active 
policy of the 'rollback' of Communism. The pro-peace organisations, many of which 
were Moscow supported, fed upon these hot spots in the cold conflict. Other organisations 
such as CND and LAP fell into line with the arguments promoted by Soviet propaganda. 
LAP literature constantly criticised the United States as the aggressor; arguing that the 
United States was the nation that would plunge the world into a nuclear abyss. Thus 
Allaun was to discover the futility of remaining non-aligned within an atmosphere of 
bipolarity. I 14 
Allaun personally criticised the prosecution of the Vietnam War at every possible 
occasion. He feared that the war would spread and escalate, and hinted on occasions that 
the United States leadership did not share his fear but rather that a large-scale conflict was 
part of their agenda. The rhetoric of 'roIlback' advocated the eradication of Communism, 
Allaun argued that the Vietnam conflict was a precursor to war with China and the Soviet 
Union. Though this seems implausible, it was an element of the zeitgeist of the 1960s. 
The fear of nuclear war kept thousands marching on Aldermaston every year. Socialists 
like Allaun marched alongside men of the cloth such as CND leader Bruce Kent and 
members of the Communist party, lIS all united under the banner of nuclear disarmament. 
This was a non-aligned movement, but Soviet propaganda attempted to influence the 
European peace movement. This propaganda campaign was designed to convince the 
members that, like them, the Soviet Union supported peace and disarmament and that it 
was the aggressive stance maintained by the West that prolonged hostilities. However, as 
Zilliacus observed in 1958, the mass movement was not one that was slavish to 
Communism, but that: "a great and growing number of people in Europe and in the United 
States is more afraid of the risks of the arms race ... than of Communist aggression.,,1I6 
Therefore, many of the pro-peace lobby became supportive of the pro-Soviet arguments in 
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the hope that if these could reach a wider audience, and alter public opinion to oppos~ the 
Cold War rationale, there was a chance of peace rather than increasing hostility. 
Allaun, despite his perception of US foreign policy objectives, attempted to maintain a 
non-aligned pro-peace position. He described the LAP, of which he was President from 
1965, as being "neither for the Russian nor the [United States] government, but for peace 
and friendship between the two.,,117 To achieve this goal many of his allies were to 
attempt to alter the public and governmental perception of the Soviet Union. This went 
beyond merely declaring themselves in opposition to the belief that the Soviet Union was 
aggressive and imperialist. Allaun avoided displaying overt support for the Soviet Union 
but, despite this, he won few friends among the party's hierarchy and there were several 
attempts to oust him for abstaining on principle during votes on foreign policy.1I8 Allaun 
refused to accept that there was anything whatsoever wrong in his actions. His aim was to 
help safeguard the future of mankind. He possessed the same ill-founded hope in the 
Labour party as Zilliacus, seeing it as the only vehicle that could achieve peace. His self-
proclaimed mission was to "deflect [the party] and steer it onto a safe course.,,1I9 He was 
not without supporters, among them lan Mikardo, who joined him in criticising the party 
over not following the promises written in the 1966 Election Manifesto. The Manifesto 
described the Vietnam war as "cruel", talked of seeking agreements on "nuclear-free 
zones" and "verified international disarmament", and espoused establishing greater contact 
with Eastern Europe and reaching understandings with the Soviet Union and Chinal2o. 
Instead Wilson supported the United States in Vietnam and the rearmament of West 
Germany as a bulwark against the East. Allaun criticised both courses of action and stated 
that a rearmed Germany was exactly what "the Russian leaders fear most, and who can 
blame them.,,121 This should not be viewed as evidence of anti-Germanic tendencies, but 
as an example of Allaun's opposition to any move that could provoke crisis and lead to 
what he dreaded most, nuclear war. 
Allaun did recognise that, on both sides of the bipolar stand-off, fear reigned supreme. 
Both the White House and the Kremlin feared lagging behind in the arms race and thus 
leaving themselves open to attack. This fear was passed down to the satellites of both 
states, so perpetuating the arms race. Allaun argued that the "ordinary men and women 
should call a halt to this madness.,,122 He recognised that, in reality, neither side was 
prepared to push the world into the nuclear volcano and that the nuclear deterrent had been 
developed purely for defensive purposes. The problem was establishing an atmosphere in 
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which both sides could recognise this, agree to make reductions, and so make the world a 
safer place. The United States remained the chief bogey; Allaun recognised that the 'gap' 
in nuclear capability was false and that the Soviet Union was not superior. He argued that 
the 'gap' was a propagandist's ploy, whipping up fear to make the ordinary person support 
arms spending in the name of their own defence. 123 He stated that "the warhawks are 
trying to convince us that we are militarily inferior and that Russia is about to attack.,,124 
While the public was led to support the Cold War, Allaun argued that in the long tenn 
nothing was being achieved. Both the international and domestic situations were in 
stagnation. Allaun argued that "those responsible for whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria are 
gUilty of bringing war closer."12S Equally the people endured cuts in public services due to 
the burden of spending while Britain suffered the ignominy of losing any independence 
that was possible in the post-war world. Britain had become, he argued, no more than a 
United States base, without any power over the nuclear arsenal but responsible for its 
presence. He equally argued that the capitalist ethos of profit, preponderant in the West, 
had gained hold of the armaments business; thus giving it a self-perpetuating force. 
Allaun argued that this was not the case under Communism, "there are no people in Russia 
making a packet out of armaments as there are in this country and [the United States].,,126 
The ultimate fear Allaun held was that the presence of nuclear weapons made Britain a 
'sitting duck' should the Kremlin wish to make one last desperate gesture. In many ways it 
could be argued that he would have supported any nation had they promised a conclusion 
to mutually assured destruction. However his belief in Soviet socialism, a belief 
reinforced by Soviet propaganda, led him to argue that Soviet foreign policy was 
motivated by protectionism. Therefore his objective was to alter the perception of the 
Soviet Union, so averting war and calling a halt to the self-perpetuating nuclear arms race. 
These objectives underpinned the unilateralist policy that he promoted through the party's 
National Executive. Whether he was also motivated by a desire to protect the socialist 
economic system established in the Soviet Union is difficult to ascertain. However this 
was the objective of others who supported his stance and allied with him in the LAP. 
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The Victory for Socialism Vision 
Swingler told the 1959 Labour Conference that: 
Only if we are clear that the aim of the party is to achieve a classless society can 
we get our supporters actively and enthusiastically to go out into the highways and 
byways and tell the truth about the nationalised industries, and tell the truth that 
full employment is only secure and total disarmament only possible if we have in 
fact a planned economy in Britain. That is the clear bold policy we need to adopt. 
If this Executive gets immediately on with the job of declaring such a clear and 
bold policy for peace, ... colonial freedom, an unequivocal policy for a planned 
economy for a society of equal citizens in Britain, then we can go out into the 
highways and byways and we shall win.127 
This was the political raison d'etre of Swingler and his allies within Victory for Socialism. 
Throughout the CLPs meetings were organised, all advertising keynote speakers, such as 
Allaun, Newens and Zilliacus, who were prominent opponents of the Cold War rationale. 
The objective of these meetings was to encourage a broad support for a 'socialist' 
programme within the Labour party. Key to Labour implementing this programme was 
for the party, once in government, to seize control of the British economy and the means 
of production, an economic model argued to be successful due in part to the example of 
the Soviet Union. While many of the speakers did not make this link explicit, a significant 
number of Victory for Socialism spokespersons did. Many of those who became 
prominent pro-Soviet activists during the period of detente, and critics of the Thatcherite 
foreign policy during the Second Cold War, figures like James Lamond and Renee Short, 
metaphorically 'cut their teeth' within Victory for Socialism. 
The group's ideals were a continuation of those that had been promoted by Hutchinson, 
Platts-Mills, Solley and Zilliacus during the 1945-50 parliament. Equally indicative is that 
key tenets of the Victory for Socialism programme, particularly the opposition to the 
Anglo-American special relationship and prioritisation of NATO over the United Nations, 
have outlived the Cold War. This shows that these issues held, and to a limited extent still 
hold, great significance for a section of the British Labour party.128 Throughout the Cold 
War the ghost of Zilliacus continued to haunt debates on foreign and defence policy. The 
peace movement, which existed on the fringes of the party's left-wing, ensured that input 
into government was maintained and its supporters within parliament persisted in 
promoting their often unpopular arguments. 
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The anti-Cold War campaign gained a new impetus during the 1980s, initially due to 
increased bipolar tensions. Western hawkishness fuelled Eastern European paranoia, 
increasing the possibility of a nuclear exchange. However the pro-Soviet strand saw their 
influence eroded as a new thaw became visible within the Soviet political system while a 
greater impetus towards agreement over disarmament developed. The two dreams of 
many on the left, rapprochement and disarmament, were perceived to be heading for 
fruition, and once again the change agent was the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union 
was implementing democratisation and openness and spearheading talks on disarmament. 
This was the ultimate objective that many on the left had been focused upon; therefore the 
campaign gained a new clarity of purpose. Both Houses witnessed heated debates on the 
official attitude towards Gorbachev, particularly as public opinion embraced him and 
traditionally anti-Soviet world leaders openly courted him. 'Gorby fever' allowed the pro-
Soviet left to glimpse their last chance of hope for peace and socialism just before it, as all 
others before, slipped from their grasp. 
Prior to this, albeit for a short period, the dreams of the exponents of the Victory for 
Socialism vision seemed to be close to becoming a reality. Detente, ushered in by Labour 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson signing the Helsinki Accord alongside Soviet leader Leonid 
Brezhnev. brought a fresh chance for rapprochement between the Communist bloc and the 
West. This led, during the 1970s, to a resurgence of extra-parliamentary pro-Soviet 
activity. Many of Victory for Socialism's prominent activists adopted a key role in those 
front organisations that established political and cultural links between Britain and the 
Soviet Union and encouraged an atmosphere of understanding to develop between 
Communism and Capitalism. This was to be the legacy of Victory for Socialism. Under 
this organisation's co-ordination, three objectives were crystallised as a blueprint for 
activism, maintaining and strengthening peace, pursuing disarmament and fostering trust. 
This consistent programme was aided by the network created by Swingler. The CLPs had 
shifted leftwards and were dominated by individuals that sought to alter the centrist 
position of the party. They included Trotskyists and Communists, often working side by 
side with little knowledge of, or little regard for, their clear ideological differences. To 
these MPs the ends justified the partnerships forged en route. By 1983 this mixture of left-
wing influences did steer the party into a leftward trajectory. The Labour party manifesto, 
famously derided as the 'longest suicide note in history' by Gerald Kaufman, appears to 
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have been an updated re-working of the Victory for Socialism manifesto writte~ by 
Swingler in 1958. Swingler had tapped into a powerful force within the party, a force that 
increasingly demanded that the party should strive towards the establishment of a socialist 
economy and a socialist foreign policy. The history of how these ideas developed within 
Labour's left-wing to become the socialist alternative to the consensual party line is 
equally the history of a slow upward trajectory of left-wingers of various backgrounds and 
ideological traditions to positions of influence within the party. While privately they 
disagreed with one another's political beliefs, often clearly divided between Trots' and 
'Stalinists',129 they also supported one another in the battle with the party's leadership. 
Left-wingers reached positions of power within the Unions, the NEe and the 
parliamentary party hierarchy. This was not a programme designed by the pro-Soviet MPs 
in a party dominated by their number, but one developed due to a growth in opposition to 
the inter-party consensus on domestic and foreign policy among a broad left-wing section 
of party membership 130. However the British electorate rejected in totality the Labour left-
wing socialist alternative, which became official policy in 1983 and represented the 
collision of intra-party ideological traditions. Thus the Victory for Socialism success story 
is a hollow one. The dominance over policy enjoyed briefly by this coalition of left 
traditions led not to the establishment of socialism but, to a protracted review process, a 
purge of radical elements from the party and a redrawing of the tenets of Labour party 
policy. 131 
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Chapter Five 
Beneath Detente 
Victory for Socialism concentrated upon altering Labour party foreign policy from the 
bottom up, attempting to gain a significant level of influence over Conference and the 
CLPs. The chief objective was to steer the party into positioning Britain as a pacific 
influence over world affairs. thus reducing the chance of war. This meant ending the 
transatlantic special relationship. opening cordial diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union and encouraging the formation of a non-aligned bloc that would reject the anti-
Communist Cold War ethos. Due to the party's traditions of pacifism, anti-imperialism and 
hUI1!anism, Labour was perceived as the perfect vehicle to promote this internationalist 
programme. The party, however. maintained a consensual anti-Soviet, Atlanticist position, 
and avoided offering the overtures to the Soviet Union that the left demanded. Despite this 
the left of the party, and in particular the pro-Soviet strand. began to feel empowered by 
developments in international relations. These developments were the result of the rise of 
a more moderate President to the White House in 1968 and significant shifts in British 
foreign policy after the 1966 spending review. I 
After 1969 United States President Richard Nixon made efforts to end the war in Vietnam, 
began Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] with the Soviet Union and opened 
relations with China.2 The Wilson government had already reduced commitments in 
foreign policy. withdrawing British forces from East of Suez,3 Wilson also put some 
pressure on the United States government to open relations with the Communist 
countries.4 It is doubtful that British concerns had any influence over United States 
foreign policy. as Jones argued the Wilson government did not have the kudos of their 
Conservative predecessors.s However, as the 1960s drew to a close it was apparent that 
the groundwork had been laid for a thaw in East-West relations. Underpinning this 
perception was the development of what became known as the Helsinki process. Calls for 
a European-wide conference on security had been continually made by representatives of 
the Warsaw Pact nations but were received with scepticism. However as the cohesion of 
the Western Alliance began to breakdown and the United States policies of containment 
and rollback failed in Vietnam moves towards bilateral negotiations were seen as the only 
viable option.6 While the creation of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe [OSCE)' was not to be realised until the late 1980s the Conference that was to set 
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the process in motion was held in November 1972 after a long series of preparatory talks. 
These talks, and the Conference itself, sought to respond to many of the questions 
overshadowing European security. 
The Helsinki process was particularly favoured by the left-wing because it excluded the 
United States. Therefore both the adherents to the Bevanite 'Third Camp' tradition, as 
well as those who supported the pro-Soviet position and opposed United States influence 
over Western Europe, could unite around this objective. Tribune group members 
described the inchoate OSCE as a credible non-aligned international institution because it 
was not dominated by the United States, as the United Nations [UN], International 
Monetary Fund [IMF], World Bank and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] 
were.
8 This image of credibility was reinforced when the 1975 summit united in 
opposition to United States interventionism in the Middle East.9 The left hoped that the 
OSCE could supersede NATO, which was becoming increasingly unpopular, ID and make 
the Warsaw Pact moribund. This was not to happen and instead the summits were fruitless 
due to the continuing mistrust shown by both sides. This was highlighted when severe 
difficulties were experienced when Western European members demanded access to 
Communist bloc nations in order to verify that human rights standards were improving 
and, more fundamentally important, that missile capabilities were being reduced in line 
with the SALT process. The demands made by Western governments were continually 
greater than the Soviet government were prepared to offer. A particular example was the 
demand that the future of Germany be determined by 'the free decision of the German 
people' ,11 Furthennore, due to United States non-participation, the Helsinki process was 
unable to alter relations between the superpowers. Thus the Helsinki process was 
powerless to prevent the collapse of detente. 12 
However the Helsinki process represented the ideals that the Labour left-wing, and 
particularly the pro-Soviet strand, had been campaigning for since 1945. These were the 
avoidance of conflict through negotiation, the development of interdependence through 
freedom of movement and cultural exchange, co-operation in the fields of science and 
technology and glasnost within the Warsaw Pact nations.13 These commitments, laid 
down by the West, were mirrored in the Brezhnev Doctrine outlined in the Declaration of 
Prague, 25th January 1972. 14 Left-wing idealists hoped that finally capitalist and 
communist nations had finally found principles around which they could find agreement. 
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This led to a fundamental change in the behaviour of the pro-Soviet MPs. Primarily they 
focussed upon ensuring that the Helsinki process remained on track. Labour backbenchers 
constantly called on successive British governments to strengthen East-West relations. 
consider both sides of arguments and allow concessions in the name of world peace. 
However, a mixture of enthusiastic commitment and morbid scepticism characterised both 
parties' official response to the developments. Aside from those who already exhibited 
pro-Soviet sympathies no British politicians completely trusted the motives of the Soviet 
leadership, a factor that acted as a constant obstacle to success of the Helsinki process, 
particularly after the 1979 General Election. 
Beneath the high politics of international relations the pro-Soviet MPs became involved in 
more open forms of pro-Soviet activity in order to institutionalise detente. MPs helped 
establish trading links between East and West, promoted co-existence based on evidence 
gathered through contact with Communist bloc leaders, subscribed to pro-Soviet 
organisations and openly promoted pro-Soviet arguments in the House of Commons. This 
chapter focuses on three Labour MPs whose activities are indicative of the pro-Soviet left's 
response to the improved East-West relations during the detente period, a period when 
contact was encouraged between Britain and the Warsaw Pact nations in an attempt to 
draw the Communist leaders into the international community. 15 
Each of the three cases pursued a different form of pro-Soviet activity. and their level of 
pro-Soviet sympathy and their objectives also differed quantitatively. The first case, Stan 
Newens, developed a highly supportive analysis of the ideals of one Communist leader to 
encourage a deeper understanding of Communist politics and promote the creation of 
sustainable links between Britain and the Communist bloc. Unlike Zilliacus, who pursued 
a similar tactic using both Khrushchev and Tito, Stan Newens chose to use Romanian 
leader Nicolae Ceausescu as an exemplar of a fundamental shift in the foreign policy 
objectives of the Soviet camp. In promoting these arguments Newens developed a 
rationale for complete rapprochement with the Communist bloc and argued that detente 
necessitated a fundamental change in East-West relations. The second case, lan Mikardo, 
attempted to develop East-West understanding through unofficial trading links between 
British companies and industry within the Communist bloc. Mikardo created a public 
limited company, lan Mikardo plc, which was solely devoted to matching supply and 
demand between British businesses and their counterparts in the Soviet sphere. The links 
Mikardo established were intended to encourage a degree of economic interdependence as 
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well as allowing the exchange of cultural and political ideas. The third and final case is' 
Renee Short. Short is indicative of MPs who actively furthered the objectives of Soviet 
front organisations which allowed close personal relationships to develop between British 
MPs and representatives of the Communist bloc. These activities will show how detente 
was viewed as liberating, not only for the future of foreign and defence policy, but also for 
allowing a broader base of understanding to develop between the people of Britain and 
their Communist peers. These activities were encouraged by the development of detente, 
but promoted the broad aims of the pro-Soviet tradition. These objectives can be defined 
as ending the Cold War through rapprochement and establishing a new climate of opinion. 
This climate would be based upon co-operation and co-existence between the Soviet 
Union and Western society. 
No enemies to the left 
The broad left-wing consensus that had been created by Victory for Socialism believed the 
anti-Soviet climate of opinion might become a feature of the past with the emergence of 
East-West detente. The pro-Soviet left-wingers now became determined to maintain East-
West relations, increase Anglo-Soviet communication and ensure that a more positive 
image of the Communist leadership was projected within Western polities and society. 
This led some individuals to construct an alternative characterisation of the Communist 
bloc leadership. This was a task that was encouraged by the Communist propaganda 
departments and many left-wing MPs were invited to study the policies of the Communist 
states. A central objective of the Brezhnev Doctrine was to encourage those within 
democratic socialist groupings and the peace movement to believe that the Soviet 
leadership shared their objectives. 16 Therefore when attempting to attract influential 
individuals the favourite tool employed by Cominform was to project an image of the 
Communist leader that fitted with the ideology of those who were being invited. Thus 
Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian Communist leader, was characterised as carrying the 
revolution forward and encouraging the development of personal freedom within a statist 
economic system. 
Stan Newens was not specifically pro-Soviet. Like many of his colleagues. he opposed the 
Cold War rationale and the dominance of the United States' zero-sum anti-Soviet 
perspective over British foreign policy. He also shared Allaun's deep fear of the 
consequences of a protracted arms race and reliance upon the nuclear deterrent. Therefore 
176 
his tradition of dissent was one shared by many within the left of the Labour party and is 
not an indicator of pro-Soviet sympathies. Newens argued that he was not sympathetic to 
the Soviet regime whatsoever; his objective was to end the Cold War by encouraging East 
and West to open channels of communication and develop mutual understanding. He 
defended his actions by stressing that he, Zilliacus, and many others including Allaun and 
Norman Atkinson,17 openly criticised the Soviet Union as much as they did America. 
However, what is clear is that his perception of the Soviet Union differed from the 
perception held by the Labour party leadership. Newens believed that the Communist bloc 
was approachable and willing to negotiate, while the United States was completely hostile 
to peaceful overtures. Equally he also argued that there were aspects of the Soviet society 
that were socialist. following the tradition established by G D H Cole and the Webbs.'8 
This places Newens on the cusp of the pro-Soviet left. Studying his patterns of thought it 
is possible to learn why the left was able to establish a broad alliance despite its members 
differing perceptions of the world. 
Stan Newens was elected to parliament in 1964, and remained a Labour MP until February 
1983, when he lost his Harlow seat. Throughout his career as an MP, and as the candidate 
for Harlow prior to becoming MEP for the London Central ward in 1984, he was active in 
left-wing groups within the Labour party. His membership of the Eastern Area Group of 
Labour MPs,I9 Tribune Group. the Foreign Affairs Group, Labour Action for Peace. 
Liberation. and the Movement for Colonial Freedom is an indicator of his interests; 
international relations. peace and humanitarian concerns. He was also actively involved 
with the London Co-operative Society, a diligent member of the National Union of 
Teachers and an advocate of workers' rights. However, it was his internationalist stance 
that dominated his political agenda. Newens' recalled he gained his internationalist 
perspective at an early age. In 1948. when he was an eighteen-year-old Sixth Form 
Student. he was taken to the House of Commons to watch a political debate. Here he was 
introduced to the Zilliacus perspective of the Cold War: 
Ernest Bevin spoke and I thought he was putting things across reasonably. then I 
saw a chap get up from the back benches, with buckteeth sticking out, if it had 
been these days he would have had them fixed with a brace, but well, he had a 
great pile of books and a bald head shining. I watched him go through this pile of 
books. and I was sitting there as a neutral. and absolutely tear apart the logic of 
what Bcvin had put over.20 
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Newens was deeply impressed and the experience convinced him to join the Labour party. 
He accepted that he was: "very much influenced by Konni Zilliacus, as far as my attitude 
to foreign affairs was concerned.,,21 
Newens's supplementary political education was in Trotskyism; initially as a member of 
the Revolutionary Communist party [RCP], then as a member of Socialist Outlook and 
columnist for Socialist Review.22 He worked alongside Tony ClitT,23 and future 
parliamentary colleagues Eric Heffer and Sid Bidwell. As a member of these 
organisations he helped organise anti-Suez demonstrations, pro-Cuban marches and many 
meetings opposing the Vietnam War, an issue that would become of special interest once 
he had taken his seat in the House. It was from these groups that the slogan "Neither 
Washington nor Moscow; but International Socialism" emerged. Newens believed in this 
ideal and argued that Britain should stand as a non-aligned socialist nation. His analysis of 
the failure of Labour was that it had not created a socialist society, but instead had 
accepted capitalism. 24 The strategy he prescribed was to "rule out proposals for accepting 
capitalism. . .. and provide a comprehensive alternative to the increasingly crisis-ridden 
conditions of our times.,,2s He argued that Labour should present a manifesto that pledged 
to extend the nationalisation programme, create industrial democracy and institute non-
profit related economic planning measures. This is representative of the Marxist-
Trotskyite position adopted by a section of the Labour left-wing. 
Despite the retention of his radical socialist ideals, Newens moved away from the 
revolutionary groups during the late 1950s. In 1958 he was adopted as parliamentary 
candidate by Harrow CLP and found a niche in Victory for Socialism. "I was not 
interested in a Trotskyist sectarian organisation ... I was interested in a ginger group within 
the [Labour] party.,,26 He became Organising Secretary and helped develop the alternative, 
socialist foreign policy alongside his erstwhile hero Zilliacus. Newens established himself 
as a prominent speaker at anti-Apartheid, anti-Vietnam War and pro-Cuba rallies and was 
led to show a degree of support to these causes' greatest ally: "the Soviet Union supported 
the struggle in South Africa, in Cuba and in Vietnam ... the materials were instrumental to 
the[ir] just struggle.,,27 However, he did not believe that the Soviet Union was simply 
reacting to aggression from the US, he saw aggressive policies enacted by both sides. He 
deplored Soviet actions in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia, and it was his opposition to 
Soviet 'imperialism' that drew him towards Communist Romania rather than the Soviet 
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Union. However, he also intimated that it was the Soviet Union that was avoiding 
escalation in the Cold War. 
Cuba was a perfect example. Newens argued. of how the Soviet leadership had actively 
averted war. Khrushchev halted the Cuban missile crisis, preventing escalation, while also 
ensuring that the Castro regime was protected from future United States interventionism. 
Had the roles been reversed the United States would not have acquiesced in the face of a 
Soviet military threat. This allowed Khrushchev to seize the moral highground and 
become a symbolic hero for protecting the revolution which Newens and many on the left, 
including Allaun, Atkinson. Driberg. Mikardo and future leader Michael Foot, supported 
wholeheartedly.28 Newens argued that this perception was reinforced by the fact that the 
Soviet Union did not threaten the United States with retaliation over Vietnam, a time when 
the United States leadership believed they were vulnerable and lagged behind in the 
nuclear arms race. This brought Stan Newens to the conclusion that Nikita Khrushchev 
was "an extremely bold and great figure".29 However he did not argue that Britain should 
ally with the Soviet Union. His ideal was the creation of a Socialist Europe as a Third 
Camp. The aim was to exclude the United States from determining Europe's future. He 
outlined this argument in 1970: 
As much as I condemn the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia. this is no 
excuse for our agreeing to fall in behind the American proposals for Western 
Europe.3o 
This 'camp' could include Eastern European nations, such as the independent Communist 
Yugoslavia and Albania and would stand as a socialist bulwark against both poles. With 
this objective in mind he forged links with Romania, and Ceausescu. 
Zilliacus had cultivated Tito, and it appears that Newens attempted to do the same to the 
Romanian leader. The Romanian Embassy invited Newens after he had expressed an 
interest in the policies of Ceausescu. 31 Newens drew up a list of highly searching questions 
and submitted them to the Romanian Embassy. These were refused so Newens decided 
not to visit. However the Romanian government insisted he should go; his questions were 
allowed and Newens was flown to Budapest. Newens recalled that he was concerned 
when he was given his own apartment, in case blackmail was attempted. To prevent being 
compromised he spent the nights with a chair propped under his door handle, but he found 
that he was safe. Ceausescu appeared willing to talk openly to Newens and allowed him 
to criticise the lack of democracy and failings in agrarian policy that were apparent. The 
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point Ceausescu wished to stress was that Romania was independent of Moscow and that 
the Romanian government wanted to forge greater links with the West. Ceausescu, 
therefore, tried to link himself to a movement now emerging within the world order. This 
movement would become known as Eurocommunism and was perceived by those who 
followed the Zilliacus tradition as the fully developed form of socialism.32 
Eurocommunism also, it appears, appealed to Stan Newens. Newens concluded that 
Romania was "the model of a Communist country which is both socialist and fully 
independent.,,33 Newens also argued that Ceausescu had developed a socialist foreign 
policy. Newens quoted the latter to this effect: "as a socialist country we lay special stress 
on co-operation with all socialist states ... based on the principles of peaceful co-
existence. ,,34 
This was not a new programme developed by Ceausescu; this was his way of advocating 
the Brezhnev doctrine. This argued that all CPSU allies were independent of Moscow, 
and worked from a socialist perspective in all policy arenas. The Warsaw Pact was only 
established to guarantee the 'socialist' nations peace and prosperity under the Soviet 
security umbrella. This was offered to all nations who allied with Cominform, and was 
only necessary because of the aggressive policy of rollback.3s Despite this rhetoric 
Cominform was a rigid structure designed to control the political and economic life of the 
Communist bloc. However Ceausescu did show a degree of independence despite his 
adherence to Brezhnev's line. His was the sole voice in the Warsaw Pact to criticise the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and in 1967, against the Soviet line, Ceausescu 
established diplomatic relations with West Germany. Equally he refused Moscow's orders 
to sever ties with Israel during the Six Day War. However Ceausescu, as Meier observed, 
"walked a fine line". He gave the appearance of being independent while maintaining 
doctrinal purity at home.36 This could have been the role Brezhnev ascribed to Ceausescu 
to enable him to gain support from the West. It appears therefore that Newens unwittingly 
became a pro-Communist propagandist. Cominform wanted a British MP to produce pro-
Ceausescu propaganda and Newens was available, sympathetic and willing. This was a 
trap that the Soviet Union prepared for many left-wing MPs. These MPs beliefs set them 
apart from their colleagues because they yearned for a world based upon peaceful co-
existence and did not mistrust Communists on principle. All that Cominform had to do 
was project the right image and the sympathetic MP could be convinced that the 
Communist leaders shared their ideals. 
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The plausibility of Ceausescu, and the beliefs of Newens, converge in the pamphlet 
Talking with Nicolae Ceausescu and the preceding book entitled Nicolae Ceausescu. 
These works argued that Ceausescu believed in "respect for the rights of all peoples to 
self-determination.,,37 The international community, he argued, should enforce "abstention 
from maintaining troops on the territory of other states without their agreement... and non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other states,',38 The global rationale should be one of 
co-operation, particularly in "scientific and cultural matters".39 These were central tenets 
of many of Labour's left-wing and frequently promoted in their arguments in the House of 
Commons and various newspaper articles. 
The rebirth of independence and freedom from Moscow in Eastern Europe, Newens 
argued, could lead to a New World order. He argued that Ceausescu presented: 
an overwhelming case for Britain to adopt an independent foreign policy. This 
would... bring us closer to countries like Rumania and would accelerate the 
development of the demand for the withdrawal of troops on both sides and 
ultimately the winding up of both military blocs.4o 
This, Newens believed, was only tenable under a Labour government. However, he 
argued, this would mean that: 
A future British Labour government ... [must] face the question of attempting to 
justify the foreign policy which Labour has been prepared to accept of practically 
uncritical support of the United States since the beginning of the Cold War.41 
The real lesson that should be learned from Ceausescu, he argued, was the ability to be 
independent from the superpowers. 
This was a common theme of New Left arguments, though these steered away from 
Eastern European examples.42 Newens had to maintain a focus on Eastern Europe due to 
the twin objectives of his work, developing a model of existing socialism and establishing 
a climate of understanding between East and West. He believed that both objectives were 
achievable by advertising the advancements of Ceausescu's Romania and highlighting the 
desire ofCeausescu to establish links to Western socialist groups. Newens' paramount 
objective was for the British Labour party to adopt an internationalist perspective in world 
affairs and to this end he argued, on the publication of his book of Ceausescu's writings, 
that if the British government was to learn from the Romanian example, a socialist foreign 
policy could dcvelop.4J Newens became vilified for this work44 particularly given the later 
revelations regarding the reality of life under Ceausescu. His failure to recognise the 
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inconsistencies between rhetoric and reality indicate that his publications on Romania 
show a marked naivety and are evidence of Newens' deep desire to believe that 
Communism was evolving away from the Stalinist model. 
Brezhnev attempted to persuade the world that he was a benevolent, almost democratic, 
socialist. Largely, this failed. Those who hoped that the Communist political system 
would evolve, but were suspicious of Brezhnev himself, attached their hopes to the leaders 
of the Soviet satellite states, or independent Communists,4S as the model for a future 
socialist society. While not debating the degree of independence of either Ceausescu or 
indeed Tito of Yugoslavia, it should be noted that both nations were to retain membership 
of Cominform and became loyal exponents of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Their perceived 
independence was often employed as evidence that the Warsaw Pact was not an empire 
and that the Soviet Union was no longer holding the bloc together through force.46 
However, independence from the Soviet Union was impossible within the Warsaw Pact. 
The difficulties in negotiating the Helsinki Agreement prove this.47 Despite the 
contrasting evidence, Newens stubbornly retained his belief in Ceausescu: 
I very much defend what I did. I think Ceausescu was used as a scapegoat. I don't 
think Ceausescu, well the system there, was at all as bad as under Stalin. They 
rehabilitated people .. , [but] It was not a democracy and I would be very critical of 
it in that respect48, 
The underlying reason for Stan Newen~' support of Ceausescu was his opposition to 
United States foreign policy. an opposition that continued in his critique of the Gulf War 
and subsequent treatment of Iraq. Influenced by the arguments contained in I Choose 
Peace~ he agreed with Zilliacus that it was the support offered to the White Army and 
subsequent isolation of the Soviet Union that led to the harshness of the regime. Newens 
saw the Russian revolution as the: 
greatest emancipatory movement of this century, [the Western allies] helped 
impose the conditions which made for the toughest and most inhumane people to 
come to the top.49 
He argued that the Cold War was a continuation of this anti-Communist policy, 
Containment was the political expression of the United States leadership's desire to 
dominate the post-war world order: "the United States is totally intolerant of any other 
way than one which is based on a free enterprise system dominated by the United 
States",50 This perpetuated the harsh style of the Communist regimes and forced any 
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would-be independent socialist state to ally with the Soviet Union to enjoy the protection 
of her nuclear umbrella. He argued that this situation occurred throughout Latin America 
where the United States aided military dictators such as General Pinochet to gain power.51 
Newens pursued a career in opposition to United States interventionism. He formed the 
'Liberation' movement, under the auspices of Fenner Brockway's 'Movement for Colonial 
Freedom' in order to publicise the United States oppression of socialist groups in Latin 
America. Newens and his left-wing colleagues made many references to these issues in the 
House but they were unable to alter the Atlanticist stance of the leadership. Newens 
argued that the international situation became far more dangerous with the end of the Cold 
War as, without a counter balance to American hegemony, the United States 
administration had a free hand to pursue her own interests. This was of great concern to 
Newens, particularly when the American people elected as President individuals "with the 
intellectual virtuosity ofReagan ... or somebody like Clinton."s2 
These arguments were first introduced in Newens' pamphlet The Case Against NATO. 
This argued that NATO was a "potential death-trap,,53 for the nations of Europe. Agreeing 
with the arguments of AIlaun and others, Newens stated that the correct alternative was to 
get all parties to the negotiating table. Only through inclusive negotiations could an 
agreement be reached that would ensure "an overall European guarantee against 
aggression by any European power and the withdrawal of foreign troops from all 
European countries.,,54 Effectively this would mean the removal of troops under the flags 
of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact; Newens stressed that peacekeeping forces should be 
international and put in place under UN auspices. He argued that NATO was a tool of 
United States foreign policy and that all independent, socialist nations should withdraw 
from it. The basis for this argument was that no socialist, or indeed humanitarian, 
government could "remain a member of an international alliance which seeks to uphold 
exploitative systems, [they] must take an independent stand in international affairs."ss 
Arguably Stan Newens did not include the Warsaw Pact in this analysis. The Pact, in his 
analysis, was a purely defensive union necessitated by United States aggression. Thus, if 
NATO were disbanded then the Warsaw Pact could automatically be superceded by the 
OSCE. In Newens' analysis the United States administration was significantly flawed, had 
little or no regard for upholding the UN Charter, or indeed the International Declaration of 
Human Rights and had forced the socialist nations to adopt a bunker mentality. United 
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States political culture. Newens argued, was fundamentally anti-socialist and therefore 
could not be expected to promote humanitarian values, only the ethos of competitiveness. 
This analysis indicates that Newens held an underlying belief that the existence of a 
socialist economic strategy in the Soviet Union automatically made the Soviet political 
and economic model more attractive. To Newens, the basis of a society must be to ensure: 
at least that you don't have people who are denied the basic needs for a satisfactory 
life, food, shelter, clothing and education... the Americans are against creating 
such a society. their administration is against creating such a society, despite 
paying lip service to such things.56 
It was, therefore, the United States capitalist system that Stan Newens condemned 
unequivocally as exploitative. He perceived that there were socialist aspects to the Soviet 
Union, and was sympathetic to the ideal of a state-controlled economy. Thus he actively 
attempted to protect the ideal of the Soviet economic model. This can be understood in 
tenns of his political ideology. Newens was a fervent supporter of Clause IV of the Labour 
partl7 and vehemently opposed the privatisation of key services. He accepted that there 
were elements in the Soviet Union that were not socialist and observed that the 
"deplorable practise of using the workers as slave labour"s8 was largely responsible for the 
high rate of growth. However, he supported Frank Allaun's argument that Gorbachev 
made a "fundamental rnistake"S9 in implanting capitalism into Russia. Capitalism, 
Newens argued, destabilised society by removing all restraints and allowed those people 
who had amassed a small fortune through the black market under Brezhnev to become the 
new ruling class. Unlike Allaun, Newens did explain that Gorbachev had little choice but 
to establish capitalism in Russia, that was the penance for losing the Cold War. Newens 
reserved very high praise for Gorbachev, because it was he who had ended the Cold War, 
but criticised him for dismantling the Soviet system. The Soviet economic model was 
quantitatively advanced in comparison to Western capitalism. His rationale for this 
position echoed elements of RCP doctrine, which maintained that socialism could not be 
reduced purely to 'capitalism with a human face'. A socialist state could only be 
established after changing the ownership of the means of production. For Newens it had 
to be the state not, as he put it, the 158 millionaires.6o This ideal had existed in the Soviet 
Union and he, like Allaun, opposed the introduction of capitalism. 
Newens followed the traditions of democratic socialism. though he was influenced by 
Trotskyism rather than the Fabian gradualist doctrine which underpinned the Labour 
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party's ethos. His philosophy espoused command economics, humanitarianism, 
internationalism and pacifism, ideals which were fundamental to the arguments of 
Zilliacus, Allaun and many of the Tribunites. Equally like Zilliacus, his greatest influence, 
Newens refused to abandon his beliefs, even retaining his analysis of Ceausescu despite 
the weight of contrary evidence. However unlike Allaun and Zilliacus, Newens did find 
some of his ideals fulfilled and in Europe found his Third Camp. Newens maintained that 
only a socialist alliance of European nations could act as a counter to bipolarity.61 He 
argued that such a community would automatically adopt socialist principles and would 
encourage a broad alliance to develop that would naturally include many of the 
Communist bloc nations. This position set him apart from the Communists, and indeed the 
majority of the Labour left, who opposed the EU because they perceived that it stood as a 
capitalist club. He and three other Labour MPs clashed with the Tribune Group over their 
position on EEC membership.62 Newens argued that the EEC was instrumental in 
preventing East-West conflict during the 1970s and 1980s and, since 1990, has acted as a 
vehicle for greater international co-operation. As a Socialist European Group pamphlet 
argued: "It neither aspires to hegemony nor directs its efforts towards conflict or 
confrontation. This sets it apart from the two superpowers. ,,63 
In his political career Newens displayed, like Zilliacus, a great strength of idealism. His 
work during the early 1970s bears many of the hallmarks of pro-Sovietism, though he 
denies this. Newens argued that he was independent from all ideological groups, 
particularly the Communist party, and maintained a non-aligned stance on the Cold War. 
The label pro-Soviet was an insult, one directed against him, and many of his allies on the 
Labour left, because the "anti-Socialists,,64 could not counter their arguments. The 
centrist Labour leadership aimed to control and undermine the left-wing's position in the 
party, the fact that there was a body of ideas on which they and the Communists 
sometimes agreed was, therefore, convenient. Newens maintained his stance despite this, 
as did many others, his objective was to steer the party towards adopting a socialist 
agenda. 
The ethos of public ownership, alluded to in the wording of Clause IV, held great 
symbolic significance to a section of the Labour left-wing. The reticence of a Labour 
government to seize the 'means of production' and establish state control caused constant 
divisions between the leadership and the left. This encouraged some critics to attempt to 
show the potential benefits of a state-controlled economy, to achieve this however a 
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practical example was necessary. Newens refused to employ the Soviet Union as many of 
his allies did, despite admiring aspects of the Soviet economic system. However he" was 
encouraged to see Romania as the practical expression of his political objectives. This led 
him to develop a pro-Communist critique of Labour's policy. This was coupled with an 
analysis of foreign policy that had a clear pro-Soviet slant. He opposed the policy of the 
United States and the dominance of United States policy over Western Europe. Thus he 
became rhetorically supportive of the Soviet Union due to the zero-sum nature of the Cold 
War. He argued that, at times, a side had to be chosen and he found himself unable to 
support any aspect of United States policy. This set him apart from many critics of United 
States foreign policy among Labour's backbench groupings. Figures like Tony Benn and 
Eric Heffer put forward strong anti-Atlanticist arguments, however they avoided adopting 
a pro-Soviet position. Newens could not remain non-aligned and explained that there were 
clear reasons for his defence of the Soviet Union. His support for Cuba and Vietnam, both 
during and after the conflicts with the United States, indicates that he supported 
revolutionary socialist movements on the grounds that they were striving to establish a 
socialist society. The fact that the only force to defend these movements was the Soviet 
Union meant that Newens was drawn into the pro-Soviet orbit believing, in the words of 
former American Communist Ronald Radosh, that: "[tlo engage in anti-Soviet remarks 
served only one purpose: to detract from the fight against U.S. imperialism. ,,65 
Newens chief objective, however, was to establish a climate of understanding between 
capitalism and communism, as only within a stable world order could defence spending be 
cut, nuclear arms eradicated and socialism established. Adopting the methodology 
employed by Zilliacus, during a period of improving East-West relations, Newens 
attempted to put Ceausescu forward as the Communist leader who exemplified the ideals 
of detente. Ceausescu became Newens' model for future socialists and the exemplar of a 
leader with which open relations should be established. While the attempt failed, it 
indicates the importance the ideals of peace and socialism held to Newens. In attempting 
to further his objectives he appears to have devalued his arguments, by attaching his 
position to the policy of Ceausescu, he only succeeded in serving the Soviet leadership as 
a propagandist. His actions, however, should be recognised as a product of the 
international atmosphere. Stan Newens was not alone in attempting to ensure that the 
atmosphere of co-operation and co-existence became sustainable. Many of his colleagues 
within the pro-Soviet milieu attempted to establish less official structural links between the 
West and the Communist bloc. 
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Trading with the Enemy 
The dictum that underpinned the Cold War rationale enforced the view that any contact, 
which could have beneficial effects for the Soviet system, was inherently wrong. There is 
evidence to substantiate this perspective, particularly given that there was a political 
undercurrent to all contacts with representatives of the Communist governments. 
However it is also worth putting forward the hypothesis that, within this atmosphere of 
economic and cultural cross-fertilisation, capitalism was also introduced to the Soviet 
elite. Thus while the Soviet Union attempted to gain an ideological foothold in Western 
societies, it is also possible that some aspects of the Western liberal tradition also gained 
support among the influential elite that was to rise to the highest echelons of Soviet, and 
post-Communist, politics. Furthermore it should not be assumed that those who entered 
into the development of trading links between East and West were acting with ideological 
motivations. International trade is a highly lucrative business venture and therefore some 
of those involved will definitely have been driven purely by the opportunity to increase 
their profit margins. This is the context in which trading with the Communist bloc should 
be understood when studied outside the confines of the Cold war rationale. 
Rudi Sternberg, an entrepreneur of East German extraction, was the first to recognise that 
there were profitable business opportunities going untapped. His success was so great66 
that in early 1961 he was able to organise a Trade Fair in Leipzig with the support of the 
British Council for the Promotion of International Trade [BCPIT]. The BCPIT was 
established to promote the ideas of international equality through the free movement of 
trade and money. However it was described as having been "initiated by the World Peace 
Council, one of the principal agencies of international communism,,67 in a 1960 statement 
by the President of the Board of Trade. Dorril and Ramsay doubt the authenticity of this 
allegation, arguing that this was just another MI5 smear campaign.68 
The 1961 Leipzig Trade Fair was supported by several British MPs. A cross party 
backbench committee was formed to promote East-West Trade, though indicatively only 
the left-wing members were prominent advocates of establishing trade links with the 
Communist bloc and subsequently faced allegations of acting as agents for the Soviet 
Union.69 Ian Mikardo became the prime mover in this organisation, assisted by Jo 
Richardson, his personal secretary, secretary to vrs, and future Labour MP. Also 
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prominent were Arthur Lewis and Leslie Plummer,7o Plummer was a close friend of 
Harold Wilson, a link that caused Wilson to be investigated by MI5 during the 19705. A 
further three MPs can be identified as influential members of the East-West Trade 
Parliamentary Group, Robert Maxwell, Will Owen and John Stonehouse. Josef Frolik 
accused both of the latter two Labour MPs of spying on behalf of the StB. Owen was 
found gUilty and Stonehouse was acquitted only to infer his guilt by later actions. All 
these MPs faced similar problems in legitimising their actions, particularly Robert 
Maxwell't. As Haines indicated, it was enough for Maxwell to be an emigre and Jewish72, 
as was Mikardo. Mikardo admitted that his background influenced his political career, 
whilst Maxwell was far more reticent regarding his past and much of his career. 
Criticism of East-West trade came from the world of business, the British intelligence and 
security agencies and from the Labour party leadership. Trading with the enemy was also 
an area of dispute between Britain and the USA during the early 1960s. The Macmillan 
government, acting as a precursor to Mikardo, had stressed that trade "was a way of easing 
international tension" and argued that US critics of British trade policy "did not appreciate 
Britain's [economic] needs".73 In a statement to the United States Ambassador, Foreign 
Office attache Sir Patrick 'Reilly reminded his counterparts in the United States State 
Department that "HMG was under very great internal pressure to increase trade with the 
Soviets.,,74 Reilly did not elucidate who was applying this pressure. however the cross-
bench East-West Trade Parliamentary Group did include several influential Conservative 
MPs. John F Kennedy relaxed many regulations on East-West trade but did maintain that 
no American ally should supply material that would aid the Soviet arms industry. 
Particular concerns were raised in 1967 during the negotiation of an Anglo-Soviet contract 
for the supply of North Sea Oil. This contract, the United States State Department argued, 
would mean "the UK will have achieved almost perfect score of opposition to us in NATO 
on [East-West] issues.,,7!! Despite this governmental debate on trading with the Soviet 
bloc. the left-wingers who encouraged trade faced strong criticism for their unilateral 
action and were often accused of acting as vehicles for pro-Sovietism. 
Desmond Donnelly, a staunch Gaitskellite, argued that "MPs should not accept 
Communist hospitality in the present state of international relations". He pursued his 
critique of left-wing activists by stating that "I have also felt deeply at the sight of British 
MPs being used as vehicles for Communist propaganda such as the East German 
campaign for rccognition.,,76 Donnelly links two very different arguments in this criticism 
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of these figures. Those who chose to argue the cause of recognition for the German 
Democratic Republic [GDR], for example, did not necessarily also encourage" the 
establishment of trading links with the GDR. Some argued that official recognition was a 
necessary step towards East-West rapprochement. However, the most prominent voice in 
support of the GDR was that of Renee Short, who also championed trade expansion. 
Therefore these two issues became intrinsically linked. Official recognition of the GDR 
ended the debates over the German question and enabled the establishment of trading 
links. However rapprochement was not the objective of all the advocates of establishing 
trading links. Sternberg was an opportunist and arguably so were many of his colleagues. 
However, East-West trade became part of a movement for establishing and maintaining 
structural contact between Britain and the Communist bloc. This was pursued extensively 
during the detente era. The objective was to develop an atmosphere of trust by establishing 
mutually beneficial economic links between East and West. This would establish an 
interdependent structure that could prevent the Cold War rationale from becoming 
dominant once again. 
It is important to provide some detail of how the trading networks were established. The 
chief task was introducing producers to markets. British businesses which produced goods 
that were in short supply in the Eastern bloc were identified. Introductions took place, and 
exchange visits encouraged. This allowed a working relationship to develop between 
trading partners." The involvement of organisations such as the BSFS and the SCR 
indicates that it was not a purely economic venture. The records of the Birmingham 
branch show that there was a constant flow of Russian workers, trade unionists and 
officials visiting businesses in Birmingham. These visits were a feature of the expanding 
trade links between the West Midlands and the Soviet Union. The Birmingham BSFS 
provided platforms for those who visited from the Communist bloc to deliver presentations 
to their British counterparts. These events focussed on worker's rights, international 
socialism and co-operation in the peace campaign.7s While there is no evidence that this 
increased pro-Soviet activity within these areas, it is clear that this was the intention.79 
Furthermore, the funding of strikes through CPGB links was also strengthened by this 
contact, as it represented the ideal of international workers' co-operation. This then was 
the undercurrent to non-governmental East-West trade, and goes some way to explain why 
it was viewed with such hostility. so 
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It appears that political infiltration was the central objective of Cominform. The Soviet 
government offered substantial profits to Western companies that signed contracts to 
supply their markets. Particularly high profit margins were given to those companies that 
allowed further contact between Soviet representatives and their employees.81 This contact 
involved allowing Soviet diplomats to visit and facilitating their lecturing tours of 
Britain.82 British businessmen were also treated to all-expenses paid visits to the Soviet 
Union. These visits were organised through Progressive Tours and designed to show 
visitors the benefits of a communist society. It is difficult to gauge what effect, if any, 
these visits had.83 Equally it is difficult to ascertain the number of businessmen who 
became involved in East-West trading. Risks existed for those who did visit the Soviet 
Union frequently. There was the opportunity for blackmail, or more simply businessmen 
could be offered other ways of increasing profits, such as importing propaganda. It was 
these risks, which were dwelt upon by the opponents of East-West trade, that cast 
suspicion on Mikardo's trading network. 
It is implausible to argue that those who argued for increases in East-West trade were 
aware of Cominform's objectives for encouraging the establishment of trading links. 
However those who pursued these activities cannot have been unaware of the oppositions' 
arguments. This begs the question of whether the supporters of increased East-West trade 
decided to ignore these allegations as erroneous, part of anti-Communist irrationality, or 
that they were aware of the risks but did not see them as an obstacle worthy of serious 
consideration. The latter argument is most plausible given the potential benefits of selling 
goods to the Communist bloc. The alternative thesis is that figures like Mikardo knew 
exactly what they were doing and willingly supported the Soviet Union by aiding the 
Communist bloc economically and allowing Cominform agents access to the British 
economy and society. This question is highly pertinent when studying figures who 
simultaneously expressed .a sympathetic attitude to the Soviet Union. lan Mikardo, the 
man responsible for encouraging extensive trading links to develop during the detente 
period, is evaluated as an example of an individual who actively pursued trading links with 
the Communist bloc specifically. Therefore an examination of his arguments and 
perspectives can shed some light upon the question of motives. 
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The Rebel of Zion 
lan Mikardo was born of Russo-Jewish refugees into the East End of London. His parents 
originated from Podolia in the Western Ukraine region of Russia, and were among many 
Jews who left Tsarist Russia to escape the pogroms. Their intended destination was 
America, but unscrupulous 'travel operators' took them to the nearest ship and stowed 
them in the hull. Finding the comparative safety of the Jewish community in London 
would have been a relief for Moshe and Bluma Mikardo. However, it was a harsh 
environment for a young boy, who could speak only Yiddish, to grow up in. In his 
autobiography Mikardo recalled being bullied by British children for being Jewish and by 
young Jews for not speaking English properly. He recalled feeling a strong sense of 
isolation and estrangement from the society in which he lived: ''Those who go through that 
harrowing experience become either haters themselves or internationalists, and I had the 
good fortune to come out of it right side Up.,,84 This internationalism made him an ideal 
member of the Labour left whom he joined in 1945. His close friends in the House were 
Zilliacus, Leslie SoUey and Sydney Silverman, all of whom would have shared his 
experiences as children. He also had close ties with the Swinglers. Anne recalled him 
being a true socialist who saw no one as an enemy.8S Beyond the political education he 
gained within the Jewish Community, and through the Marxist Zionist party Poale Zion 
which had links to the Labour party, he also worked on Oswald Mosley's magazine 
Action. Mikardo shared Mosley's ideal of a centralised, state economy,86 though this 
association ended when Mosley turned to Fascism. 
Mikardo entered the House as MP for Reading in 1945. Like many of his contemporary 
debutantes he possessed "the euphoric romantic belief that we were about to break out of 
the constraints of past practice and create a brave new world.,,87 This feeling was to lead 
him to forge close ties with the left-wing. Mikardo launched oppositional motions against 
Bevin and shared Platts-Mills perception of the Foreign Secretary as anti-Semitic and 
closed-minded.88 Mikardo was not as prominent dissident as those classified as the party's 
Lost Sheep, leading him to be accused by Zilliacus of "pulling his punches".89 He allied 
with the Keep Left group of Bevanites, supported the Crossman Amendment, but avoided 
the sensitive telegrams. However Mikardo did oppose the Cold War on principle and 
argued that there was a personal aspect to Bevin's anti-Communism. Mikardo recalled that 
in 1937, the Transport and General Workers' Union [TGWU] leader and prominent CPGB 
member, Bert Papworth had thwarted Bevin by holding a strike calling for a shorter 
191 
working day to coincide with the coronation of George VI. Mikardo argued that on 
meeting Molotov, Bevin "saw behind the full moon face of the Communist Foreign 
Minister the more rugged features of the communist Bert Papworth, and said to himself 
'Lest We Forget' .,,90 Mikardo believed that Bevin's attitude was a serious obstacle to co-
operation between Britain and the Soviet Union and, like many of the pro-Soviet MPs, 
Mikardo argued that the Cold War, and its "sterile anti-Communism",91 was an illogical 
course for Britain. 
Initially he, and like minded rebels, hoped Bevin and Attlee could be convinced of the 
error of their policy. This ideal faded fast and was replaced by, firstly dogged defiance, 
and then a more personal crusade. Mikardo, unlike Bevan and others, was never silenced. 
He expressed his opposition without invoking the Soviet Union, in contrast to Stan 
Newens and Renee Short. However was as opposed to the Cold War as any of his pro-
Soviet colleagues. Quietly, and often anonymously,92 he argued for a "democratic and 
socialist alternative to an otherwise inevitable conflict.,,93 
Mikardo moved in left-wing circles for his entire political career, preferring the 
independence he enjoyed as a lifelong backbencher. He was a member of both Keep Left 
and Victory for Socialism and had input into the One Way Only pamphlet which critically 
examined the myth that the Soviet Union was preparing to attack. Mikardo argued that 
this was ludicrous as the Soviet Government lacked both the: "will and capacity for an 
invasion of the West.,,94 Mikardo reiterated this argument when drafting the Labour party 
pamphlet Sense about Defence,9.5 the document that became party policy from 1980 
to1983. 
Mikardo was a key left-wing activist on the Labour NEC. He campaigned for allowing the 
CLPs to choose their own candidates, a move that ensured a greater influx of left-wing 
candidates, particularly those selected as Second XI members and former Victory for 
Socialism activists, during the 1970s and 80S.96 Furthermore, Mikardo was no stranger to 
writing policy documents, however he maintained a centre-left position in these 
publications.97 From his writings it is possible to gain a picture of his political position. 
In 1948 he published a personal manifesto detailing his prescribed party programme for 
the second term of office. In this he talked of establishing 'economic integration' with 
Europe and the development of "trade with Eastern Europe".98 While at this time the 
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Soviet sphere was only becoming established it is clear that his objective was some form 
of economic rapprochement. 
Mikardo's centre-left position, and avoidance of pro-Soviet arguments, indicates that he 
made attempts to ensure that he was not perceived as a fellow traveller. His name was 
once attached to the list of supporters of the British Peace Committee [BPC], which was 
allied to the World Peace Council, [WPC] and reputedly a Soviet front organisation.99 
Morgan Phillips, when investigating 'illegal' associations of party members, wrote to 
Mikardo asking for an explanation, making it clear that membership of such an 
organisation was not conducive to Labour party membership. In reply Mikardo assured 
Phillips that "I have never been associated with the activities of this body."IOO Arguably, 
despite not being a member of the BPC, his arguments did follow the general tenets of the 
organisation. Mikardo maintained the stance that Britain should adopt a pro-peace policy 
towards the Soviet Union and declare itself independent from United States dictates. He 
sponsored the Committee for European Security and Co-operation [CESC] Which, though 
not ostensibly a front organisation. was chaired by Gordon Schaffer, BSFS and CPGB 
executive member. This organisation was a key exponent of the pro-Helsinki perspective 
and maintained support for Soviet arguments on arms control and verification. Mikardo. 
as a recognised expert in Russian affairs, pursued numerous Soviet links and as 
International Secretary of the Labour party, represented the party at various conferences. 
This allowed Mikardo to pursue a pro-peace agenda on the international stage. He was a 
strong advocate of East-West negotiations and asked. at 1973 CESC conference, if there 
was a price too high to ensure a peaceful future. lol 
In his autobiography he recalled having links with at least one member of the WPC, llya 
Ehrenburg, a colleague on East-West Round Table meetings. At these meetings British 
and Soviet delegates discussed world issues in an open forum. The underlying agenda, 
Mikardo freely admits, was to open discourse beneath governmental level on both sides. 
Representing the Labour party, though not in an official capacity, were Mikardo, Konni 
Zilliacus and John Mendelson. 102 The latter two Mikardo described as the most active 
members. due to them being "well informed on all complexities and nuances of 
international politics".lo3 He admitted though that from these events a friendship between 
him and the Ehrenburgs grew and that he and his wife Mary often visited their dacha in 
Chechov. 
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Mikardo also made a stand against the 'witch hunting' of 'Reds' in the Labour party. He 
particularly fought the opposition to the endorsement of Zilliacus, AlIaun and Ernie 
Roberts lO4 as parliamentary candidates. 105 His protest was, as he put it, that "my friends, 
and doubtless myself as well, [are] being spied on as though we were criminals."I06 It is 
doubtful that this stand was motivated simply by self-interest. Mikardo, along with Allaun 
and Jim Sillars,107 had input into the Tribune Group pamphlet Party or Puppet, which 
called for greater democratisation of the Labour party selection procedure l08 and he 
constantly opposed the dictatorial tactics of the Gaitskellleadership. The main thrust of his 
alternative, dubbed the 'Mikardo doctrine',109 was to allow the CLPs to have responsibility 
for candidate selection. This exemplifies the campaign, which he launched from within 
Victory for Socialism, for greater power to be bestowed upon the grassroots level of the 
Labour party. However there were also personal motivations for this campaign and it 
appears that it was the campaign against his friend Zilliacus that encouraged Mikardo to 
lead opposition against the dictates of Transport House. 
Zilliacus was a close friend of Ian Mikardo. 1 \0 They had faced racist slurs together due to 
their names being 'non-English' .111 Therefore it would not be unexpected for Mikardo to 
show solidarity for a friend and colleague, particularly one for whom he had a deep 
respect. He described Zilliacus as "polyglot and encyclopaedic ... sometimes among us 
but never totally with US",112 which appears to sum up Mikardo's opinion of Zilliacus 
reasonably succinctly. Mikardo respected Zilliacus' knowledge and experience of foreign 
affairs. He also respected Zilliacus' determination in standing for what he believed in. 
However, Mikardo was not in total agreement with Zilliacus' sympathetic perspective of 
the Soviet Union. They were colleagues and friends but it is unlikely that they were 
fellow agents as Gordievsky would have us believe. I 13 
Ideologically Mikardo stood for a middle way in international affairs and was not pro-
Soviet. Like Newens he maintained a staunch anti-American position and opposed the 
institutionalisation of the Cold War because it had turned the "[British] Foreign Office into 
a subsidiary and subordinate branch of the State Department". 114 This was a perspective he 
shared with many of his colleagues within Victory for Socialism. He was a staunch 
supporter of left-wing causes, speaking out against nuclear weapons, Britain's support for 
the Vietnam connict and US interventionism in Latin America, particularly Cuba, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. He also congratulated Ho Chi Minh on his victory over the 
French coh)nial forces; crowing in his memoirs "Ere long they were to outdo that feat of 
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defeatin a Great Power by defeating a Superpower." I IS Mikardo also promoted greater 
priv' tisation and state control over the economy. This indicates that, in essence, he did not 
fit with t e Atlanticist dominated, revisionist party of which he was an elected member. 
In his autobiography he described his involvement in East-West trading as being based 
upon good business sense: "The one market in which British exporters were furthest 
behind their competitors from other countries was the Soviet bloc.',116 He conducted wide 
research both in Eastern Europe and among British businessmen and it was in Britain that 
he found the greatest obstacles. Those who accepted the anti-Soviet propaganda had a 
variety of "silly reasons,,117 for avoiding association with the Soviet Union and "were 
convinced by bogey tales in the tabloids that if they went on a business visit to Eastern 
Europe all sorts of horrendous things could happen to them."lIs Mikardo strove to alter 
these perceptions. He held seminars explaining how British businessmen could understand 
the political instruments and markets of a Communist country. These dealt with the 
mechanics of economic planning, how it could be analysed to make sense in capitalist 
terms and how these plans could be translated into a list of requirements that could be met 
by British industry. Importantly he also educated them in the language they should use 
when dealing with the Soviet industrialist. These seminars were extremely successful. 
Mikardo, as the East-West liaison, acted as a broker within the Communist market on 
behalf of many British public and private sector companies and at least one colonial trade 
development council. Jo Richardson was employed, within lan Mikardo pIe, as co-
ordinator and maintained links with parties from both sides of the Iron Curtain. He 
recalled that "it was full of interest and challenge, and in the course of it we made a lot of 
friends and had a lot of fun.,,119 
He freely admitted his contact with Communist officials but highlighted that these were 
not always cordial. One occasion he recalled was an experience during a visit to Hungary. 
He was introduced to a group of Polish Jews by his "unsmiling and rigidly Stalinist,,120 
interpreter. He began asking questions about what he considered the normal aspects of 
traditional Jewish life, activities that remained part of his own life. These questions, he 
was to realise, were not the questions that an English politician should be asking. This was 
made apparent when he heard one say to another in Yiddish, "This Englishman is by no 
means a gullible fool." Advantageously his knowledge of Yiddish enabled him to ask 
what made them think he would be a gullible fool. Once the surprise abated, the 
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conversation was continued in Yiddish; the interpreter, probably a KGB agent employed 
to govern the conversation, was completely excluded. 121 
He and Jo Richardson maintained Mikardo's trading network until 1977, when lan 
Mikardo plc was folded. He does not give a reason for the cessation, however their age, 
and Richardson's failing health. were the most probable causes. While the trading network 
potentially benefited the Soviet government it is doubtful that this was Mikardo's 
intention. He maintained a critical view of the Soviet political system and, though he 
expressed some sympathy for the economic model, highlighted the inconsistencies 
between Soviet rhetoric and the reality of life under Communism. He witnessed at first 
hand the acute shortage of consumer goods in the Muscovite shops and was aware from 
his research that this shortage was deliberately created by the Government. Equally he 
recognised that there were vast inequalities between the living standards of the masses and 
of the apparatchiks, and argued that this was in stark contrast to the image projected by 
Soviet propaganda. More importantly he argued that the General Secretary was an 
unelected dictator and often argued that the Soviet society could never become socialist 
unless it was democratised. Therefore he supported many of the key tenets of the anti-
Soviet position. 
However, he did not see the Soviet Union as a threat to Britain and argued that there was 
little enmity in the Soviet Union towards the West. Mikardo's role, therefore, was as a 
conduit of understanding between the Communist East and the Capitalist West, though we 
can argue that the Soviet Union saw him as facilitating a unidirectional channel of 
propaganda and influence. It seems that he saw the Soviet attempts to penetrate British 
society as having little significance and worth the risk if co-existence could be nurtured. 
Ironically it seems possible that Mikardo, in introducing capitalists to the Soviet Union, 
unwittingly introduced capitalism to the Soviet system. The quality of goods produced 
under capitalism were seen as far superior to Soviet-produced goods and the living 
standards experienced by many of the apparatchiks who visited Britain caused some to 
doubt in the Communist system. 122 
Mikardo enjoyed a degree of influence within the Soviet Union, and was seen as a non-
aligned East-West expert within the British political system. This is indicated by the fact 
that. in July 1985 he advised Gorbachev during his visit to Britain. This was with the 
approval of both British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the Soviet government. 
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Mikardo produced a paper for Gorbachev on the effect of his glasnost and perestroika 
programmes on the East-West relationship and recalled that this paper was "studied and 
appreciated by [the] foreign ministries of both countries.,,123 Therefore, during the final 
years of the Cold War, Mikardo attempted, arguably successfully, to act as a bridge across 
the ideological divide. 
This was Mikardo's chief objective. He revelled in this image and maintained that he 
represented neither American capitalism nor Soviet Communism. Thus he attempted to 
position himself as a cultural bridge between East and West and described the trading 
network as "a little candle lighting up one corner of a dark world". 124 The ideal of 
establishing some form of mutually beneficial contact between the Soviet Union and 
Britain does not appear to be an unusual objective among the left-wing that opposed the 
Cold War rationale. Mikardo, like many of his left-wing colleagues, followed the rationale 
that if the British government refused to end East-West hostilities, then he would attempt, 
at non-governmental level, to plant the seeds of peaceful co-existence. 
During the period of detente this activity can be seen as symptomatic of, and contiguous 
to, the changing international atmosphere. The trading links established were small but 
highly important aspects of the new climate of understanding that was developing at the 
governmental level. While the activity and the links established were not confined purely 
to the period identified as that of detente, they symbolised the kind of future these Labour 
left-wingers desired. Their ideal world order was one where the Western capitalist 
accommodated, co-existed with and learned to understand the Communist. Mikardo was a 
highly successful businessman, well educated in the capitalist world. He argued for 
economic planning and state control, as practised in the Soviet Union, and promoted the 
perception that the Soviet Union was not an imperialist and expansionist power but merely 
practising a policy of protectionism. This analysis was used to explain why the Soviet 
leadership saw that the degree of control over the Russian people and the citizens of its 
satellites was necessary. 
Mikardo appears to have hoped that as detente developed, alongside interlinkages at the 
non-governmental level, this 'bunker mentality' would be relaxed. This was espoused by 
the Brezhnev doctrine, and later expressed in terms of glasnost and perestroika. Mikardo 
supported these initiatives and attempted to alter the climate of opinion towards the Soviet 
Union to accommodate these changes. This was the mission pursued by many within this 
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political strand. The pro-Soviet left particularly, and many within the broad left of the 
Labour party, supported the ideals of the Brezhnev doctrine and hoped that the Soviet 
Union could develop in line with that ideal. Importantly they recognised that this could not 
be achieved in an atmosphere of hostility. Therefore some MPs undermined the Cold War 
rationale by actively attempting to improve East-West relations. Detente offered the 
perfect opportunity for this and Mikardo seized this moment with alacrity, creating 
sustainable trading links between East and West. The international atmosphere was to 
thwart his hopes and the objective he had worked towards was to fail in the face of 
renewed and invigorated anti-Communism. This meant that the campaign would be 
forced exclusively into the extra-parliamentary sphere, a level at which extensive links 
were developed by many of Mikardo's left-wing colleagues during the period of detente. 
'Red Renee' 
While Mikardo, assisted by fellow left-wingers in the East-West Trade Parliamentary 
Group, was responsible for the creation of trading links, others on the Labour benches 
were constantly striving to create a more favourable environment for the success of their 
efforts. Several of these MPs were accused of acting as agents at some stage or another. 
This is particularly the case with Will Owen, who faced espionage charges in 1971, and 
Arthur Bax, who also allegedly worked for the Czech Embassy. Bax was a prominent 
advocate of establishing East-West trade links. However, evidence suggests that this was 
only one aspect of his pro-Soviet activities. Pincher stated that as a result of a 
conversation with Lord George Brown, who at the time was Deputy leader of the Labour 
party, Brown testified that Bax had admitted passing on information regarding the party 
and its members. 12S This appears to indicate that those MPs who advocated East-West 
trade, and were frequent visitors to the Soviet Union, were seen as, and in some cases 
were, confidential contacts of the KGB. 126 
There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that either Ian Mikardo or Renee Short were 
agents or contacts. However they were probably perceived as assets by their Soviet 
contacts, particularly Renee Short who appears to have been a devout pro-Soviet 
sympathiser and activist, more so than Mikardo. At present Short's papers are 
inaccessible, and she is unwilling to discuss this issue,127 so a picture of her pro-Soviet 
activities can only be created by looking at her scant writings in the press and the 
affiliations she pursued during her political life. This dearth of information on Short is 
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unfortunate as her involvement in pro-Soviet organisations and her constant pursuit of pro-
Soviet objectives, indicates that she was a key figure within the pro-Soviet strand and 
would have been viewed as an important asset by the British political observers in 
Moscow. 
During her parliamentary career Short served as Vice Chairperson of the Parliamentary 
East-West Trade Group, Chairperson of both the British-GDR Parliamentary Group and 
the British-Soviet Parliamentary Group, and President of the British-Romanian Friendship 
Association. She was also listed as a sponsor for the League for Democracy in Greece and 
the CESC. Evidence indicates that she joined other similar organisations without holding 
an executive pOSt.128 It is equally apparent from the causes that she espoused in the House 
that Short willingly promoted arguments which furthered the aims of the Soviet Union, 
particularly trade, rapprochement, and nuclear disarmament. Short was probably a clearer 
case of a fellow traveller, if we were to employ this definition, than many of the left-
wingers who pursued pro-Soviet activities during the detente era. Her arguments 
transcend those of Zilliacus and A1laun, though the latter supported her on a number of 
issues. She would have been aware that her consistently pro-Soviet stance was unpopular, 
however opposition did not deter her in the slightest. 
Short collected allies throughout her career. lames Lamond cited her as an influence129 and 
during debates when she was prominent she gained support from most of the figures 
identified as having sympathies with the Soviet bloc. However Short stands out within 
this group because she maintained a explicit pro-Soviet perspective and on every occasion 
upon which she contributed to a debate on an issue that would effect the Soviet Union or 
her allies she argued the pro-Soviet case. 
It is significant that those who viewed her with highest regard were within the pro-Soviet 
coterie while those in mainstream politics saw her, at the very least, as radical. Former 
Labour MP Nigel Spearing, on hearing her name, laughed saying "ah yes Red Renee".l30 
In contrast, Philip Crees, Chairman of the Birmingham BSFS 1966-94, described her as 
"one of the more progressive types".l3l Audrey Wise,132 a fellow Coventry MP and 
Short's replacement on the NEC as Womens' Section representative, recalled her as: "a 
good friend and devout supporter of the oppressed in Britain and abroad. She spoke 
common sense ... We sometimes followed different causes but I miss her support. l33 lames 
Lamond and WiIIiam WiIson viewed her arguments with the greatest respect. l34 Equally 
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indicative is the lack of recognition she received within the Transport and General 
Worker's Union [TGWU] and its monthly paper The Record. Given that this voiced the 
moderate stance of leader Jack Jones, alongside the Union's sponsored MPs George 
Brown, Arthur Creech-Jones and John Silkin, it seems unsurprising that no room could be 
found for the opinion of Renee Short. The only clear link between Short and the TGWU is 
that the Union paid her election expenses. 
It should be noted that Renee Short was not however a single-issue MP. In fact during her 
career she promoted many domestic causes. These were social issues, particularly those 
which concerned women. Her only major publications dealt with the condition of long-
term prisoners and women and children's health issues. Alongside her pro-Soviet 
affiliations she was also President of the Nursery Schools Association and Action for the 
Newborn from 1988, a member of the British Medical Association, the Campaign for 
Nursery Education and the Women's National Cancer Control Campaign, acting as Vice 
President of the latter. We can, therefore, view her as an active campaigner on behalf of 
many causes and she used her parliamentary role as a promotional platform for them all. 
To gain an insight into her broader ideals it is useful to study some of the causes to which 
she lent her name. Short was a champion of the pro-Abortion lobby, sponsoring the 1967 
Abortion Act. Equally she was scandalised by the lack of representation for women in 
parliament and admits "harangu[ing] meetings on this issue."13S Equally, her publication 
on the rights for long-term prisoners argued for greater stress on rehabilitation, stating that 
family contact should be maintained through conjugal visits and that prisoners needed 
educating in order that they be equipped to cope on their return to society. 136 This provides 
the picture of Short as a staunch egalitarian and campaigner on behalf of minorities and 
the socially excluded. 
However, she often used the Soviet Union as a comparative case study for her arguments. 
For example in the course of the work on prisoners she stated that "British prisons had 
been shown to be unconstructive and less humane than those in other more progressive 
countries. 137 Though this inference is somewhat veiled, on other occasions the comparison 
between British and Soviet society was made much more explicit. To ascertain the basis of 
her pro-Sovietism, we need to look at the pro-Soviet causes Short pursued and the content 
of her arguments, which changed little over her years in parliament. This will generate 
some conclusions as to the nature and background of Renee Short's sympathies. 
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From her arrival in parliament in 1964, the chief objective of Short's argument was to 
encourage co-existence between East and West. However, unlike many of her left-wing 
colleagues, Short did not promote rapprochement from a pacifist stance. Short's position 
was that the peoples of Eastern Europe were not the 'evil Communists' that anti-Soviet 
propaganda inferred but that they sought co-operation and a cessation to the atmosphere of 
mistrust. Short opposed any policy that could damage the fragile East-West relations, 
arguing for the greatest possible gains to the Soviet side attainable from successively anti-
Communist governments of either political colour. She gained some minor achievements 
as a member of Labour's NEC. However, NEC policy directives were seldom adopted by 
Labour when in power and therefore Short took her campaign directly to the House. 
It is unknown when she joined the British-GDR Friendship Society, however James 
Lamond recalled that, when he entered parliament in 1970, Short was already a key figure 
within many of the parliamentary friendship groups. It is clear that the GDR was of 
special interest to her and Short opposed moves to encourage defection. On the 6th 
December 1965 she revealed that a letter from one of the West German Embassy staff in 
Nicosia had been passed to a group of East German artists. This stated, in Short's words, 
that "if these people did not wish to return to what the writer called the "Soviet Occupation 
Zone" of Germany they could go to the British, French, American or German Embassies 
for help." 138 Before she was able to give her account of the ramifications of such actions, 
the Speaker interrupted Short. This led her to put a similar question forward for written 
answer seven days later. Her question asked what measures were being made to improve 
relations between the UK and the GDR. .The beleaguered Walter Padley139 gave her a one-
word reply: "None.,,140 This did not deter her. 
The issue of official recognition for the GDR was constantly high on her agenda. 
Criticising her own Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, George Brown, for not 
following his resolution of the 1961 Conference, she called the absence of recognition 
"ridiculous", arguing that the ruling rationale forced the Government to "pay lip service to 
what the West Germans say about East Germany." 141 This criticism was employed 
particularly when arguing for an increase in trade with the GDR. Short argued that this 
would be enhanced by a visit from Herr SoeHe, East German Minister for Foreign Trade. 
A visit prevented due to the political status of the GDR. The British Government, she 
argued, "should not allow political prejudices to interfere with our trade.,,142 Short also 
argued that it was the FDR government that had ensured that the GDR remained excluded 
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In order to enhance West German economic interests. Britain, she argued, was 
"hamstrung by the idiotic Hallstein doctrine l43 and ... over-conscientious in keeping to its 
rules". 144 The doctrine did not stop the FDR trading British made goods with the GDR and 
enjoying the profits, she argued. The Labour Government's intransigence over this issue 
was anathema to everything Short believed in. She stated that the policy: "prevent[ed] 
peace-loving friends from East Germany coming here". 145 It is interesting that she made 
no reply to George Brown's rebuttal "what inhibits peace-loving friends from East 
Germany coming here more than the existence of the Wall for which they are 
responsible."1~6 
Short reiterated these pro-GDR arguments on several occasions. Support came from Will 
Owen and Arthur Lewis. Owen was a champion of East-West trade throughout his 
parliamentary career and he also involved himself first hand. Therefore, it is arguable that 
Owen, like Mikardo, had an interest in receiving governmental sanction and, where 
possible, enhancing conditions to further profit. It appears that Short pursued this issue 
purely in the name of improving relations between Britain and the Soviet bloc. 
An early example of her campaign to improve relations with the Soviet bloc was Short's 
interest in the impending visit of Alexei Kosygin, Soviet Prime Minister. Short 
encouraged the Prime Minister Harold Wilson to speed up the process stating that: 
we on these benches and the majority of people in this country long passionately 
for progress on two aspects on which we are fully committed, namely a nuclear-
free Europe and a non-proliferation treaty. 147 
This argument is similar to those of the Zilliacus tradition, which argued that every effort 
should be made to get Soviet representatives to the negotiating table and, once there, to 
make every effort to accommodate them. Short, however, seems to have taken this 
activism one stage further by actively taking part in encouraging contact between the 
British and their East European counterparts. It can be argued that her objective was to 
alter the perception of the Soviet world; what Pat Litherland described as putting "the 
cardboard Russians back in 3D.,,148 
Short also keenly opposed the entry of Britain into the Common Market; this, she argued, 
would create a further bloc that excluded the Soviet Union: 
the major problem which faces us is not whether to go into the Common Market 
but to get a settlement of the political issues which divide Europe, an agreement on 
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the frontiers between the two Germanys and a security conference between East 
and West. This cannot be done without the Soviet Union. 149 
Her analysis of each issue agreed unequivocally with that of the Soviet Union and her 
allies. No matter what issue she addressed, Short exhibited either devout support or a 
notable silence. Her silence, on Czechoslovakia for example, was striking because, 
despite the fact that her ideals should have led her to oppose the actions of the Soviet 
leadership, she refused to denounce the Soviet Union. This does raise the question of what 
led Short, a democratic socialist, to support a nation whose political and foreign policy 
objectives appeared to be opposed to every principle her party stood for. Short, like many 
sympathisers of Communist regimes, held the belief that "[a]ny criticism of Russia, any 
candid discussion of Soviet problems ... was to aid the Revolution's enemies."lSO 
The roots of Short's pro-Soviet perspective remain a matter for speculation as there is little 
recorded detail on her political ideas. Short produced one report for the NEC entitled 
'Socialist Philosophy'. This unpublished article encouraged moves towards worker's 
control, state planning and greater social equality. This gives the impression that she held 
some Marxist tendencies. This is reinforced by her recommendation to the party that 
Labour should "carry out socialist policies and not allow itself to be swayed by the 
interests of free enterprise". m In this document she appears to have fitted with the 
Bennite tradition, but, unlike Benn, her pro-Soviet sympathies guided her perception of 
foreign affairs. Short was also a prominent campaigner for sexual equality, and was a 
tireless campaigner for child-care facilities to be made available in the workplace. With 
Audrey Wise, she argued that the House of Commons should recognise that women MPs 
had family commitments and should set working hours in a way compatible with women's 
lifestyles. 1s2 Short also devoted a significant amount of time to the pro-Abortion 
campaign, and argued that women were entitled to equal pay and equal opportunities in 
the workplace, while being recognised as having different needs. It is for this work that 
many of her colleagues like to remember her. 
It is difficult to define Renee Short's personal principles, and how the pro-Soviet 
perspective fitted into her philosophy. Her speeches and scant writings show a belief in 
social equality through proletarian control. However, she did not elucidate what form of 
government she favoured. It appears that she held a belief in the Labour party as a 
working class representative, and maintained that the party could adopt a pivotal role in 
ending the Cold War, a view she shared with many of her colleagues within the pro-Soviet 
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left. This was an illusory ideal that often made her appear estranged from the Labour 
party's broad church of traditions. Despite this Short did enjoy a degree of influence within 
the party; having a seat on the NEC from 1970 to 1981. However, she exerted little real 
influence over policy. Throughout her career Short worked consistently with a dual 
agenda and was instrumental in promoting the arguments of the Soviet Union in the House 
and within the party. She expressed her pro-Soviet arguments in such a way that indicates 
that they were ideals to which she herself was firmly committed. 
From her position of limited power, Short did her best to ensure that organisations within 
the pro-Soviet orbit were able to recruit party members. To this end Short led a campaign 
within the NEC to end the policy of proscription. She highlighted that two organisations, 
the Labour Research Department [LRD] and the Medical Aid Committee for Vietnam 
[MACV], enjoyed substantial support among party members. Short campaigned for de-
proscription of the MACV by using the LRD as an example of the inconsistency between 
rules and reality. Her proposal was that the rules either required tightening or that 
proscription should be officially abolished. In an Organisational Sub-Committee meeting 
of 6th December 1971 Short revealed the scale of membership shared by the Labour party 
and the LRD and asked what should be done. Subsequent investigation found that the 
majority of Trade Unions were affiliated to the LRD therefore expulsion, the prescribed 
response, could not be pursued. At the Sub-Committee meeting t h February 1972 it was 
decided that proscription of the LRD was no longer tenable. The following year Short, as 
Vice Chair of the NEC, demanded that the whole list of proscribed organisations be put 
forward for review. The report found that many Union leaders and left-wing MPs were 
ineligible for membership. The only viable conclusion remained to abandon 
proscription. 153 
While this conclusion was common sense the fact that the issue was raised by Short, a 
veteran of at least five of these organisations, is important. In essence she appears to have 
advertised her pro-Soviet affiliations and dared the party to dismiss her. Short had a 
strong position as Women's Section representative on the NEC and enjoyed the support of 
a majority of the Executive. 154 Furthermore Trade Union leaders such as Ken Gill, General 
Secretary of the Technical and Support Section [T ASS] of the AEUW, Ron Hayward and 
Alex Kitson, both of the TGWU. also supported various proscribed organisations and 
shared Short's pro-Soviet sympathies. Mikardo also supported the motion on the grounds 
that a socialist party should not fight totalitarianism by restricting the political affiliations 
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of its members. Therefore at the 1973 Conference, a broad left-wing consensus emerged in 
favour of Short's motion. 
The abandonment of proscription quantitatively increased the membership of various pro-
Soviet organisations. The pro-Soviet left-wingers were now able to affiliate and pursue the 
aims of pro-Soviet organisations without fear of the sort of reprisals that Zilliacus and 
Platts-Mills had faced. Following this decision James Lamond became Vice President of 
the World Peace Council [WPC], the parliamentarian membership of the League for 
Democracy in Greece increased exponentially and William Wilson became President of 
the British-Soviet Friendship Society. Despite the Home Office's fear of such 
organisations, there were no harmful effects to national security. The MPs who chose to 
support organisations like the WPC were a minority and the organisation did not gain any 
significant influence. However it did give these organisations a degree of credibility and 
lent their events a higher profile. This was, arguably, Short's objective when campaigning 
against proscription. 
The fact that she did not hide her affiliations shows that Short saw nothing covert, or 
subversive, about her activities. In fact there appears, as with James Lamond, a sense of 
pride in her stance and the activities that were associated with pro-Sovietism. Short 
appears to have subscribed to the notion of 'no enemies to the left' and lived by this 
principle. This is indicated by the fact that when Labour Monthly published eulogies to 
Raj ani Palme Dutt, out of all the Labour MPs who contributed, hers was the most 
affectionate. Julius Silverman and Fenner Brockway, both of whom were left-wingers 
who pursued similar arguments to Short, praised Dutt's devotion to duty but highlighted 
the different courses they had chosen. Short appears not to have perceived any difference. 
Short believed that she and Dutt were engaged in the same struggle: 
It is always sad when a devoted socialist and a staunch comrade dies. Raji'sm 
whole life was dedicated to the struggle for a better society for all working people, 
wherever they lived, whatever their race or religion. He was a fiery, determined 
speaker, a man of passion and conviction as I remember him. 156 
In furthering her campaigns for racial and sexual equality and proletarian economic 
control she pursued every route available to her. Her methodology was close to Dutt's as 
Short also lent her support to the Soviet Union because her leaders espoused socialist 
principles. It is unfortunate that we do not know more about her influences, however 
arguably her strand of thought was infused with the idealistic principles inherent in the 
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work of the Webbs and G D H Cole. She perceived the Soviet Union as a socialist nation 
and maintained that Communist society was governed with a socialist ethos,' this 
perception had been established through several guided tours of Communist bloc nations: 
"[m]y visits to the Soviet Union extend over many years from the late 1950s and early 
1960s and they have shown me how warm hearted the Soviet people are". 157 
Short published several favourable reports following her visits. Combining her interest in 
child welfare she researched the education system in the Soviet Union and published her 
findings in the Guardian newspaper. Though she did not observe anything radically 
different from the domestic educational system it is obvious that she was highly 
impressed. She particularly highlighted the "real attempt to inculcate social and moral 
responsibility at every level."ls8 In Soviet schools, older, more able students provided 
assistance to their younger peers she told the reader. This, she argued, helped to create a 
society founded upon collective responsibility where: "the strong must help the weak."IS9 
She refused to accept that the reality of Soviet society was markedly different to the model 
shown to visitors as it appears that Short, as an individual who needed to believe in the 
existence of a socialist society, could not accept these notions. 
Equally it was the Soviet Union, she argued, that had defeated fascism, and so should be 
recognised as a worthy anti-imperialist ally of the British Labour party. 160 Short opposed 
the post-war vilification of the Soviet Union and attempted to change public perceptions 
of, and governmental policy towards, Communism. Her methodology was to encourage 
the development of cultural links as these "between young people, are among the best 
ways of pursuing a fruitful and friendly policy.,,161 As Short openly stated, she actively 
pursued this goal through "voluntary organisations".162 Opponents of Communism 
classified these organisations as fronts for Soviet policy but this was not the view held by 
those who opposed the Cold War rationale. Short did oppose that rationale and acted 
accordingly. It appears that her activities were aimed towards the ultimate goal of co-
existence, a goal that was anathema to most of her parliamentary colleagues. This did not 
deter her from her mission and she actively enlisted like-minded individuals to her cause. 
It is likely that she was viewed by Soviet diplomats as an asset, and possibly an agent. 
How she viewed herself is unknown. Short's goal, like Dutl's, was to create a socialist 
society in Britain and help establish an international order based upon peaceful co-
existence. Her aftiliations appear to be the product of a degree of idealism and can, in 
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some cases, appear highly questionable given her position within the Labour party. This 
illustrates the fact that the pro-Soviet perspective was developed by individuals ~hose 
perceptions differed from the opinions that were popularised during the Cold War era. 
Short held the perception that the Soviet Union was not an enemy but a beleaguered nation 
isolated by an antagonistic world order. She and others offered their support to the 
Communist bloc, despite the perceptions of others and with little regard for the reality of 
life under Communism. Her ultimate objective was to alter the prevailing climate of 
opinion. She hoped that her position of influence would enable her, in tandem with her 
colleagues in parliament and the pro-Soviet organisations. to establish sustainable links 
that would ensure that Communism was understood and that the Soviet Union was drawn 
out of isolation and into the world order. 
Detente from Below 
The three MPs studied in this chapter characterise the types of activity that developed 
alongside detente. These activities can be broadly defined as firstly, promoting the new 
policy directives being introduced within the Warsaw Pact nations and thus encouraging 
political leaders to adjust their perceptions of the Communist bloc, secondly, the creation 
of institutions that reflected the thaw in governmental relations and lastly, expanding the 
work of organisations which pursued cultural and political East-West links. Pursuing these 
objectives shows that there was an iconic link between these individual's ideas and the 
Soviet model of socialism. whether that was in the current form or an abstract version. 
These MPs believed wholeheartedly in the process of establishing bipolar communication 
and devoted a large proportion of their career activities to furthering this process. Mikardo 
presciently described this as lighting a candle. These MPs held the view that they were 
instrumental players on the front line of the defence of humanity, acting to avoid war and 
pursue interdependence through cultural and economic links and the exchange of political 
ideas. 
It is equally important to note that each of these three cases possessed differing political 
beliefs. While it appears that Short was quite devoutly pro-Soviet, both Mikardo and 
Newens were critical of the regime and refused to offer unequivocal support for the Soviet 
socialist model. Therefore it is useful to explore why these three became prominent within 
the pro-Soviet milieu during the detente era. Stan Newens' ideas developed from a 
Trotskyist analysis. His ideal, however, was a global socialist revolution by democratic 
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means. During the Cold War this was impossible and. according to Newens' analysis. the 
nation that opposed socialism to the greatest extent was the United States, not 'only 
because it stood as the capitalist bastion but because it was pursuing a foreign policy that 
acted against socialist regimes. Detente offered the opportunity for an independent course 
that would threaten United States hegemony over the non-Communist sphere of influence. 
While Newens harboured deep mistrust of the Soviet leadership he had some sympathies 
for the economic system and he argued that this must be married to a democratic political 
system and an open society. This, he argued, had been achieved in Romania. Thus 
Newens was drawn towards the ideas emanating from the Communist bloc because he 
opposed American influence over Europe and supported the ideals of the socialist state. As 
was the case with many socialists who rejected the Soviet model. but sought a practical 
model for their ideals. Newens was drawn into supporting an alternative revolutionary 
state after Ceausescu had proclaimed that he shared Newens' values. As Hayden and Lynd 
found in various Communist states. "we call ourselves in some sense revolutionaries. So 
do they. After all. we identify with the poor and oppressed. So do they.,,163 Ceausescu 
promoted socialism, peace and co-operation. Newens was led to believe that Ceausescu 
was independent from Cominform's ideological and political control and that he 
represented the model for future Communist leaders. Romania was not the only focus 
Newens' arguments. He also supported Castro's Cuba, Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam and 
Ortega's El Salvador. Therefore he appears to have been constantly in search of a socialist 
model throughout his career. The models he supported all shared certain characteristics; 
they were in conflict with the United States and they espoused revolutionary socialist 
credentials. Ironically it was in the European Union that he would eventually find his 
political ideal, after apparently losing faith in revolutionary socialism completely. 
In contrast, Ian Mikardo. who also supported the ideal of the socialist society. had little 
sympathy for revolutionary doctrines. In his case part of his sympathetic outlook was due 
to racial solidarity. As was the case with Julius Silverman. a lifelong supporter of the SCR 
and Vice-President 1987-94. his roots were in the Russian Jewish community. Mikardo 
had supported the ideals of the 1917 revolutions and developed an analysis of Soviet 
history similar to that of Zilliacus. Mikardo recognised that the leadership was driven by a 
bunker mentality, but he rejected the thesis that there were socialist aspects to the Soviet 
model. His aim was to draw the two opposing ideologies together, establish some 
framework for co-operation and build the foundations for an interdependent future. This 
would neg'lte the need for anti-Soviet propaganda and anti-Russian attitudes in Western 
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society, lead to a reduction in defence spending and reduce the chances of war. Mikardo 
saw himself as a conduit of understanding between the two contrasting economic and 
political systems, not as an agent for one side or the other. This was a position that 
Newens also attempted, unsuccessfully, to carve out for himself 
Renee Short appears the most profoundly pro-Soviet of these cases and her activities and 
arguments are more consistent with Platts-Mills's approach to opposing the Cold War. 
Her objectives were the establishment of a socialist society based upon sexual and racial 
equality, public ownership and workers' control, none of which was tenable in the Cold 
War atmosphere. The vehicle for establishing this society was the Labour party and, from 
her position on the NEC, Short attempted to alter the party's political objectives while also 
attempting to establish an atmosphere of bipolar co-operation and co-existence. Her 
vehicles for achieving the latter goal were the 'voluntary organisations', which espoused 
the establishment of cultural links and encouraged contact between East and West at the 
individual level. Through her role within these organisations she would be invited to visit 
Eastern Europe and encouraged to provide reports on her visit. The 'guided tour' she 
received would have helped to convince her that the Soviet Union did indeed represent the 
model for her political objectives and encouraged her to protect the regime from her anti-
Communist enemies. 
While the motivations of these three MPs vary, their objectives were similar and their 
methods had a similar result. They shared the objective of wanting to alter the anti-
Communist climate of opinion and sought to institutionalise detente within British 
political and economic life. The result would be that the pro-Soviet cause gained some 
prominence, though among a minority, and that some Labour left-winger's socialist ideals 
became linked to the future of the Soviet Union. This was not the result Stan Newens or 
Ian Mikardo wanted to achieve. Their support for the Soviet Union, pursued through extra-
parliamentary activities became linked to their arguments for socialism. Therefore pro-
Soviet activities, and their concomitant arguments for establishing East-West links, 
became established as a tradition within the Labour party's ethos. This tradition had 
gained prominence among the pro-Soviet left-wing during the 1945-50 parliament and 
continued as a tradition within Victory for Socialism. It was this link, which was perceived 
as fundamental by some on the left, that led to the development of a campaign to protect 
the Soviet Union. 
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During the period of detente British socialists explored new ways of undermining the Cold 
War rationale. These methods would be the way forward as the stakes were raised 'Once 
again during the Second Cold War. As detente collapsed, and a renewed ideological 
determination emerged in the United States and the Soviet Union, pro-Soviet activity took 
on a renewed impetus. The links that were established under detente survived into the next 
decade and would be exploited by the pro-Soviet sympathisers, and their Soviet contacts, 
to encourage deeper forms of pro-Soviet activity. Within the period characterised as the 
second Cold War the McCarthy-style fears and allegations became almost an 
acknowledged truism. A minority of Labour MPs promoted Soviet policy within the 
British parliament and on the world stage. They became apologists for the aggressive 
foreign policy of the Soviet Union and, more importantly, exchanged political information 
with their Soviet counterparts. Equally party policy reflected a complete rejection of the 
anti-Soviet rationale and mirrored the arguments of the pro-Soviet tradition. Perhaps for a 
brief period the pro-Soviet MPs were happy within their own party; however they were so 
far from attaining real political influence that extra-parliamentary activity became the only 
avenue through which they could pursue their goals. 
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Chapter Six 
Raising the Stakes; The Second Cold War 
Detente had offered the left-wing, and in particular the pro-Soviet strand, the 
opportunity for co-existence to develop between the communist and capitalist blocs. 
However, by the end of the 1970s, the international atmosphere reverted to one of bi-
polar hostility. As Cox outlined, this was the result of the Soviet Union "on the 
march" I and a United States Presidency renewing its resolve to contain communism 
and exploit the weaknesses of an increasingly overstretched Soviet imperialism.2 The 
United States increased anti-Communist intervention in Latin America while the 
Soviet Union declared military rule in Poland and established a puppet government in 
Afghanistan.3 This led to the period 1979-87 being referred to as the Second Cold 
.u.---r-t-t-...cuawkish New Right alliance of Reagan and Thatcher abandoned the 
reconciliatory st nce of their predecessors; a policy that both leaders argued had left a 
void in Western security of which the Soviet leadership had taken advantage.s Soviet 
actions were used by the United States and British governments to prove that the New 
Right anti-Communist defence policy was the correct course and western propaganda 
characterised the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire' and the Cold War as an 
'irreconcilable conflict'. 6 A decisive war seemed inevitable. 
In Britain the collapse of detente led to the re-emergence of a deep fear of nuclear 
war7 and an increase in anti-Cold War activism among the pro-Soviet left-wingers. 
However the lack of influence over British policy meant that their objectives were 
limited to influencing opinion and establishing interdependent East-West links 
beneath governmental level. The internationalist's agenda involved attempting to 
encourage co-existence between the Soviet Union and the West through non-
governmental activity. Various pro-Soviet cultural organisations attempted to 
maintain unofficial dialogue and create an atmosphere of mutual understanding 
between Britain and the Soviet Union. The central aim was to limit the deterioration 
of East-West relations further and to prevent the outbreak of war.8 The increased 
hostilities, coupled with a need to counter the official antagonism, meant that the 
attraction of organisations that were disposed to preventing conflict and promoting 
co-existence increased. The pro-Soviet left attempted to gain wider support among 
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Labour party members, alter aspects of the party policy and lead the attack against the 
Thatcher-Reagan alliance in parliament. These MPs publicised, but failed· to 
popularise, the pro-Soviet analysis of international developments. This increased 
activism was facilitated by the Labour party's leftward shift which led the pro-Soviet 
left-wingers to feel that they were no longer polarised from the majority. 
At Labour party Conferences the left-wing Trade Unions held a considerable level of 
influence. This led to what Shaw described as the "paralysis of leadership.,,9 This was 
exacerbated by constitutional reforms within the party, spearheaded by the Campaign 
for Labour Party Democracy [CLPD], which were designed to redistribute power 
away from the PLP and award it to the rank and file. lo These reforms gave power to a 
left-wing dominated NEC and a broadly left-wing Union leadership. The power of the 
left-wing over the parliamentary party is the subject of some debate, but the fact that 
the left agenda became party policy and that this was diametrically opposed to the 
stance of the Callaghan-Healey leadership is indisputable. I I 
Thorpe highlighted the importance of the Trade Unions in shifting the party's stance. 
He argued that in supporting the constitutional reforms the Union leaders aimed to 
pay Callaghan back for his conservative responses to the 1978-9 economic crisiS. 12 
This should not be understood, however, as the left-winger's 'fit of pique'. The left-
wing fight for control was a coherent and organised attempt to ensure that the party 
leadership adhered to 'socialist principles' and that no future leader could betray the 
party by allying with the forces of capitalism. This could only be achieved by giving 
control to the workers, the party rank and file, and forcing the leaders to act as 
spokespersons for their agenda. Between 1980 and 1983 this was almost achieved. 
Alan Sapper recalled that the left-wing Trade Union groupingl3 could virtually set the 
agenda of the party. The left-winger's agenda was determined in meetings between 
left-wing Union leaders and their colleagues in parliament. The alliance of left-
wingers in the parliamentary party, the NEC and at Conference ensured that the left 
was able to control the party manifesto and policy of the PLP, though this was not 
entirely driven by the Unions as Sapper claimed. 14 The centre-right of the party was 
unable to retain its traditionally dominant role over policy and accepted as leader 
Michael Foot, Tribunite and anti-nuclear campaigner. Arguably, whoever had become 
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leader following Callaghan's resignation in 1980 would have had little choice but to 
accept unilateralism, this was one of the policies that the left had been attempting to 
force onto the agenda since the 1950s. 
The left-wing of the late 1970s and 1980s have often been compartmentalised into 
hard and soft divisions. IS This characterisation is somewhat awkwardly defined as 
being between the Bennite hard left, which would include the pro-Soviet strand, and 
the soft left characterised by Foot. 16 This is a largely erroneous description. Seyd has 
characterised Labour's left as: 
[M]ore than a set of political attitudes: it is also a distinct culture, a way of life 
and an approach to politics ... someone from the Labour left is an 'outsider' 
who does not mix easily with the political establishment ... The term 'comrade' 
is part of the language ... The singing of 'The Red Flag' is symbolic ... 17 
More importantly the left was not cohesive and largely avoided developing a serious 
alternative to the party's centrist position. Equally there was never an alternative left-
wing leader waiting in the wings to take control of the party. The perceived contest 
between left and right for the deputy leadership in 1980 is a myth, left-wing support 
was divided between Benn and John Silkin. 18 The left included a wide range of 
traditions, ideals and perspectives and lacked a clear and consensual alternative 
agenda. 
Despite this lack of unity and purpose the left was able to ally in support of the 
agenda adopted by the party at the 1980 Conference. This alliance was built around 
broad socialist objectives. Key issues included a neutralist stance on the Cold War, 
unilateral nuclear disarmament and the alternative economic strategy,19 though 
debates raged within NEC policy subgroupings which were often extremely heated 
and highly divisive. Publicly, however, the appearance prevailed that the left was 
united, had a common body of ideals which had been translated into a Manifesto and 
had a leader. This perception was enhanced by the left's consensus of opposition to 
the Thatcher government's political agenda. A particular theme around which the left 
built this consensus was anti-Americanism. This allowed the promotion of a foreign 
and defence policy that could be accused of being pro-Soviet and that would mirror 
aspects of the programme put forward by the CPGB.20 The consensus on this anti-
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American. neutralist stance is evident in the many articles written by profoundly anti-
Soviet left-wingers during this period. 
Anti-Americanism had been a tradition of Bevanism and a feature of Tribune articles 
and editorials. however during the second Cold War anti-Americanism reached 
paranoiac proportions. Tony Benn. Eric Heffer and Stan Newens were particular 
critics of Atlanticism and accused the Thatcher government of subservience on 
several occasions. Benn described the 'independent nuclear deterrent' as a tool of the 
United States that acted as a "ball and chain limiting [Britain's] capacity to play a 
more positive role in the world.,,21 His fear of United States objectives was far more 
expansive: 
They are trying to transform the troublesome natives of Britain ... into the 
subjects of a new imperialism ... represented by the sort of federal Europe they 
would like to see created.22 
While many left-wingers' fears were not expressed in such dramatic terms there was 
consistent opposition to deepening the 'special relationship' and a fear that Britain had 
become a subordinate partner. or. in Allaun's terms. a stooge in foreign and defence 
matters. Synthesising the mood eloquently. Ken Livingstone observed that: "US 
intelligence had managed to ... achieve an almost complete dominance at the Ministry 
of Defence".23 The left-wing agenda therefore tied together a rejection of monetarism 
and Atlanticism. But. beyond these key tenets. divisions over policy alternatives were 
prevalent. Equally the left-wing's oppositional stance to Thatcherism attained a 
consensus across Labour's backbenches and at Conference. but it failed to gain mass 
support among the electorate.24 Crushing defeats both in parliament and in elections 
made it clear that the parliamentary road for change was closed to the left. possibly 
forever. 
This chapter represents a study of the last battle waged by the pro-Soviet strand of the 
Labour party. The MPs who acted as the frontIine of opposition to the renewed policy 
of roll-back developed a much closer working relationship with the Soviet Union than 
their predecessors. This involved becoming a conduit of understanding. attempting to 
build personal bridges between the opposing political systems and developing 
common ground from which co-existence could develop. The highpoint for MPs 
establishing themselves in the role of conduit was the period of the Second Cold War, 
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though the relationships that were established were founded upon structures that had 
been put in place since 1947 and which had been strengthened particularly during the 
decade of detente. However the increased requirement to act as an Anglo-Soviet 
bridge was necessitated by developments in East-West relations. The perceived thaw, 
during the 1970s, had led to the adoption of deeper pro-Soviet links, arguably 
underpinned by the belief that such activity would become a natural concomitant of 
rapprochement and co-existence. However, with these institutional links in place, as 
detente collapsed, they became an effective tool to utilise against a resurgent anti-
Soviet rationale. 
Front organisation activity in the Labour party 
The main conduit for developing links between British MPs and the Soviet Union was 
the network of front organisations. This Communist-sponsored activism was not a 
phenomenon solely of the 1980s. Since the establishment of the Popular Front in the 
1930s, MPs sympathetic to the Soviet Union had become involved in deeper fonns of 
pro-Soviet activity. This course of action had previously led to expulsion.2s Members 
of such organisations were seen as promoting the Communist party line and, as such, 
would attempt to subvert the policies of the PLP. The traditional solution to 
Communist entryism was proscription: this was now only a tenable, although 
ineffective, weapon against the Trotskyist Militant group.26 The Labour party had 
proscribed any organisation that had Communist links, employed members of the 
Communist party or was supportive of Soviet arguments and policy. It was fairly 
easy for these to be identified; the leadership of the front organisations usually 
consisted of the same individuals, their objectives were supportive of Soviet policy, 
and they were usually affiliated to one of the umbrella organisations27 that were under 
a more direct form of Communist control. Proscription stemmed Communist entryism 
throughout the period from 1927 until 1973. By this time so many organisations had 
been established that control over pro-Soviet affiliations had slipped away from the 
Labour party. Furthennore many left-wingers were sympathetic to the ideals of these 
groups. The League for Democracy in Greece attracted 24 new members from the 
PLP and a further 43 Labour MPs listed Greek politics as being "of special interest" 
following the League's 1974 recruitment drive.28 Many of those who offered support; 
Frank Allaun, Tom Driberg, Michael Foot, Eric Heffer, Joan Lestor and Renee Short, 
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were influential members of the NEC.29 This meant that it became a simple process to 
abolish the proscription policy. 
The abolition of proscription allowed MPs to join and openly promote front 
organisations, and meant the organisations were able to recruit within parliament. 
However recruitment would not have been easy had the organisations not had existing 
supporters within the Labour party. John Fraser, who drew up a list of MPs who were 
sympathetic to the aims of the League for Democracy in Greece, can be described as a 
supporter of the aims of the organisation; though Fraser avoided becoming involved 
further in pro-Soviet activity. There were others who would definitely have been 
regarded as friends of the Soviet Union, using Gordievsky's definition. MPs did share 
information with Soviet agents regarding the party and they discussed politics and 
developed personal relationships with members of the Soviet Embassy. However, 
these individuals should not be classified as acting as spies, agents or traitors. This is 
evident from their motives. The pro-Soviet Labour MPs were not ordinary career 
politicians, they focussed on a higher ideal and ignored the consequences of their 
actions and how history would damn them for pursuing an internationalist agenda. 
This was particularly the case with those who not only joined front organisations, but 
who took higher executive posts, promoted the organisations' cause in the House and 
took on extra tasks on behalf of these organisations. We now know that two MPs did 
this by their own admission. To have a former Member of Parliament admit acting as 
an agent of influence on behalf of a front organisation, discuss the role they played 
and place it within the context of the period provides a much better picture of an 
individual who would normally be written off as an agent. Neither Gordievsky, 
Pincher or Crozier examined the motives behind pro-Soviet activity; they saw the 
world in black and white while there are. in the words of Clement Attlee, infinite 
"shades of grey .. 30 between right and wrong. We can argue that these figures were 
acting in the way they believed to be best and some have argued. with hindsight. that 
they did prevent escalation of the Cold War. For example William Wilson hinted that 
the existence of organisations like the BSFS. with a membership that included 
members of the political elite. showed the Soviet Union that it was not entirely 
isolated. Thus despite fears of a pre-emptive strike by NATO forces, the Soviet 
Union was able to discuss these fears and have them allayed by individuals with input 
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into the political decision-making process.31 While this clearly over-exaggerates the 
importance of Wilson and the BSFS, it does explain Wilson's personal perception of 
his role. 
Furthermore some of the arguments espoused by pro-Soviet delegates in the House 
have been proven correct. The arguments of those who recognised a decreasing threat 
from the Communist bloc and a genuine desire for rapprochement were validated by 
the Gorbachev overtures that initiated the end of the arms race. Volkogonov testified 
that ending the arms race was an aim expressed by the Politburo during the early 
1980s, the obstacle was that unilateral arms reductions equated to surrender.32 The 
fact that figures like Wilson had close contact with members of the Soviet Embassy 
and representatives of the Soviet government meant that they may well have had a 
more accurate picture of Soviet policy aims. We could classify this as pure 
propaganda designed to influence, however it is also possible that the Soviet Union 
was not always, metaphorically, 'crying wolf. The individuals studied here believed 
in the integrity of their Soviet contacts, though some did hold reservations. They 
appeared to have been attempting, in Mikardo's terminology, to light a candle in a 
dark corner of the world33 by extending the hand of friendship to the falsely 
demonised Russian. They equally hoped that if they could establish sufficient 
personal links between the peoples of the two nations the Russian people would not 
agree to initiate a nuclear attack on Britain despite the relationship of the two 
governments. 34 
With these ideals in mind pro-Soviet MPs became senior officials of front 
organisations. This led them to work on behalf of that organisation both in parliament 
and upon the world stage. This activity will be studied through personal admissions 
where possible. It cannot be achieved in the case of every individual involved; 
however we can gain a snapshot of their beliefs by studying those on whom evidence 
is available. Front sponsored activities are best viewed through the activities of James 
Lamond and William Wilson and to a lesser extent Ron Brown and Alex Kitson. If 
we employ the fellow traveller metaphor we can argue that these four left-wing 
figures travelled a further stage in the metaphorical Moscow bound car and 
hypothesise that they chose to remain seated until the very end of the journey. This 
poses the question were the motives of these individuals different to those previously 
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studied and if so how? This question will be answered using their own rationale for 
their behaviour and an assessment of their complicity in working alongside the Soviet 
Union. In particular it needs to be assessed whether they offered unquestionable 
support for the Soviet regime and how they rationalised their role in light of the 
collapse of Soviet Communism. 
Peace and Internationalism: the alternative perspective 
For those individuals who enjoyed close contact with the Soviet Union the 
abandonment of detente, and return to the expansionist policy synonymous with the 
late 1940s, could be called a consequence of Western distrust. Brown told the anti-
Communists that: "the more you try and fracture the alliance of socialist nations the 
more they will need to increase their defences". 35 Soviet propaganda reinforced this 
perception, arguing that the United States was determined to break up the Warsaw 
Pact using the procedure of detente.36 Therefore, the Soviet Union had been placed 
under immense pressure to retain ideological hegemony over her sphere of influence, 
particularly if NATO was planning to actively pursue rollback in Europe. The Soviet 
strategy, developed during the detente era, was to elicit information regarding the 
intentions of NATO policy makers. After 1980 the Soviet Union grew concerned that 
NATO was contemplating a pre-emptive nuclear strike. To allay these fears Andropov 
launched Operation RY AN,37 which entailed heightening defences and increasing 
intelligence-gathering measures. Diplomats who had contacts in the House increased 
the frequency of meetings and strengthened relationships with all sympathetic MPs. 
They also focussed on gaining material on specific policy areas and attempting to gain 
information that would enable the Soviet Union to gain control over key figures 
within government. The Soviet intention was to prevent attack or, at least, to be able 
to respond when an attack came. The Soviet leadership's failure to achieve this, 
compounded with the development of the SDI early warning system by the United 
States, led to an unassailable loss of parity and to Gorbachev's co-operation in ending 
the arms race. 
The combination of fear of war due to increased international tension, and the Soviet 
drive for increased contact caused an exponential increase in peace activism. Anti-
nuclear arguments were fervently propounded in the House by many of the surviving 
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peace campaigners such as Frank Allaun, but more notably by newer allies such as 
James Lamond, many of whom had a more pronounced pro-Soviet viewpoint. The 
increasing divide between anti-Soviet Atlanticists and the moderate anti-Cold War 
activists led debates in parliament to adopt a zero-sum character. The all or nothing 
perspective allowed the pro-Soviet arguments to gain a degree of legitimacy as the 
official oppositional stance.38 
On consecutive dates both Houses of Parliament, firstly the Lords then the Commons, 
heard debates on the question of East-West relations after Gorbachev became leader 
of the Soviet Union. The majority of voices who spoke on the subject in either House 
expressed the traditional anti-Soviet position despite the change of leadership. The 
message of the opening statement to the House of Lords, delivered by Lord Home of 
the Hirsee9 on 23 April 1985, asked whether Britain could realistically expect policy 
to change even if the Soviet leadership had. Gorbachev was still a man who 
subscribed to the Bolshevik ideology. Lord 'Manny' ShinweIl, former Labour 
Defence Minister, stated, in support of Home's argument, that either the Soviet 
Union's ideological basis altered significantly or war may be eventually unavoidable. 
However, there were dissident voices. Baroness Gaitskell, widow of former Labour 
leader Hugh Gaitskell, reminded the House that "there was a time in fairly recent 
years when we were both allies ... What have they done to us that we have not done to 
them?,,4o There was also the voice of seasoned left-wing campaigner, and President of 
the SCR, Baron Jenkins of Putney who accused his old adversary Home of 
"falsification of the facts .. 41 when documenting the background to current East-West 
relations. Home's key tenet had been that mistrust was logical as statements made by 
the Soviet government promising one course were usually followed by contradictory 
actions. lenkins refuted this stance. 
Lord Orr-Ewing highlighted that the existence of MPs who expressed a sympathetic 
perspective of the Soviet Union, and who held prominent roles within the Soviet 
controlled peace movement, corroborated the notion that the Soviet Union was 
untrustworthy. He listed two MPs and seven Union officials who belonged to the 
British Peace Assembly, which he referred to as an "organ of Soviet foreign policy".42 
Orr-Ewing stated that the activity of such organisations undermined the worldwide 
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efforts that were underway to negotiate disarmament. He used this platform to deliver 
a message both to the Soviet Union and the British electorate: 
The message to Russia is: your sincerity would be less suspect if you stopped 
training people from the free world to create dissent in their own countries and 
to destroy their own institutions. The message to Britons is: study the form of 
those who seek your votes.43 
This message, mainly directed at the constituencies of parliamentarians such as James 
Lamond, Renee Short and William Wilson, was aimed specifically at undermining the 
ideas of rapprochement. Orr-Ewing used previous and current Soviet policy as the 
benchmark against which to gauge the level of trust that could be awarded the Soviet 
Union. The majority of speeches supported this argument and this was echoed in the 
Commons the following day. Orr-Ewing however pursued his attacks on the left 
stating that they were based on a long-term research project. Evidence was contained 
in a thick, pink, dog-eared tile which he waved at those accused, stating: "it's all in 
here. It's a measure of the information that this file is so thick".44 Such was the 
quality and quantity of this research that Blake Baker based two articles in the Daily 
Telegraph of the same month upon the Orr-Ewing file. Baker named several Trade 
Unionists and Labour MPs who were associated with Communist controlled 
organisations. 45 
The attitude of the governmental majority did not dampen the ardour of those who 
had devoted their political lives to the peace movement. Their activities increased 
particularly in opposition to the mistrust shown initially to the Gorbachev regime. 
The emphasis awarded to the pro-Soviet position was utilised by those who were 
prominent in the pro-Soviet peace network to heighten their attack on the dominant 
anti-Soviet policy. Those who believed that peace was an international issue largely 
led this attack. They argued that the British peace movements were too parochial and 
that questions regarding the future of mankind should be handled at the international 
level. WPC literature argued that the UN could not act in this capacity because it was 
under United States control. Therefore the WPC and affiliate bodies had been created 
to till this void. 
Konni ZilIiacus had maintained this argument when calling for a strong, independent 
United Nations. Arguing that only through negotiations between all the powers could 
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peace be attained and maintained. This perspective led him to attend the World 
Congress of Intellectuals in Wroclaw, Poland in August 1948. This one-day event 
witnessed a gathering of intellectuals from almost every nation in a town that clearly 
bore the scars of war. These intellectuals had one mission in mind, ensuring World 
War could not recur. The Conference decided that an organisation needed to be 
created to actively prevent war through open and inclusive meetings that awarded 
equal status to all participant nations, the organisation that was created was the World 
Peace Council. Unfortunately what these intellectuals either refused, or failed, to 
recognise was that they were, in joining this organisation, becoming part of the pro-
Soviet orbit. However, many did attempt to excuse themselves for this oversight. 
Pablo Picasso, the Spanish representative, who witnessed and painted for posterity the 
devastation of Guernica by the German Luftwaffe, happily admitted "I am unfit for 
pOlitics".46 
There were equally those in the movement that should have known better. Konni 
Zilliacus in particular, given his experience of international politics. However, from 
their recollections they seem to have become blinded by the rhetoric of the 
organisation. The concept of representatives of each nation sitting down to discuss 
peace, rather than oil prices or other capitalist concerns, had a very real allure and 
attracted some internationalist Labour MPs. Following the abandonment of 
proscription these MPs were allowed to join organisations suspected of Communist 
affiliation. One backbench MP with previous links to pro-Sovietism and the TGWU 
representative on the NEe were asked to join the WPC: they were James Lamond and 
Alex Kitson. 
The Trade Unions and Pro-Sovietism 
Prior to studying the activities of James Lamond and his contemporaries in the WPC 
it is useful to explore one source of Lamond's pro-Soviet stance, his experiences 
within the Trade Unions. The factor of Union influence on a sponsored MP is largely 
ignored in studies of the left-wing. This section seeks to explore how a pro-Soviet 
dominated Trade Union had a tendency to adopt pro-Soviet parliamentary candidates 
and encouraged them to act, not only on Union interests but, to pursue an 
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internationalist agenda with a pro-Soviet perspective. This is explored using the 'case 
of T ASS members Ron Brown. J ames Lamond and Ernie Ross. 
Mcllroy and CampbeIrs recent study of the Liaison Committee for the Defence of 
Trade Unions shows the clear link that existed betwe~ist party and 
---_.-/ British Trade Unionism.47 Prominent members of the CPGB who held important 
positions within the Unions or were influential activists maintained this link: of 
particular note are Baruch (Bert) Ramelson of the London Trades Council and the 
CPGB Industrial Department. Ken Gill. Chairman of the Technical Administrative 
and Supervisory section [T ASS] of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers 
[AVEW] and Reg Birch, official of the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and 
Technicians [UCATT].48 These individuals ensured that the Communist line was 
injected into the policy of the Union and therefore the Labour party. Ramelson 
claimed, in 1973, that: 
We [the Communists] can float an idea early in the year and it can become 
official Labour policy by the autumn. A few years ago we were on our own 
but not anymore.49 
The allies Ramelson spoke of were the Union leaders Harold Wilson alluded to when 
he spoke of a "tightly knit group of politically motivated men."so Fears existed within 
the party that Union militancy would undermine government policy and damage the 
economy. It remains debatable whether the 'winter of discontent' was solely the 
responsibility of Trade Union activism and even more scepticism should be shown 
towards allegations that the Communist Union leaders were attempting to gain control 
of the Labour party. The argument put forward in this section is that we can 
recognise that there was greater CPGB influence within those Unions which adhered 
to the unilateralist position. This is not a universal concomitant, however it is notable 
that certain Unions. that adopted CPGB members as their officials, promoted the left-
wing agenda and sponsored MPs who held a similar stance.S1 
The relevant example used here is that of T ASS. T ASS sponsored Ron Brown,s2 
James Lamond and Ernie Ross, along with Joe Ashton and Albert Booth. The first 
three MPs were prominent exponents of the pro-Soviet line, particularly Brown and 
Lamond and all three held offices in recognised front organisations. Before outlining 
the careers of these MPs this section will focus on how T ASS and its predecessors put 
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forward the pro-Soviet argument through its publications and encouraged its MPs to 
do the same. This shows a clear link between the political stance of a Union and the 
MP sponsored by that Union. 
The political stance held by T ASS generally followed a pro-Soviet line of analysis, a 
tradition that can be recognised in the union's predecessors the Association of 
Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsman [AESD] and the Draughtsmen's and 
Allied Technicians' Association [DATA]. These were independent Unions prior to 
the merger that formed the AUEW, however TASS was able to retain ideological and 
political independence. This was important for the Union as its views were not 
consistent with those of the AUEW that was led for many years by individuals who 
subscribed to New Left ideas rather than those of the CPGB.53 The ideological 
position maintained by T ASS was made clear during the late 1950s and early 1960s in 
the publications of the AESD and DATA. 
Articles in the AESD newspaper The Draughtsman provided a clear pro-Soviet 
analysis for the readership. These contained three main themes, the advanced status 
and influential role of Trade Unions in the Soviet Union,54 the need to recognise the 
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact allies as proletarian states and partners in the socialist 
struggle and the need to protest against the arms race and concurrent anti-Communist 
foreign policy. 55 DAT A News, emerging with the change of Union title in August 
1961, adopted a similar political message. The paper supported Cuba, the Lidice 
Shall Live campaign, and ran anti-Atlanticist. anti-NATO and anti-EEC articles. 
DATA also ran summer schools that educated the members in the pro-Soviet analysis. 
The 1963 Summer School advertised speakers from the World Peace Council, the 
Soviet Trades Council and the United Nations Association.56 The advertisement 
placed in DATA News called for all members to attend who wished to understand 
their role in world affairs.57 Guided tours of Communist states were also advertised 
. 11' h 58 cont1Oua y m t e newspaper. 
The descendants of Data News, TASS Journal and after 1979 TASS News and 
Journal, continued this pro-Soviet tone. During the 1970s articles called for increased 
trade with the Eastern bloc and the building of fraternal links between T ASS members 
and their Communist counterparts. Barry Seager's Presidential address argued that 
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"the world has become a better place"s9 while Ken Gill warned against being fooled 
by the "clever reformists" in the Labour party who distracted the workers from their 
international mission.6o They also promoted the anti-American analysis of conflicts in 
Africa, South America and the Middle East. 
The pro-Soviet arguments were exacerbated as detente collapsed and anti-
Communism re-emerged. Des Starrs called for a united campaign for peace and 
detente to be led by the workers.61 Gill, writing as representative of the All-Britain 
Peace Liaison Group, an affiliate of the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces a 
Soviet-controlled umbrella organisation, called for "strong condemnation by delegates 
of the anti-Soviet cold war campaign which is being whipped up once again".62 The 
1979 T ASS Conference led a campaign for members to ensure trading links with 
Eastern Europe be established or maintained. Starrs stated: 
Conference recognises the growing opportunities being presented by the 
planned economies of the socialist countries to British engineering firms to 
develop trade, and their failure to respond.63 
Special issues of the TASS News and Journal promoted the campaign for peace and 
disarmament. Frank Allaun. James Lamond and Ernie Ross made contributions. Ross 
argued in 1980 that British foreign policy was not based upon common sense but on 
the policies of Ernest Bevin whose interests had not been to "defend Britain, but 
rather to defend the interests of the US."64 The 1981 TASS Conference mirrored the 
major tenets of the Labour party's 1983 Manifesto. and the following year Alexander 
Sobotin, Soviet representative to the World Parliament for Peace. was invited to 
present the Soviet case for disarmament. 
This pro-Soviet line forced the Union into an oppositional stance to the Labour party 
for much of its history. This had been clearly stated by the DATA representative 
council to be a necessary course of action: 
To have a voice within the organisational machinery of the Labour party is 
insufficient as a means of strengthening the effectiveness of the Union, but 
whilst continuing to fulfil our responsibilities as an affiliated Union to the 
Labour party, we must cease as an Executive to attempt to keep our political 
action confined to our responsibilities to the [Labour party] and divorced from 
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our industrial interests when, in fact, the sphere of industrial and poHtical 
activity is indistinguishable.65 
This statement clearly expressed the desire to enter into industrial activity on an 
independent basis, without consultation with the TUC or the Labour party, and to act 
against the party if necessary. While this was not unusual for a Trade Union it also 
set the agenda for the T ASS sponsored MPs. The 1972 T ASS representative council 
Conference report stated that sponsored MPs should fulfil two criteria. Firstly they 
should reflect Union policy and maintain full liaison and affiliations consistent with 
that policy and secondly offer political and industrial leadership when promoting the 
Union's policy.66 The following year the union also called for the Labour party to 
"withdraw all bans and proscriptions preventing socialists who pay political levy 
becoming individual members in addition to other political affiliations.,,67 It went on 
to state that "such affiliations were necessary to furthering the Union policy. ,,68 This 
statement clearly links the promotion of Union policy and the affiliation of their MPs 
to front organisations. 
The five TASS sponsored MPs should not all be considered as pro-Soviet. Ioe 
Ashton and Albert Booth retained a degree of reticence in foreign policy debates. 
Booth, though named as a member of the British Peace Council, did not display the 
same type of commitment as Lamond. Ernie Ross avoided making pro-Soviet 
statements, but maintained an anti-American stance. lames Lamond was seen as the 
greatest asset to the Union, a factor highlighted by the concerted drive to secure a seat 
for him. 
Lamond had held executive posts in AESD and DATA branches. After nineteen years 
of active membership he became Chairman of the No! Divisional Council and Chair 
of the Industrial and Political Committee. Letters between Jim Forsyth, Secretary of 
the Scotland Central Branch of DATA, and central office show there was a fear that 
DATA policy was being suborned in favour of the Labour party line. Forsyth refuted 
this, stating that: "Lamond is a man of high principles and staunch credentials in the 
Union".69 Forsyth's backing of Lamond saw him nominated for over twenty seats 
between 1963 and 1970. It is clear that there were ideological differences between 
Lamond and many of the CLPs. After failure to be nominated for Clackmannan and 
E Stirlingshire, the former seat of Emrys Hughes, Lamond informed Forsyth that the 
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panel "didn't seem to agree with me".70 Lamond recalled that he and the selection 
panel disagreed over policy.71 In 1968 seven different constituencies were 
approached to adopt Lamond as candidate, he found success in Oldham West. Gill 
personally congratulated Lamond on his re-election in 1974 telling him in a letter: "I 
know you will do your best to express the views and objectives of TASS". He and 
Ross won similar public praise in 1980 from Gill: "on major questions like the fight 
against war hysteria [they] have been determined, loyal and radical in defence of 
TASS pOlicies".72 Clearly the ideas of Lamond and TASS were identical and his 
affiliation to the W orId Peace Council was encouraged. 
This was not the normative relationship between pro-Soviet MPs and the sponsoring 
Union. For example Newens and Short were given little attention from the NUT and 
TGWU respectively. AlIaun used many Union papers as a platform for his 
'Bathrooms not Bombs' argument but avoided a clearly pro-Soviet line. In other 
cases the resident pro-Soviet was used as a representative under specific 
circumstances. Pro-Soviet TGWU representative on the Labour party NEC, Alex 
Kitson, was the TGWU's representative on peace and security issues. Answering a 
personal invitation to the 'Prevent War-Build Peace' Conference organised by the 
CESC, Jack Jones, General Secretary of the TGWU, replied: "you will, of course, be 
aware that it is customary for Brother Kitson to represent this Union in connection 
with these matters. ,,73 This implies that Kitson was the Unions nominated 
representative and that CPGB and BSFS executive member, and Conference 
organiser, Gordon Schaffer should have been aware of this arrangement. 
From this evidence we can build a picture of the relationship between Lamond and 
TASS. However, given that there were other Unions which were led by Communist 
party members, we should assume that this type of relationship was common and that 
MPs and sponsoring Unions had some form of ideological consensus over policy. 
Evidence for this is difficult to locate, however, Alan Sapper, leader of the 
Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians [ACTT] , 
encouraged the affiliation of the Union, and individual members, to various front 
organisations. As Chairman of the League for Democracy in Greece, Sapper 
encouraged the promotion of the Greek democrat's cause through the media and for 
members of the Union to join the League.74 This encouraged his members to become 
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involved in pro-Soviet political activism. The sole MP sponsored by the ACTT, 
Hugh lenkins, was Chairman of the SCR for a short period showing that pro-Soviet 
ideas did seem to have held sway over the Union and their MP.75 Of course a larger 
sample of Unions and sponsored MPs is required to offer solid conclusions regarding 
this relationship. However, the pro-Soviet line maintained by DATA was one of the 
influences which governed the career of lames Lamond and his relationship with the 
Communist leaders does provide some indicators of the broader picture of the 
relationship between the pro-Soviet Trade Union and their sponsored MP. 
There were also clear lines of communication between left-wing Union leaders. A 
steering group was created within the TUC to co-ordinate with the left-wing MPs in 
parliament. At Labour Co-ordinating Committee [LCC] meetings a relevant MP 
would be called to discuss strategy and a coherent challenge to PLP policy was 
developed. Sapper recalled that when a particular issue was due for debate within the 
TUC, the NEC or either Houses of Parliament, left-wingers with a particular interest 
in the specific issue would be invited to an LCC meeting to discuss what the left's 
response should be. Sapper indicated that there were representatives who were 
recognised as the sympathetic expert on most issues. For example, Trade Union 
legislation was the special interest of T ASS MP J oe Ashton, housing was seen as 
Frank Allaun' s speciality and on foreign affairs and disarmament the LCC had a wide 
choice but favourites were Allaun, Lamond, Newens, Ross and Short. The 
relationship between the left-wing Trade Unions and their supporters in parliament 
developed during the 1970s but reached its peak during the 1980s when, "the 
challenge was greatest".76 
The activity of the Lce adds weight to the notion that there was a coherent strategy to 
promote a left-wing agenda. This should not, however, be regarded as a strategy 
orchestrated by the CPGB. The Labour party left-wing was alienated from policy 
making at the parliamentary level. The parliamentary party leadership constantly 
reversed conference and NEe decisions. As the left increased in numbers they could 
exert greater influence and mount a credible opposition to the consensual politics of 
the Labour party. It was in these circumstances that leftist Union leaders and MPs 
were able to develop a political strategy that was an expression of their core ideals. 
The success in promoting this agenda is a reflection of the influence of the left during 
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the 1980s and was a result of the perceived danger that the disintegration of East-West 
relations invoked. 
James Lamond and the Soviet movement for World Peace 
James Lamond and Alex Kitson, his ally on the WPC, had similar political influences. 
These were gained through the Trade Unions, Lamond in T ASS and Kitson from the 
Communist Scottish miners' leader Abe Moffat. Kitson displayed a more Marxist 
outlook and was an open admirer of Soviet society. He visited every year from the 
1950s to the 1980s. After every visit he extolled the benefits of the planned, 
communist economy. Following his visit in 1977 he reported that: 
I am pleased to visit a country where the situation differs from that in my own, 
where there is no unemployment and one can see a consistent rise in the 
standard of living of common workers.77 
In making a statement such as this it would appear that he fell victim to the guided 
tour and had succumbed to the fake statistics produced by Soviet propaganda. 
On the occasion of his visit, from the 5th to 11th November 1977, he received much 
criticism from the British media because of his controversial perspective of the Soviet 
Union. However he stated that his analysis had been proven during visits which 
spanned 23 years.78 He had particular admiration for the progress made in housing, 
education and health. His compatriots on the left rallied to his support, though Allaun 
reminded Kitson's critics that Kitson's was a comparative perspective. This was an 
accurate account of his argument. Kitson compared the Soviet Union during the 1970s 
with the same country he had visited after the devastation inflicted upon it during the 
Gennan invasion. Thus he argued that the level of progress attained, given the 
circumstances in the Soviet Union after 1942, vastly outstripped the achievements of 
post-war British governments. His main supporters were Frank Allaun and Norman 
Atkinson who opposed his dismissal from the NEC. Kitson maintained his support for 
the Soviet regime and admitted receiving gifts from the Soviet Union, one of which 
was from Brezhnev personally.79 
However Kitson admitted that there were faults with the Soviet system. He argued the 
cause of Jewish dissidents in the Soviet Union and joined Tony Benn and Frank 
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Allaun in their opposition to the continuing trials of Czech dissidents in 1980. These 
contradictions in the Soviet Union he happily discussed with his contacts, particularly 
the case of the Jewish dissidents. He recalled telling a Kremlin official: "if these 
people want to leave, for Christ's sake let them go".80 Furthermore he supported 
NATO but argued for reform of the military alliance from within. Therefore we can 
recognise Kitson as a political actor who held very complex and often contrasting 
perspectives of the world. He described himself as a democratic socialist, 
distinguishing himself from the Social Democrats who led the Labour party. 81 He 
believed in the ideological basis of the party as defined in the wording of Clause IV of 
the Constitution.82 This led him to support the Soviet system because of the benefits 
of "complete economic planning".83 His support for the Soviet economic model 
encouraged him to seek greater links with representatives of the Soviet Union and her 
allies arguing: "I'd sooner have colleagues in the Communist party than in the 
Conservative party any day."s4 
Though he was a member of the WPC, at the same time as being on the NEC of the 
Labour party, he was not the most vocal proponent of the Soviet foreign policy line. 
His argument, in his own words, was based on the advanced nature of Soviet society: 
They had no unemployment. .. they had a genuinely free health service; and ... 
they had made more industrial progress in 60 years than we had made since 
the Industrial Revolution.8s 
Thus Kitson appears to have held reservations. James Lamond, in contrast, focussed 
on the pacifistic nature of Communists, refusing to become involved in debates on 
Soviet politics. He was to become Vice-President of the WPC under Romesh 
Chandra, and provided a good account of his motivation for joining the organisation. 
James Lamond was taken on many visits of the Soviet Union while an official of 
TASS. Lamond recalled that he was already a pacifist, having witnessed the human 
cost of the Second World War. He equally admitted that he believed that the Soviet 
Union had tipped the balance in that conflict and so deserved inclusion in the 
decision-making process surrounding the post-war international settlement. However, 
one experience, when visiting the Soviet Union with the Scottish Trades Council in 
the 1960s, touched him deeply. Neither the achievements of the Five-Year Plans, the 
superficial equality, or the leaders' rhetoric made Lamond pro-Soviet, it was the desire 
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for peace among the common Russian citizen. As he argued in the House on 7 April 
1987: 
No-one can visit the Soviet Union without being impressed by the desire of 
the ordinary people for peace and friendship with the world and in particular 
the west. There is no anti-American or anti-British feeling there. Their 
concern for peace sterns from the suffering they went through in what they 
refer to as the 'Great Patriotic War' ... This desire for peace did not begin with 
the arrival of... Gorbachev ... it has been there certainly as long as I have been 
visiting that country, and it is very deep rooted and sincere. 86 
The conclusion to the argument he developed was that "the danger the Soviet Union 
represented to us was grossly exaggerated ... 87 In fact he was willing to argue that the 
perceived threat was mythical, created by the British and United States' governments 
to expand markets for their arms industry. The arms race, Lamond argued, was 
independent of developments in East-West relations: 
If the Soviet Union disappeared as an enemy and there was subsequent 
pressure on the United States, Britain and other countries to reduce the amount 
spent on defence, a fresh enemy would have to be found. 88 
Like Stan Newens he predicted that this enemy would be found in the Muslim world 
and arguably was proven correct by the US-Iraqi conflict. 
It was an ex-pilot, a veteran of the Battle of Stalingrad, who convinced him of the 
pacifistic nature of the ordinary Russian. He met the former airman, "blind and 
disfigured", in a sanatorium in the Crimea. For some reason they were introduced and 
the pilot spoke to Lamond. With an understanding of Soviet methods we can 
conclude that it is highly likely that this encounter was staged for Lamond's benefit. 
However this was not apparent to Lamond. Lamond recalled the airman telling him: 
I know that you're very sorry to see me like this, but don't think of that. Just 
do one thing for me, go home and work to make sure that nothing like this 
ever happens to anyone else.89 
Lamond did just this. He joined the WPC, established an affiliate body, the British 
Peace Assembly, and helped establish a Scottish branch of CND. In Lamond's 
opinion the WPC was the only organisation which fought for peace at the 
international level. He believed implicitly in the aims that had been laid down twenty 
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years earlier by Frederic 10liot-Curie and was convinced that they were being 
followed to the letter by the organisation. The urge to spread these beliefs led him to 
parliament, with the encouragement of the T ASS organisation, using the Labour party 
as a vehicle for his ideas. 
Once elected Lamond allied himself with the Anglo-Soviet Parliamentary Group. He 
recalled that Renee Short and Robert Edwards dominated this grouping. He also 
developed an independent role by founding 'Parliamentarians for Peace' which 
included many of the Anglo-Soviet Friendship lobby as well as individuals from 
across the left-wing.9o He also joined Labour Action for Peace, chaired by Ron 
Huzzard and Frank Allaun. We see, therefore that he migrated almost immediately 
towards the like-minded individuals on the left of the party. His strong association 
with the pro-Soviet left is mirrored in the debates in which he took part. Here we see 
him supported by the pro-Soviet T ASS sponsored MPs Ron Brown and Ernie Ross 
and unilateralists and pro-Soviet peace activists like Frank Allaun, Norman Atkinson, 
Stan Newens and Renee Short. His highest office was as PPS to Stan Orme in the 
Ministry for Social Security, but he was forced to resign because of his pro-Soviet 
affiliations. He recalled that Orme, a staunch left-winger, was willing to stand by him 
but Lamond resigned to protect his colleague. Lamond's pro-Soviet affiliations were 
to cause him to come under constant attack. However, he was always more than 
willing to defend himself and the WPC. 
Lamond refused to accept that there was a clear financial link between the WPC and 
the Soviet Union. As he stated on 25 April 1985, when defending his Vice 
Presidency: 
I am proud of it, and I would not deny it for a moment. However, I do deny 
the allegation that the World Peace Council is financed by the Soviet Union ... 
If anybody can prove to me that money for the World Peace Council comes 
from the government of the Soviet Union, or from any other government, I 
shall resign immediately from it.91 
His protestations were not accepted by the House, and have been proven wrong since 
the end of the Cold War. As his protagonist, Andrew Mackay92 retorted: "It is for 
honourable members to decide whom they wish to beIieve.,,93 All Lamond later 
admitted is that the organisation was definitely "pro-Soviet".94 But he maintained that 
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the WPC was not, to his knowledge, dependent upon Moscow finances. It is plausible 
that he was not aware of the extent of Soviet influence over the WPC. The 
organisation attempted to maintain an aura of independence, therefore any Soviet 
funding took a convoluted route to its coffers. Members such as Lamond were prized 
by the WPC and so were protected from some of the realities of the organisation. As 
Lamond admitted he possessed one of the greatest assets the WPC could ask for, a 
British passport. 
Lamond recalled that members were selected to join by the Council. He believed that 
he was given the "honour" of an offer of membership because he had an air of 
respectability. He had sat on Aberdeen City Council 1959-1971 and had served 
simultaneously as Lord Provost and Mayor of the city in 1971. However, he 
recognised that the greatest asset he could offer was his ability to travel freely on the 
WPC's behalf. Chandra, the WPC President, was restricted because of his Communist 
affiliations. Equally, Alex Kitson had been refused entry to the United States because 
he was a frequent visitor to Cuba. Lamond was able to represent the WPC on the 
international stage without constraint. He refuted the claim that this meant he acted as 
a Soviet agent, because he denied that the WPC was a tool of Soviet foreign policy. 
Lamond argued that he acted with the best intentions, and we can conclude that he 
was blinded by the ideal of world peace that the WPC literature promoted and that the 
annual conferences appeared to engender. He admitted acting as advisor when an 
affiliate body was created in Afghanistan at some point prior to what he referred to as 
"the alleged Soviet invasion".9s While his aim was to provide international support 
for the anti-American movement in Afghanistan, it is possible to claim that Lamond 
established an organisation within Afghanistan that would ensure the nation remained 
within the Soviet sphere of influence.96 
Lamond could not resolve the inconsistencies between his beliefs and the reality of 
the Cold War ideological battle. To accept that there was truth in the anti-Soviet 
position would mean accepting that his activities were wrong. He stood as an open 
and tireless campaigner for the WPC and contributed several supportive articles for 
Labour Monthly.97 Equally he was always open with his constituents and advertised 
his allegiances on all election campaign flyers. None of this harmed his electoral 
prospects whatsoever and he remained unashamed of his actions and proud of his 
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beliefs. His arguments fitted well with the stance adopted by the left of the Labour 
party during the years in opposition to the Thatcher government. He particularly 
focused on the opportunities for rapprochement that were presented by Gorbachev's 
reforms. At every opportunity he argued for greater relations to be established with 
the Soviet Union, whether they be at the national or cultural level. On the 25th April 
1985 Lamond, supported by Norman Atkinson, accused Thatcher of only offering 
"frigidity,,98 in return for the Soviet overtures. Lamond argued that if negotiations 
were genuinely open then there would be a greater potential for success. He opposed 
the Cold War constantly and argued vociferously against the arms race. He argued 
that there were hidden victims of the Cold War that neither side publicised, 
particularly within the African states where proxy wars were fought by both 
superpowers: 
Perhaps it has kept the peace in Europe for forty years ... but the victims of the 
nuclear arms race, the casualties of the hidden, secret war of starvation, 
sickness and depravation, are the 800 million people in the Third World.,,99 
Highlighting the tragic consequences of the Cold War and presenting an alternative to 
the people of the world, Lamond argued, was the mission of the WPC. It did not 
support the Soviet Union slavishly, but promoted peace. However he could not 
absolve himself of the mindset that the West was an aggressive force and that the 
Soviet Union was acting only in reaction to Western aggression. With hindsight he 
remained unable to explain the contradictions between his actions and beliefs. He 
could only view the world through a zero-sum prism and, in his opinion, the Soviet 
Union was the side that best represented his ideals. This perception was developed 
through his experience of the propaganda produced during the Second World War that 
showed both the Soviet hardship and the dedication of the Red Army in defeating 
Nazism. His education within Communist dominated Unions reinforced this belief; 
he was then taken to the Soviet Union for the final lesson. It is possible that he was 
selected as potentially susceptible to the scenario of the blind airman, particularly 
because of his pacifist outlook. Lamond acted on convictions and, therefore, it seems 
doubtful that he accepted money for his actions, though the Soviet Union could 
possibly claim otherwise. His travel expenses would definitely be seen as a wage and 
though the amounts paid are unknown we know that he travelled widely on behalf of 
theWPC. 
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Lamond toured America in 1978 assessing the public's attitude to the SALT II 
talks. lOO The following year he was the British representative on a WPC delegation to 
Vietnam and Kampuchea 12-23 October 1979. His report, published in Labour 
Monthly,lOI followed the pro-Soviet, anti-China line to the letter. This position had to 
be maintained because these visits were funded by the WPC and, therefore, by the 
Soviet Union. Soviet officials dominated the membership of the WPC and set the 
agenda for officials and delivered payments. Lamond would have been viewed as an 
agent of influence on behalf of the Soviet Union, however he refuted these claims. By 
maintaining the belief that the WPC was independent of the Soviet Union he could 
also insist that he was an independent peace activist who "devoted nearly forty years 
of my life to promoting peace at the international level. ,,102 While he accepted that the 
movement failed he, like Stan Newens, attributed the blame for this failure directly 
against the United States. 
What we do not know is how much contact he enjoyed with Soviet officials and how 
far he was convinced by them to run errands, publish sympathetic articles, and raise 
key issues in the House. From his unrepentant analysis of his position on the Cold 
War it appears that he would not have been hostile to such approaches and, 
disagreeing with the ruling rationale that defined the Soviet Union as an enemy, may 
well have agreed to put forward the Soviet case. This was not a traitorous act in his 
eyes, but the only course he could follow and remain true to his ideals. He stated that 
money was of no interest to him. If it had been, he may well have been more 
ambitious in his political career. Instead he chose the course of an independent within 
the broad church of the Labour party. He was not alone in this and enjoyed 
membership of the party at a time when it shared his principles to a certain degree. 
However, after 1985 as the party lurched back towards the right and Atlanticism re-
emerged, he and many of his allies were deselected. 
Lamond saw himself, as did Zilliacus, as a sane man in an insane world and attempted 
to highlight the errors in the policy of consecutive British governments. In parliament 
and through WPC and BPC meetings and publications he tried to change the climate 
of opinion. The fact that the majority of this activity took place at the extra-
parliamentary level, under the auspices of organisations identified as under Soviet 
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control, led him to come under constant attack from the anti-Soviet majority. "The 
criticisms levelled against him and his supporters did not detract him from his 
mission. He recognised that he worked with a different rationale, one that the anti-
Soviet Atlanticists could never accept, his ideas were as alien to them as the dominant 
Cold War rationale was to him. 
William \Vilson: The Confidential Contact 
Brian Crozier alleged that certain left-wing MPs were, in KGB terminology, 
confidential contacts of the Soviet Embassy, an accusation that has never been proven 
unequivocally. In fact such allegations led Crozier to withdraw one publication after 
the threat of libel action by Joan Lestor. Oleg Gordievsky identified other contacts 
whom he personally handled while in London. Once again these allegations remained 
unsubstantiated and are denied as ridiculous by those accused. 103 This type of activity 
is inherently secret. No written evidence of meetings exists, the only way that the 
claims that such activities took place can be verified is by an admission from someone 
who was a contact of the Soviet Embassy. William Wilson, MP for Coventry South 
1964-74 and Coventry South East 1974-83, admitted just this. Through his activities 
in pro-Soviet friendship societies and campaigns for recognition of the GDR and in 
support of the extension of trading links to Eastern Europe, Wilson became a close 
friend of a representative of the Soviet Embassy. Wilson admitted that this friendship 
was not purely innocent. He was aware that his friend in the Embassy wanted 
information and willingly discussed British politics and the Labour party with him. 
However, Wilson should not be classified as a spy. The topics they discussed were 
what Gordievsky referred to as 'daily tittle-tattle', material that was available in the 
news media. The content of the discussions and the quality of the information was 
unimportant to the Soviet Union, there were others in Western nations that would 
obtain state secrets on their behalf. The role of a contact in parliament was initially 
just to talk freely about current affairs. However, had conflict broken out between 
East and West, which was the fear of the Politburo. a contact who was close to the 
decision-making process may provide information that would be important. 
William Wilson's role was as a conduit of understanding. He enabled the Soviet 
leadership to interpret British politics and the imperatives of decision-making from 
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the perspective of someone who worked within the British parliament. It is useful to 
elucidate the background, influences and ideological motivations of Wilson to discern 
why an MP would be willing to enter into this type of relationship. In building this 
prosopography we are able to assess the nature of the relationship and the importance 
of this link, as an aspect of Wilson's political agenda and in pursuing his objectives as 
a change agent. 
Wilson was born into a politically active, Trade Unionist family in Coventry in 1913. 
An early hero was Richard [Dick] Wallhead, who was a conscientious objector during 
the First World War. During the 1918 'Khaki' Election Wilson recalled his house 
became the committee room for the local Labour party. He also recalled the plight of 
his father who, due to his involvement in the Engineers' lock-out in 1922, was black-
balled104 from working for over a year. The young Wilson was forced into work to 
help keep his family. Therefore we see that he was introduced to socialist ideals from 
an early age. It was these ideals that would draw him into politics. 
Wilson's belief in the role of the Trade Unions as working class representatives was a 
central theme of his domestic political theory. He argued that the left-wing in Britain 
should develop a "unity of purpose".10S This would replace the uneasy relationship 
between the party and the Trade Unions that characterised the 1970s, and should not 
be limited to establishing a corporate relationship with the Unions. Wilson argued 
that the Labour party in government should build an agenda around the desires of the 
working class, therefore promoting Conference and the NEC to the position of 
determining policy and reducing the power of the leadership of the PLP. Wilson's 
hope was that the Labour party would be the vehicle for societal change. He 
described capitalism as an anathema to socialism and argued for economic reform of a 
radical nature. Capitalism, he argued was a "profit-making, poverty-making, war-
making, anti-democratic system of society", 106 therefore it should be supplanted by a 
state-owned system founded upon working class control. This was a belief imbibed 
during his early life and it remained central to his objectives as a Labour politician. 
Alongside this belief Wilson campaigned for complete social equality and completed 
many studies for the party on race relations and social exclusion. The fact that his 
ideals were thwarted, as they were for many on the left of the party, led him to look 
for inspiration to the East and the Soviet Union. 
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Though he worked during the 1920s as an engineer's labourer. his involvement in the 
local Labour party led him to be suggested for the job of clerk for a local socialist 
solicitor. He did not supply the name of this solicitor but indicated that through this 
job he was able to take his legal exams and passed at the bar in 1939. Notably it was 
not until 1941. when the Communist analysis of the war changed, that Wilson joined 
the army. He did not comment on why this decision was delayed, but it can be 
inferred that he became involved in more radical socialist activities during the 1930s. 
During his army service he pinned his hopes upon the success of the Russian front. a 
perspective encouraged by the socialist movement in Coventry. After the war 
Coventry was twinned firstly with Stalingrad and later with Dresden. The association 
with the latter led Wilson to join the British-GDR Friendship Society. He recalled 
that this gained him friends when he was to enter parliament in 1964. 
During the 1950s he stood repeatedly for parliament, becoming the candidate for 
Warwick and Leamington. This was the staunchly Conservative seat of Prime 
Minister Anthony Eden. and was not to fall to Labour until after Eden's resignation. 107 
Wilson moved home in 1962, was adopted by Coventry South CLP and elected to 
parliament in 1964. His background led him to the left-wing of the party, particularly 
the Tribune Group. However it was through other alliances that he pursued his pro-
Soviet agenda. When he joined the parliamentary branch of the British-GDR 
Friendship Society he found most of the members were also members of the BSFS~ 
thus he joined also. Their number included Renee Short, James Lamond and Stan 
Thome. IOB However the majority of his early BSFS activity was at the local level. 
Wilson was active in twinning Coventry with Volgograd and he led several exchange 
visits to the Soviet Union. 
As with Philip Crees, Wilson's pro-Soviet support was nurtured during the 1930s 
when he was an active opponent of fascism. This led many to view the Soviet Union 
as the bastion of anti-fascism. a perspective that was reinforced as the Eastern Front 
became pivotal in determining the outcome of the conflict. Crees argued that the 
Soviet Union had "done more to defeat the Germans than we had".I09 This should 
have allowed the Soviet Union a major role in determining the shape of Europe's 
future. Individuals with these beliefs joined many friendship organisations on the 
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grounds that the people of the Communist nations were not enemies. However, Crees, 
with the benefit of hindsight. exhibited doubts regarding the Soviet and Eastern 
European leadership. "We were never critical enough of these people"llo he recalled 
when talking of his relationship with Ceausescu as a member of the British-Romanian 
Friendship Society. Wilson exhibited similar doubts. 
In the House Wilson remained particularly quiet in comparison to his aforementioned 
allies. The only pro-Communist causes he pursued were the recognition of North 
Korea, the campaign for admission of that nation to the UN in 1974 and 1977 and the 
increase of trade with Albania in 1980. It appears that his role was not as a pro-Soviet 
activist in parliament. This makes it difficult to determine the core of his ideals at this 
time. However he did write for The Morning Star, as did many left-wingers, and from 
these articles we can get a picture of where his sympathies lay. The central campaign 
he extolled was for the recognition of the GDR. Following a visit during February 
1967 he outlined his argument. Wilson focussed upon economic stability, he observed 
that the "people are well dressed, there are more cars on the road and an increased 
variety and quantity of goods in the shOpS.,,1l1 It was from this argument that he 
developed a theory outlining why it was important for Britain to trade with the GDR, 
and reminded his opponents that while the FDR blocked recognition it was one of the 
GDR's major European trading partners. I 12 
Wilson also discussed the threat posed by the Soviet Union, arguing that he "was 
satisfied that the desire for peace ... is a genuine aspiration".1l3 However he was not 
prominent within the peace movement. The only campaign he supported that pursued 
rapprochement was the recognition of the GDR as a de jure government. He called 
this essential, not only so Britain could enjoy the benefits of an economic relationship 
with the GDR but also, "to secure real peace in Europe.,,114 As he later reiterated, 
Europe as a continent, not defined by blocs, should be made into the "continent of 
peace and friendship". W It appears that, in his own small way, this is the ideal that 
Wilson attempted to make a reality. 
Following the 1975 Disarmament Conference, held in Helsinki. it was expected that 
arms spending would be reduced. The maintenance of a high defence budget led 
those left-wingers. who believed that the Communist regimes and their populace had 
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purely pacifistic intentions, to be highly critical of governmental policy and act in 
opposition to anti-Communism through extra-parliamentary activity. In parliament 
Wilson acted in a supporting capacity only, the most vocal critic of government policy 
was his BSFS colleague Stan Thorne. In September 1975 Thorne visited the Soviet 
Union on an exploratory visit. Reporting to the Morning Star Thome described "the 
great desire for peace among the Soviet people:' 1 16 Thorne led calls for a reduction in 
arms spending on the strength of the Helsinki agreement and thus the development of 
a 'socialist budget'. The failure of this campaign led the left within the party and 
Conference to revolt against leader J ames Callaghan. While the majority argued for 
increases in domestic spending other left-wingers opposed Labour's defence spending 
because it was a concomitant of a policy that maintained that the Soviet Union was an 
aggressor. The left argued that the party's domestic policy was anti-socialist, 
particularly following the adherence to Crosland's revisionist socialism by the 
parliamentary leadership. The pro-Soviet left-wingers, particularly figures such as 
Thome and Wilson, developed a critique of the party that identified the anti-Soviet 
policy with an anti-socialist attitude. Thorne argued that the Labour party could not 
accept that the Soviet Union was willing to seek rapprochement because that would 
mean the party leaders would have to deal with Communism as an ideological threat 
rather than as a purely military adversary. Thorne called for his allies to apply the 
maximum pressure upon the Western governments: "that we may realise the high 
aims of the Helsinki Conference.,,117 The number who adopted this stance were too 
few to apply any significant pressure, therefore some pro-Soviet left-wingers made 
greater efforts to develop personal contacts with Soviet representatives in order to 
encourage co-existence. 
As Wilson observed the Helsinki process reduced to a series of lengthy conferences 
that concluded in stalemate, he became extremely disillusioned with the commitment 
of the Western governments to detente. Wilson argued that this was the fault of 
Western leaders who opposed Communism on principle and refused to believe that 
Soviet approaches were genuine because of a deep fear of the Communist ideology. 
This had led. in Wilson's opinion, to the West, and particularly the United States, 
.. ' h C ' "'1 [ ] b t I " 118 remforcmg the perception t at ommUOlsm was eVl... not a ou peop e power . 
It was in this climate of increased bi-polar hostility that William Wilson developed a 
relationship with one "staff member of the Embassy.,,119 
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When interviewed, Wilson recalled his contact to be a "diplomat".120 He met this 
diplomat at the first BSFS Annual Dinner he attended, he recalled that he was friendly 
and interested in his work. Following this meeting Wilson was to receive invitations 
to "Embassy dos" which enabled the diplomat to talk with him further. Wilson is not 
specific as to when this relationship began, however we know that Wilson became 
Chairman of the BSFS in 1977 and, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that this 
relationship was established prior to this appointment. 121 
The relationship between Wilson and the diplomat became more intimate after 1977. 
Wilson was often invited to lunch at the Diplomat'S expense at which he was 
encouraged to "discuss the British political situation and who in British politics were 
likely to be favourable to the Soviet Union.,,122 This he recalled was not a passing 
interest but the underlying reason for the meetings. Therefore we know that Wilson 
was aware of the purpose of these meetings and entered into the relationship 
voluntarily. He recalled that at an meeting in 1979 they discussed the result of the 
forthcoming General Election. Wilson predicted that the next government would be 
Conservative and would survive for ten years due to North Sea oil revenue. While he 
admitted that his economic analysis was flawed. his prediction was correct. Therefore. 
he argued, "they thought I knew my stuff so kept in touch,,!23 This means that he 
must have been aware he was being used as a conduit for information; the kind to 
which the Soviet Union did not readily have access. 
Wilson's rationalisation of this relationship bears all the hallmarks of a view with 
hindsight. While he recalled that his initial rationale was that the Soviet diplomat 
simply wanted to attain a different perspective on the British political scene, the 
nature of which a Russian may not understand. Wilson also recognised that more 
cynical motives existed. 124 The diplomat used their friendship to gain information on 
British politics and to ascertain which MPs would be responsive to Soviet overtures. 
Wilson did not carry out any introductions, but did give the diplomat information on 
who would be sympathetic and how to contact them. He also relayed messages and 
invitations between the diplomat and other contacts. This he rationalised as the 
diplomat simply "doing his job" and knew that he had to report to his superiors. 12S 
Despite this Wilson believed that there was a bond between the two men. When 
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Wilson visited Moscow he usually stayed with this diplomat. It is possible therefore 
that the two men did have a close personal bond beyond the agent-contact 
relationship. The fundamental motivation for Wilson was that he did not see the 
Soviet Union as a threat to Britain therefore, to him, there was nothing wrong in his 
actions. Furthermore, while a body of friends existed the British people could not be 
dehumanised within the Soviet Union and war would be less likely. To Wilson he 
was simply extending the hand of friendship and, as he stated, "I didn't tell them 
anything they didn't already know.,,126 
From information supplied by Oleg Gordievsky the diplomat can be identified as 
Anatoly Maisko who, as Cultural Attache in London, oversaw the friendship societies. 
Maisko was not a KGB officer but can be defined as a "co-optee", a KGB-trained 
diplomat who operated with a dual brief. Gordievsky recalled that Maisko was a man 
with similar ideas to himself, someone that had become disillusioned with 
Communism and played out his role to the minimum. His relationship with Wilson 
was utilised to prolong Maisko's appointment in London. Wilson was his personally 
cultivated contact but. as Maisko's KGB case officer, Gordievsky was well placed to 
observe that there was "very little flesh" to the relationship. Due to Gordievsky's 
similar disenchantment he did not press Maisko's to obtain more sensitive 
information or encourage Wilson to run errands that would compromise him. Instead 
Gordievsky allowed them to "chat as friends rather than act as the traitor he wanted to 
be.,,127 Reading between the lines it is possible to accept that, as Wilson admitted, his 
role had little insignificance. In fact Wilson possibly saw himself as more important 
than he actually was. 
This is possibly the case with many of the MPs that Gordievsky is aware were 
'confidential contacts' but with whom he had no personal dealings. He recalled a 
similar case with Alf Lomas MEpI28 who had been cultivated by Bogdanov, the 
amanuensis of Brockway's latter days. The order from the Centre was to encourage 
all sympathetic MEPs to heckle Ronald Reagan when he addressed the European 
parliament at Strasbourg. Bogdanov passed the idea on to Lomas, who complied 
encouraging his left-wing colleagues to join in. Bogdanov was able to claim a great 
success, however we can hypothesise that Lomas would have taken part in any 
demonstration against Reagan and the United States. Fellow MEP Stan Newens 
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would have agreed with the principle of the demonstration and, arguably, others 
would also have seen this as 'good fun' and so joined in semi-independently. This 
alternative interpretation of the event proposes that just because the Soviet 'friend' 
suggested an action does not mean it was automatically complied with. Equally 
compliance cannot be used as a measure of the extent of Soviet control exerted over 
these figures. This reinforces the alternative perspective of agents of influence. 
Though confidential contacts existed, it appears that none of the MPs were either 
slavish or blind supporters but individuals who acted according to their own 
ideologically-driven agendas. 129 
This argument is reinforced by the fact that Wilson was aware of the faults of the 
Soviet Union. He was a frequent visitor and was given freedom of movement. He 
saw that standards of living were lower than they should have been and blamed this 
upon mismanagement. Wilson argued that the Soviet Union had all the resources 
necessary for creating socialism in one country, but the totalitarian nature of the 
Stalinist model of governance had acted as an obstacle to socialist achievements. In 
Wilson's words, the Soviet leadership and people had "lost their inspiration.,,13o 
Wilson made no excuses for this, but remained unable to divorce his socialist 
aspirations for Britain from the success of the Soviet system. To denounce the Soviet 
model would mean rejecting existing socialism, so Wilson preferred to ignore the 
faults in his public statements on the Soviet Union and provided help where possible. 
He stated that the failure of the Soviet leadership to achieve a socialist society was not 
just a domestic failure; they failed socialists the world over. The ideological link he 
established between the Soviet Union and the global socialist movement led Wilson to 
desire success for the Soviet Union and, therefore, he "didn't mind helping it a bit".131 
Like Philip Crees, he recognised that the Soviet relationship with the BSFS was 
purely political. The purpose of the organisation was to gain supporters in high 
places. This was made evident during celebrations of the 75th Anniversary of the 
Russian Revolution. Wilson attended events on the basis that if he, or another MP, 
did not then neither would a representative of the Soviet Embassy. However, this did 
not dampen his spirits. Wilson believed in the fundamental basis of the BSFS: 
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Without doubt in my mind the real driving force was that by supporting the 
Soviet Union the cry of 'workers of the world unite' would be realised upon 
the economic success of the Soviet Union. 132 
The membership consisted of individuals who "had hoped the Revolution would 
succeed or were grateful to the Red Army or wanted the Cold War to end." 133 These 
ideals were consistent with Wilson's motivations and beliefs. 
Wilson grew up in the shadow of the Russian Revolution as the great socialist 
achievement, one in which exploited workers like his father had sought inspiration. 
Furthermore Soviet aid to striking workers would have reinforced the link between 
the workers struggle and Communist Russia. Wilson's experience of the war, as with 
Lamond and Short, imbibed him with the perspective of the Soviet Union as the 
saviour of Europe and, like many of his contemporaries, he viewed the ensuing Cold 
War as an anathema to everything he believed in. 
The important aspect of Wilson's minds et is his perception of the nature of Soviet 
society. Like Cole and the Webbs, he believed in the socialist basis of that society. 
Equally he recognised that it was a project under development and this led him to 
attempt to aid its success. Arguably he became an agent of the Soviet Union. 
However his relationship with Maisko was founded upon neither traitorous or self-
seeking ideals. Wilson's belief in international socialism, not the paramount parochial 
realism, motivated him to act in opposition to government policy and the normative 
negative perspective of the Soviet Union. He believed that the world needed a 
socialist nation to act as a model and, though fundamentally flawed, the closest 
practical example of his model of socialism was the Soviet Union. This led Wilson to 
support the Soviet regime. To reject the model would mean denouncing his own 
ideals, a shift he was still unable to make in 1999. 
We can therefore characterise Wilson as a man whose activities were motivated by 
deep-seated socialist ideals. He believed in worker's equality and argued that greater 
political power should be vested in the producing class. The ideal was not to be 
realised in this country or under the political system within which he worked. 
Therefore he protected the one nation that aspired to the same principles as he did. 
He was not alone in pursuing this idealised and self-ordained role. To interpret his 
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activity we should look at one further example of an individual who acted as a contact 
and assess the fundamental basis of his motivation, thus testing the hypothesis 
established by the Wilson case. 
The Wild Man of Leith: a further variable 
Ron Brown, MP for Edinburgh Leith 1979-92, had what can be described as a 
colourful parliamentary career. His political trajectory was founded upon a radical 
socialist agenda fighting for workers' control. Brown had been sacked in 1972 for 
leading an electricians strike in support of the miners. Furthermore, as a councillor in 
Lothian he was suspended for voting against spending cuts proposed by his own 
party. Therefore, Brown can be categorised as being of a similar vein to Wilson, 
Kitson and Lamond as far as political roots are concerned. His opposition to 
capitalism and Conservatism led Brown to throw eggs at Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher on the occasion of her visit to Glasgow in 1982, and to wield and drop the 
mace while opposing the introduction of poll tax in Scotland in 1985. However, it 
was his internationalist ideals, alongside events in his private life, which led to his 
deselection. 
Brown's internationalism was guided by his pro-Soviet sympathies and his admiration 
for existing socialist systems. He enjoyed close links with Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi 134 and made frequent visits without the sanction of party leader Foot. 
Gaddafi was a Soviet ally and laid claim to socialist credentials and Brown's support 
for him was one aspect of his role in supporting the working class struggle. Brown 
obtained money from Gaddafi to fund the striking miners in 1984; an activity shared 
by Mick Welshl3s and John Platts-Mills. Milne's account of the affair found Platts-
Mills as the most active in obtaining funds from both the Soviet bloc and Libya and 
ensuring it reached the NUM's Warsaw bank account. 136 This shows that there was a 
degree of cohesion between the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary pro-Soviet 
left at times of keen struggle. This should not be seen as unusual. Brown was a keen 
working class activist; Platts-Mills, a veteran of the British pro-Soviet left-wing, had 
already shown his colours during his career as a QC. That they were allied in support 
of the miners is not particularly striking, particularly as Brown had already been 
acti ve as a member of the pro-Soviet coterie. 
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The only voice from the Labour benches on the Afghanistan conflict came from Ron 
Brown. He had established links with the Soviet sponsored government led by 
Babrak Karmal, and had been a guest of Karmal in early 1981 during a mission 
sponsored by the Soviet Embassy.137 His actions during this visit gained him much 
press coverage, particularly when, accompanied by Bob Litherland,138 he unwisely 
posed in front of a monument in the shape of a tank after writing in Labour Monthly 
that he had seen no tanks in the country. The media ignored his work in procuring the 
release of Pinder Wilson, a British national taken hostage in Afghanistan during the 
conflict, this was not part of the received image of the 'loony left' which Brown 
personified.139 Brown pursued a pro-Karmal position after his return and argued in 
parliament that the Karmal regime should be recognised. Recognition, Brown argued, 
would reassure Karmal that the Western world was not antagonistic towards him. 
Karmal, Brown claimed, was willing to extend the hand of friendship: "we are talking 
about world peace, does that not matter, or does militarism cloud every mind in the 
House?,,14o 
Brown produced an 'eyewitness report' for Labour Monthlyl41 following his visit. He 
reported that Karmal had told him that Western hostility towards his regime, formally 
established in April 1978, forced him to "seek aid from the USSR".142 The previous 
President Hafizzulah Amin, whose coup had overturned the revolutionary People's 
Democratic party government in July 1979, had been a CIA agent, Brown argued, 
who had been employed to undermine the popularity of the revolutionary party. 
Therefore the Soviet army with public backing had executed Amin. The Soviet 
occupying force now remained to keep the regime secure from further attack from the 
West and would leave only "when the border areas were guaranteed from 
interference,,:43 Brown claimed that he saw none of the warfare that the Western 
TneH-t?r~scribed. He also saw no sign of rebels and described Afghanistan'S capital 
alalabad as "quiet and peaceful."l44 He argued that to have been duped into this 
ption would have taken "a cast of thousands and the biggest Hollywood set ever. 
And quite frankly this would have turned Cecil B de Mille into an amateur in ' 
comparison,,:4S This means that either the Western governments had initiated a 
gigantic conspiracy campaign or Ron Brown, despite his protestations, was either 
duped or was lying. The question is if he was lying why, and for what? 
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Brown argued that to the West, and particularly to the Thatcher government, the 'red 
bogey' was a convenient tool. It justified arms spending and an aggressive foreign 
policy. He argued that this was the real reason for Western refusal to recognise the 
Karmal government. The alternative, Brown argued, would mean admitting that the 
Soviet Union was not acting in a hostile manner, an admission that would force the 
British government to review its anti-Soviet defence policy. This analysis of British 
policy determinants, and his sympathy for the Soviet model of socialism, led Brown 
to develop a relationship with an agent of the Soviet Union. 
In his autobiography Next Step Execution Gordievsky revealed that Brown was a 
willing, but incomprehensible, contact that he had inherited. 146 It is unclear what 
Brown's role was in relation to the KGB, or how he was recruited. Brown's private 
life suggested he lacked moral standards and self-control. This made him the perfect 
target for the KGB. notwithstanding his personal beliefs. It also could explain how he 
came to the conclusion that the Soviet forces in Afghanistan were living in harmony 
with majoritarian support. This was the picture that the Soviet government attempted 
to supply to the West. Could he therefore have acted as a propagandist on their 
behalf? Without forming conclusions based upon circumstantial evidence. it is 
indicative that Brown became a trade agent for Communist North Korea. acting as a 
conduit between British companies. such as the Virgin Trading Company and 
Highland Distillers, and the Stalinist regime. 147 Therefore he maintained a role as an 
agent working for a Communist power, possibly due to his ideological links with the 
dogma of that society. This also appears to have been the motivation for his pro-
Soviet activity that is under examination here. 
Brown's only attempt to explain his stance was made through letters to The Scotsman. 
From these scant statements it appears that he, like Platts-Mills before him, was 
attempting to redress a balance. He stated that the right wing used the Soviet Union 
as a "bogeyman" which was "conjure[d] up ... to divert attention from the real issues 
in this country.,,148 This he believed should be redressed by the Labour party which 
should recognise that it could not create socialism in a vacuum, but must ally with 
other progressive forces both national and international. I49 This meant adopting the 
Soviet economic model of planning, one which Brown reminded readers was not only 
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a Communist theory but also one that had been proposed by N ye Bevan in the late 
1940s.150 His disappointment lay in the fact that the Labour leadership had 
abandoned socialist principles to gain office and subsequently built a consensus in 
parliament on both domestic and foreign policy. Labour, he argued, must be 
authoritative in policy making when in power and their policy should be constrained 
only by the principles of socialism and the demands of the Trade Unions, not the 
forces of capitalism. The principles he promoted were those laid down by Sydney 
Webb in 1922 when he authored the Constitution, Brown invoked the symbolic 
significance of the words of Clause IV arguing that worker's control of the means of 
production was fundamental to establishing a socialist state. lSl Here we can see how 
Brown's thinking led him to support the Soviet Union as a socialist model and how 
this mindset led him to become a confidential contact of the Embassy's diplomats. 
Brown believed that the Soviet Union was socialist and argued that the Anglo-
American anti-Sovietism was part of a strategy of deception founded upon the self-
interest of the capitalist class. It was this anti-Communist campaign, Brown argued, 
that was posing the greater threat to world peace as it opposed the creation of socialist 
nations, ones that were non-competitive so would actively avert war. The perception 
of the West as anti-socialist highlights Brown's belief that the Cold War was zero-
sum. He argued that if the Soviet Union lost the Cold War, and was forced to adopt 
capitalism, then a socialist future would be unattainable. It seems, therefore, that 
Brown, like Wilson, was prepared to aid the Soviet Union in order to ensure the 
survival of the 'socialist superpower' and its ideology. 
In a letter to The Times Brown defended his relationship with Gordievsky. He denied 
ever acting as an agent. Gordievsky, he recalled, was someone he had known as a 
"newspaper man who claimed he wanted to brief the Soviet reformers, including a 
rising star called Gorbachev, about the realities of British life."ls2 The information 
imparted was trivial, Brown argued: U[Gordievsky] could have got it from the 
Beano":S3 Gordievsky had led him to believe the Politburo desired "better 
understanding of the situation in this country" telling Brown that the Soviet goal was 
establishing a "mutual purpose and camaraderie."IS4 Brown's attitude is tinged with 
bitterness towards Gordievsky, possibly as a traitor to the Soviet Union but, mainly 
because he revealed his relationship with Brown. Perhaps presciently Brown recalled: 
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I have now to ask myself was the information for British Intelligence? It was 
always Labour figures Gordievsky wanted to know about. The information 
was more valuable to the Tories than it would have been to the KGB. 1SS 
This demonstrates the risk in pursuing this type of contact. The KGB operatives held 
a zero-sum perception of the world, there were no friendly contacts, only potential 
spies and traitors. Brown's perspective was that he was personally contributing to the 
creation of a new rapprochement, this perspective was not shared by the security and 
intelligence services of either side. 
Friendship: For the Common Weal or Anti-Democratic Traitors? 
There are no key differences between the motivations of these individuals and those 
studied in chapters covering previous periods. There is some evidence that Brown 
and Wilson held a more radical outlook, one similar to Renee Short's, while Lamond 
seemed to argue from a position similar to that adopted by lan Mikardo and Konni 
Zilliacus. Arguably Brown's stance was influenced by his role as a Trade Union 
activist and his lack of an intellectual, socialist perspective. He perceived the world 
as black and white, socialist or anti-socialist, and could not see the nuances between 
differing systems and regimes as other left-wingers did. This zero-sum opinion of the 
world was one that was shared by many who held pro-Soviet sympathies. The 
perception they held was that the Cold War was a zero-sum ideological conflict and 
evidence indicates that they also held the belief that the future of socialism was 
intrinsically linked to the survival of the Soviet Union. Perhaps it is accurate to argue 
that they perceived the second phase of the arms race as being decisive. Equally, they 
realised that their influence within the party had reached its watershed. This does not, 
however, necessarily set them apart from their predecessors. 
What is clear is that, like their predecessors, they believed that they were acting with 
the best intentions and on behalf of humanity as a whole. They created a linkage 
between the ideals of peace and co-existence and the goal of attaining a socialist 
future. They were not slavish to Moscow, or supportive of Washington or London, but 
held the rather exaggerated view that their constituency was the future generations of 
the world. They wished all children, of all nations, creeds and political systems, to be 
born into a world founded upon peace and socialism, not capitalism and competition. 
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Many of their left-wing colleagues, such as Tony Benn, also promoted these ideals, 
however these figures avoided linking their socialist doctrine with the Soviet 
communist model. The pro-Soviet position, held by figures like Brown, Lamond and 
Wilson, led them to argue for an end to the bi-polar antagonism and the pursuit of co-
operation and understanding. This would allow the Soviet Union to introduce 
democracy to the state economy. This would be the fruition of the dream that the 
majority of the non-Communist, pro-Soviet left shared, and the objective they worked 
for despite broad hostility to such ideas. 
The pro-Soviet left-wingers were unable to achieve this through the lobby or from the 
backbenches in parliament. These figures therefore adopted a more individual 
approach; one of personal contact and rapprochement at the personal, rather than 
governmental, level. The motivation for this is largely identical to those which drove 
Zilliacus to establish a relationship with Khrushchev and Tito, his aim was to act as a 
conduit between the two leaders and their western counterparts. These figures acted 
in opposition to the policies of their party and ultimately the law of the nation. They 
appear not to have recognised the legitimacy of these policies and concomitant laws 
due to the fervency of their opposition. They could not view the Soviet Union as an 
enemy and thus co-operated with organisations that attempted to change the ruling 
rationale. By no means was this a new phenomenon. Laski argued in Tribune in 1937 
that "are we not all. as socialists, friends of the Soviet Union, even if we are also 
critics."ls6 In the zero-sum world of bipolarity criticism was no longer an option for 
many. Therefore they acted in the only way they believed to be correct. They refused 
to accept defeat by majority decision. Instead they chose to work as activists on the 
fringes of politics. 
This led some to support the notion of totalitarianism, in the form of a commitment to 
establishing socialism through strict control of the economy of a nation. This was 
seldom made explicit, however a tradition existed for a minority of left-wingers to 
argue that only by seizing full control of society could the groundwork for a socialist 
state be established. These socialists had experienced the defeat of their ideals from 
time immemorial. The only success in establishing socialism had been made by the 
Soviet leadership and only achieved by removing political opponents, ending 
democracy and ruling by force. Marx after all had hinted at this by extolling the 
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notion of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus some were led to accept 
totalitarianism as a route towards socialism and supported and defended the Soviet 
Union and her allies because of the system they had created. They had accepted the 
necessity of harsh means to attain the ends they required and were willing to support 
the Soviet Union in comparison to the ineffectuality of western democratic socialism. 
These figures retained democratic socialist credentials, and supported the ethos of that 
creed, but they had also become disillusioned with Labour governments that rejected 
socialist principles and accepted the constraints of capitalism. This was the 
conundrum they faced when arguing their causes in parliament. They knew they 
would not be taken seriously, that the majority either would not or could not effect 
change, however they stood by their personal principles and dreamt of becoming 
influential. They acted independently and supported the cause of a foreign nation 
purely on the grounds that its ethos was closer to their own than that of the British 
government, or indeed, the Labour party. 
Never Again: the end of parliamentary pro-Sovietism 
In 1989 the focus for pro-Sovietism collapsed, however by this time pro-Soviet 
influences had been exorcised from the Labour party. The NEC, accurately described 
by Richard Crossman as the 'battering-ram of change', 157 was to lose this power 
under the Kinnock initiated organisational reforms. The only oppositional force to 
these reforms was what Shaw described as the 'hard left'. This group should not be 
characterised as being pro-Soviet, nor should it be assumed that all pro-Soviet MPs 
belonged exclusively within the hard left. To group the left together in this way 
disguises the nuances within its traditions. However an agenda was developed, based 
upon democratic socialist principles, which was supported by the majority of those 
who harboured pro-Soviet sympathies. Neil Kinnock, as party leader 1983-92, led an 
attack on those individuals who, as Hattersley put it, made up the "illegitimate left" 
who were "cuckooing in Labour's nest".158 There were continual attempts to introduce 
one member, one vote [OMOV] between 1984 and 1993 in order to reduce the power 
of the constituency based activist. The introduction of OMOV for elections to the 
NEC eroded the power of the left-wing and reduced the influence of Communist 
Trade Union leaders like Ken Gill and Alan Sapper. A clear concomitant of the 
reform procedure is that, as TUC President 1985-6, Gill had little opportunity to 
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reverse the rightward shifting balance of power. This was Kinnock's chief 
b· . 159 R d' o ~ectlve. espon mg to a report produced by Geoff Bish, Labour Research 
Secretary;60 Kinnock strove to ensure that the leadership's hands were not tied by 
manifesto commitments drawn up by the left-wing and that the Cabinet regained 
control over party policy, candidate selection and communications. This was to be 
achieved by the 1992 General Election. 161 
The battle over candidate reselection resulted in the pro-Soviet MPs losing their 
parliamentary seats. Pro-Soviet ideas were unpopular within Militant, the left-wing 
group that had become influential within many of the staunch Labour constituencies. 
This resulted in WiIIiam Wilson resigning rather than face an unsympathetic 
reselection battle and James Lamond being deselected in favour of a Trotskyist 
candidate. 162 Renee Short also refused to face the reselection procedure and stood 
down prior to the 1987 General Election. 163 The influence of Militant, within both the 
CLPs and the NEC, was expressed when Tony Benn, Eric Heffer, Joan Maynard and 
Dennis Skinner organised a walk-out of left-wingers on the NEC in support of 
Militant, thus leaving the body impotent without a quorum. l64 Other left-wingers, 
described by Butler and Kavanagh as 'the old white left', were to be deselected in the 
name of positive discrimination. For example, Norman Atkinson was forced out of his 
Tottenham seat to make way for Bemie Grant. While this provided the Tottenham 
constituency with a more representative MP, it clearly showed that the extreme views 
held by the pro-Soviet strand were losing appeal at every level. The Militant-inspired 
manual on selection encouraged CLPs to produce a spreadsheet recording how their 
MPs had voted in parliament. 165 While this did benefit all left-wing MPs it became 
clear that the pro-Soviet members were at a disadvantage. As an ideological battle 
raged within the party it became clear that all factions were opposed to their ideas. 
The pro-Soviet sympathisers became increasingly isolated even within a left 
dominated party. The Bennite left saw them as mavericks and opposed their 
attachment of socialism to Soviet communism. The centre-left and right wing argued 
that they, together with Militant, were damaging to the party's electoral credibility. 
Thus Kinnock's attacks on the radical sections were welcomed by a majority of the 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary membership. The isolation of the pro-Soviet 
MPs, and their maverick status, can be recognised by the lack of cohesion over the 
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party's direction. Allaun, Atkinson, Lamond. Mikardo. Richardson and Thome 
backed Benn in his challenge for the deputy leadership. but Brown. Ross, Short and 
Wilson wavered in their support of Benn but could put forward no suitable alternative 
candidate. 166 This lack of cohesion impaired their opportunity to gain influence, 
however. the broad left-wing consensus. while it lasted. did make the party leadership 
a hostage to left-wing activism. Tudor Jones indicated that Kinnock, during his first 
years as leader, saw himself as restricted in reforming the party. His mission was to 
break the left's cohesion and undermine its position at all levels of the party. It was 
only following the enforced deselection of pro-Soviet and Militant candidates that 
Kinnock, and later Smith and Blair, enjoyed a "time of tranquillity when party 
members were finally prepared to let [the leader] get on with his job.,,167 
The consistent attack on left-wing strongholds, the creation of a centrally approved 
candidate list and a complete policy review, a procedure which was to see the party 
accept what some left-wing critics argue to be a new right agenda. 168 also saw the 
ideas of pro-Sovietism removed from the party. Ernie Ross was to be the only MP 
referred to in this study that survived into the Blair parliament. Some of their less 
radical allies. however. were to maintain the stance developed by Victory for 
Socialism. These individuals. numbering no more than twenty. were to be a faint 
voice opposing the support for the American bombing campaign against Iraq.169 
Unilateralism was abandoned under Kinnock and nuclear weapons were once again 
accepted as a necessary part of Britain's defence capabilities by a Labour 
government. 170 With the collapse of Soviet communism came the abandonment of 
many of the socialist tenets that drew those with pro-Soviet sympathies to the Labour 
party. It is unlikely that such ideas will resurface in the foreseeable future given the 
current trajectory of the party. 
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Chapter Seven 
The perspectives of pro-Sovietism 
The case studies of pro-Soviet MPs show that there were nuances between their 
individual activities and motivations. This indicates that the Soviet Union played a 
different role within the political thought of each individual. Some individuals were 
convinced that the Soviet model of socialism represented their practical ideal and, on 
the strength of this conviction, sought to protect the regime. In contrast others 
employed the Soviet Union purely to express opposition to the Cold War rationale. 
They rejected the rationale that the Soviet Union posed a military threat, arguing that 
the United States had created a myth surrounding Soviet foreign policy aims. This 
chapter suggests a framework for understanding these differing perspectives and seeks 
to explain why individuals who held contrasting perspectives pursued differing types 
of pro-Soviet activity. Understanding the nuances between the individuals helps to 
explain why there was a lack of cohesion between these politicians. While they shared 
a common focus for their critique of the Cold War, they did not share a framework of 
reference, because of their differing perspectives of the Soviet Union, and therefore 
they lacked unifying objectives. 
Having assessed their arguments it appears that some British Labour party MPs 
supported the Soviet Union because they believed that the Soviet Communist system 
represented a positive alternative to the politics and policies that were native to their 
own party. The strengths of belief differ and can often be contextualised within the 
periods in which they were developed. This is the primary reason for this study being 
carried out chronologically. However the nuances between individual's beliefs, and 
their activities, cannot always be confined within one definite historical period. Some 
beliefs emerged out of a specific period, and· were reactive to events in the 
international order or the Labour party. However, other pro-Soviet perspectives 
developed into traditions that would shape the beliefs of the pro-Soviet strand in later 
periods, thus becoming an aspect of Labourist thinking. While the study has focused 
on individuals as case studies, determining the specifics of their beliefs and 
influences, this penultimate chapter will focus on the ideological strands within the 
pro-Soviet movement. 
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Many socialists and liberals, who espoused pacifism and social equality, saw the 
Russian Revolution as a great emancipatory event. This spirit underlined the agenda 
for the 1917 Peace Convention. In contrast, the Bolshevik coup received a more 
reserved reception. The Soviet political system, which emerged following the Civil 
War, became a curiosity, an image Stalin exploited to the full. However, it would be 
inaccurate to assume that Soviet marketing techniques provided the sole impetus for 
pro-Sovietism. Developments in relations between the Soviet Union and the West, 
and failures within the Western social democratic model, chiefly dictated how the 
Soviet Union was perceived. In those sparse periods of domestic stability and 
international harmony the Soviet Union received little attention, however this was 
limited to a brief period during the 1920s. 
Events overtook the Soviet propaganda campaign~ making the Soviet model the focus 
of a movement over which the ideological leaders of international communism had 
little control. For example in the 1930s a movement formed calling for a popular 
front to emerge within the European socialist movement. The CPGB were drawn into 
this movement but did not stand as the ideological leader. The lack of Communist 
control over the pro-Soviet coterie was also weak during the Cold War. The peace 
movements, which revolved within a pseudo-pro-Soviet orbit, opposed Communists 
control, 1 but did not specifically oppose the Soviet Union. This meant that the 
Communist party succeeded by following entryist tactics, gaining influence within 
movements, but failed to attain ideological control over policy. 
Labour party left-wingers chaired many of the organisations that fell within the pro-
Soviet orbit. This appears as something of an anomaly considering the policy of the 
party that they represented. Studying the individuals themselves however, in isolation, 
it appears an obvious path for them to select. They stood as individual thinkers, 
motivated by ideals that surpassed the traditional party political dichotomy. Equally 
they seldom sought real power, only the power to influence. They attempted to be 
agents of influence for their cause and took on the role of change agent. Due to the 
unpopularity of the focus of their arguments they became almost self-defeating, 
despite the fact that their objective was to legitimise their cause. They were an 
embarrassment to both the Militant left and the centre-right of the Labour party and 
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were considered by the leadership, alongside Militant, as a serious threat to party 
cohesion. Kinnock:, and arguably many of his predecessors, saw the removal of those 
who promoted the left-wing agenda as a necessity. Kinnock attacked the ideologues 
stating that: 
Implausible promises don't win victories [but] start with far-fetched 
resolutions ... [which] are then pickled into rigid dogma, a code, and you go 
through years sticking to that, outdated, misplaced, irrelevant to the real 
needs. 2 
This statement encapsulates the ideological mindset of the pro-Soviet strand, but the 
expression of this opinion did not convince the pro-Soviet left that they should alter 
their course. To the pro-Soviet MPs these 'far-fetched' resolutions were deep-seated 
ideals. 
Any attempt to group these individuals into neat compartments can obscure the 
nuances in their thinking. However, categorising the perspectives they held of the 
Soviet Union allows us to discuss the subjacent denominators within pro-Soviet 
thinking. A discussion of the commonalties that are evident in their arguments 
provides an indication of how the Soviet Union figured in each individual's thinking 
and how this perspective acted as a prism through which the beholder viewed the 
world. 
After cursorily examining these figures it can be argued that the Soviet Union played 
a different role to each sympathetic observer. However we can group the differing 
perspectives under one single assumption, that the Soviet Union represented a positive 
alternative to capitalism and so stood as an example to socialists the world over. Not 
all within the pro-Soviet strand argued that the Soviet model should be adopted ill 
extenso. Therefore we can separate the beliefs into subdivisions. These subdivisions 
will be contextualised with regard to the individuals to whom they are relevant and, 
where possible, the historical period in which they were developed. 
The Soviet Union as the socialist example 
The Soviet Union's claim to be the first socialist state certainly provided the stimulus 
for left-wing interest. Some awarded the Soviet Union the unique status of 
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representing the core of the socialist world and, though the Soviet model was copied, 
it remained the model and, during the Cold War, was able to establish itself as the 
protector of the international socialist movement. China, Cuba or any other 
independent or semi-independent Communist state managed to achieve similar 
prominence or status among British MPs. Despite the fact that the majority of 
influential Western socialists rejected the Soviet model, others were unable to 
separate the Soviet Union from the ideals of the global socialist movement. Thus, 
while Trade Unionists and intellectuals denounced the socialist, and indeed Marxist, 
aspects of the Soviet Union, others argued that the Soviet Union was socialist in 
various respects, a description they did not award to Britain under Labour. 
The Wall Street Crash, and the economic repercussions, led to one of the high 
watermarks of this ideal. Capitalism, the system founded upon never-ending 
accumulation, neared apparent collapse. Socialists, like G D H Cole, Jennie Lee and 
John Strachey, with previously diverse beliefs, agreed that the world was destined to 
progress towards socialism. This appeared to be proven by the fact that the Soviet 
Union was thriving, a factor that led many theorists to develop a theory for the 
establishment of socialism based upon the Soviet model. There were differing 
strengths of belief in the Soviet Union as a model. While some confined themselves to 
arguing that a Soviet-style centrally planned economy was the key to establishing a 
socialist society, others confidently argued that all aspects of Soviet society were 
socialist and that the Soviet model should become the blueprint for all socialist 
movements. Planners, such as John Maynard Keynes and GDH Cole, lent reserved 
support to the Soviet model in a revised form. Within the zero-sum context of the 
Cold War, MPs Frank Allaun and Stan Newens argued that there was an 
interdependent relationship between the Soviet model and international socialism, and 
hinted that the success of socialism relied upon the success of the Soviet model. 
While these figures exhibited a restrained support for aspects of the Soviet model, 
there were those who expressed an almost devout belief Ron Brown, Alex Kitson, 
Renee Short, the Webbs and William Wilson all placed the Soviet Union on a 
pedestal as an example to the British Labour movement. 
Those figures that did express a belief in the Soviet Union as a model for socialism 
utilised this belief as a mirror to reflect the inequalities and inconsistencies within 
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western democracy and Labour party policies. Issues such as unemployment, 
education and free access to welfare were highlighted. The purpose for their 
comparativist analysis was to hypothesise that if the Soviet Union could achieve clear 
advances, despite unfavourable circumstances, why were the British Labour party's 
achievements so limited. This analysis was activated particularly in response to claims 
that the western system was superior. This was the case after the 1931 debacle, but 
was also expressed following the unravelling of key aspects of the 1945-50 welfare 
reform programme. MPs like AIlaun and Short used the Soviet Union as a stick with 
which to beat those socialists who suggested further cuts to benefits awarded the 
British proletariat, particularly when the cuts were made to finance 'unnecessary' 
defence spending. The Soviet Union, they argued, had achieved quantitative results 
in a very short period, while Britain was constrained by a cross-bench consensus 
despite having had an established socialist government. This reflected the necessity 
for change. Those who espoused change did not wish to disband democracy, but 
wanted the Labour party to harness the reins of government and break the economic 
power of the capitalist class. This would allow for swift reforms that would establish 
Britain as a socialist state. 
This was socialism in the most idealistic and dogmatic form. Arguably, had a British 
Labour government been guided firmly by its founding principles then these 
individuals would have been satisfied. However this was not, and could not be, the 
case. Forces beyond governmental control ensured that a pro-capitalist consensus was 
maintained. This led to mounting dissatisfaction among the left-wing of the party. It 
was within this dissatisfied left, many of whom felt estranged from the party and 
parliament, that notions of pro-Sovietism emerged. Those who developed the pro-
Soviet critique of the party highlighted the achievements of the Soviet Union and 
exhibited the belief that if the Soviet experiment failed then socialism across Europe 
would be perceived as an obsolete ideology. Therefore they protected the model. 
This notion was an aspect of the mind sets of many of those who actively opposed the 
Cold War, particularly AIlaun, Hutchinson, Kitson, Platts-Mills, Short, Swingler and 
Wilson. Therefore their arguments developed a dual motivation; they spearheaded a 
campaign for co-existence that also aimed to protect the system in which they vested 
their hopes. 
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This motivation was shared by others who were even more proactive in their pro-
Soviet activity. Melita Norwood, the employee of the British Non-Ferrous Metals 
Association who willing passed secrets to the KGB regarding the British nuclear 
weapons development programme, explained: 
I thought they should somehow be adequately defended because everyone was 
against them, against this experiment... it was unfair to them that they 
shouldn't be able to develop their weaponry.3 
This attitude was not particular to Norwood, or to others proven to be agents of the 
KGB. Konni ZilIiacus also characterised the Soviet Union as a beleaguered nation 
forced into acting defensively by a hostile world and Allaun argued that the Soviet 
experiment should be allowed to evolve unhindered. Thus by attaching 'Socialist' to 
the national title, the Soviet Union was able to become an embodiment of the illusory 
Marxist-Socialist state. 
The Soviet Union as a positive alternative 
Russia was epitomised as the model for alternative action after the revolution of 
February 1917. Later this trend was exemplified by the popular front movement. The 
world was perceived as divided between opposing political ideologies of right and 
left, defined in their most extreme forms as fascism and communism. This dichotomy 
led some left-wing ideologues to be drawn to embrace the ideas of the Soviet Union 
as the only alternative to fascism and imperialism. The argument was put forward 
that if there was a choice between fascism and communism, communism must be the 
victor. This was particularly espoused by G D H Cole, but featured in the arguments 
of Aneurin Bevan, Stafford Cripps and S 0 Davies. Bevan and Davies had received 
financial aid from the Soviet Union in their roles as strike leaders in the South Wales 
coal mines.4 Therefore it stood, albeit for a short time in Bevan's case, as their natural 
ally as the embodiment of proletarian power. This led to the perception of the Soviet 
Union as the enemy of governments that supported capitalism, but the ally of the 
working class of every nation. This notion was transposed into the political ideas of 
many of those who went into politics through the Trade Unions. 
This analysis was extended during the Cold War era. The Soviet Union was seen as 
the positive alternative to the United States. The left-wing would not accept the 
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subjugation of British foreign and defence policy to the White House and opposed 
any attempt to allow the United States hegemony over Europe. The Soviet Union's 
history was analysed sympathetically within a subjectivist framework. This reflected 
the ideals of the analyst and the conclusion was determined by the perception that the 
Soviet model was fundamentally correct. If the Soviet government had deformed the 
Marxist-Leninist model, Zilliacus in particular argued, then this was due to the anti-
Communist campaign pursued by the capitalist world. If attempts to develop an 
understanding of the character and implicit aims of the Soviet system were made then 
the Soviet model would evolve along socialist rather than totalitarian lines. All un-
socialist activity within the Communist bloc was excused by activating this analysis. 
Zilliacus, in I Choose Peace, was a major exponent of this view however G D H Cole, 
who put forward a similar argument during the 1930s, laid much of the groundwork 
for this analysis. This alternative analysis allowed socialists to view the Soviet Union 
as a socialist nation that had become disfigured by the international order in which it 
functioned. Later sympathisers such as Wilson adopted a similar view in retrospect, 
therefore this was one of the traditions that developed within pro-Sovietism. 
As outlined above there were those who argued that the Soviet Union was socialist. 
This argument was activated at times when a Labour government was forced to adopt 
a conservative agenda. The condemnation of the Callaghan budget of 1974, by 
Atkinson, Newens and Short, was peppered with comparisons to Soviet economic 
policy. Those individuals who held the view that the Soviet Union was socialist 
developed a comparative analysis of British Labourism. Their conclusion was that the 
British model was deficient. Thus the idealised image of the Soviet Union became a 
fixture within the mindset of the pro-Soviet MPs. They vested their hope in the Soviet 
Union as the driving force behind world socialism and were unable to recognise the 
failings of the Soviet regime because, to them, it embodied their hopes for the future. 
These radical figures desired a society without poverty, unemployment or inequality 
and believed that that society had been created in the Soviet Union. This tradition can 
be traced back to the Webbs but was also promulgated by Kitson, Short and Wilson. 
The popularisation of this notion created a certain degree of support for the Soviet 
Union, this was not vested in the Soviet leadership but in Soviet socialism as an 
ideology with a practical dimension. It is important to note that none of these 
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individuals ever extolled the virtues of Stalin or Brezhnev and that those who initially 
supported Khrushchev were part of a short-lived minority. It was a belief in the 
socialist societal basis that was the impetus for support and this, in turn, led them to 
support the governmental policies in an attempt to protect the regime. 
These individuals supported the idea of socialism with religious fervour. They 
believed that they alone recognised the true potential of socialism as a governmental 
model. All they had to do was convince others .of that potential. They thus employed 
the Soviet Union to show what could be achieved by maintaining a commitment to 
socialism, while highlighting the fact that these were attained under an atmosphere of 
hostility. They failed to realise that much Soviet propaganda was false because they 
wanted to believe with an almost religious fervency. Therefore they allowed 
themselves to be convinced. Thus their beliefs and perceptions acted as a prism 
through which they viewed the world. 
The Soviet Union as a governmental alternative 
As cursorily explored in earlier chapters there was a strand of thought within pro-
Sovietism that supported the notion of authoritarian socialism. This remains largely 
unstated in any of the cases under examination apart from Ron Brown and Lester 
Hutchinson. Dleg Gordievsky, however, linked the whole body of pro-Soviet thought 
with a support for totalitarianism. In an article for The Spectator he asked: 
Why were totalitarian inclinations so very characteristic of the Old Left, and 
why did so many of its members participate so enthusiastically in the 
operations of the Soviet propaganda machine?5 
This question can be answered, to an extent, by reviewing the arguments many of the 
pro-Soviet figures put forward in support of the Soviet political model. 
From the now infamous 'betrayal' of socialist principles by Ramsay MacDonald in 
1931 onwards, there was a recognition that certain aspects of British democracy 
enforced the subjugation of socialism to capitalism. Those who opposed the 
Bemsteinian model, which argued that socialists could only create a reformed version 
of capitalism until history ran its full course,6 proposed that their leaders should act 
with greater resolve and that the principles of socialism should not merely guide, but 
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dominate, policy formulation. Cole, in 1941, hypothesised about the redundancy of 
social democracy and used the achievements of Soviet society to illustrate his 
argument. Others developed a similar analysis. Therefore some pro-Soviet MPs were 
explicit in their support for committed, decisive and determined leadership in 
implementing socialism and eradicating capitalism. 
The Labour party has only twice had a sufficiently significant majority to dominate 
parliament. The first ran from 1945-50, the second began in 1997. In the former 
period opposition from the left was based upon the notion that the time had arrived to 
implement a socialist policy and make such a policy irreversible. While Attlee's 
domestic reforms were indeed socialist, they were also consensual. The left wanted 
far more than what was on offer, particularly in the field of foreign policy. The fact 
that this too was based on a consensus between left and right caused the dissent 
described in this study and led to a continued and deepening polarisation within the 
party. Some critics of the government, particularly G D H Cole, Lester Hutchinson 
and Stephen Swingler also became, at key junctures, critics of the democratic system. 
They argued that it precluded radical reform and was opposed to any pro-socialist 
advancement. 
This allows speculation as to what type of political system did they argue would allow 
the creation of a socialist society? The examples they offered to us, both prior to and 
after the Second World War, indicate that it was only when the leadership had 
absolute power that society could be totally reformed. A determined socialist leader 
had to be able to suppress the reactionary elements, particularly when they hold 
economic, if not governmental, power. The strict economic centralisation enacted by 
Stalin could not have been accomplished under a liberal democratic parliamentary 
system. Equally the programme that the left prescribed for 'cradle to grave' welfare 
and full employment could not be achieved when capitalists retained economic power. 
The pro-Soviet strand did not enquire whether the British public would want such 
reforms. Their understanding was that a socialist society was mankind's ultimate 
desire. The evidence they presented argued that those living under Communism had a 
better standard of living than their British counterparts. Kitson, Short and Wilson all 
promoted this argument in the press; therefore we can enquire whether these figures 
also believed that Labour should become authoritarian when in government. 
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Though it is tenuous to propose that any section of the Labour party had an inclination 
to recreate Stalinist politics in Britain, there are indications that a desire existed 
among the left for greater dedication from their leadership. Many of the precedents 
they discussed were set by the Soviet Union and these were utilised to explain how 
the world could be changed for the better and indicate an inclination towards the 
authoritarian socialist model. The fact that their chosen vehicle for change, the 
British Labour party, was trapped within a consensual parliamentary democracy 
appears to have given them a feeling of deep frustration. This was felt particularly 
when, despite holding positions within the party hierarchy, they still lacked any real 
influence over, or access to, the policy formulation process. 
This led to a situation whereby authoritarian socialism could not be denounced 
because, by linking socialism to the Soviet Union, it could not be separated from the 
notion of implementing 'true socialism'. The Soviet leadership, it was argued, had 
displayed true resolve, the quality which domestic Labour leaders lacked. This led 
some British socialists to lavish praise on the achievements of the Soviet Union, using 
Soviet achievements as a mirror to reflect the inadequacies of British socialism and 
the political system. The majority hoped implicitly that democracy would evolve 
within the Soviet Union, but excused this failing upon the aggressive stance of the 
international order. There is, however, recognition, exhibited in the work of the 
Webbs and Zilliacus, that the authoritarian nature of the regime was initially 
necessary, and even desirable, for the installation of socialism. 
There are other factors that led to unswaying support, particularly the desire to protect 
the Soviet socialist model, and this can explain why the authoritative nature of the 
regime did not deter democratic socialists. In their analysis the regime was 
authoritative for a reason, to install socialism. But the withering away of the 
bureaucracy had been hindered by the continual external threat. Therefore, the nature 
of Soviet Communism could only progress to a more democratic stage once the world 
had accepted the regime as an ally rather than an enemy. Since many believed that 
the threat was ideological, not military, they argued that the United States was 
prolonging the war to defeat communism; not the Soviet expansionist policy as 
Western propaganda argued. 
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Returning to the premise of this argument, we can understand the dual notions of 
accepting and even supporting authoritarianism, providing the dictator was a socialist. 
This refutes, to an extent, the premise of Gordievsky' s enquiry but explains why this 
perception can be adopted. It is difficult to find any elected individual who argued 
that the Labour party should, once in government, establish a dictatorship and install 
socialism regardless of the short term hardship. However, we do see individuals 
calling for greater resolve and opposing their leaders when they were seen to 
dissemble under capitalist pressure, an accusation that could never be levelled against 
the Soviet leadership. Thus those who were committed to the installation of a 'true' 
socialist political system, and were predisposed to believing that the Soviet model 
represented the ideal of socialism, were able to excuse the authoritarian nature of the 
Soviet political system. This led them, at key junctures, to highlight the virtues of the 
Soviet leadership's commitment to socialist aims. The analysis of their support for 
authoritarian socialism indicates the deep complexity of the movement and the 
contradictions that existed in these figures' thinking. Equally, it shows why it was 
simple to view pro-Soviet activists as apologists for Stalinism. Their beliefs are 
shrouded within traditions of British socialism that have remained largely unexplored. 
Without a deeper understanding of the roots of these arguments it is easier to view it, 
on face value, as an aberration rather than a continuity. 
The Soviet Union as the proponent of peace 
It would be a simple process to categorise the peace movement as pro-Soviet because 
the arguments of the movement, and of Soviet propaganda, were often identical 
during the Cold War period. To make this judgement, however, would be largely 
erroneous. The peace movements attempted a policy of non-alignment and were 
largely successful in maintaining this position. Soviet sponsored groups such as the 
W orId Peace Council undermined the non-aligned position arguing that non-
alignment meant ineffectuality and intransigence.7 WPC publications enquired, when 
the world is tom between 'good and evil' and 'right and wrong', is it possible to be 
neutral? Neither camp believed this was possible and therefore attempts were made 
to force individuals to decide which side they would support. Soviet propaganda led 
some pro-peace activists to believe that the Soviet Union, the nation that produced 
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volumes of material supporting disarmament and rapprochement, was indeed opposed 
to the nuclear stand-off. This was arguably an accurate perception. Volkogonov 
testified that the Soviet Union could not compete on equal terms in the arms race, and 
Gordievsky recalled that paranoia was prevalent among the Politburo during the early 
1980s. The Soviet propaganda campaign, however, was not a mechanism that affected 
everyone in a positive way. Diana CoIlins remained profoundly anti-Soviet and found 
that the cynical methods of Agitprop reinforced her perceptions. 
The majority of left-wingers who engaged in studies of the foreign policy objectives 
of the Communist bloc did so because they were already sympathetic to the ideas of 
pro-Sovietism. Therefore they were predisposed to conclude that the Warsaw Pact 
was a defensive mechanism. This trend began in the popular front era, however the 
magnum locus came following the ideological demarcation of the world. Zilliacus 
was the first, and arguably most prominent, exponent of the idea that the Soviet 
leadership desired an end to hostilities. His influence was passed down to Allaun and 
Newens, representatives of a younger generation of anti-war left-wingers. The 
arguments of these figures were not confined within the pro-Soviet analysis of events, 
but did largely agree with the central tenets of the Soviet line. Others like Lamond, 
Short and Wilson also made the transition to pro-Sovietism, produced adulatory 
articles and voluntarily joined the pro-Soviet peace movement. Those already within 
the pro-Soviet orbit reinforced these beliefs, as did front organisations such as the 
WPC. Thus the pro-Soviet left and the Soviet Union spoke with essentially one voice. 
Both called for an end to the arms race, the decommissioning of nuclear weapons and 
rapprochement with the Communist bloc. Within the pro-Soviet milieu the notion that 
the Soviet Union favoured peace, while the United States opposed any move to end 
the Cold War, was popularised. 
Soviet foreign policy was also argued to be the positive alternative to the Atlanticist 
model adopted in Britain during the Cold War. In the 1930s the Soviet Union was 
characterised as the bastion of anti-fascism, during the Cold War it provided the 
impetus for detente and rapprochement and stood as the anti-imperialist force in the 
world. Despite United States President Roosevelt promoting the notion of self-
determination at the Bretton Woods Conference, and its codification in UN resolution 
637 as "a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights",8 left-
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wingers argued that United States foreign policy undermined the concept completely. 
The Soviet support for progressive movements, such as the Greek Democrats, 
enhanced Soviet anti-imperialist credentials and led figures like Leslie SolIey to fall 
within the pro-Soviet orbit. The progressive nature of Soviet foreign policy was 
reinforced by Soviet support for the anti-Apartheid cause and the protection of 
Castro's Cuba. This perception led figures like Ron Brown to promote the Soviet 
analysis of Afghanistan and join pro-Soviet organisations like the World Peace 
Council. Therefore the Soviet Union was able to establish itself, among a minority of 
left-wingers, as the positive alternative to the capitalist, imperialist and, importantly, 
anti-socialist United States of America. 
The Soviet Union in humanist perspective 
There was equally a trend which focussed upon the people, rather than the 
government or ideology, of the Soviet Union. John Platts-Mills retained great faith in 
the Russian and East European public, a belief that he gained when producing 
propaganda during the Second World War. Similar ideas emerged as a tradition 
within pro-Soviet thinking. These were a particular feature of arguments put forward 
by Lamond and Short. These figures appear to have been unable to separate the 
Russian general will from Soviet governmental policy. They believed that the Soviet 
model of decision-making operated as an upward stream of directives that were 
translated into policy by the Politburo. This belief led them to argue that the lack of 
public enmity to the West, exhibited by the Eastern European Communists they met, 
would be expressed as foreign policy if co-existence was pursued by NATO. This led 
them to support friendship and cultural exchange societies and to produce propaganda 
aimed at countering the anti-Soviet rationale. 
This was particularly important for those, like lan Mikardo and Julius Silverman, who 
were of Russian extraction. They had a link to Soviet Jewry and to the revolutionary 
traditions of Russian society. lan Mikardo's family fled the Tsarist pogroms of pre-
Revolutionary Russia, therefore he possessed a sympathetic view of the regime that 
overthrew Tsarism. More importantly, he could not accept the dehumanisation of the 
people of Eastern Europe because of his hereditary ties to the region and its peoples. 
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It was a humanist outlook that led others to oppose anti-Russian propaganda. Had 
there been a change in the Western governmental perception of the Soviet people, it is 
doubtful whether some of these individuals would have shown any support for the 
regime. Mikardo, for example, did express opposition to the regime, but was able to 
explain why it had evolved into a totalitarian state. Therefore he encouraged the 
regime to be accepted, in order to allow the regime to become more democratic, while 
countering the official anti-Soviet propaganda. This led him to attempt to establish an 
economic bridge between Britain and the Soviet Union and actively support 
Gorbachev as a reformist Communist leader. Many others within the pro-Soviet 
milieu also attempted to change public opinion. Through the development of 
economic and cultural links between Britain and the Communist bloc, they attempted 
to alter the 'sterile' anti-Communist propaganda perspective of the Eastern European 
peoples and encourage an atmosphere for rapprochement between East and West. 
Conclusion: The Soviet Union as a focus for alternative activism 
The British parliament is arguably a forum where competing political ideas can be 
debated and a reasoned conclusion reached that has the support of a majority of 
members. However, to those within the pro-Soviet left, it was a forum in which they 
had little influence. They were continually defeated by the consensus between the 
major parties on issues very dear to them and thus felt compelled to pursue extra-
parliamentary activities. These figures argued for an alternative to the Cold War and 
attempted to achieve this through establishing themselves as conduits for 
understanding between the opposing ideologies. Arguably it was during detente and 
the Second Cold War that this methodology was taken to the extreme. Brown, 
Lamond, Mikardo, Short and Wilson all acted with a view to 'lighting a candle in a 
dark corner of the world'. This led them to join friendship societies, reach out to 
diplomats of the Soviet Embassy and generally evoke the image of co-operation and 
co-existence. In a world metaphorically perceived in black and white, they attempted 
to maintain a middle ground and attached themselves to groups of like-minded 
individuals, be they liberals, humanists or communists. 
Within these forums of discussion, existing in opposition to the governmental 
structures, strategies for change were developed. These forums, usually extra-
279 
parliamentary societies, included a variety of individuals; from Pritt and Platts-Mills 
to IIya Ehrenberg or Dmitri Shostakovich. Whatever their composition, they 
expressed 'progressive' ideals. The individu~ls who participated in these forged links 
beneath governmental level in the name of those higher ideals to which their lives 
appear to have been dedicated. The results of their extra-parliamentary contacts were 
brought back to parliament where, despite eloquent arguments, they found a wall of 
hostility to their alternative stratagem. In the course of their activities it appears that 
some could have been used as pawns by operatives of the Soviet Union. However, it 
appears doubtful that any of those studied ever acted against their personal principles. 
Therefore, it can be argued that, though they were of use to KGB officials this was to 
a minor degree and on their own terms. They enjoyed forging links with members of 
Soviet society, reconstructing the person behind the one-dimensional propaganda 
image, and finding that they shared an outlook on the world. KGB agents often used 
these friendly overtures, if only to gain approval from the centre. Furthermore these 
contacts allowed the possibility of gaining an insight into British politics and the inner 
machinations of the Labour party. However, the principles on which these 
relationships were founded were far removed from the image that is created by the 
unsympathetic Cold War perspective of these activities. 
The political activities of these individuals were geared towards changing the ruling 
rationale that encapsulated anti-Communism, the Cold War and the nuclear stand-ofT. 
Therefore the Soviet Union became a focus, or a lever, that could be used to bring 
pressure to bear upon the government. However, the result of this activity was only a 
devaluation of their arguments. The failure to remain non-aligned meant that they 
could be, and were, written ofT as agents, fellow travellers and crypto-Communists, 
their words being lost in a plethora of slurs. Though in many cases they became 
blinkered to reality by their adherence to an ideal of 'true' socialism, they campaigned 
continually with their sights set on a higher goal, a peaceful, prosperous and socialist 
world. This vision is one that became a powerful motivational force, but remained a 
dream that could not be made reality despite the constant campaigning and activism 
engaged in by these internationalist, socialist politicians. 
1 This was clearly stated by Marjorie Thompson. CND Chainnan 1990-3, who opposed any attempts by 
Communists to steer the organisation's agenda. See P lohnston. Daily Telegrapl.1 25/9/99, p 25 
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2 N Kinnock. Speech at the Labour party Conference 1985, Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 
London, Labour party, 1985; P Gould, The Unfinished Revolution, London, Little, Brown & Co, 1998, 
p4. 
3 D Rose, interview with Melita Norwood, Sunday Telegraph. 12/9/99, p 5. 
4 During the 1926 General Strike, in which both Davies and Bevan were involved, the British Miners' 
Relief Fund was funded almost exclusively by the Russian Central Council of Trade Unions. The 
funding arrived through CPGB members active in the regions. See R Griffiths, S 0 Davies: A Socialist 
Faith, Dyfed, Gomer Press, 1983, p 78. Bevan praised the CPGB for providing aid duimg the 1930s 
and organising hunger marches under the auspices of the National Unemployed Workers' Movement. 
See J Campbell, Nye Bevan, London, Richard Cohen, 1997, p 59. 
s Spectator, 22/5199, p 35. 
6 E Bemstein, (1899) Evolutionary Socialism, New York, Schocken, 1961. Bemstein developed his 
critique of revolutionary Marxism while in Britain and used the British parliamentary system as a basis 
for his theory. Sce T Wright, Socialisms: old and new, London & New York, Routlcdge, 1996, p 10; 
pp 45-46. 
7 This was argued by Diana Collins, wife of Canon Collins, leader of CND, in a letter to the Editor of 
Peace News 18/3/63. J D BcrnaL President of the WPC, particularly pressed the point home as an 
argument for joining an aligned organisation. Sce, G Wernicke, 'The Communist-Led World Council 
for Peace and Western Peace Movements: The Fetters of Bipolarity and Some Attempts to Break Them 
in the Fifties and Early Si:\1ies', Peace and Change, Vol. 23, No. 3, July 1998, P 290. 
8 R H Jackson, 'The Weight of Ideas in Dccolonization: Normative Change in International Relations', J 
Goldstein & R 0 Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Poliev: Beliefs. Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca, 
CorneII, 1993, pp 111-139, P 12-1. 
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Conclusion 
This study has developed an analysis that allows historians and political scientists to 
understand how pro-Sovietism developed as a tradition within British Labour party 
politics. Through a study of the individuals who were sympathetic with the Soviet socialist 
experiment, we are able to understand how their perspective of the Soviet Union acted as a 
guide over their political activities and drew them into adopting an oppositional stance 
against the Labour party leadership and successive British governments. This conclusion 
will respond to some of the questions that are raised by the study, but which could not be 
addressed within any single chapter or through anyone case study. 
Four questions can be identified. Firstly, why did these figures invoke the Soviet Union as 
the model for a socialist world order. Secondly, why did they use the Labour party as a 
vehicle through which to change the perception of the Soviet Union and establish a 
'socialist peace'. Thirdly, what were these individual's long term objectives and finally, 
what effect did they have on the Labour party, the socialist movement in general and on 
the Cold War, all of which they attempted to change in line with their objectives. The last 
section will reintroduce the roles ascribed to them in the introduction, the change agent 
and conduit of understanding, and assess how these definitions capture the individual's 
essence as politically motivated individuals. 
Why the Soviet model? 
Any history of socialist thought is a history of the interaction between many complex, 
varied and competing notions of the socialist state, many of which were represented within 
the ethos of British Labour party members. The complexities within socialist theory were 
often reflected in the contradictions within an individual's own socialist convictions. For 
example, G 0 H Cole criticised socialists who harboured non-libertarian tendencies, yet he 
perceived the socialist movement as a single body of ideals and rejected any analysis that 
dwelt upon "narrow and sectarian manifestations." I This perception, which was expressed 
by many within the British socialist movement, enforced the view that the Soviet model 
was one competing theory of socialism and, more importantly, that it was the only theory 
with a practical dimension. In the most basic terms it was the first socialist state and 
claimed to be successful in implementing a socialist economic system. Only the 
Bolsheviks could lay claim to this achievement. 
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The fact that any attempt to establish socialism had limited success outside of the Soviet 
sphere of influence meant that the Soviet Union became of significant symbolic value to 
one strand of the socialist movement. If Lenin and Stalin were able to create socialism. 
within a proto-industrial, peasant society, what had hindered MacDonald, Attlee, and the 
other leaders of British socialism, from doing likewise? Thus the Soviet Union became a 
model for socialists who wished to make significant socialist achievements, they rejected 
the Bernsteinian theory of historical inevitability, arguing that by adhering to this 
philosophy a socialist future may remain beyond mankind's grasp forever. They argued it 
was achievable and should be established, not in a piecemeal form, but in totality and 
now! The use of a model of socialism was not particular to the pro-Soviet strand. Perry 
Anderson, and some also argue Antony Crosland. looked to Swedish social democracy as 
a model for British socialists.2 However the Soviet model held a special significance to 
some individual thinkers. It was the first and, though beset by problems, represented a 
fledgling making its first tentative steps. It was also constantly under threat from a world 
order hostile to its ideology, therefore, continuing the fledging metaphor, the Soviet model 
needed protection if it was to evolve properly. Most importantly, however, the Soviet 
leaders expressed a devout commitment to the socialist ideology, they did not debase their 
ideas to gain support and had no inclination to allow either endogenous or exogenous anti-
socialist forces to damage the integrity of the socialist regime. Therefore, within the work 
of a minority of socialists the Soviet Union became of an iconic significance. 
The Soviet Union laid claim to socialism as a political, economic and social form of 
government, this led some to perceive a link between their personal political objectives 
and those of the Communist bloc. Why this link was established is complicated and reliant 
upon individual experiences. For example; the Soviet Union was perceived as the victor 
against fascism, the protector of Spanish republicanism, the opponent of American 
hegemony, the nation opposed to war and the nuclear arms race and a nation excluded and 
demonised due to its adherence to socialism. All these factors are represented in the 
mindsets of those individuals studied, the perceptions were awarded differing prioritisation 
but became normative beliefs within the culture of pro-Sovietism. This appears to have 
deep cultural significance within the British socialist movement. On consecutive 
programmes for BBC Television's Campaign Confessions Labour candidates made a link 
between their ideals and the idea of the Soviet Union. Bob Marshall-Andrews, when 
waving a hammer at the camera he was about to use to knock in posts. jokingly 
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commented: "I'm just missing the sickle,,3; John o Farrell, when distributing campaign 
leaflets outside Maidenhead railway station, told one supporter: "You're wearing a Russian 
hat, I knew you were one of ourS.,,4 While both candidates possess 'old lefts' credentials, 
and are unsympathetic to the Blairite reforms of the party, neither have ever expressed 
support for the Soviet Union. Therefore this link can be argued to be an aspect of the 
culture of the left. The idea of the Soviet Union as one arm of the socialist movement, that 
shared the same ideals of public ownership, social equality and worker's control, became a 
powerful motivator. 
This rnindset meant that many were unable to condemn the Soviet Union, that would mean 
falling into the trap laid by the exponents of anti-Communism. This minority attempted to 
change the anti-Soviet rationale and establish an atmosphere in which the Soviet Union 
could be discussed without pejorative connotations being automatically conjured. The 
Soviet Union, using the phraseology developed by Goldstein and Keohane, became a 
potent sign on these individuals route through politics, determining their behaviour as 
political actors. The theory that ideas act as road maps, though intended to predict the 
actions of leaders,' is useful in explaining the adherence to the pro-Soviet line. This 
hypothesis argues that there are, concerning each political choice, a series of alternatives. 
Ideology earmarks those which can be adopted and those which cannot. Ideas, it is 
argued, "can stipulate what is right and wrong" moreover "principled ideas enable people 
to behave decisively ... [and] can shift the focus of attention to moral issues and away from 
purely instrumental ones focused on material interests and power.,,6 The latter has, 
historically, formed the basis of foreign policy formulation. Those studied herein 
abandoned material interests and power, their ideas focussed on moral issues and; 
"determined the tracks along which [their] action [was] pushed by [their] dynamic of 
interest"'. This ideological stance placed moral, socialist and humanist principles above 
those of national security, national interest or power politics. While they can be accused 
of being erroneous over their choice of focus, their political stance can be explained in this 
way. 
The socialist politician, when constrained by ideological strictures, is limited in the 
political choices available. This became a particularly potent factor in an ideologically 
divided world. Those who believed that the Soviet Union was socialist appear to have 
been drawn to choosing the Communist side and the political activities associated with 
pro-Sovietism. This was clearly one of the chief motivational forces that led those with a 
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dogmatic adherence to the socialist ideology and a desire to establish 'true' socialism in 
Britain, to forge an ideological alliance with Soviet Communism. 
Why Labour? 
The idealised view of the Soviet Union was one aspect of a minds et that focussed upon 
objectives that were untenable, particularly within the hostile atmosphere of the Cold War. 
The anomaly is that these individuals chose the Labour party as the vehicle through which 
to change the world order. The party was historically anti-Communist, proscribed any 
organisation that held pro-Soviet links and had been instrumental in the establishment of 
the framework for the containment of Communism. Equally Labour was reformist and 
subscribed to gradualism, rejecting revolutionary socialism as a doctrine that inevitably 
lead to totalitarianism. Yet, within the writings of many of these figures, we find a belief 
that the Labour party would change British policy towards the Communist bloc and that 
Britain could stand as an example to the world, both by standing as an non-nuclear power 
and by providing the impetus for co-existence. 
Had the Labour party been the only socialist party in Britain during the Twentieth 
Century, or the Cold War period, it would not be surprising for it to be a broad church that 
contained a complex array of competing ideas. However a viable alternative existed that 
was sympathetic to the Soviet Union and espoused similar objectives to these individuals. 
Curiously, however, they saw the Communist Party as anathemic to their ideals and 
objectives. All those figures interviewed denounced the CPGB as unsocialist, controlled 
by Moscow and anti-democratic. This appears as a contradiction within their thinking, 
howe~er there is, perhaps, logic to this position. None of these figures were slavish to the 
Soviet line and liked to perceive themselves as independent regardless of how closely their 
arguments matched those of Cominform or the CPGB. Equally they did not propose that 
the Soviet Union should rule Europe or Britain, they espoused an independent and 
democratic route towards socialism. Furthermore they did not view the world in the same 
way as the Communists, the pro-Soviet Labour MPs spoke of co-existence, not alliance, 
with the Soviet Union. They also argued that the world order should consist of 
independent and equal socialist states, there should not be one superpower or a single 
ideological guide. Their support for the Soviet model became contextualised within the 
Cold War rationale, but it was not a support based upon a strong ideological attachment. 
Their attachment was weak and flexible, it was their opposition to the Cold War anti-
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Soviet rationale, and the role of the United States as a hegemon over the non-Communist 
world, that caused their support for the Soviet Union to become accentuated. 
There was also a highly idealistic view held of the Labour party that figured as a symbolic 
constraint upon their thinking. The left believed that the party could be 'steered' to 
becoming a vehicle for the worker's, a notion enforced by the Trade Union link. This led 
the left to amalgamate around organisations which sought to influence the constituency 
and Conference level of the party organisation. This was largely successful as once 
Conference became left-wing oriented, a greater number of left-wingers were elected to 
the NEC. The campaign to steer the party into a leftward trajectory had been begun by the 
Bevanites using Tribune as a platform. Activity was increased by Victory for Socialism, 
the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy and the Labour Co-ordinating Committee, all 
of which attempted to heighten support for the left-wing agenda. These left wingers, who 
included the pro-Soviet MPs and Trade Union leaders, sought to establish the party as a 
radical, socialist party. This was an unrealistic campaign, the central tenets they promoted 
had been only been expressed during the formative years of the party's history. However 
these notions held enormous symbolic significance to these individuals. 
The Labour Representation Committee, in the manifesto written for the 1900 General 
Election, declared its objectives were: 
the Socialisation of the Means of Production, Distribution and Exchange, to be 
controlled by a Democratic State in the interests if the entire Community, and the 
Complete Emancipation of Labour from the Domination of Capitalism and 
Landlordism with the Establishment of Social and Economic Equality between the 
. Sexes.8 
The 1929 manifesto. in less precise terms, committed the party to: "making Britain a 
happier and more contented land, and establishing peace in the world. ,,9 It was these ideals 
that underpinned Labour's ethos and governed the activism of many left-wing figures. The 
party constitution, and particularly Clause IV, held greatest significance. Tony Benn 
described it as "the clearest and best possible statement of the democratic, socialist faith", 
one that "must ... remain at the core of our work." 10 The socialist project in Britain was 
often referred to in terms of a faith, particularly among left-wingers who maintained a 
perpetual myth of betrayal by the party leadership. They also linked the success of the 
socialist project in Britain, which was often referred to in personal terms reminiscent of 
the language of a religious crusader, with the establishment of socialism across the globe. 
286 
This was often expressed in idealistic terms and expressed the belief that socialism would 
solve all mankind's ills and that it was the ultimate desire of all people, whether they knew 
it or not: 
the ugliness and squalor which now meets you at every turn in some of the most 
beautiful valleys in the world would disappear, the rivers would run pure and clear 
as they did of yore ... and in the winter the log would glow on the fire ... the youths 
and maidens made glad the heart with mirth and song, and there would be beauty 
and joy everywhere. 11 
The creation of this society was the ultimate objective of all party members and, as one 
former General Secretary declared: 
No socialist worthy of the traditions of the Labour movement should refuse, on 
occasions, to go against a strong current of public opinion if in doing so he believes 
that such a course is necessary for the purpose of social progress. 12 
The pro-Soviet MPs believed it also necessary to oppose party policy and national 
legislation, but equally saw that this was in keeping with the traditions of the party and its 
ethos, arguing that it was the leadership's stance that was antithetical and anti-socialist. 
The future ideal: a movement's objectives 
Summlln bonum, or the highest good, appears as a prescient term to use to describe the all-
embracing goal to which the pro-Soviet strand aimed towards in their activity. Arguably 
they worked neither for party or nation, but for res pllblica~ the common wealth. They 
expressed the notion that there was a greater good that a government should attain for her 
subjects. These internationally minded politicians extended this ideal to encapsulate the 
common wealth of the world's people. The future they campaigned for was socialist, as 
expressed by the Labour party constitution and successive manifestos, and peaceful, which 
necessitated co-existence between all states rather than competition and containment. As 
the Cold War rationale opposed both these ideals these individuals worked to undermine 
anti-Sovietism, either by parliamentary or extra-parliamentary means. The individuals 
provided a good account of their personal objectives, either through their writings or in 
hindsight during interviews. The evidence indicates that these individuals shared a 
significant number of ideals and motivations and all focussed upon an abstract goal in the 
name of humanity. This was rationalised as a positive alternative to Cold War, and the 
arguably inevitable nuclear war, and unconstrained capitalism. To these individuals it was 
only the Soviet Union that represented these ideals. 
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Footprints in the Snow 
A more complex question asks what effects these figures had .. In tenus of altering the 
course of the Cold War the answer appears to be that they had no effect at all. 
Communism. and Marxist socialism. was defeated; as was the ideology as a blueprint for 
society. However during the Cold War supporters of the Soviet model existed as a group 
that could not be ignored by the Party leadership. Therefore. as one strand within the left-
wing of the party. they established themselves as an anchor. maintaining a link between 
the pragmatic approach to government adopted by the PLP and the party's traditional left-
wing ethos. Therefore. while the party subscribed to the Cold War rationale, it could not 
have become as deeply Atlanticist as Conservative governments. Apart from the 1945-50 
period parliamentary majorities were too weak to allow backbench rebellions to take 
place. The very fact that a force existed who opposed the activities of the western secret 
services meant care had to be taken. In practice this usually meant greater secrecy.13 but 
policies were also enacted as a result of pressure from the left. For example, the caution 
with which Wilson handled the issue of Vietnam was the result of having to balance the 
demands made by the United States and those of the party's left-wing. 
Left-wing pressure was constantly brought to bear against the Party leadership. Hansard is 
peppered with demands that a peaceful settlement be negotiated between Britain and the 
Warsaw Pact. This escalated during the diplomatic process that culminated in the Helsinki 
Conference of 1972. This was a joint venture between the member nations of the European 
Economic Community and of the Warsaw Pact, a venture the left saw as being a positive 
step toward rapprochement. It seems unsurprising, given the groundswell of support for 
rapprochement on the back benches, that it was a Labour government which entered into 
this venture, rather than continuing British reliance on the United States to ensure 
European security. 
Equally as the power of the left grew, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, manifestos 
were increasingly dominated by key tenets of the left-wing agenda. This is particularly the 
case with defence policy. Unilateral disarmament, an argument with roots in both the 
Bevanite and Zilliacus traditions, dominated the agenda. Ironically though, this was the 
beginning of the end for left-wing influence. Gerald Kaufman described the 1983 General 
Election manifesto .1S the "longest suicide note in history", It was rejected in totality by 
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the electorate and contributed to Labour's consignment to fourteen years in the political 
wilderness. I" To become electable again meant a long process of policy refonn' and 
modernisation. Therefore, we can say that the pro-Soviet strand, as activists within the 
left-wing, did have an impact upon the party, but it is difficult to describe this effect as 
positive. 
In general the pro-Soviet strand made little impression on governmental policy or the 
course of world history. Their radicalism was as unpopular with the public as it was in 
parliament. Few could see a link between socialism and Soviet communism and even less 
could accept that adopting any Soviet-style mechanisms would benefit them. This was the 
framework in which the party had to operate. These individuals were unable to work 
within these strictures, and thus their marginalisation was inevitable if the party was to 
maintain itself as an electoral force. 
While their domestic influence was marginal, it can be asked whether they had any effect 
upon the Soviet regime they sought to protect. In the long tenn the answer is again no, 
however, in the short tenn it is possible that they contributed to the longevity of the 
regime. In acting as a counter to the anti-Soviet rationale they were able to alter the 
perceptions of some toward the Soviet Union. For example without their alternative 
political strategy British businesses would not have been encouraged to aid the Soviet 
economy, valuable information may not have aided the Soviet anns race and there would 
have been no direct line of communication between the Politburo and the British 
Parliament. While these may appear trivial in the light of the events of 1989, they amount 
to quantitatively more than was hoped when Munzenberg established the mechanisms to 
create a' fifth column. British politicians were actively supporting the Soviet Union, albeit 
with a focus on a higher goal, and attempting to protect the integrity of the regime. This 
point is reinforced by the definition of pro-Soviet activity provided by Northedge and 
Wells. They described the multi-faceted activity of the pro-Soviet strand as having "at 
times ... the effect of weakening the vigilance of [Britain] against Soviet pressures within 
the international system". They do not over exaggerate this effect, however, stating; "this 
can never have been more than minimal."ls 
Furthermore, building upon the Northedge and Wells argument, the support for the Soviet 
Union did reinforce and enhance the perception of the Soviet Union, though to differing 
dl!grees, held by the Western public, members of governments and the international 
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community. While few believed Soviet leaders when they declared that Soviet policies 
were purely protectionist and that the nation sought peaceful co-existence, a British 
politician, when reiterating these declarations, could convince a broader audience. This is 
highly debatable. Through studying the individuals it would seem that, despite the 
eloquence of their argument, they did not add any weight, nor give credence, to the Soviet 
arguments. It would be more accurate to state that in reiterating Soviet arguments to 
emphasise the necessity to change policy they devalued their own position. Thus pro-
Sovietism became one characteristic exploited by the anti-Labour tabloids when coining 
the phrase 'loony left'. It seems clear, therefore, that they had as little tangible effect on 
international relations as they did on the domestic policies of the western nations. Equally 
they drew little support from public opinion, the dominant anti-Soviet rationale held sway 
across the western alliance. It can be extrapolated from interviews and scant writings on 
their careers the majority recognised that they failed but exhibited a degree of pride in the 
fact that they alone tried. In their opinions, through the maintenance of their ideals, they 
remained true to the ideals of peace and a secure future for mankind the world over. When 
placing yourself on this lofty pedestal it appears that failure is immaterial, what matters is 
that the fight was juSt. 16 
Change Agents and Conduits of Understanding 
In pursuing their objectives it is clear that these figures sought to alter Labour's domestic 
and foreign policies and the governmental perception of the Soviet Union. While they 
were not alone in the former activity, they spearheaded the latter campaign. They 
personally attempted to position themselves as the agency through which a co-existent 
future was attained between the two ideological blocs. In pursuit of this goal they helped 
establish links between Britain and the Soviet Union that would facilitate mutual 
understanding of the political systems. They also promoted Soviet foreign policy 
objectives in an attempt to gain support for the alternative, sympathetic, perspective of 
Soviet aims. Therefore they stood as repositories for this perspective, and attempted to 
ensure that it was received by the widest possible audience. Furthermore, in establishing 
Anglo-Soviet links, they also attempted to encourage Communists to understand British 
politics. The main aim of this activity was to prevent war through nurturing an atmosphere 
based on mutual understanding. 
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The alternative analysis of these figures, as supported by Chap man Pincher, Brian Crozier, 
Blake Baker, Oleg Gordievsky and, most recently, Vasili Mitrokhin, argues that pro-
Soviet left wing MPs amounted to little more than "Soviet spies and saboteurs".17 
However, using the cases of Kitson, Lamond, Short and Wilson as examples, their 
ideological motivations and philosophies do not earmark them as traitorous. In fact, their 
ideals appear as patriotic as those who argued the case for strong defence. To them it was 
an issue of national survival and prosperity, standing in opposition to a foreign power, the 
United States, which opposed their ideology, taking control. They believed that United 
States ideological hegemony over Britain would mean the abandonment of socialism and 
the subordination of British Labourism to American capitalism, Therefore to these figures 
the choice was clear, better Communist than capitalist. In the case of the pacifist pro-
Soviet strand, and to turn a well-used aphorism on its head, 'better red than dead'. 
Due to the openly sympathetic support displayed by some of these individuals it is certain 
that the Soviet Union believed they had agents in Parliament. This perception was 
exacerbated by the clear willingness of some left wingers to encourage relationShips with 
representatives of the Soviet government. Once again this is a question of perceptions. 
Konni Zilliacus, who talked to Khrushchev and published a favourable account, would 
have been perceived as a propagandist. However, from his perspective, he was presenting 
a researched argument as to why the West should improve relations with the post-Stalinist 
Soviet Union. This is equally the case with Frank Allaun, lan Mikardo and Stan Newens 
who consulted Soviet diplomats and Eastern bloc leaders, thus building a more two 
dimensional picture of world affairs. As Norman Atkinson argued, it was perceived 
acceptable for a right wing MP to consult an Eastern European Embassy, but not for a left 
winger; 'particularly one who was sympathetic to the Communist model of socialism. 
Equally the cases of Renee Short and Alex Kitson, who visited the Soviet Union and 
extolled the virtues of Communist society, indicate that they were fighting for a higher 
cause, the creation of a socialist society. However by using the Soviet Union as a 
benchmark for socialist achievement they provided the right wing with the ammunition to 
denounce their politics. It is clear that they acted as change agents and conduits of 
understanding as they actively campaigned to alter the ruling rationale and public 
perception of the Soviet Union. This led some to be viewed, in some cases correctly. as 
confidential contacts nnd to become associated with the pejorative connotations attached 
to that ddinition. They openly supported many causes which furthered Soviet foreign 
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policy objectives, not simply because it would benefit the Soviet Union but, because there 
were, in their analysis, clear benefits for the future of humanity resultant from the pursuit 
of these objectives. They were drawn to front organisations because, as Sapper indicated, 
to support the progressive side meant you had to join the pro-Soviet orbit. The pro-Soviet 
strand became the living embodiment of their own meta-narrative; they viewed themselves 
as the frontline in the campaign to provide humanity with a better future. 18 
This political strand were largely impotent, both in changing British governmental policy 
and in protecting the Soviet Union from either military or economic attack. Therefore, it 
can be asked what is the importance of these individuals. They were individuals who were 
prepared to stand for an unpopular cause and opposed the politics of the party for which 
they were elected in the name of future generations. They rejected the party line, negated 
their own chances of career prospects and, it would seem, ignored common sense in 
pursuit of a goal that remained permanently beyond their reach. In different circumstances 
they may have been extremely influential, but not in a world divided by a zero-sum 
ideological perspective. Equally, outside the Cold War ideological dichotomy, the context 
within which they operated, they would not have been as highly motivated. Therefore 
they stand as a distinct group of principled individuals who refused to be cowed by the 
opposition they faced. It is doubtful that such politicians will emerge again. They remain 
one aspect of the history of the Cold War, and therefore cannot be separated from the 
context of the events of the period. However, if a similar conflict developed, one which 
separated mankind becJuse of ideas many felt were an aspect of their personal ideology, 
that encouraged irrational hate and fear to govern the minds of the people, and threatened 
the security of the future generations of the peoples of the world, then similar arguments 
may well be raised again in parliaments across the democratic world. 
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Appendix I 
Biographical Detail 
Below represents a brief biography of the key individuals dealt with within this thesis 
both those who are used as the main constituents and peripheral characters used as 
variables. 
Frank AlIaun (1913-) 
Labour MP: East Salford 1955-83. PPS to Secretary of State for the colonies Oct 
1964-March 1965 (resigned). NEC Member 1967-83, Deputy Chairman of the party 
1977-8. Chairman 1978-9. Editor Northern Voice 1951-67. Previously correspondent 
with Manchester Guardian. Manchester Evening News and Daily Herald. Founder of 
Labour Action for Peace, Founder member of Victory for Socialism. member of the 
Tribune Group and CND. Organised the first Aldermaston March. Lifelong 
campaigner for peace and opponent of nuclear weapons. 
Norman Atkinson (1923-) 
Labour MP: Tottenham 1964-87. Labour Party Treasurer 1976-81. Left-wing MP 
once tipped to be the successor to Aneurin Bevan. 
Arthur Bax (died 1961) 
Head of the Labour party Press Department 1945-61. Committed suicide after 
confessing to passing information on internal party affairs to the StB. 
Geoffrey Bing (1909-77) 
Labour MP: Hornchurch 1945-55. Assistant Government Whip 1945-6. Later 
Constitutional Advisor to the Prime Minister of Ghana 1956-7; Attorney General of 
Ghana 1957-61: Advisor to President Nkrumah 1961-66. Self-confessed fellow 
traveller of ZilUacus and left wing socialist. Lawyer. 
A Fenner Brockway (1888-1988) 
ILP MP: East Leyton 1929-31: Labour MP: Eton and Slough 1950-64. Chairman: 
Labour and Socialist International 1926-31. British Centre for Colonial Freedom 
1942-7. British, Asian and Overseas Socialist Fellowship 1959-66. British Council for 
Peace in Vietnam 1965-9, Congress of Peoples against Imperialism 1948-88. CND 
1964-95. Executive member Anti-Apartheid Movement 1964-92. Lifelong anti-war 
demonstrator, conscientious objector and campaigner for peace arid an end to the arms 
race. Created Baron Brockway of Eton and Slough 1964. 
Ron Brown (1940-) 
Labour MP: Leith 1979-92. Formerly Chairman Pilton Branch AUEW. Currently 
exporting Coca-Cola to North Korea. One time confidential contact of KGB resident 
Oleg Gordievsky. 
G D H Cole (1889-1959) 
Chairman of the Fabian Society 1939-46; 1948-50. President, Fabian Society 1952-9. 
Member, Fabian Society 1912-59; ILP 1912-45~ Labour party 1913-59. Socialist. 
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influential political theorist and Lecturer. Supported the Soviet Union 1930-45 ori the 
basis of socialism and anti-fascism. 
Tom Driberg (1905·1976) 
Labour MP: Maldon 1942-55; Barking 1959-74. NEC member 1949-72, Party 
Chairman 1957-8. Journalist to the Daily Express, 1928-43, BBC 1943-5, later Editor 
Reynolds News, New Statesman and Tribune. Notorious homosexual and alleged 
double agent for MI6 and the KGB. Created Baron Bradwell1975. 
Ray Fletcher (1921·90) 
Labour MP: llkeston 1964-83. Leader UK Delegation to Council of Europe 1974-6, 
Executive member, UK group Western European Union 1974-6. Times Columnist. 
Alleged to have been a KGB agent by the Mitrokhin papers. 
Ken Gill (1927·) 
General Secretary TASS, AUEW. Member of the General Council of the TUC 1974-
92. Member of the Committee for Racial Equality. Member, British-Soviet 
Friendship Society, World Peace Council, British Peace Assembly. 
Hugh Lester Hutchinson (1904.?) 
Labour MP: Manchester Rusholme 1945-9, Labour Independent Group 1949-50. 
Participant in the Communist-led Meerut conspiracy 1929. Expelled from the Labour 
party July 1949. Became a teacher in Lichfield and dropped out of political life. 
Hugh Jenkins (1908·) 
Labour MP: Putney 1964-79. Minister for the Arts 1974-9. Member of the Public 
Accounts Committee. Executive Member of the Arts Council, Chairman of the 
Theatres Advisory Board 1964·74, Vice-President 1976-86, President 1986-95. 
Chairman of Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR 1985-91. Chairman of 
Victory for Socialism 1956-60. Vice-President of CND 1981·, Aldermaston Marcher. 
Peace and anti-Nuclear campaigner. Created Baron Jenkins ofPutney 1981. 
Alex Kitson (1922·97) 
NEC member 1978·83. Party Chairman 1980·1. Deputy General Secretary Transport 
and General Workers Union 1980-5, Acting General Secretary 1980-1. Executive 
member World Peace Council, Chairman British Peace Assembly, member CND, 
Labour Action for Peace, Committee for Peace and Security in Europe. Frequent 
visitor to the USSR and supporter of a united industrial front with the CPGB. 
James Lamond (1928.) 
Labour MP: Oldham East 1970-83, Oldham Central and Royton 1983-92. Chairman 
No. I Divisional Council of DATA 1965·70, Executive member TASSIMSF 1944·. 
Vice-President World Peace Council 1974·96. Lord Provost of Aberdeen 1970-1, 
Lord Lieutenant 1970-1. Justice of the Peace . 
.loan Lestor (1931·1998) 
Labour MP: Eton and Slough 1966-83; Eccles 1987-97. Parliamentary under· 
secretary: Department of Education and Science Oct 1969-1une 1970 (resigned), 
under-secretary to FCO 1974·5 to DES 1975-6. ~EC Member 1967-82,. Party 
Chairman 1977-8 and 1987-97. CND National CounCil member 1983-98. PreVIOusly 
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a nursery school teacher. Left wing parliamentarian once accused by Brian Crozier of 
acting as a confidential contact of the KGB; the resultant libel action led to Crozier 
withdrawing' Free Agent' from the shelves. Created Baroness Lestor of Eccles 1987. 
AlfLomas 
Labour MEP: London NE 1979-99. Political Secretary London Co-operative Society 
1965-79. Chairman Committee for Peace and Security in Europe. Member British 
Soviet Friendship Society, British Peace Asembly. 
Joan Maynard (1921-98) 
Labour MP: Sheffield Brightside 1974-87. NEC member 1972-87. Vice-President 
National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers 1966-72. Chainnan British Peace 
Assembly, Troops Out Movement. President Labour Committee on Ireland. Vice 
Chairman Northern Ireland Group of MPs. Chainnan, Campaign Group. Left wing 
activist her main causes were the end to imperialism in Ireland and for enhanced 
rights to the farming community. 
lan Mikardo (1908-1993) 
Labour MP: Reading 1945-59; 1964-87.NEC member 1945-59; 1964-87. Party 
Chairman 1970-1. Chairman; Tribune Group; Campaign Group. Member Poale Zion, 
Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union. Pioneer of East-West trade. 
Entrepreneur; traded as Ian Mikardo Ltd. 
Stan Newens (1930-) 
Labour MP: Epping 1964-70; Harlow 1974-83; MEP London Central 1988-99. 
Foreign Affairs Group 1992-3. Chairman of Tribune Group 1982-3. Vice-Chainnan 
Labour Action for Peace. Director London Co-operative Society 1971-7. Anti-
NATO and anti-American propagandist, supported the foreign policy of Nicolae 
Ceausescu. 
Will Ower. (1901-81) 
Labour MP: Morpeth 1954-70. Secretary East-West Trade Committee. Chainnan, 
Anglo-GDR Parliamentary Group. Tried and acquitted on charges of espionage 1970. 
Later Lecturer and Chairman of Sutton and Carshalton CLP 1974-81. 
John Platts-MiIIs (1917-) 
Labour MP: Finsbury 1945-48. Labour Independent Group 1948-50. Founder Labour 
Independent Group 1948. Expelled from the Labour Party 1948. President of Society 
for Cultural Relations with the USSR 1990-. Chairman, League for Democracy in 
Greece 1972-7, Haldane Society of Progressive Lawyers 1972-, International 
Association of Democratic Lawyers 1969-84. Made Queen's Counsellor 1964, 
Bencher of the Inner Temple 1970. Lawyer. 
Denis Nowell [D N] Pritt (1887-1972) 
Labour MP: Hammersmith North 1935-40, Independent 1940-9, Labour Independent 
Group 1949-50. Expelled from the Labour party March 1940. Chairman of Labour 
Independent Group 1949-50, League for Democracy in Greece 1949-72, Society for 
Cultural Relations with the USSR 1927-72, Haldane Society of Progressive Lawyers 
1949-72. Executive member of International Association of Democratic Lawyers. 
Lawyer. Winner of the Stalin Peace Prize 1954. 
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Jo Richardson (1923-94) 
Labour MP: Barking 1974-94. Member NEC 1979-91. Served on Select Committees 
dealing with Home Affairs; Nationalised Industries, Expenditure and Procedure. 
Member, Keep Left. Tribune Group, Victory for Socialism, CND, Campaign Group. 
Ian Mikardo's Private Secretary 1951-65. Secretary, Victory for Socialism. Partner 
in Ian Mikardo Ltd. Campaigner for women's and lesbian rights. 
Ernie Ross (1942-) 
Labour MP: Dundee West 1979-. Chair of Foreign Affairs Committee 1997-. 
Member ofTASSIMSF. Member British Peace Assembly. Left wing anti-NATO and 
anti-nuclear campaigner during the 1970s and 80s. 
Alan Sapper (1931-) 
General Secretary Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians 
1969-91. Member General Council of the TUC 1970-64, British Copyright Council 
1964-74. Governor British Film Industry 1974-94. Chairman League for Democracy 
in Greece 1970-. Influential pro-Soviet Unionist and Labour activist. 
Julius Silverman (1905-96) 
Labour MP: Birmingham Erdington 1945-55; Binningham Aston 1955-83. 
Chairman, Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Group; Parliamentary Chess Club. 
Executive Member, Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union. Member, 
Tribune; Victory for Socialism. Frequent visitor to the Soviet Union. Lawyer. 
Sydney SiIverman (1895-1968) 
Labour MP: Nelson & Colne 1935-68. Member NEC 1956-68. Member, Society for 
Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union. Left-winger, opponent of capital 
punishment, supporter of Cuba. Lawyer. 
Renee Short (1919-) 
Laboul MP: Wolverhampton NE 1964-87. NEC member 1970-81, 1983-8. Vice-
Chairman Parliamentary East-West Trade Group 1968-87. Chairman, British-GDR 
Parliamentary Group 1972-87, British-Soviet Parliamentary Group 1984-7. 
Secretary, British-Soviet Parliamentary Group 1972-84. President, British-Romanian 
Friendship Association, Nursery Schools Association 1970-80, Campaign for Nursery 
Education 1970-83 . Numerous other affiliations concerning women's health, 
prisoner's welfare and East-West relations. Executive member Victory for Socialism. 
Member British-Soviet Friendship Society. 
Lesley J Solley (1905-1968) 
Labour MP: Thurrock 1945-9, Labour Independent Group 1949-50. Expelled from 
the Labour Party May 1949. Treasurer of the League for Democracy in Greece 1945-
55. Vice-President of the Songwriters Guild of Great Britain 1952-68. Formerly 
Research Physicist. Lawyer 1934-68 . 
.John Stonehouse (1925-88) 
Labour MP: Walsall North 1957-76. PPS Ministry of Aviation 1964-6. Parliamentary 
under-secretary of state for the colonies 1966-7, Minister of Aviation 1967, Minister 
for Technology 1967-8, Postmaster General 1968-9. Minister for Post and 
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Telecommunications 1969-70. Imprisoned for fraud and theft 1976-9. Later charity 
worker and writer. Named by Josef Frolik as an agent of the Czech StB. 
Barnet Stross (1899-1967) 
Labour MP: Hanley 1945-50; Stoke-on-Trent 1950-66. PPS to Minister for Health 
1964-5. Formerly medical practitioner. Made Honarary citizen of Lidice, 
Czechoslovakia 1957. Awarded Commander Order of the White Lion of 
Czechoslovakia 1957. Named by JosefFrolik as an agent of the Czech StB. 
Stephen SwingJer (1915·1969) 
Labour MP: Stafford 1945-50; Newcastle-under-Lyme 1951-69. PPS to Ministry of 
Transport 1964-7, Minister for Transport 1967-1968, Minister for Health and Social 
Security 1968-9. Founder of Victory for Socialism, Chairman 1960-8. Previously 
Lecturer in Adult Education. Marxist and Communist party member during 1930s 
Stan Thome (1918-) 
Labour MP: Preston South 1974-83; Preston 1983-7. Member British-Soviet 
Friendship Society, Troops Out Movement. Left-wing activist and Trotskyist MP. 
\ViIliam \Varbey (1903.1980) 
Labour MP: Luton 1945-50; Broxtowe 1953-5; Ashfield 1955-66. Executive Director 
of the Organisation for World Political and Social Studies 1965-80. Secretary World 
Studies Trust 1966-80. Executive member Victory for Socialism. Member British 
Council for Peace in Vietnam. Anti-Vietnam and anti-NATO campaigner. 
Beatrice \Vebb (1858·1943) 
Husband of Sydney Webb (see below) Co-founder of the LSE 1895, member of the 
Royal Commission on the Poor Law 1906-9.Co-published works advertising the 
advanced nature of Soviet society but held private doubts regarding the regime. 
Sydney \Yebb (1859-1947) 
Labour !\<1P: Seaham 1922-29. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 1929-30, tor 
the Colonies 1929-31. Founder of the Fabian Society, the LSE, the new Statesman. 
Wrote the 1921 Labour party constitution. Pro-Soviet propagandist in his latter days. 
Created Baron Passfield 1929. 
WilIiam Wilson (1913-) 
Labour MP: Coventry South 1964-74; Coventry SE 1974-83. Member Commons 
Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration 1970-9. Chainnan, British-
Soviet Friendship Society 1977-83. Deputy Lieutenant of the County of Warwick 
1967. Lawyer. Self-confessed confidential contact of the KGB. 
Konni Zilliacus (1894-1967) 
Labour MP: Gateshead 1945-49; Independent 1949-50; Labour MP: Manchester 
Gorton 1955-67. Expelled from the party 1949, readmitted 1952. Fonnerly, Royal 
Flying Corps 1914-18, Information Officer, Secretariat of the League of Nations 
1922-39, Ministry of Information 1939-45. Pro-Soviet foreign affairs expert, peace 
and anti-nuclear campaigner. 
Appendix 11 
Note on Interviews 
Interviews Conducted 
Bill Alexander, 2 February 1999. 
Norman Atkinson, 1 December 1998. 
Philip Crees, 12 May 1999. 
John Fraser, 23 July 1999. 
Oleg Gordievsky, 15 November 1998. 
James Larnond, 17 February 1999. 
Stan Newens, 10 December 1998. 
John Platts-Mills, 4 July 1998. 
Sir John Roberts, 27 May 2001. 
J ane Rosen, 9 July 1998. 
Alan Sapper. 25 July 2000. 
Vladimir Shaposhnikov, 19 November 1998. 
Anne Swingler. 14 November 1998. 
Williarn Wilson. 24 May 1999. 
Audrey Wise, 20 April 2000 
Jan Zilliacus, 10 March 1998; 8 July 1998. 
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Follow-up interviews were carried out by telephone with Oleg Gordievsky and 
William Wilson for clarification purposes. 
Bill Alexander. Norman Atkinson, Philip Crees, John Fraser, James Larnond. William 
Wilson and Audrey Wise were all interviewed over the telephone due to a 
combination of limited travel budget and the fact that several did not wish to have 
visitors. 
Ron Brown, Baron Jenkins of Putney. Alfred Lomas, Emie Ross, Renee Short and 
Stan Thome were all approached for interview but no replies were received. In the 
cases of Brown and Short it proved impossible to locate them. Brown was working in 
north Korea while Short had moved into a retirement home due to ill health. 
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